Chapter 1

Steps 1, 2 & 3: The Issue and Actors Involved

The purpose of the study is to determine the likely involvement of major world actors if Iran continues to defy the United Nations in its quest for nuclear power.  The fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent end of the Cold War has ironically not ended the fear of annihilation from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).[1]  Islamic radical terrorism tops the list of threats to the United States.  Specifically, the Islamic Republic of Iran has drawn the ire of the world powers because it refuses to submit to the United Nation’s demands to curb its nuclear program.  Members of the UN suspect Iran of developing a covert military nuclear program concurrent with its civilian one.  Among other rogue nations accused of developing a nuclear arsenal, President George W. Bush declared Iran a member of the “axis of evil”[2].

Iran’s rebellious behavior is not new, although it has only recently drawn major attention from the western media.  President Clinton, in early 1995, declared: “Our problem is with the unacceptable behavior of the Iranian government: direct and indirect support for and use of terrorist subversion of states friendly to the United States; military intimidation of its neighbors; and acquisition of weapon and technologies of mass destruction—including nuclear.”[3]  The concern is the possibility and eventuality of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and the related capability to employ those weapons in either a coercive or a military deployment inconsistent with international law.

In response to Iran’s endeavor to acquire WMD, the United Nations (UN) has openly discussed its concerns.  As of the writing of this paper, the UN has demanded from Iran’s theocracy that it stop its enrichment of uranium until a compromise can be reached concerning its nuclear program.  The UN offered a series of incentives to entice Iran to succumb to its request.  To date, Iran’s leadership has not responded to the offer, explicitly stating that Iran has the right to enrich and develop its nuclear program without regard to demands of the UN or others.

Iran’s reckless approach to dealing with the world’s governing body has alarmed many nations.  Diplomatic measures such as targeted sanctions and embargos are among the tools available to politicians.  Other nations, like the United States and Israel, may seek a preemptive attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s missile or fissile material sites as a means to deal directly with the problem.  In this highly dynamic situation, many countries’ economic interests and desires for regional stability weigh heavily on the outcome of the current circumstances.

This paper will utilize the analytical method designed by Dr. Jonathan Lockwood, known as the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP), to analyze the above-described situation and provide an estimate of likely future actions of the major actors.  Dr. Lockwood’s method provides a means to arrive at a logical analytical prediction for a given international issue.  In this particular case, it will be employed to discover the likely outcome of the Iranian nuclear issue.

This essay will follow the twelve-step LAMP method by first discussing the issue at hand and each of the actors involved:  Iran, Israel, the European Union, Russia, China and the United States.  Next, it discusses the likely scenarios and courses of action each actor is liable to take.  An analysis of the alternative futures will be discussed and the consequences and potentials for transposition will be provided.  Finally, a discussion of indicators and focal events will be offered in an attempt to provide warning of the alternate futures.

Iran

The Dynamic and Ironic Mindset of Iranians

In order to understand the nuclear proliferation problem in Iran, it is imperative to recognize the historical impetus behind the Iranian leaders’ desire for nuclear weapons.  Iranians (and previously Persians) have been in cultural conflict between the forces of modernization and the forces of traditionalism since as early as the 7th century Islamic conversion.  This historical dynamic continues to play a role in the formulation and application of foreign policy.

Cyrus Vakili-Zad, an Iranian scholar, described cultural modernization as a process of “the importation of modern ideas, institutions and technology from the more developed world to the less developed world…intellectuals as carriers of modernity are given the most important role.”[4]  Contrary to modernization is traditionalism, a simple, uncomplicated way of life, and a desire to stay with one’s religious or cultural roots.[5]  Within modern Iran, these two forces continue to influence the foreign policy and often divide its population between the modern, intellectuals and the poorer, less educated masses.  The latter group is led stalwartly by the Shiite Muslim clerics, personified by the current president, Ahmenijad and its Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.[6]

Historically, events from as early as the late 19th century have demonstrated Iranian’s mistrust of the West and America.  The Tobacco Rebellion in 1891 involved Iranian farmers against British and Russian forces that attempted to exploit cheap Iranian labor.  The successful rebellion reinforced Iran’s disdain for the “modern” West and established an “Islamic” Iranian identity.  The Islamic Shiite clerics helped the people to envisage the struggle as the righteous Muslims against the Western infidels[7].  Nuri, the predominant cleric of the time, was against all forms of Western reform, including modern schools and constitutional states.  In the end, the rebellion ended when Britain conceded to the Muslim clerics.  The outcome of the Tobacco Rebellion reveals two major themes that are relevant today and influences how the government of Iran conducts business.  First, the clergy has the power to greatly influence the minds of the people and act as a “power broker” for the nation itself.  Second, the outcome demonstrates the Iranian belief that “divine” Islamic law and faith in Allah can overcome any man-made power.

The forces of modernism and traditionalism collided again in the early 20th century when the Iranian Constitution of 1906 was adopted.  The Iranian clergy leveraged the constitution to control the power of the Shah.  The constitution guaranteed that only Muslims would be appointed as cabinet ministers.  During this period, the clergy ruled supreme.  This period was shortened however, by the ascension of Reza Pahlavi Shah to the throne in 1925.  The clergy took a back seat to politics until the Revolution of 1979.

The Pahlavi Dynasty was a period of intense Westernization in Iran.  They modernized the military and became a regional superpower in the Middle East.  The Shahs, Reza and Mohammed Reza, modeled their governments after the United States.  They ruled heavy handedly, exiling political opponents and punishing dissenters.  The heavy spending in the 60’s and 70’s combined with the slow economic growth during the 70’s created a terrible economic situation in Iran.  The clergy seized the opportunity and blamed the United States and the Western world for Iran’s unemployment and inflation.  They led protests that focused on the luxurious lifestyle led by the Shah and the evils of the West.  Circumstances created an opportunity, once again, for traditionalism and the clergy to gain political power.

The revolution resulted in the current government existing in Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran.  The triumph of Islam reaffirmed the people’s belief in Islam and the rejection of the Western culture.  Many turned to Islam (and to their government) for answers to the economic crises.  The irony in the Iranian culture is the “struggle to remain traditional and overtly reject modernization, while at the same time pursue a road of economic and military modernization.”[8]  The ironic situation just described intensified during and after the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988).

