‘Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, over 100 major conflicts around the world have left some 20 million dead’[1]. In An Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali set out visions for preventive diplomacy and strategies to strengthen the United Nations’ (UN) capacity to maintain the peace. The collapse of Cold War bipolarity has seen a surge in demand for UN involvement. The UN has cast its net wide, beyond narrow conceptions of collective security, into human rights, environmental politics and human security. The response from the Security Council, General Assembly and member states to An Agenda for Peace was cautiously optimistic; the rhetoric, asserts Chesterman, ‘was euphoric, utopian, and short’[2]. Boutros-Ghali warned his political masters that the emerging consensus for cooperation between states must be nurtured, that the past powerlessness of the UN must be guarded against. The support of the Security Council for Charter provisions vacillates based on national interest, but the role of the Secretary-General remains the same. As the only individual, acting on personal responsibility, who is charged to concern himself with the maintenance of peace[3] and the human condition of a global constituency, the Secretary-General is unique – he must transcend territorial borders and national interest to work continuously for global peace and security.

The post-Cold War international environment is characterised, arguably, by a relatively anarchic structure within which accepted rules and norms can rapidly change. The opportunities for conflict, recognise Bercovitch and Rubin, ‘are multiplied manifold’[4]. Mediation is not judicial but political[5] and offers ‘the best practical method of managing conflicts and helping to establish some sort of regional or international order’[6] because mediation allows dialogue and compromise that formal apolitical structures cannot. The Secretary-General is an ideal political actor to be a mediator. Yet, analysis is problematic because there are no regular empirical tools one can apply to a role that is constantly in motion. Any hope of devising a formula for the effectiveness of the Secretary-General results in a subjective methodological debate[7]. Nonetheless, it is crucial to study the Secretary-General if one hopes to understand the UN and its relationship with other international actors, including regional organisations.

International organisations are an association of states established by treaty and characterised by their permanence and quasi-governmental organs[8]. Some characteristics of international organisations are,

an executive committee composed of a relatively small number of member states, a general deliberative body in which all the members participate… It may be more or less universal in membership, have a regional focus, or even be composed of just two[9] or three states.[10]

A regional organisation is a type of international organisation whose members are drawn from a geographical region, and organisations of this type have ‘proliferated and grown [in] every part of the world’[11]. The League of the Arab States, the African Union (AU)[12], the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and, with some caveats, the European Union all fall within the bracket of regional organisations.

The United Nations is the world’s premier international organisation whose membership comprises solely of sovereign states[13]. Consequently, the UN was structured along a realist state-centric approach to international politics with the exclusive Security Council having the greatest authority, closely followed by the main deliberative organ with equal representation for all member states, the General Assembly. The UN’s main purpose is ‘to maintain international peace and security on the basis of the principle of collective security’[14] and with the collapse of Cold War bipolarity has seen a resurgence in its core activities as well as an increase in humanity-centric goals such as human rights, self-determination and humanitarian issues, as outlined in the UN Charter.

However, the UN is not a world government, it is an intergovernmental organisation of sovereign states that works, argues Hamburg, ‘by seeking common ground among [states] to cooperate in their long-term self interests’[15]. Boutros-Ghali recognised that the UN is ‘a gathering of sovereign states and what it can do depends on the common ground that they create between them’[16]. The principles of the Charter are powerful normative provisions but, in recognising that the end of the Cold War provides an opportunity for member states to recommit to these provisions, Boutros-Ghali underlined that the Charter is heavily dependent on the cooperation of the Security Council and other member states to uphold it.

One may talk of the ‘spirit’ of the UN Charter because the principles espoused within it are aspirations of maintaining peace and improving the human condition through a realistic set of international organs, procedures, responsibilities of member-states and collective security. The Charter is an international treaty which acts as the UN’s constitution[17]. The Charter attempts transactional change towards disarmament and states that all peoples have a right to self-determination, freedom from want and from fear and seeks to uphold universal human rights. Moreover, the Security Council is vested by the Charter with the means to maintain peace and security by compelling member states to ‘apply such measures’[18] as they deem necessary, and even to ‘take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’[19]. The Charter establishes the procedures of the UN, the powers and responsibilities of the UN organs and the consequences if a member state breaches the peace or acts aggressively. In their seminal text The Procedure of the UN Security Council, Bailey and Daws rightly criticise the Charter for its imperfections and the dichotomic nature of its pronouncements[20].

