

The Major Limits to Naval Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region

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Home to some of the world's largest powers, the Asia-Pacific is characterized by general tendencies that are more competitive and destabilizing, rather than cooperative and stabilizing[1]. Today, high tensions over territorial disputes coexist with discernable arms race dynamics across the region, as well as potential conflict at the Taiwan straits and the threat of nuclear provocation from North Korea. As Asia-Pacific countries are increasingly looking towards the sea, emphasizing "offshore defense," rather than "coastal defense" alone, the boundaries of their nations, as well as their nations' threats, have expanded. Therefore, there is a great need for more integrated cooperation in the region to deal with the complexity of the regional maritime environment and to secure good order, particularly at vital sea lanes of communication (SLOCs). Naval cooperation, which normally includes diplomatic and practical levels of cooperation between navies[2], is imperative, as it serves as a strong contributor to and lubricant for maritime confidence-building, reduces the prospects for conflict, and stabilizes by unifying the region[3].

What are the major limits to naval cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region? This paper argues that the major factors contributing to the difficulty in cooperation correspond to political, strategic, military, and security dimensions. They are as follows:

- (1) Political: a strong political adherence to "exclusive" national sovereignty and established strategic mistrust among Northeast Asian (NEA) powers;
- (2) Strategic: a growing number of conflicts over maritime interests in the East and South China Seas which involve China;
- (3) Military: competitive action-reaction arms race dynamics across the Asia-Pacific;
- (4) Security: differences in prioritization of maritime security threats among the Southeast Asian (SEA) littoral states.

This paper will first present a general overview of some of the areas where progress in naval cooperation in the Asia-Pacific has been made. Then it will explore some of the reasons why the Asia-Pacific region is experiencing less naval cooperation than the Western nations. This will be followed by an analysis of the major limits currently contributing to the difficulty of further naval cooperation in the region. The paper will conclude by proposing some solutions to mitigate barriers to naval cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.

What are some areas of progress to naval cooperation in Asia-Pacific? Collectively, countries in this region have contributed to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, especially in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, and the recent Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013. There have been reductions in sea piracy in the Straits of Malacca through multinational patrol efforts. Under the framework of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), multilateral interoperational exercises are organized on a regular basis to enhance the fight against maritime terrorism, specifically the carriage of weapons and material of mass destruction and navies have united in their pursuits of international peacekeeping missions for instance, to help deter and disrupt serious piracy threats at the Gulf of Aden[4]. International and regional exercises in naval cooperation, such as the 2008 Exercise RIMPAC, and

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the US-Thai bilateral Exercise Cobra Gold in particular are important areas of naval cooperation with the goal of keeping peace internationally.

Why is the Asia-Pacific region seeing less naval cooperation, as compared to the evinced cooperation flourishing among our US and European naval counterparts? When comparing both regions, the US has displayed its move towards a cooperative 21st century maritime vision through its “Global Maritime Partnership”, while Asia-Pacific countries do not yet have a maritime vision that strives to unite their Navies, Marine Corps and Coast Guards into a single naval maritime task force. Globalization has increased the interconnectedness of this world, and the complex maritime situation in the Asia-Pacific region should compel countries in the region to cooperate more actively.

The first reason why the Asia-Pacific is seeing less naval cooperation among themselves than the West may have to do with the interaction of a strong principle of sovereignty and the unevenness in developmental experiences among the Asia-Pacific countries. For instance, in Southeast Asia, there are sharp differences in economic stability, divergent resource allocations and threat perceptions. These different developmental stages mean there is a mix of countries with rudimentary navies with more inward outlooks towards naval missions, while there are also developed, progressive maritime nations in the region like Singapore, with advanced naval capabilities and more outward outlooks towards naval missions[5]. This asymmetry in navies and maritime outlook, combined with the adherence to the principle of sovereignty, can make cooperation between the Southeast Asian countries incompatible.

In Northeast Asia, geographical, circumstantial, experiential or constitutional (as in the case of Japan) constraints to the strategic ambitions and maritime outlook of these countries has also resulted in divergent regional naval strategies among the Northeast Asian powers. Among Western nations, cooperation is the norm because countries are democratically stable, with relatively even developmental experiences, and have developed and sustained high levels of shared interdependence among themselves over the years in many aspects. Hence, in recent times, cooperation and collaboration, rather than conflict and competition, appears as the norm. There are also less mature democratic regimes in Asia-Pacific, such as Myanmar, which understandably display preference for self-reliance and sovereign rights when dealing with matters of national interests.