In the mind of the Iranian Muslim, they have always defeated the West.  From the time of the Tobacco Revolution to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Islam has triumphed.  According to Bassam Tibi, Islamic scholar, “Many Muslims…share the view that Islam, owing to the repercussions of the Afghanistan war, has given its share to the breakdown of communism.  The Muslims then ask, why not defeat the West, too?”[9]
Nuclear History and Technology of Iran

The Iran-Iraq war had a major impact on the people of Iran as well as the decision of its leaders to pursue WMD.  As Shahram Chubin, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wrote:

The experience of Iran’s leaders during the course of the war has dominated the way they have looked at security since.  The first, overwhelmingly clear political lesson was that Iran could not rely on the international community where its defense was concerned, that some states would not be bound by rules governing the conduct of war, and that Iran should seek preparedness accordingly.[10]

During the war, Iraq openly used chemical weapons against the conscripted armies of Iran.  Iranian soldiers were powerless and technologically unable to prevent Iraq’s use of Scud missiles and chemical weapons.  The Iran-Iraq war taught the Iranians a costly lesson concerning the importance of having a credible deterrent of its own.  Internally, the war taught the leaders of Iran that religious fortitude did not compare to military technology.  Just before the end of the war, Hashemi Rafsanjani was appointed commander-in-chief of the Iranian armed forces and was later elected President in 1989.  He gained huge popularity by emphasizing the significance of readiness and a strong contemporary military.  By concentrating on building a modern military, Rafsanjani ensured that Iran would become the resident superpower of the Middle East.[11]

It would be short sighted to think that Iran’s quest for nuclear power is simply a desire to preserve sovereignty.  Dr. William Martel, from the Air War College, provides some other persuasive reasons behind Iran’s motivations for nuclear weapons; these include: domestic political pressure and political and military leverage.[12]

The leadership of Iran has placed tremendous pressure on itself, professing traditionalism, yet, proclaiming to be a legitimate regional power, with a modern military.  The balance of these two ideals within the Iranian paradigm has contributed to the development of WMD within the country.  Iranian leadership considers Iran a vehicle of Islam.  Its goal is to bring about the “Mehdi” or the “MEHDI-AL-MA’OOD”.  The Mehdi is the Islamic version of Armageddon or the end of the world.  Predominantly Shiite, the culture reflects an appreciation and value on tireless effort, resistance, sacrifice and martyrdom to further the spread of fundamental Islam.[13]  Nuclear weapons provide not only a “voice” in determining events within the region and a means to retain sovereignty, but a tool with which to destroy the infidels who oppose them and speed the arrival of the Mehdi.

Iran’s experience with the Iran-Iraq war and its ring side seating during Desert Storm and the Persian Gulf War have served only to enforce its respect for military power.  Clearly, the difference between Iran possessing WMD and the US possessing them is this: the US has a massive military, rapidly deployable and only uses nuclear weapons as a last resort.  Iran, conversely, (in the author’s opinion) would have a much lower threshold for their use.

Nuclear Weapons and Missile Development

Iran is a signor of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and as such submits to nuclear inspections by the IAEA.[14]  So far, the IAEA has found no direct evidence that Iran is developing a military nuclear weapons program.  Yet, western intelligence communities continue to proclaim that Iran is developing WMD.  Why?

Iran is similar to both Iraq and North Korea, both of which developed a military nuclear program without the knowledge of the IAEA.  Iran admits to having hidden evidence of its nuclear program from the UN and seeks to enrich its own uranium.[15]  In 1995, the Russian nuclear energy minister Victor Mikhailov and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Reza Amrollahi signed an agreement to continue building Iran’s Bushehr Nuclear Reactor as well as the construction of a uranium shaft for future enrichment.[16]  Yeltsin later confirmed, “The contract indeed has elements of both peaceful and military power engineering.”[17]

Although more sites have been added, including the Natanz reactor site, the following is a slightly outdated, but unclassified list of nuclear facilities in Iran (estimates are from 1995):

1. Bushehr – 2 power reactors 85% complete as of 1995
2.  Bonab – low power reactors construction started 1994
3. Darkhovin – Chinese built estimated completion date 2002
4. Esfahan – Chinese built and underground
5. Esteghlal – Chinese built estimated completion date 2005
6. Gorgan – Russian nuclear technicians present
7. Karaj – Chinese calutron near completion
8. Mo’allem – possible uranium enrichment site
9. Tehran – uses 20% Argentinean enriched uranium operational
10. Yazd – high-grade uranium mine (est. 5,000 cubic tons)[18]

The preceding list confirms the West’s skepticism over Iran’s nuclear intentions.  First, the relative maturity of the infrastructure despite its oil reserves draws attention.  Secondly, the diversity of enrichment methods shows similarity to Iraq’s nuclear weapons program.  Thirdly, the number of foreign contracts, deals, technical support, and potential nuclear black marketing of fissile material is alarming.  Finally, the relationship between China and Iran is perturbing because of the rapid success of China’s own nuclear program in the 50’s.[19]

In 2003, an Iranian dissident group tipped off the IAEA inspectors to a small town two hundred miles south-southeast of Tehran.  Inspectors found two giant underground complexes still under construction.  Although not yet required by the NPT to disclose this information, its secret existence highlights Iran’s ability to carryout a large-scale program almost un-noticed.  The now famous Natanz site is a uranium enrichment facility, which inspectors say “is an exact duplicate of a uranium enrichment facility in Pakistan.”[20]  The Natanz reactor site is designed to contain 50,000 machines.[21]

It is necessary to investigate whether or not Iran has the technical capability to deliver a nuclear weapon if it acquired one.  Since the conclusion of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. has applied pressure on Russia, China, India, and other countries to deny nuclear reactor equipment and dual use technology to Iran.  However, missile technology continues to flow into Iran from North Korea and China as well as Russia.  The Rumsfeld Commission in 1998 declared:

Iran now has the technical capability and resources to demonstrate an ICBM-range ballistic missile, similar to the [North Korean] TD-2 [itself based on scaled-up SCUD technology], within five years of a decision to proceed– whether that decision has already been made or is yet to be made.

The Iranian Shahab-3 ballistic missile means Meteor-3 or Shooting Star-3 in Farsi [alternatively designated Zelzel (Earthquake)] and is derived from the 1,300-1,500 kilometer range North Korean No-dong missile.  The Shahab-3 reportedly has a range of between 1,300 and 1,500 kilometers and is capable of carrying a 1,000-760 kilogram warhead.[22]  Since the range of this particular missile is, coincidentally, greater than the distance between Iran and Israel (nearly 1000 kilometers), it is conceivable that this missile or a version of it could deliver a nuclear warhead to Israel.

According to a 2005 analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies:

Iran’s ballistic missile programme is based primarily on liquid fuel technology acquired from North Korea.  We estimate that Iran has deployed a single Shahab-1/2 missile brigade, comprising three or four missile battalions for a total of 12–18 mobile missile launchers and 48–72 missiles in the field, and at least one Shahab-3 missile battery, which would normally consist of 3 launchers and 12 missiles in the field. Additional missiles are stored in reserve.  As far as is known, Iran’s missile forces are armed with conventional high explosive warheads, although Iran could probably build primitive CBW warheads if it chose to do so. Based on the most recent flight tests in 2004, Iran is seeking to develop a smaller warhead for the Shahab-3, which appears consistent with reports of research into the development of a nuclear warhead for the Shahab-3, but the details of this reported research are not available.[23]

Iran, Why Develop?