The UN Charter commits member states to the concept of mediation because it bans the use of ‘armed force’ except in the common interest, and requires member states to settle all international disputes or situations in a peaceful fashion that would not threaten peace or security. Consequently, the Charter declares that the ‘parties to any dispute… shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice’[21]. Moreover, the Security Council can explicitly compel members to undertake a course of action, theoretically including mediation[22].

Conflict and competition are inevitable corollaries of an international system that upholds the sovereignty of individual states. Theoreticians and practitioners of diplomacy agree that mediation is a common mechanism to negotiate a pacific settlement to a dispute[23]. Moreover, scholars agree that mediation must be distinguished from other forms of pacific settlement, including conciliation, good offices[24], arbitration and judicial settlement[25]. International mediation is a complex and contested phenomenon. There is still ‘considerable disagreement amongst scholars, and a state of confusion amongst practitioners, as to what constitutes an effective mediation’[26]. Broadly, mediation is a method of conflict resolution in which a third-party intervenes to facilitate agreement between disputing actors and create a peaceful settlement[27]. Berridge and James concur, asserting that mediation is ‘the active search for a negotiated settlement… by an impartial third party’[28]. The extent of the mediator’s active role differs in other definitions, with some arguing for the mediator to investigate the problem and propose recommendations to the parties[29], others suggest that the mediator limit their activity to providing good offices. Nevertheless, a commonality in most definitions is that the mediator should ‘facilitate’ the achievement of a mutually-acceptable settlement and that it is only the format of facilitation that is contested. The definition provided by Berridge and James covers most of the facilitation roles of a mediator; ‘drawing up the agenda, calling and chairing negotiating sessions, proposing solutions, and employing threats and promises towards the rivals’[30]. However, to highlight this disagreement, Bercovitch and Rubin explicitly argue that mediation should be ‘non-coercive, non-violent’[31]. But to claim that a mediator does not utilise all their assets (including coercion and reward, financial or otherwise) would ignore the reality of international mediation[32]. Perhaps more accurately, mediation does not involve the use of force[33], moreover, the only actors likely to have the force as a potential asset are states or the United Nations, and these are not the sole actors engaged in mediation.

‘The Secertary-General’s contribution rests on the pattern of trust and cooperation established between him and the deliberative organs of the United Nations’[34] argued Boutros-Ghali; emphasising that the UN is not a world government and the Secretary-General is not its secular pope. The Secretary-General is the chief administrative officer of the UN[35], commonly deriving his express and implied responsibilities from the Charter, other UN organs, and custom and usage[36]. The Secretary-General manages the Secretariat – the UN’s international civil service – crucially responsible for the appointment of staff. The Charter states that the Secretariat shall be independent from any authority outside the UN and that member states ‘undertake to respect [their] exclusively international character’[37]. But it is the significant political role – under Article 99 – that impacts on mediation. Article 99 ‘confers on the Secretary-General a right [which permits him] to undertake a wide range of political and diplomatic activities’[38]; stating ‘The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security’[39]. As Pérez de Cuéllar observes, the political function ‘has never been very precisely defined’[40] which results in the Secretary-General being afforded a margin of discretion depending on the ‘state of international relations at the time [and] on the political character of the Secretary-General’[41]. Generally speaking, Secretaries-General tend to fall into three camps[42]; first, highly proactive and taking a liberal view on the independence afforded to them by Article 99 and the spirit of the UN Charter; second, largely passive and only performing those duties explicitly outlined in the Charter or under mandates from a UN organ; or third, they fall somewhere in-between – being proactive when necessary, but recognising that they are primarily servants of the Security Council and General Assembly. Nevertheless, Article 99 has rarely been invoked[43]. Instead, Secretaries-General have used its wording without explicitly citing the Article; Hammarskjold brought the Congo crisis to the Secretary Council’s attention in 1960, Thant the 1971 situation between Pakistan and India, and Waldheim the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis[44]. Bailey and Daws accurately argue that Article 99 provides Secretaries-General ‘with a convenient hold-all to conduct such activities as deemed appropriate to his office [or] in the absence of the explicit authority of a policy-making body’[45].