A third potential reason why the Asia-Pacific is seeing less naval cooperation when compared to the West is because among the Western nations, there is a much stronger appreciation of the value of naval cooperation in peacetime. Throughout European history, numerous battles have been fought at sea, and these experiences have served to hone Western naval finesse at an operational level and heighten a collective historical consciousness of sea conflict. On the other hand, a general unfamiliarity with fighting wars at sea or dealing with maritime conflicts correlates with a lack of confidence of Asia-Pacific countries to deal with future challenges, even if these challenges also portend to opportunities for enhanced naval cooperation. The salience of peacetime cooperation has not yet been driven home so profoundly as in the West, and as a result Asia-Pacific countries might be seen as being less eager to cooperate than their Western peers.

A fourth and final reason why the Asia-Pacific is seeing less naval cooperation compared to the West is that while countries like the US are experiencing a decline in acquiring and developing navies, the Asia-Pacific powers China, India and Japan are acquiring new naval capabilities and/or modernizing their navies. This means that existing naval equipment and tools potentially outpace the navies before navies can gain proficiency in their original operational capabilities. Hence, naval cooperation is seen to pose an added layer of operational challenge.

Strong Political Adherence to “Exclusive” National Sovereignty and Established Strategic Mistrust Among NEA Powers

Sovereignty issues really matter to China and Japan as they compete over rights to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Seas. This strong adherence to sovereignty rises to the surface particularly when their sovereign spaces appear to be under compromise. Yet, the basis of their overlapping claims involve competing legal and historical claims to their EEZs, and thus maritime activities continually infringe upon each other’s “exclusive” sovereign spaces. High dependence on the seas as a source of food and energy makes the safeguarding of the marine environment a particular economic and strategic necessity for the navies on both sides. Despite growing

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financial and economic interdependencies, China and Japan have in recent times displayed reluctance to set aside their national interests when matters of maritime sovereignty are involved. In 2008 China and Japan signed an agreement to jointly explore for oil and gas resources in the neighbouring Chunxiao/Shirabaka oil fields. However, co-production efforts have not been successful, and both sides have been unable to reach an agreement [6] over the rights and interests for the production of natural gas[7]. In its 2013 Defence White Paper, Japan raised the possibility of China's potential unilateral development of the Chunxiao/Shirabaka oil fields[8]. Unsettled historical legacies of Japanese aggression during the Second World War continue to remain a source for Chinese mistrust and suspicion towards Japan. Chinese elites have distinguished between "exclusive cooperation" and "inclusive cooperation", to emphasize how cooperation will accentuate their sense of national sovereignty[9]. At a 2008 press briefing, Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dewei was quoted, saying that "The cooperative development of the Chunxiao oil and gas field between Chinese and Japanese enterprises is different from the 'joint development' of the East China Sea... [and] must be conducted in accordance with the Chinese law...this is the biggest difference from 'joint development'... [as] the sovereign rights of Chunxiao oil and gas field belong to China"[10].

Among Southeast Asian countries, national sovereignty is of great importance, as evidenced by the territorial disputes over two islands in the South China Sea. Four member countries of ASEAN, namely, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, as well as China and Taiwan, have conflicting territorial claims to the Spratly islands. The Paracels have been controlled by China since 1974, and are claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam. Attempts by the claimant states to secure their presence by force have resulted in tense stand-offs. As this continues to trouble bilateral relations between the Southeast Asian nations, cooperation at the South China Sea is less likely. China's vast and long claims to vital SLOCs in the South China Sea have long been a source of suspicion for ASEAN.

Southeast Asian countries are protective of the South China Seas regardless of which nation, particularly when international security arrangements appear to undermine it. The stiff resistance from Malaysia and Indonesia to the "Regional Maritime Security Initiative" (RMSI) led by the US, highlights this point: that the littoral states prefer to safeguard its maritime peripheries by adhering to principles of sovereignty[11]. The plan was strongly rejected by Malaysia and Indonesia, and Malaysia emphasized its "sovereign prerogative" in "ensuring the security of the Strait of Malacca"[12].