Iran has invested billions of dollars into its nuclear and missile programs.  Why?  To what end?  Why risk economic hardships and sanctions?  Why risk retaliation from Israel or the U.S.?  These questions were partially answered during earlier discussion and will be developed in this section.

Iran may wish to eliminate its arch foe, Israel.  In a meeting with the organizers of the International Conference for Support of the Intifada (15 January 2001, Iranian TV) Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said, “The foundation of the Islamic regime its opposition to Israel and the perpetual subject of Iran is the elimination of Israel from the region.  Palestine is Islamic land that was conquered by an anti-Islamic enemy, and according to Islam, one must oppose the Zionist regime.  The support for the Palestinians is a religious decree.”  (Emphasis added)  The list of calls for Israel’s destruction is endless.  From the Supreme leader down to the lowliest public servant, each calls for the destruction of Israel.  If Iran had a nuclear bomb, it is certainly a credible thought that it would be deployed against Israel.

Furthermore, Iran may wish to intimidate other countries in the region from pursuing aggression as a strategy.  Iran may consider its last war with Iraq.  Perhaps if Iran had had a nuclear weapon then, war may have been deterred.  Since the liberation of Iraq and its subsequent occupation by U.S. forces, Iran may feel threatened.  For this reason it may seek to develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the U.S.

Since the liberation of Iraq and its subsequent occupation by U.S. forces, Iran may feel threatened.  While the U.S. claimed that Iraq had nuclear weapons, in fact they did not.  Iran may infer that because Iraq did not have nuclear weapons, they were attacked vice if Iraq really did have weapons the U.S. would not have invaded.  Just as North Korea has nuclear weapons and the U.S. has not attacked, Iran may hurry fissile production in an effort to enjoy the same nuclear deterrent capabilities as North Korea.

Prestige is another reason that Iran may seek nuclear weapon capability.  Prior to the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf, Iran considered itself the regional superpower.  Second to the U.S. Navy, Iran possesses the largest naval force in the Gulf.  Iran may gain increased standing among its neighbors as a power to be reckoned with, if it acquires nuclear weapon capability.

Iran may finalize development and marry nuclear warheads to missiles because the leadership may feel that it was “forced” to.  The mindset of the Iranian government is one that does not deal well with pressure or threats.  The government is adapt to bargain and negotiate, however, if the U.S. refuses to acknowledge Iran’s proposals and does not negotiate directly with Iran, it may react by simply defying U.S. demands on principle.  To date, the United States refuses to deal directly with Iran; this may exacerbate any efforts at negotiation.  If Iran’s leadership feels it has been backed into a corner, without diplomatic options, it may proceed with atomic development.

Whatever the reasons, experts are all over the board on predictions for when Iran will have a nuclear weapon.  Israeli analysts predict that it is only a matter of months until completion, while U.S. analysts put the date from 1 year to 10 years until completion.[24]  Most, however, agree that a weapons program does exist.  Iran counters on one hand that its nuclear effort is strictly a civilian energy program, yet on the other hand it says enrichment and nuclear power is its sovereign right, and calls for the destruction of Israel in the same breath.

In June 2004, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi rejected western influence on Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.  “We won’t accept any new obligations,” Kharrazi said.  “Iran has a high technical capability and has to be recognized by the international community as a member of the nuclear club.  This is an irreversible path” (AP, June 12, 2004).  Iran’s leaders view themselves as “holy messengers” on a mission from Allah to spread Islam and to destroy Israel.  From a fundamentalist perspective, they consider themselves a righteous group of true believers who will not likely bend their views to western powers.  A leading Islamic fundamentalist, Hassan al-Turabi, has spoken of individual human rights with contempt in identifying them as “an import from the West” for which the Muslims “have no need.”[25]  Iranian fundamentalists, like the ones described by Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, directors of the Fundamentalism Project, “see themselves as actors in an eschatological drama unfolding in the mind of God and directing the course of human history.”[26]

Israel

Following the Second World War, the British withdrew from Palestine, and the UN divided the area into Arab and Jewish states, an arrangement unsatisfactory to the Arabs and Iranians, and created the State of Israel.[27]  As a Jewish state, surrounded by Islamic states, in a region entirely hostile to it, Israel refuses to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  The reason for this is understandable considering the deterrent factor that such weapons project.  Israel considers self-preservation key in its foreign policy.

Since its creation in 14 May 1948, Israel has endured many regional wars and foreign attacks.  During these years, it has always maintained the integrity of its borders. After the June War of 1968, Israel acquired land previously in possession of Palestinians.  Since that time, tension between Jews and Palestinians has escalated, often resulting in riots and mortar attacks.  Fringe groups, labeled as terror organizations by the U.S., like Hezbollah, have organized suicide bombings and attacks on Jewish populations.  Iran is said to be a major supporter of this group.[28]

Throughout its existence, Israel has demanded respect from its Muslim neighbors, for no other reason than military might.  Israel is assumed to possess nuclear weapons, although officially it denies possession.  The assumption of nuclear capability continues to dissuade aggressive nations from pursuing a major conventional war.

The Iranian nuclear issue at hand has, undoubtedly, caused alarm for the Israelis.  If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, it would level the playing field- a situation undesirable for Israel.

London’s Sunday Times (March 13, 2005) claimed that Israel has a plan to assault Iran’s nuclear reactor and that the U.S. would not block the attack if diplomatic efforts fail to restrain Iran’s nuclear expansion.  Both Israel and the United States denied the allegations though both are generally believed to be considering military action if diplomacy fails.[29]  A preemptive attack against Iran is reasonable, considering statements like the one made in October 2005, when recently elected President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad quoted Ayatollah Khomeini and declared, “As the Imam said, Israel must be wiped off the map.”  The Iranian president added: “And God willing, with the force of God behind it, we shall soon experience a world without the United States and Zionism” (AP, October 26, 2005).

Three senior Israeli lawmakers from across the political spectrum warned the United States on September 29, 2005 that, as a last resort, Israel itself would act unilaterally to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear arms.  Iran will not be deterred “by anything short of a threat of force,” said Arieh Eldad, a constituent of Israel’s National Union Party.  “They won’t be stopped unless they are convinced their programs will be destroyed if they continue,” he said.  “Threats of sanctions and isolation alone will not do it,” said Mr. Steinitz.[30]

Although an attack on Iran may seem reasonable, Israeli analysts are not naive to potential Muslim backlashes.  Iranian-backed groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Islamic Jihad in the West Bank in Gaza would most likely retaliate greatly, resulting in heavy Jewish casualties.[31]  It is a trade-off than Israel will have to consider and may choose to attack Iran only if diplomatic efforts fail.

Israel has a history of preemptively attacking nations that pose a nuclear threat.  In 1981, Israeli fighter jets attacked the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq.  The Osirak reactor was designed to test the effects of neutron flux upon metals in reactors.  It could also be used to transmutate U238 to Pu239 to make a bomb.  The Israeli attack followed a failed Iranian attempt to destroy the French made reactor.  The reactor was destroyed quickly and the eight F-16s and six F-15s returned to their Israeli base, Etzion, without incident.  The attack took place well before any fissile material was transported to the site, to prevent fallout.