As a high-profile international actor, with a reputation for impartiality, a positive normative character, and a representative of the premier international institution, the invitations for the Secretary-General to engage in mediation have grown considerably since the end of Cold War bipolarity. The Secretary-General is arguably the best potential mediator at any given moment in international relations; depending on the international climate he can appear as the influential embodiment of the UN Charter – with a mandate from the most powerful states – or he can distance himself and portray a prestigious, experienced and impartial independent actor. Typically, the Secretary-General engages in mediation either with a mandate from a UN political organ, or at the invitation of a conflicting party. The most critical aspect of the Secretary-General is that they are subservient to the Security Council and the General Assembly. Newman is highly critical of the tendency of Boutros-Ghali and subsequent Secretaries-General for believing in a wider liberal internationalist role for the office – claiming that the structures underpinning international politics suggest that any cosmopolitan movement to revive the spirit of international civil service is a delusion[46]. The debate aside, it is evident that in the limited capacity that a Secretary-General is an independent actor, any actions are reliant on the tacit approval or quiet acquiescence of the Security Council. It is, as Newman and Barros contend, a ‘fiction to believe that any Secretary-General can lead states to a goal of which they are not supportive’[47].

While the UN has been criticised, particularly during the Cold War, for its failure to take action, the Secretary-General largely escapes this form of normative negativity because of his unique position. Franck is especially supportive of the office, declaring that,

It would be no exaggeration to say that the UN is well worth preserving if it serves no other purpose than to facilitate the fact-finding, mediating, and peacekeeping initiatives of the Secretary-General.[48]

While not quite as enthusiastic, James nonetheless supports Franck’s contention arguing that the Secretary-General is ‘splendidly fitted for the function of mediation’[49] because of his recognised impartiality, commitment to peaceful settlement and the highest integrity of his office. Moreover, of the nine[50] Secretaries-General, seven had direct experience as a diplomatist, therefore incumbents certainly posses negotiating skills. The Secretary-General’s access to an extensive communications network, frequent international travel and contact with diplomatic and high-level political figures are considerable assets in mediation. The ability to devote consistent and continuous attention to a dispute is a major asset of UN mediation because engagement allows the Secretary-General to develop a large understanding of the conflict and build personal relationships with the parties involved, extending his network of contacts. The Secretary-General can capitalise on his independence from the Security Council in claiming to be a more efficient and just alternative as a mediator who will give equal attention to each parties’ interests. Of utmost importance is that mediation of the Secretary-General is conducted in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and thus ‘seeks an objective and lasting settlement of a dispute and not merely one which responds to the expediencies of the day’[51]. Consequently, a major asset of the Secretary-General is the recognition that he will not place the weaker party in an unfavourable position. Thus conflicting parties are likely to seek the Secretary-General as a mediator above other entities; because the Secretary-General’s primary concern should be justice and a lasting settlement, not realpolitik.

While engaged in mediation, if the leadership of a state stubbornly refuses to respond to rational persuasion the Secretary-General can make the facts known – his recognised impartiality, commitment to higher global ideals and personal prestige all add credence to any criticism he may level at member states in the forums of debate at the UN or through the international media. Conversely, if a negotiation is progressing particularly well, or if states are cooperating or making major concessions or signs of goodwill, the Secretary-General can praise them in the hope of compelling them to continue to cooperate in his mediation. Furthermore, one can recognise that sometimes simply referring a dispute to the Secretary-General for mediation or advice can in itself cause the conflict to simmer down, or create a ripe moment for subsequent mediation. However, the Secretary-General can also threaten to bring a matter to the attention of the Security Council if he believes a settlement is no longer within his power or if mediation is stalling because of uncooperative antagonists. The threat of the Security Council can be a powerful coercive force towards mutual understanding.