Growing Number of Conflicts Over Maritime Interests in the East and South China Seas Which Involve China

Since 2001, there has been a general trend towards conflicts over maritime interests that involve China, and a series of confrontational acts at sea which has, with time, intensified perceptions of China's assertiveness and aggressiveness[13]. Since the phrase "harmonious world"[14] and "China's peaceful development"[15] were introduced into Chinese foreign policy lexicon in 2003 and 2004, there has been much attention on the way China is rising. Yet, China's rising economic clout, its corresponding modernization and expansion of naval power, and its increasing assertiveness with which it stakes expansive claims over air[16] and seaspace have been growing sources of anxiety for the international and regional community[17]. Following its ratification of the UNCLOS in 1996, China has shown its capabilities to exert "continuous and effective occupation" of the islands in the South China Seas, under UNCLOS provisions[18]. It has used multilateral instruments to consolidate or complement its need to assert its national image and preserve its regional power. It has responded to the moves of other claimants in unilateral ways that have been described by the international community as both aggressive and assertive[19]. This is typified by the 2012 cable-cutting incident involving a Vietnamese oil and gas survey ship in the South China Seas[20]. China's foreign ministry blamed Vietnam for the incident, saying its oil and gas operations "undermined China's interests and jurisdictional rights"[21]. In May 2012, China's State Oceanic Administration announced that it had started its first deep-water drilling operations in the South China Seas, where disputed territories continue to trouble relations between China and their SEA claimants[22]. Northeast Asian countries have displayed general reluctance to enter into cooperative security agreements with China, even though the regional states share economic interdependence. Trade partnerships coexist along with strategic mistrust, mostly over unsettled historical legacies of the Second World War. This relationship remains the status quo for China-Japan relations. Japanese defense analysts have expressed concerns[23] about China's trajectory and the potential implications for the region, citing the following factors: China's rapid build-up and modernisation, vast claims over Japan's vital SLOCs, advancement

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towards the East China Sea, and potential aggressive advancement towards the coastal waters off the Sea of Japan, which would enclose the entire Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Japan. Japan's 2013 Defense White Paper listed China's assertions as "incompatible with the existing order," highlighted by actions that "involve intrusions into Japan's territorial waters, violation of Japan's territorial airspace and even dangerous actions that could cause a contingency"[24].

In the military aspect, the US has reacted to a rising China with its Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Challenge, an operational strategy to dealing with and engaging with China[25]. Diplomatic tensions have been heightened by the Chinese response to US actions. In 2010, China stridently objected to the possibility of a US aircraft carrier participation in an exercise in the Yellow Sea aimed at the DPRK in the aftermath of the *Cheonan* incident[26]. As a result, international navies, including the US, have shown increasing wariness of Chinese intentions through its engagements with China in more strategic ways[27]. This confirms that increasing signs of China's assertiveness in protesting and pushing back US naval operations in international waters as well as international air-space off its coast has had tangible effects in making the US more cautious about its engagements and cooperation with China in recent times. Incidents like the 2001[28] collision with a US Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane over the South China Sea airspace, the 2009 USNS *Impeccable* incident[29], the 2013 extension of the ADIZ in East China Sea, and the confrontational encounter with US vessels in the South China Sea in December last year have adversely shaped US responses towards and engagement with China, especially in recent years.

Competitive Action-Reaction Arms Race Dynamics Across the Asia-Pacific

Among China and the US, China and Japan, China and India as well among Southeast Asian countries, there is an interactive and competitive modernization and acquisition of "exclusive" naval capabilities. This is induced by the need to maintain strategic stability/security from the other side. "Exclusive" naval capabilities currently pose a major limit to naval cooperation. In response to the changing strategic environment, Asia-Pacific countries have been strengthening their defences by modernizing and expanding their navies[30] at a remarkable rate. According to Geoffrey Till, the dynamics of action-reaction is defined as the "action of one party that will create in a reaction in another designed to counteract the original action." The "resultant competition... actually makes them less secure," because, "the efforts that states make to defend themselves [tends to] spark a reaction [by the other state]." Geoffrey Till also lists seven characteristics of an arms race: namely, that they are driven by international imperatives; usually bilateral in nature; intense in effort, rapidity and expression; associated with high levels of political tension; operationally specific; indicative of high strategic stakes; and regarded as such by the players[31]. The difficulty of measuring all seven characteristics does not preclude the possibility of an arms race dynamics across the region as a whole. Competitive action-reaction dynamics between China and Japan, China and the US, China and India, as well among the Southeast Asian countries, have reduced incentives for the countries to seek, initiate or change the regionally tense trajectory by engaging their navies bilaterally.