Israeli covert operatives have conducted operations against scientists and nuclear facilities in Egypt as well.  Mossad agent Wolfgang Lotz worked in Egypt obtaining information on missile sites and German scientists working on the Egyptian rocket program.  In 1962 and 1963, several key scientists in the program were targets of assassination attempts.[32]

In 1980, Israel was purportedly behind the sabotage of components for nuclear reactor being sent from France to Iraq.  Again, in 1980, the Mossad was implicated in the death of Egyptian scientist, Yahia al-Meshad, who was working on Iraq’s nuclear program.  In Brussels, 1990, the Mossad was probably behind the assassination of Gerald Bull, inventor of the Iraqi “super gun,” a technology significant to the development of the nuclear bomb.[33]

The historical attacks on Iraq and supposed assassination attempts demonstrate that Israel’s leadership will act unilaterally to stop any threat it perceives to endanger the State of Israel.  Given Iran’s rhetoric and desires to eliminate them, the Israelis may act soon to stop the development of Iran’s nuclear reactor program.

Iran has learned a valuable lesson, at the expense of Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor.  The Iranians have spread out the nuclear program over a vast geographical area.  They have also built many of the facilities in underground bunkers, in an attempt to defeat a conventional bombing attack.  Israel is a major recipient of U.S. weaponry and, as such, likely has access to bunker busting bombs that can and have destroyed hardened underground targets as deep as 50ft.[34] The U.S. has recently sold between 100 and 500 of the laser guided bunker-busters to Israel despite warnings that they may be used to attack Iran.[35]  The GBU-28 (bunker-buster) is a 2,000-kg conventional weapon with a powerful warhead that can burrow through six meters (20 feet) of concrete or 30 meters of earth.[36]  Additionally the US has already upgraded the weapon system to the GBU-37, a weapon much more accurate and powerful.  These bunker-buster bombs are deployable via Israel’s F-15 fighter planes.

Additionally, the Mossad, Israel’s covert intelligence agency, is capable of performing acts of sabotage that could render Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile or centrifuges useless.  The Mossad’s Special Operational Division is recognized as one of the world’s best intelligence organizations and as such, has performed acts of sabotage and would assist, in any case, an Israeli attack on Iran.[37]

Israel is definitely opposed to Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons and has the military technology to temporarily stop Iran from its continued development and enrichment program.  If Israel has decided or has already decided to attack Iran on a limited basis, it is not a matter of if it could, only when.

European Union / E-3

The European Union (EU) is a 25-nation governing body that broadly covers the economic and trade issues in and around the greater body of Western Europe.  The creation of the European Union, previously known as the European Community and earlier as the European Economic Community, established in the 1950’s, was a step to put domestic affairs and trade within Europe in order.  The body is led primarily by its largest members, Great Britain, France, and Germany, known informally as the E-3.  Because of the diverse interests within the community, this paper will focus primarily on the foreign policy of the E-3 regarding Iran.[38]

Western Europe enjoyed a great economic benefit after WWII due to the large number of U.S. forces stationed within its borders.[39]  Because the U.S. was involved in Cold War posturing, Western Europe was able to spend its tax revenue on domestic issues including welfare and infrastructure.  Since V-day, the allied European nations have enjoyed steady economic growth and have not been encumbered by the need to maintain a large military.  Its dependence on the U.S. to handle its foreign affairs and sovereignty has enabled most of Western Europe to take a passive approach towards international affairs.  The E-3 is primarily concerned with trade and economic issues, however, it also addresses human rights and environmental issues worldwide.

Although the United States does not maintain a policy of open dialogue with Iran, the European Union does.  Because of this channel of communication, the European nations, and their corporations, enjoy regular trade with Iran.  Because they are actively trading with Iran, the EU has taken occasion to deliver messages of warning and council to Iran regarding issues such as human rights and its nuclear program.

The EU has expressed explicitly to Iran that it is committed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), an agreement that Iran has ratified.[40]  The NPT is an international agreement among nations who openly profess to nuclear technology (with the exception of Pakistan, India, and North Korea).[41]  France, Germany and Great Britain maintain economic relationships with Iran despite the issues the EU and E-3 have discussed concerning its nuclear proliferation and human rights violations.

Historically, Britain has been a champion of the Jewish community, providing the area along the Mediterranean Sea, now known as the State of Israel, which is disputed hotly amongst Arab and Islamic nations.  France and Germany are equally committed to the integrity of Israel, though leaders of each nation publicly criticized and condemned the preemptive strikes of Israel against the Osirak nuclear reactor and Israel’s human rights violations.  During a visit to the EU Council of Ministers the Israeli Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, said (referring to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict), “There is complete agreement between Israel and the European Union on the central objectives of the political process, in particular the existence of two national states.”  She continued, “This is our joint interest and goal.  Even if there are differences of opinion between us from time to time concerning the correct way to achieve this goal, these are only on the tactical level and not on the substantive level.”[42]

The E-3 and EU’s position regarding the Iran nuclear issue is one of wary.  On one hand, the EU does not want to ruin any economic relationships that have developed with Iran.  On the other hand, they do not want Iran to possess nuclear weapons that may be used against Israel or any other nation.  At this point however, many EU leaders point out that there is no hard evidence that Iran has violated the NPT or any other agreement to which it is party.  The EU may point to the bad intelligence that suggested Sadam Hussein was developing WMD, and demand absolute proof before agreeing to any action against Iran.

The EU prefers diplomatic talks and efforts to peacefully resolve any issues.  This is primarily the case because the EU, as a governing body, historically has lacked the joint military power and coordination to act in any other way.  Additionally, the EU does not have a mutual defense agreement amongst its own members.  However, it has recently (2004) organized a “European Union Reaction Force” (EURRF) that is a non-standing army comprised of various troops from within the EU.  EURRF can quickly assemble 60,000 soldiers that can deploy for at least a year.  Although the EU commands the EURRF, individual nations’ commanders must approve orders.  The EURRF has been a point of debate among European nations and the United States.  The U.S. complains that this army and its autonomy undermine NATO (and the representation the U.S. has as a member).  The EURRF’s chief mission is peacekeeping and humanitarian aid.  Under its charter, it may be used as an offensive tool in UN operations in resistance to offensive regimes, once the EURRF is more established.[43]  Because the EURRF is so newly organized, it is unlikely leadership will is unlikely to employ this force in reaction to an uncooperative Iranian government.

Individually, however, Great Britain has acted independently of the EU to assist the U.S. in its military efforts against Iraq and Afghanistan, though both France and Germany have refused troops to the area.  The EU has a foreign policy that does not run parallel to that of the United States.  Diplomatic efforts such as talks, however, may eventually lead to targeted sanctions and hard sanctions against Iran, which would include prohibiting sales of dual-use technology and freezing some Iranian assets.  These sanctions would definitely affect the billion-dollar trade flow between Europe and Iran.