The support of the Security Council is, arguably, the most effective tool the Secretary-General can ever hope to employ while engaged in mediation. Far more effective than innumerable regional organisations, the support of the permanent members of the Council is greater than their individual sum – however massive this may be. It is rare indeed for the mediation efforts of the Secretary-General to falter if supported by the Council or one of the major permanent members, now that the use of the veto has declined. The success of Thant’s initiative to secure self-determination for West New Guinea from the Netherlands was achieved through a combination of Thant’s diplomatic skills and the United States’ desire for a settlement[52]. Similarly, Pérez de Cuéllar’s failed attempt to mediate between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982 might have been successful if the Secretary-General had the coercive capabilities of a powerful state. Thus, the necessity of having ‘friends’ at all is because the Secretary-General acting alone lacks inducements; in situations where he is independently successful (more so when mediating between larger states) it is usually because one or more of the conflicting parties has recognised that settlement is necessary, or can see benefits to its national interest from the Secretary-General’s involvement. The UN initiative to negotiate a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan only achieved success when the Soviets began contemplating departure, and the Secretary-General’s role in the negotiated ceasefire of the Iran-Iraq War only came to fruition when the Security Council finally took affirmative action[53]. Similarly, the Secretary-General’s efforts, combined with his facilitating role, to encourage Syria, Iran and the US to exert their influence on the parties in the Lebanon hostage situation in 1991 made the release of the hostages possible[54]. With the exception of NATO, regional organisations lack the resources necessary to provide the necessary coercive assets to support the Secretary-General in mediation. For example, most of the 17 peacekeeping operations operated by African regional organisations prior to 2002 had ‘been beset by serious and sustained operational and political shortcomings’[55], prompting serious moves to improve their preventive capabilities. In contrast, NATO’s provision of air power to defend the United Nations Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia[56], is an asset generally only available to sovereign states. Therefore, the myriad of assets available to the Secretary-General for mediation are most effective when multiplied by support from the Security Council or one of the permanent members, without them, an impasse in negotiation if often unsurpassable.

Impartiality is the greatest asset of the Secretary-General, of particular emphasis when engaged in mediation. Pérez de Cuéllar called impartiality ‘the heart and soul of the office’.[57] Not only impartiality on issues in conflict mediation, but also detachment from indebtedness to the governments of member states which could influence his decisions in mediation. In mediation, the intervening party must be perceived to be impartial and this is true of the Secretary-General, but he is further obligated to uphold the principles of the Charter. The support or lack of, from regional organisations and the Security Council can impact heavily on the credibility of the Secretary-General as impartial. Nonetheless, the Secretary-General’s impartiality is not neutrality, nor should it become moral hubris – he must prosecute mediation along a fine line between objectivity, the normative provisions of the Charter for a just settlement, the necessity of avoiding further violence and the directions of his political masters.

Nevertheless, as a semi-autonomous actor, the Secretary-General can engage in preventive diplomacy without a specific mandate from the Security Council therefore regional organisations[58] are useful allies. When support from other UN organs is not obvious, the backing of a regional organisation can accentuate the Secretary-General’s individual mediation assets. Mediation ‘requires measures to create confidence’[59] and the additional credibility afforded the Secretary-General when cooperating with the region’s interstate organisation can legitimise his efforts in the eyes of the conflicting parties. But there are issues in cooperating with regional organisations, ‘institutional jealousies and difficulties in [coordination]’[60] can lead to tension, for example in the early relationship between the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the UN. However, greater continuous or continual consultation between the UN and all major regional organisations is likely to identify areas where mediation by the Secretary-General would be possible, and how regional organisations and the UN could support one another in preventive diplomacy, such as the strategy meeting between the Secretary-General and the heads of regional organisations on ‘Cooperation for Conflict Prevention’ in 1998[61]. Furthermore, if the Security Council explicitly mandates a regional organisation to lead or support the Secretary-General’s mediation efforts it adds significant credibility to the mediation and promotes the belief of the UN as a democratic and inclusive international institution[62].