Between the Northeast Asian countries, China and Japan are showing pronounced signs of arms racing dynamics, through their competitive and interactive acquisition and development of naval capabilities. In particular, China's growing submarine fleet and its improving surface fleet through its A2/AD sea-denial program has been a growing source of concern for Japan.

Chinese leaders speak openly of developing the capability to control the waters out to the "First Island Chain" by 2015, viewing it as part of a broader "historic mission[32]" to prevent a major power from interfering with China's access to oceans, resources or markets, or striking mainland China from the sea. Hence, as Geoffrey Till observed, Japan's submarine expansion plan can be seen to be an attempt to counter the perceived weaknesses of China's submarine warfare capabilities. In a 2010 national defense program guidelines (NDPG), outlining Japan's military policy for the next decade[33], Japan stated its objective to become a "dynamic defense force". This trend highlights the drive towards an outward-looking and assertive defence policy by Japan. Japan also registered "strong interest" in Chinese activities, citing China's "rapid advancement of military capabilities," lack of transparency, and encroachment into waters and airspace, as sources for concern for regional and global security[34].

In response to China's growing assertiveness in maritime coastal domains and at high seas, Japan's defense

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planners are also looking southwards, towards their maritime domains, as their Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) enhance their anti-submarine warfare capabilities, submarines, F-15 fighter jets, and surveillance technologies around Japan's South-western islands[35].

Tense arms racing dynamics can be discerned in the bilateral ties between US and China. China views US seapower as a menacing presence and has deployed A2/AD capabilities to extend its influence and back its territorial claims in the East Asian Sea. This might potentially impact the US-led regional stability, either by blocking US access to critical areas, or by strategically undermining and displacing US naval status quo powers in the Asia-Pacific region[36]. The most significant development under China's A2/AD program is the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM)[37], which threatens US naval forces through cyber technology. China's ASBM is said to have entered the initial operational capability stage as early as in 2001, while as part of the strategic requirement, the PLA Navy is advancing China's naval forces through cyber warfare, precision long-range weapons, and distant sea projection capabilities. In response to China's asymmetrical anti-naval capabilities, the US has its Air Sea Battle challenge. US spokespeople categorically deny this is only or even mainly aimed at China, of course. This has served to limit cooperation on both operational, as well as strategic levels[38]. Operationally, China's "exclusive" intended missions has heightened the need for secrecy and reduced transparency, elements which hinder exchange and cooperation between Chinese and US navies. Strategically, China's build-up has sparked the US to reinforce its forward presence, responding as a crisis-stabilizing force, through its Air-Sea Battle challenge. This has enlarged the strategic atmosphere with the introduction of more advanced competitive capabilities, and at the same time has increased the security dilemma[39].

India's recent commissioning of an aircraft carrier, the *INS Vikramaditya*, can be seen to be a reaction to Chinese development of its first aircraft, the *Liaoning*[40]. Many have raised questions as to why India is investing in such expensive state of the art naval capabilities, when more immediate tensions across the India-Pakistani border appear to be taking up much of its defense resources. There is a strong argument that India has strategic maritime ambitions in the Indian Ocean, and the expansion of its naval scope to include an aircraft carrier is a response to counter China's increasing aspirations in the Indian ocean. Hence, strong action-reaction dynamics between India and China can be discerned.

Among ASEAN members, aggregate defence spending has increased from US\$15.88 billion in 2000 to US\$28.14 billion in 2011[41]. This rise in defence spending confirms an action-reaction dynamics as it coincides with a number of countries with rising economic clout, the increase in tensions over maritime disputes that involve China, and uncertainties towards the US security strategy in the Pacific. China's unilateral claims in the South China Seas, as seen in its vast claims to the SLOCs, and a 2012 establishment of a garrison on the disputed territories, have served as geo-strategic imperatives for Southeast Asian states to enhance their naval capabilities. Action-reaction dynamics can be discerned between China and SEA. This is backed by a strong collective political will among SEA nations to defend their sovereignty in the interest of national security. The failure of ASEAN members to reach a breakthrough on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea issue indicates that divergences exist on issues of security interests among ASEAN member countries, and between China and ASEAN. Competing cooperative security strategies in the region has reduced prospects for multilateral cooperation among ASEAN nations and between the ASEAN states and China.