Russia

During the time of the Soviet Union, Russia was the largest republic and is now the largest member of the Commonwealth of Independent States.  Russia is a voting member on the U.N. Security Council and, although its economy and world standing has suffered greatly, it remains an extremely influential country.[44]  The Soviet Union developed nuclear technology shortly after the United States and its nuclear arsenal, technology, and scientists, since its fall in late 1991, have been a subject of worldwide concern.[45]

A former Soviet Ministry of Atomic Energy official in 1994 said, “The question is not whether large quantities of highly enriched nuclear material will be stolen, but when.”  The current Russian military is in a crisis.  The standard of living is dreadful and wages are sometimes not paid.[46]  These circumstances create conditions that lead to illegal sales of weapons and nuclear material.  Terrorism expert Jessica Stern claims, “seizures of stolen nuclear material by the authorities appear to have peaked in 1994, but it is unlikely that smuggling has actually decreased.  Rather…it may be that the amateur thieves have become more proficient, that professionals have entered the market, or that the Russian government has become more secretive.”[47]

Another concern presented by the collapse of the Soviet Union is the number of unemployed or underemployed nuclear scientists.  Russia’s 24,600 nuclear scientists earn an estimated $50 per month.[48]  Although the cost of living is significantly lower in Russian when compared to the United States, it creates a dangerous imbalance when nations, like Iran, can take advantage of the situation for their benefit.  During the reign of Saddam Hussein, Russian scientists were begging for the opportunity to work and found employment with Iraq’s nuclear program.  Iran likewise has sought the expertise of Russian Scientists.  In February 1992, the Washington Post reported that some scientists were being released from prison to work on the Iranian nuclear program.  Iran has also sent 500 Iranian nuclear scientists to Russia for technical nuclear training.  Russians and Iranians have a continuous working relationship.  Iranians frequently consult with their Russian colleagues on a number of technical issues.  The staff of Iran’s nuclear and missile programs have contacts within Russian scientific institutes, research hubs, and universities, including the State University of Moscow and the Institute of Nuclear Research at Dubna.[49]

Besides sending students to Russia, Iran has had recruitment programs in Russia.  In October 1992, the Washington Post reported that Iran was endeavoring to enlist unemployed Russian nuclear scientists.  From 1991 to 1992, 14 Russian scientists found work in Iran.  Six were assigned at the Karaj nuclear site, and the others are engaged in research at the Gorgan nuclear facility.  When the media reported that Iran was paying up to $20,000 per month for former Soviet scientists to work on its nuclear program, Iran’s foreign minister rejected the claim as groundless.[50]

The relationship between Russian and Iranian governments is not limited to academic resources and training.  Russia had/has a $1 billion stake in building Iran’s first atomic reactor.[51]  The rebuilding of the Bushehr reactor and developments at other sites have major economic implications for Russia, considering its current poor economic health.

Apparently, despite Russia’s economic and nuclear involvement with Iran, they oppose a nuclear-armed Iran.  Russian President, Vladimir Putin said after a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, “Russia, the Federal Republic (of Germany), and our European partners, and the United States have a very close position on the Iranian problem.”  He continued, “In the Iranian nuclear issue, we need to work very carefully and without taking any abrupt, erroneous steps.”[52]

Certainly, Russia has nothing to gain by arming Iran with nuclear weapons, other than short-term monetary gains.  Russia is geographically in close proximity to Iran and competes with Iran as a seller of oil.  If Iran were to become ambitious, it may aggressively try to acquire oil fields in and along the Caspian Sea.  Despite Russia’s aging military, it could easily launch missiles and aircraft to stop an aggressive Iran.  Although Russia has the means to fight Iran militarily, it is not in an economic position to do so.  Russia would likely rely on diplomatic efforts to curb Iran’s ambitions and sanctions only if hard pressed by the rest of the world.

During a CNN interview on 21 June 2006 with John Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Bolton related that China and Russia are committed to an Iran without nuclear weapons and they [Russia and China] will support “measures” to prevent that from occurring.  He added that the test would be whether Russia and China exercise veto power at the UN Security Council if indeed Iran is referred.[53]

Peoples Republic of China

For the purposes of this analysis, China is omitted from the matrix of actors.  This was done for two reasons.  First, it was an effort to simplify the already complex problem of analyzing the issue.  Secondly, only actors with likelihoods of taking action were included.  China, though it wields power, will probably not participate in either sanctions or military action.  The following section was included to show that China was considered in the problem and that it does contribute to the issue.

Since 1978, China’s communist government and its leaders have focused almost entirely upon improving the nation’s economy.  By 2000, Deng Xiaoping, the communist party leader, had nearly quadrupled China’s economy, and increased the quality of life of its citizens.[54]  China’s booming economy has created a high demand for oil to power its many factories and power plants.  This growing dependence on oil places China as the number two importer of oil in the world.

In 2004, China received 13.6% of its oil from Iran, with plans to increase that number and make new deals for importation of natural gas.  “As China’s booming economy has turned the country into one of the biggest oil consumers in the world, Iran – as OPEC’s [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] second-largest crude oil supplier [after Saudi Arabia] – can only be a natural partner for China,” Zanganeh told China Business Weekly.  Current trade is estimated at over 4 billion dollars per year.  Additionally, China has negotiated the development of a pipeline in Iran that will deliver crude oil directly to China. [55]  China also signed a 100 billion dollar deal to export liquefied natural gas from Iran over the next 25 years as well as 150,000 barrels per day of crude oil over the same period.[56]

China’s current and future dependence on oil will drive its decisions in dealing with Iran.  The U.S. National Intelligence Council estimates that by 2015, only one-tenth of Persian Gulf oil will be directed to Western markets; three quarters will go to Asia.[57]  Although China will not want to alienate the United States, a major consumer and trading partner, it will seek to preserve what it perceives to be in its best interest.  This will probably mean neutrality in any issue that comes before the U.N. regarding Iran.  This is somewhat undesirable from the U.N.’s standpoint because any economic threat or sanction, without the participation of China, would be less than effective.

This is not to say that China will remain a quiet giant in the coming nuclear showdown with Iran.  China maintains excellent relations with the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as well as with U.S. diplomats.  China has already demonstrated that it will act as a negotiator in the situation and will probably seek to be the “peace maker” between Iran and the West.  In 2004, the Chinese foreign minister also told President Khatami that he had spoken with US Secretary of State Colin Powell and British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw regarding the nuclear issue, and made it known to them that Iran was cooperating well with the IAEA.  Consistent with Li’s statements, referring Iran to the Security Council would only make things more problematical.[58]

Another interesting dynamic worth noting is the China-Russia economic relationship.  In addition to the weapons trading, in the past five years, non-military trade involving Russia and China has increased at a regular annual rate of nearly 20%.  Moscow and Beijing have targeted non-military trade to achieve $60 billion by 2010, from $20 billion in 2004.  One of the key components of commercial trade is Russian energy export to China.  In early 2005, Moscow contracted to more than double electricity exports to China, to 800 million kilowatt hours (kWh), by 2006.[59]

Chinese and Russian governments appear to have similar views on the Iran nuclear issue.  They support Iran’s civilian nuclear program and have promised to veto U.N. Security Council actions to curb Iran’s peaceful nuclear intentions.  Yet, they maintain the U.N. party line that a nuclear-armed Iran is not in their interest either.  This seems to serve each nation’s own purpose in maintaining good economic ties with Iran and satisfying the West on the issue.  However, a closer look may reveal that their actions are serving to limit the unilateral power of the United States.  Fear of the world’s only superpower may drive some of the foreign policy of China as well as of Russia.