Moreover, in prosecuting the Secretary-General’s common role as mediator, Boutros-Ghali asserts that all the mechanisms and resources devoted to conflict settlement ‘will be of little significance unless this new spirit of commonality [between states] is propelled by the will to take the hard decisions’[63]. These comments foreshadow the criticisms that would be levelled at the UN for its failure to intervene in the Rwandan genocide in 1994 because of the unwillingness of the Security Council to recognise the events as genocide, which would have compelled member states to intervene. It is necessary to recognise that in the Rwandan situation, and many other issues of great humanitarian but little strategic importance, regional organisations such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) are of minimal assistance to the work of the Secretary-General; the lead must be taken by the Security Council, who have the authority and resources to ensure intervention is effective and timely. Thus, even in situations where the responsibilities of member states are clearly proscribed in the UN Charter, the states must formally recognise that the situation in question conforms to the conditions outlined in the Charter. Furthermore, in situations of internal crisis the UN is obliged ‘to respect the sovereignty of the State [in] accordance with the understanding of Member States in accepting the principles of the Charter’[64]. UN guidelines stress that humanitarian assistance ‘should be provided with the consent of the affected country’ therefore if assistance is resisted the Secretary-General must rely on the Security Council to authorise intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of any state. Certain regional organisations, such as the South African Development Community (SADC), have set precedents for assisting states in internal strife – including support to legitimate democratic governments facing possible military coup[65] – which would be practically impossible in the UN. Without the political will of the Security Council to support him, the Secretary-General is marginalised and effectively powerless. Similarly, regional organisations have minimal impact on Security Council deliberations beyond lobbying and political or public pressure, nevertheless having the support of regional organisations can encourage outside states to act supportively of UN efforts.

In protracted conflicts, particularly in areas with a history of ethnic stratification, the problems facing a mediator are multiplied beyond the consideration of issues specific to the conflict; the mediator has to break down entrenched behaviour and negative stereotypes that could have persisted for generations. Regional organisations ‘deepen cooperation and ease some of the contentious characteristics of sovereign and nationalistic rivalries’[66] and lessen the extent to which tribalism can impact on negotiations. The Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC), acting through Indonesia, secured a peace agreement between the government of the Philippines and the radical Muslim separatist group, the Moro National Liberation Front[67], without seeking mediation support from the UN; highlighting the capabilities of some regional organisations. The recent initiatives to bring peace to the Democratic Republic of Congo succeeding in establishing a cease-fire following cooperative mediation efforts between the UN, SADC, OAU and the leaders of neighbouring states[68]. Engaging in dialogue with regional organisations can help build a regional and international consensus on an issue and what the best measures are to address it, thereby making mediation efforts more likely to succeed[69]. In developing countries (historically the ‘Third World’ bloc in the General Assembly) involvement and high-handed resolutions from the Security Council can have negative consequences for the Secretary-General’s mediation, in which case the involvement of regional organisations – particularly one with a vocal history of opposition to exploitation from the global ‘North’ – can multiply the chance of a negotiated settlement.

Moreover, regional organisations have a primary responsibility of preventive diplomacy, to ‘ease tensions before they result in conflict [or] to act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes’[70]. The geographic proximity of members of regional organisations and the specific regional experience of the organisation’s institutions increase the likelihood of identifying potential conflicts early and recognising the underlying causes of tension. One can extend to this to mediation efforts; the support and expertise of regional organisations can be of considerable assistance to the Secretary-General’s role as mediator. Specialist regional knowledge can be invaluable in diplomatic activities and can be provided by regional organisations; such as the technical input on constitutional issues relating to Abkhazia provided by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)[71]. Hamburg supports this assertion, arguing that regional organisations have intimate knowledge of regional actors and sensitivity to local historical and cultural factors[72].

However, regional organisations and NGOs are subject to the same partisanship of states in proximity to a conflict; that through emotional engagement they often favour one conflicting party and consequently are not credible as impartial mediators. Thus, there are scenarios where the Secretary-General’s mediation efforts will be most successful if he is seen to be operating without ‘friends’ (even independent from the UN). The OAU were of little practical support to the UN-led contact group attempting to mediate over Namibian self-determination from South Africa because of their criticism on moral grounds towards any diplomatic linkage that would provide dividends to South Africa for fulfilling its legal obligations to withdraw[73].