Differences in Prioritization of Maritime Security Threats Among the SEA Littoral States

Differences in priorities of maritime security threats amongst the littoral states of SEA has led to different security policy agendas, frustrating cooperative efforts between navies. Singapore takes the threat of sea piracy in the Straits of Malacca (SOM) seriously, viewing a potential for terrorists to attack commercial ships there and disrupt the freedom of passage for global oil trade. However, differences in developmental paths have led Indonesia and Malaysia to diverge in their prioritization and perception of the issue at the SOM. Malaysia deals with the problem of piracy in the context of the maritime security domain, and regards it to be not particularly as acute as illegal immigration by seas. Indonesia takes seriously the threats of illegal fishing and smuggling, and devotes resources to the prevention of environmental disasters. The country's weak socio-economic conditions, which include high levels of poverty and unemployment, separatist, communal and political violence, infectious diseases, and man-made and

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natural disasters, have stretched thin its economic resources. Given the impact of piracy on its economy relative to other existing challenging conditions, Indonesia is more reluctant to allocate scarce resources to address the problem, so it has therefore contributed to and participated in regional maritime security in constrained ways.

Multilateral responses to piracy and maritime terrorism have been limited to forums such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Plus Three. Cooperative efforts have been initiated in as early as the 1990s, but evidence suggests that they have so far been either poorly implemented, largely ineffective, and frustrated by the financial crisis, or fraught with controversies[42] and disagreements. Currently, two concrete multilateral measures exist in the region. The first is the Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia (MALSINDO) security cooperation initiative in aerial surveillance, dubbed “Eyes in the Sky” (EiS). The second is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre[43], which was set up in Singapore in 2006 to facilitate communication between national agencies in response to piracy incidents. Among the littoral countries surrounding the SOM, Indonesia and Malaysia are not participants of ReCAAP, indicating their divergent threat priorities on this issue.

Conclusion: Mitigating Barriers to Naval Cooperation

The Asia-Pacific has made striking progress in several functional areas of maritime cooperation[44]. However, cooperation coexists with conflict, indicating the presence of the difficulties to greater naval cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. This paper proposes the following solutions to mitigate barriers to naval cooperation.

First, the US should respond to the rising naval challenge posed by East Asia’s powers by encouraging the powers to build an East Asian Security Framework. Such a framework should be based on norms and buttressed by diplomatic and practical mechanisms. As China and Japan take the lead, they can draw in minor powers of the East Asian region, including the countries of Southeast Asia, into a cooperative regional grouping.

Second, in line with its responsible rise, China should also take an enlightened and transparent approach in navigating and reacting to international events. It should assume a leadership role in initiating security cooperation measures and participating in dialogue, to consolidate a reliable and dependent security network across the Pacific. The Southeast Asian region has been particularly prone to natural disasters, and in building up its reputation as a responsible power, China’s PLAN should direct long-term strategies so as to strengthen its involvement in the aspect of HADR. China should engage with members of ASEAN openly and magnanimously to positively bridge the disjunction between between a responsible regional power and a responsible global power, adopting a regional and a global understanding of events without fear of lessening its national sovereignty.

Third, as national sovereignty issues register high levels of tension among East Asian countries, there should be a direct military hotline between the major East Asian powers, China and Japan. This can rapidly defuse tensions, mitigate potential disruptions to economic ties between both countries on land, and ease antagonism at sea. The governments of both China and Japan need to demonstrate genuine political will and profoundly set aside differences in national ambitions in order to overcome realistic barriers to closer regional ties.

Fourth, although differences in cooperative security approaches among SEA littoral states exists, a number of groupings in Southeast Asia, such as the ADMM-Plus, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), and a number of international symposiums, have served valuable platforms over the last decade. They serve to institute responsive and effective dispute resolution mechanisms for Maritime Confidence and Security Building purposes. These multilateral settings can continue to serve as strategic platforms for initiating ad-hoc workshops, bringing together like-minded countries whenever the need for cooperation arises. This increases the likelihood of convergence between countries.