The United States of America

U.S. History/Policy in the Persian Gulf

Since 1947, containing the growth of Soviet power and influence in the Middle East has been one of the utmost priorities of United States Middle East policy.  Now, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia no longer is a strategic threat to the supply of Persian Gulf oil.  The U.S. has had to rapidly re-assess its policy and restructure its priorities.  The U.S. government is now primarily concerned with assuring steady Western access to Persian Gulf oil, ensuring the security of Israel, America’s most powerful ally in the region, and preserving good working relations with moderate Arab states.[60]

The U.S. has not enjoyed relations with Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, in which U.S. civilians were held hostage and the Shah was exiled.  Before this period however, the two governments enjoyed great economic and political ties.  In 1953, Shaw Muhammad Riza Pahlavi fled Iran for a short period after a power seizure by the militant nationalist premier, Muhammad Mossadegh.  Nevertheless, the Shah quickly regained his throne with the support of monarchist elements with covert U.S. support, a factor henceforth acrimoniously resented by Iranian nationalists, who largely blamed the United States for the Shah’s autocratic and grandiose rule.[61]  As an ally of the U.S., the Shahs enjoyed the support of the U.S. military in supplying equipment and training.  Despite lack of official communication with Iran since 1979, the U.S. government, under the Regan administration, was involved with selling arms to Iran to fund the Contras in Nicaragua and an effort to get American hostages in Lebanon released.[62]

Since the fall of the USSR, American policy has shifted away from deterring Moscow to intervening in regional threats such as the threat presented by Sadam Hussein in his quest to acquire Kuwait.  The United States is the dominant power in the region and controls vast resources in the Persian Gulf, Iraq and Afghanistan as well as in Qatar and Bahrain.

U.S. Interest in Iran

The Bush administration is interested in preventing a nuclear-armed Iran.  Why?  If Iran develops nuclear technology, it can control the Persian Gulf and the flow of oil.  It can also attack Israel and threaten neighboring countries.  If Iran continues development of its Shahab missile program, it will eventually master the inter-continetal-balistic-missile (ICBM) technologies and pose a direct nuclear threat to U.S. soil.  Additionally, the imbalance of power in the region will drive oil prices higher, increasing Iran’s already large oil income.  The higher oil profits will allow Iran to develop its missile and nuclear programs at an even faster rate.

The media and others have accused the Bush administration, in its invasion of Iraq, of fighting a war for oil.  The U.S. interest in invading Iraq however, is not the topic of this paper.  Nevertheless, it does provide a precedent for major U.S. military operations in the region and the issue of oil is an important consideration.

The U.S. imports over 40% of its daily oil consumption, however, only between 15 and 20% of those imports come from the Middle East.  The region of the Middle East, nevertheless, contributes to nearly 75% of the world’s total consumption of oil, greatly affecting the world oil price.[63]  Therefore, with the Soviet Union no longer a threat to the supply of oil, the question of oil is more of an economic one rather than a vital strategic interest.[64]

Regional stability was the strategic goal in overthrowing Sadam and his regime and helping to ensure equilibrium in the supply of oil.  However, saying that the goal of the U.S., in invading Iraq, was to lower the price of oil is shortsighted.  During military operations oil facilities are often damaged, temporarily interrupting the flow of oil.  Additionally, higher oil prices are probably better for the U.S. economy in the end, allowing higher-priced American oil to compete in the world market. Of note is the common misconception that gasoline prices have reached new heights.  Although the price of fuel has risen in the past few years, its price, adjusted for inflation is roughly what it was in 1980. (See following chart.)[65]

Capability to Negotiate/Embargo/Attack Iran

The U.S. is currently waiting for Iran to respond to the U.N. proposal to stop enrichment of fissile material (as of July 5, 2006).  The Bush administration has repeatedly said that it will not negotiate with Iran until Iran stops enrichment.  It appears that both countries have dug in their heels and may have reached an impasse over the enrichment issue.  Fortunately, the U.S. and Iran are still able to communicate somewhat through the U.N. and European countries.

Because the United States is the world’s only superpower and has troops situated on three sides on Iran, it appears as if an embargo or an attack against Iran is easily achievable.  Aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf can maintain a nearly constant salvo of missiles and attack aircraft for as long as necessary.  Without doubt, if the U.S. attacked Iran it could easily neutralize its air assets, communication systems, navy and any other target of value within weeks.[66]  As mentioned earlier, the U.S. military has developed “bunker-buster” bombs that could destroy any underground facility within Iran.  Ground troops, if employed, could dominate the conscript army of Iran and the more capable Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

Despite America’s superiority and capability, the Bush administration has informed the media that it is not planning an invasion of Iran[67], perhaps only limited air strikes against known nuclear facilities.  A consideration and possible goal in attacking Iran is not only the destruction of its weapons arsenal, but a regime change to a more amiable one.

Opponents to U.S. involvement in Iran point to several key concerns:

• Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has not violated the Treaty.  While there appear to be unresolved issues regarding full transparency, its nuclear program, including enriching uranium, is perfectly legal under NPT requirements for non-nuclear weapons states.
• Iran does not have nuclear weapons; even if it is trying to build a nuclear weapons program, it could not produce weapons for five to ten years or more.  [According to recent estimates]
• U.S. officials claim they are not considering an invasion of Iran but “only” surgical air strikes against known nuclear facilities; they have not explained what their military response will be when Iran retaliates, whether against U.S. troops in Iraq or elsewhere in the region, against U.S. oil tankers in near-by shipping lanes, or against Israel.
• Global suspicions remain regarding U.S. claims because of Washington’s lies leading to the invasion of Iraq.[68]

Chapter 2

Steps 4 & 5: Possible Courses of Action and Likely Scenario

There are two courses of action for Israel and three courses of action for the United States, EU-3 and Russia.  China was not included in the analysis in order to simplify the problem.  China in any case will likely maintain the status quo in an effort not to offend either party.  Israel can choose to either attack Iran preemptively or remain on the sidelines, maintaining the status quo.  The U.S., EU-3 and Russian governments have three choices available.  Because they have much larger economies and world trade agreements, they have the added option of utilizing diplomatic and economic measures.  These “diplomatic measures” (for the purpose of this paper) include targeted sanctions, hard sanctions, diplomatic negotiations and a complete embargo.  Three scenarios were considered during the analysis of the situation.