Information gathering and fact-finding missions are vital components of preventive diplomacy and effective mediation, and regional organisations are better prepared to respond immediately to their requirements than international organisations like the UN, where procedural requirements, including debate in the Security Council or General Assembly, result in long delays before a decision is reached. Thus, Boutros-Ghali’s encouragement that regional organisations should seek observer status at the UN and be linked with UN security measures supports their ‘important role in early warning’[74]. The specialist human rights entities of the UN and the Council of Europe frequently exchange information with the limited aim of sharing and developing ‘technical and advisory assistance in human rights’[75]. Regional organisations may lack the necessary intelligence-gathering functions of states, but their resources are not inconsiderable; the provision of technical assistance to the Secretary-General in mediation can make a significant contribution to sustaining peace.

Moreover, the great difficulty of gathering detailed and accurate information on a conflict has been recognised by all Secretaries-General: Pérez de Cuéllar claimed that the UN’s ‘means of obtaining up-to-date information are primitive by comparison with those of member states’[76]. The highest quality information and intelligence to support the Secretary-General’s mediation is possible only by contact ‘with the Governments of Member States’[77]. Consequently, the Secretary-General or his representatives are reliant on the information services of member states for ‘detailed information on issues of concern’[78] because only through engagement with all interested parties (including states not directly participating in a conflict) can the wider ramifications of an issue be understood. To carry out successful future mediations the informational constraints on the office need to be lifted, along with the Secretary-General’s reliance on information benefactors (whether states or regional organisations). As documented by Franck, while in office both Lie and Waldheim proposed the creation of independent UN fact-finders stationed in state capitals and potential conflict zones as a means to gather information and to ‘add to the sensitivity of governments [and] heighten their awareness of the Secretary-General’s availability’[79] for mediation.

Confidence-building measures performed by cooperative actors are a crucial asset to the Secretary-General when engaged in mediation. Regional organisations can contribute, but the diplomatic activities engaged in by states – such as exchanging representatives, improving the flow of information and creating intrastate bodies to monitor conflict[80] – are all stressed by Boutros-Ghali as essential in reducing the likelihood of conflict between states. Moreover, the security of borders and monitoring of arms agreements can be crucial during negotiations. The Secretary-General is reliant on the cooperation and efficiency of neighbouring states to limit the flow of arms into a conflict zone, regional organisations themselves cannot guarantee border security.

With ever-increasing demands on the UN, regional organisations have the capacity to undertake measures to alleviate or mediate a conflict without prior consent of the UN, and may request the involvement of the Secretary-General, the UN or other actors at a later stage. In conjunction with the UN’s willingness to cooperate with regional organisations it encourages the formation of regional actors to operate in specific areas (treaty-based, regional development, contact group behaviour etc.). Consequently the UN and Secretary-General are supported by ‘a rich variety of complimentary efforts’[81]. Boutros-Ghali highlights how cooperation with regional organisations has had successes in Somalia, in the Cambodian conflict, how ‘The Friends of the Secretary-General’ contributed ‘to agreements reached through the mediation of the Secretary-General’[82] in El Salvador and that the European Community worked closely with other states and the UN in the Balkans[83].

Consequently, regional organisations as ‘friends’ of the Secretary-General can be incredibly valuable, particularly if supported in tandem by the Security Council or a powerful member state. They are a poor replacement for the Security Council, but – as with most diplomatic activities – there will be situations where their involvement will prove immeasurably more beneficial than involvement from other actors, or where their involvement could be to the detriment of mediation. This is so with every potential actor who could befriend the Secretary-General. To determine who will be of benefit demands a careful assessment of the individual circumstances and wider context of that specific mediation at that precise moment in time. It is clear, however, that a new security consensus based on the interdependence of threats and responses is of paramount necessity. The UN, as an influential blending and manifestation of state-centric power and Charter-based principles, has the potential to develop a positive consensus in international society. One hopes the potential will not be squandered.

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—

Written by: Oliver Lewis
Written at : University of Leicester
Written for: Prof G R Berridge
Date written: Dec 2007

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• The Barriers and Weaknesses of Kofi Annan’s Mediation Efforts in Syria
• How Successful Has the UN Been in Maintaining International Peace and Security?
• Limits of Liberal Feminist Peacebuilding in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
• Can International Organisations Become “Autonomous Sites of Authority”?
• Why Are Feminist Theorists in International Relations so Critical of UNSCR 1325?
• A New Era of UN Peacekeeping? The Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Africa