Fifth, in the long-term, there is a need for Asia-Pacific maritime strategies that emphasize “inclusive” rather than “exclusive” cooperation through means of international symposiums, workshops, and forums. As venues for conceptualizing national and regional security strategies, these sites cultivate an awareness of navies’ roles in

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securing order at sea as well as a shared historical and ecological awareness of our maritime dependence, including the risks of maritime pollution and erosion. Since the Asia-Pacific maritime region is so complex, and its security challenges are different from the advanced West, naval strategists should groom this region into one conducive for the flourishing of an epistemic community of maritime practitioners. Then, steps should be taken to host ecological and maritime environmental workshops, talks and discussions. In this way, multinational education and training at the regional level can build maritime awareness and strengthen the link between naval cooperation and regional security.

Finally, contemporary complex maritime challenges require good planning, skills and expertise by a wide range of navy personnel. Complex challenges indicate that the roles of civilian and military personnels are likely to become increasingly intertwined. There is therefore a need for navies to focus their efforts on coordinating more closely with one another. Navies and coast guards must seek synergy, rather than control over each other.

This paper concludes on a positive but cautious note for the future of naval cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. It is through emphasizing diplomatic and cultural cooperation as a complement to practical cooperation, that structural tensions to naval cooperation can truly be mitigated and reduced in the long-term. By accentuating “soft power” diplomatic and cultural aspects of cooperation, perhaps navies can satisfy their “hard power” concerns of sovereignty and military control while also mitigating these concerns in order to forge greater cooperation in this region.

Notes

[1] See “The Divided Oceans: Towards a larger Asia-Pacific Security Architecture,” http://www.telegraphindia.com/1121213/jsp/opinion/story_16302719.jsp#.UqchnjkbQ06VADM

[2] Naval cooperation is broadly defined as any cooperative military activities at sea, which can range from low to mid to high-level cooperation. Examples of low-level naval cooperation include confidence-building activities such as ship visits, fleet reviews, personnel exchanges, navy-to-navy talks, and multilateral naval conferences. Examples of mid-level activities include more ambitious activities such as information/intelligence exchanges, joint doctrine development, standard operating procedures (SOPs) for exercises and peacetime operations, bilateral agreements, naval peacekeeping, and cooperation on tasks such as marine scientific research and anti-piracy. Examples of high-level activities include combined operations such as cooperative maritime surveillance, standing regional naval forces, cooperative sea lines of communication (SLOC), protection, and mine-countermeasures.

Extracted from Sam Bateman’s chapter on “Regional Efforts for Maritime Cooperation: State and Prospect,” in *Maritime Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific toward the 21st Century*. Kim, Dalchoong et al. (eds), Korea: East and West Studies Series, 2000, pp. 218, Print.

[3] See Eric Grove, “Sea Power in the Asia-Pacific Region,” *The Future of Seapower*, London: Routledge, (1990), pp.17-31 (“The seas unite this region; its maritime forces should do the same.”). See also, Geoffrey Till, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: What’s New? What’s Next? A View From Outside,” *Defence Studies*, 8(2), (2008), pp. 25-26; Geoffrey Till, “Sea Power: A Guide for the 21st Century,” London: Routledge, (2009), Chapters 11 and 12;

<http://www.navy.mil/maritime/maritimestrategy.pdf>;

Gompert, David C., “Sea Power in the Western Pacific,” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, 139 (7), July 2013.

[4] Sam Bateman’s chapter on “Regional Efforts for Maritime Cooperation: State and Prospect,” in *Maritime Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific toward the 21st Century*. Kim, Dalchoong et al. (eds), Korea: East and West Studies Series, 2000, pp. 218, Print.

[5] Geoffrey Till, Till, Geoffrey. Introduction, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*. London: Routledge, 2013. Print.

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[6] See “Japan and China in Dispute Over Undersea Oilfields,” *The Telegraph* (Online), <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/energy/oil/4121105/Japan-and-China-in-dispute-over-undersea-oil-fields.html>

[7] See “China, Japan Conflict on Chunxiao/Shirabaka Gasfield,” *Turkish Weekly*, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/153440/china-japan-conflict-on-chunxiao-shirakaba-gas-field.html>

[8] See Defense of Japan 2013, “Chapter 2: Trends in the International Community,” http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2013/07_Part1_Chapter0_Sec2.pdf

[9] Carlson, Allen. “Constructing the Dragon’s Scales: China’s approach to territorial sovereignty and border relations in the 1980s and 1990s,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, 12(37), 2003, pp. 677–698.