Scenario #1 is the U.S leads a preemptive strike against Iran.  Given Iran’s propensity to defy the West and its desire to acquire nuclear weapons, the first scenario assumes that:

• Iran is referred to the UN Security Council
• Iran is continues enrichment of fissile materials
• Iran continues exploitation of Uranium mines
• Iran continues MRBM and LRBM development
• Iran continues rhetoric against Israel, U.S and the west in general
• Iran continues to support terrorism

Scenario #2 is Israel leads a preemptive strike against Iran.  It assumes all of the points in scenario #1 and that:

• Israel perceives diplomatic measures are ineffective or that Iran is using diplomacy as a stall tactic to continue preparation of a nuclear attack against Israel
• A window of opportunity exists for Israel to execute a limited strike against Iran’s nuclear weapon fuel
• Iran does not immediately retaliate against Israel or the U.S.

Scenario #3 is the least likely of all.  It assumes:

• Iran ceases enrichment and complies with U.N. regulations
• Iran terminates uranium mine exploration
• Iran’s missile systems are controlled
• Iran’s rhetoric against Israel stops
• Iran ceases to support terrorism
• The world (including the U.S.) perceives that Iran is no longer a threat and is complying with all U.N. demands

Chapter 3

Steps 6, 7, 8 & 9: An Analysis of Alternative Futures

In order to calculate the total number of permutations of possible “alternate futures” for each scenario a simple formula is applied.

(X^Y) * (I^Y) = Z  or   X^Y = Z

X= the number of courses of action available to the EU-3, Russia and the U.S.

Y= the number of actors involved who have the same courses of action available to them

I= the number of courses of action available to Israel

Z= the total number of alternate future to be compared.

Scenario #1: U.S. leads a preemptive strike against Iran

(3^2) * (2^1) = 18

There are 18 alternative futures in scenario #1

Scenario #2: Israel leads preemptive strike against Iran.

3^3 = 27

There are 27 alternative futures in scenario #2

Scenario #3: Iran ceases enrichment & complies with UN demands.

There is only one future in scenario #3.  No nation attacks Iran, trade resumes and Iran coexists peacefully with the world.  No analysis will be performed on scenario #3.

A pair wise comparison of all alternate future to determine their probability was conducted.  The following tables show all possible permutations in ranking order after a pair wise comparison vote was performed.  Each of the alternate futures for each scenario from the highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of votes received is displayed.  Results of individual votes cast in each case are not provided due to lack of space.

Scenario #1  U.S. leads a preemptive strike against Iran

Scenario #2 Israel leads limited a preemptive strike against Iran

Analysis of Alternative Futures in Terms of the Consequences for the Issue

At this point in the analysis the highest and lowest ranking alternate futures will be analyzed to determine if there are any patterns that will be useful for determining the potential for those futures to transpose into other alternative future.

Scenario #1 Futures with the highest number of votes

Scenario #1 Futures with the lowest number of votes

It is clear that there is no one apparent alternate future.  The future with the most votes wins by only a narrow margin.  Perhaps the result is indicative of the complicated nature of world politics and this issue.  There are patterns, however, that can show trends of what one might expect should the U.S. lead a strike against Iran.  The first evident pattern is that in an attack led by the U.S. other actors are likely to not join the U.S. in military action.  The second obvious pattern is that Russia is not likely to join the U.S. in a military strike at all, but it is willing to participate in diplomatic pressure.  It appears that if the U.S. were to initiate a strike against Iran, other countries would only provide economic and diplomatic assistance, precluding major aggression from Iran.

Scenario #2 Futures with the highest number of votes

Scenario #2 Futures with the lowest number of votes

Quickly, one can see that if Israel were to attack Iran, it would most likely be doing it alone.  However, it would receive major diplomatic support from nearly all countries, probably in an effort to deter Iran from retaliating.  The U.S. is clearly its strongest supporter followed by EU-3 and finally Russia.  The futures least likely to occur are joint Israel/Russia attack on Iran followed by a joint EU-3/Israel attack.  It is clear that the actions of the U.S. have a large influence on the actions of the other actors.

Chapter 4

Step 10: Consequences and Potentials of Transposition

Potentials of Transposition

The most likely alternate future for transposition in Scenario #1 is alternative future (AF) #1 into AF #7.  This could occur if Israel discerns that the U.S. is not striking “hard enough” or is not striking important targets.  This could also transpose if Israel determines it wants “ownership” for its own defense, instead of relying solely on the U.S. for protection.

In Scenario #2, the most likely alternate future that could transpose is AF #14 into AF #4.  This could occur if the U.S. perceives that Israel is not “up to the task.”  The U.S. would also quickly come to Israel’s defense if intelligence ascertains that Iran is eminently preparing for attack against either U.S. forces or Israeli forces.

Chapter 5

Steps 11 & 12: Focal Events and Indicators

The following “focal events” must occur in order for Scenario #1 (The U.S. leads a preemptive strike against Iran) AF#’s 10, 4, and 16 to come about:

• Iran is referred to the UN Security Council
• Iran continues enrichment of fissile materials
• Iran continues exploitation of Uranium mines
• Iran continues MRBM and LRBM development
• Iran continues rhetoric against Israel, U.S., and the West in general
• The U.S. envisages that diplomatic pressures have resulted in a stalemate

Specifically, for the EU to implement economic sanctions against Iran, but not commit troops for military action, the following may occur (AF#10):

• Britain’s Prime Minister, Tony Blair, is unable to gain support for committing military forces to attack Iran
• France and Germany successfully continue anti-war campaigning
• The EU commits to economic sanctioning against Iran
• The U.S. offers economic incentives to European companies or nations that will suffer economically if they were to sanction Iran

The EU may join the U.S. militarily and enforce economic sanctions if (AF# 4):

• The EU gains continent-wide support for military action against Iran
• More terrorist attacks occur in Europe, turning the popular opinion toward a war against Iran and terrorist organizations in general
• The EU decides to take this opportunity to flex its new military power and demonstrate to the world that it is a new superpower, able to project economic power as well as military

The EU will not join in any economic or military actions if (AF #16):

• The EU is unable to come to any consensus either militarily or economically concerning action against Iran
• The local European Muslim population influences the governments and populations to the effect that they feel they cannot act against Iran
• The EU feels that a military or economic effort against Iran will be too great a loss
• The EU discerns that a limited attack against Iran from the U.S. will not disrupt EU’s economic endeavor’s in the long run and does not wish to risk losing Iranian business
• The EU decides that it will reap more benefits by staying on the sidelines

The following events must occur in order for Scenario #2 (Israel leads a preemptive strike against Iran) to come about (AF#’s 13, 12, 15, and 16):