[10] See “Chunxiao oil field’s sovereign rights belong to China,” *China Daily*, 19 June 2008.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-06/19/content_6779182.htm

[11] The RMSI was a plan by the US to “develop a partnership of willing regional nations with varying capabilities and capacities to identify, monitor, and intercept transnational maritime threats under existing international and domestic laws.”

See <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/rmsi.htm>

[12] See <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/04/05/1081017102019.html>

[13] See James Mikes article on “China and the West, a time for muscle-flexing,” *The Economist*, 19 March 2009. <http://www.economist.com/node/13279348>; <http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2012/08/south-china-sea>

[14] See http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2011-09/06/content_23362449.htm

See also, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2011-09/06/content_23362712.htm

[15] Carl Thayer, “Aggressive assertiveness: Beijing ratchets up pressure in South China Sea”, *Defense News*, 12 June 2011.

[17] M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 33 (3), December 2011, pp. 292-319.

[18] Ibid

[19] Ibid

[20] Carl Thayer, “Aggressive assertiveness: Beijing ratchets up pressure in South China Sea”, *Defense News*, 12 June 2011.

[21] See <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13592508>

[22] See http://english.gov.cn/2012-05/09/content_2133171.htm

[23] Hideaki Kaneda, “Japan’s National Maritime Doctrines and Capabilities” in Lawrence W. Prabhakar and Sam Bateman (eds), *The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons at Sea*, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, pp. 117-132.

[24] See “Trends in the International Community,” in Japan Defence Agency, *Defense of Japan 2013*,

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http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2013/07_Part1_Chapter0_Sec2.pdf

[25] See Sourabh Gupta, "China's South China Sea jurisdictional claims: when politics and law collide," *East Asia Forum*, 29 July 2012.

<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/07/29/china-s-south-china-sea-jurisdictional-claims-when-politics-and-law-collide/>

[26] See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/10/north-korea-sub-suspected_n_569584.html

See also, <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/201104SnyderandByun.pdf>

[27] See "U.S., Chinese warships come dangerously close," *CNN*, 12 December 2013.

<http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/13/politics/us-china-confrontation/>

Carl Thayer, "Aggressive assertiveness: Beijing ratchets up pressure in South China Sea", *Defense News*, 12 June 2011.

<https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30946.pdf>

[28] Shirley Kan (ed), "CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web: China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy Implications" <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30946.pdf>

[29] Ibid

[30] See <http://www.economist.com/node/11496828>

[31] Till, Geoffrey. *Asia's Naval Expansion: An Arms Race in the Making?* London: Routledge, 2012. Print. C.1

[32] See http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT332.pdf

See also, <http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM27JM.pdf>

[33] See http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2012/21_Part2_Chapter2_Sec2.pdf

[34] See http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e.pdf

[35] Hideaki Kaneda, "Japan's National Maritime Doctrines and Capabilities" in Lawrence W. Prabhakar and Sam Bateman (eds), *The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons at Sea*, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, pp. 117-132.

[36] Friedberg Aaron L., Ross, Robert S. (2009). "Is China a military threat? Menace or myth," *National Interest*, September/October 2009, pp. 19-34.

[37] Ibid

[38] See <http://www.informationdissemination.net/2010/12/adm-willard-df-21d-reaches-initial.html>

[39] A 2012 report published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), a research think-tank for the US Congress warned:

"Although China's navy has limitations and weaknesses, it may nevertheless be sufficient for performing certain

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missions of interest to Chinese leaders. As China's navy reduces its weaknesses and limitations, it may become sufficient to perform a wider array of potential missions."

[40] See <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/NK16Ad01.html>

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-11-16/india/44137322_1_indian-navy-mig-29k-ins-vikramaditya

[41] Ron Matthews and Alma Lozano, "Evaluating motivations and Performance in ASEAN Naval Acquisition Strategy," *Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia: Nature, Causes and Consequences*. Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan (eds), London: Routledge, 2013. C.4.

In November 2013, Vietnam unveiled its *kilo*-class submarines, its first ever, while Malaysia commissioned the *Scorpene* in 2009, to replace its earlier submarines.

[42] See "Singapore Can't Invite US to Patrol Straits: KL," *Straits Times*, May 12, 2004.

See also, "Rumsfeld: Asia Maritime Security Plan Misreported," *New York Times*, June 3, 2004.

[43] See <http://www.recaap.org/>

[44] Functional areas of progress include shipping/marine safety/search and rescue; fishing; security and law and order at sea; security and management of offshore oil and gas.

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