• Israel perceives diplomatic measures are ineffective or that Iran is using diplomacy as a stall tactic to continue preparation of a nuclear attack against Israel
• A window of opportunity exists for Israel to execute a limited strike against Iran’s nuclear weapon fuel
• Israel suspects that other countries will not take action to prevent Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons
• Israeli intelligence indicates that an attack by Iran is eminent

In particular, Russia will not employ economic sanctions and the U.S. and EU will not assist Israel militarily if (AF# 13):

• Russia’s promised actions to limit Iran’s nuclear reactors are unfulfilled
• Russia continues to send scientists to assist Iranian nuclear endeavors
• The U.S. observes that Israel is striking nuclear/missile targets successfully and Iran poses no immediate threat to Israel or to U.S. forces
• The E.U. follows U.S. lead

Russia, the EU and the U.S. will employ economic sanctions however will not aide Israel militarily if (AF#12):

• Russia stops sending scientists and support to Iran
• The E.U. follows U.S. lead
• The U.S. observes that Israel is attacking successfully and Iran poses no immediate threat to Israel or to U.S. forces

However, the EU may not support sanctions even if the U.S. and Russia do if (AF# 15):

• Russia stops sending scientists and support to Iran
• The E.U. does not follow the U.S. lead
• The EU is unable to come to any consensus either militarily or economically concerning action against Iran
• The local European Muslim population influences the governments and populations to the effect that they feel they cannot act against Iran
• The EU feels that a military or economic effort against Iran will be too great a loss
• The EU discerns that a limited attack against Iran from the U.S. will not disrupt EU’s economic endeavor’s in the long run and does not wish to risk losing Iranian business
• The EU decides that it will reap more benefits by staying on the sidelines
• The U.S. observes that Israel is attacking successfully and Iran poses no immediate threat to Israel or to U.S. forces

Indicators That May Precede Scenarios 1 & 2

• Iran prepares for sanctions/war
• Iran rations fuel
  • To stockpile for military use in the event of war
  • To build up national supply in order to prepare for sanctions
• Iran builds military
  • Purchases new military equipment
  • Allocates resources for military
  • Signs new mutual defense agreements with neighbors
  • Adds additional troops through draft
  • Additional training exercises
• Iran combines nuclear weapons with missiles
  • Moves medium or long range missiles to nuclear storage sites
  • Moves nuclear warhead to missile site
• Iran expels IAEA inspectorsIran consolidates foreign assets
• Iran declares aggressive nuclear weapon intentions
• Outside factors which contribute to a hostile Iran
  • China and Russia do not take an aggressive stance with regard to Iran nuclear weapons
  • The EU-3 does not respond to Iran’s defiance of U.N. demands
  • The U.S. refuses to negotiate directly with Iran

Discriminating factors that may prelude scenario #1 are:

• Iran directly attacks U.S. troops in Iraq or in the Persian Gulf
• Additional terrorist attacks against the U.S. on U.S. soil occur
• U.S. civilians or companies are targeted by Iranian supported terrorist organizations
• The U.S. President receives congressional support for an attack against Iran
• The EU collaborates with the U.S. and supports an attack against Iran
• North Korea maintains the status quo
• No major terrorist actions in Iraq

Particular indicators that may precede scenario #2 are:

• The U.S. does not act militarily on a time scale consistent with what Israel believes is necessary to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapon capability (Israel says the U.S. is taking too long.)
• Iran attacks Israel through surrogate means
• Iran funnels money/troops/equipment to Hezbollah to use in an attack against Israel
• Iran covertly attacks Israel through acts of sabotage
• The U.S. President Bush is unable to gain congressional support for military action against Iran
• A future U.S. President ran on a “anti-war” platform and does not support military action
• The U.S. suffers a major military setback in Iraq or war escalates with North Korea or another country.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Has the nuclear situation in Iran reached the point of no return?  Will Iran’s leadership acquiesce to U.N. demands?  Can war with Iran be averted?  How will the world react to a war with Iran?  Will the United States lead an attack on Iran or will Israel beat us to the punch?  Will Iran strike Israel first?  What will happen to the price of oil?  How many people will die?  Will the form of government in Iran change?  Does Iran really have nuclear weapon ambitions?  How long before they acquire them if they do?  How will a war with Iran affect the American way of life?  Will there be more terrorist attacks if we provoke Iran?  Is this the “right” thing to do?

These questions and more occupy the minds of world leaders and politicians, analysts, and citizens alike.  This paper briefly analyzed the current situation and the major factors surrounding the issue.  At the conclusion of the paper (July 5, 2006), Israeli attacks along the Gaza Strip have increased, further increasing the likelihood of military action in the region.  Iran continues to enrich fissile material and develop its missile systems.  The U.N.’s demands on Iran have gone unanswered.  History has shown that negotiations with rogue states prove ineffective.  Even if Iran signs agreements, unless it perceives that it was not “forced” to do so, the agreement will eventually fail, as it did in the case of North Korea.

Having used Dr. Lockwood’s method for analysis, the paper shows that if national actors continue along the current path, military action against Iran is likely.  Additionally, if either the U.S. or Israel leads an attack, they will likely not enjoy the military support of other nations.  This analysis provides also provides a list of focal events and indicators that may precede military action against Iran.  These indicators can serve as a warning and prediction of events yet to occur.  The margin for error in this analysis is great, however, it shows major trends and patterns that are congruent with current intelligence forecasts.[69]  The method employed is a “logical method for illuminating the many possible paths the future may take.”[70]  As with all analyses this paper and its pair wise comparisons need to be updated periodically as events unfold and new situations develop in order to remain current.

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Footnotes

[1] Betts, Richard. New Threat of Mass Destruction (Council on Foreign Relations Jan./Feb. 1998), 1

[2] State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002. President George W. Bush

[3] Perry, Richard. Rogue or Rational State?: A Nuclear Armed Iran and US Counter Proliferation Strategy (n.p. ACSC, 1997), iv.

[4] Cyrus Vakili-Zad. Collision of Consciousness: Modernization and Development in Iran (Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, no. 3, July 1996), 139.

[5] Ibid, 139-140

[6] Access July 11, 2006 Online: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/leadership.htm

[7] Browne, E. G. (1989). The Tobacco Rebellion and Haji Mirza Hasan Shirazi. Expectation of the millennium: Shi’ism in History/ edited by Nasr, Dabashi, Nasr. State University of New York Press. Ch. 20, Pp 302-305.

[8] Perry, Richard M., “Rogue or Rational State?: A Nuclear Armed Iran and US Counter Proliferation Strategy” Air Command and Staff College, 1997, 8.

[9] Tibi, Bassam. “The Challenge of Fundamentalism Political Islam and the New World Disorder.” (University of California Press, 1998.),17.

[10] Chubin, Shahram. Iran National Security Policy (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), 25.

[11] Perry, Richard M. “Rogue or Rational State?: A Nuclear Armed Iran and US Counter Proliferation Strategy” (Air Command and Staff College, 1997), 10-11.

[12] Perry, Richard. “Rogue or Rational State?: A Nuclear Armed Iran and U.S. Counter Proliferation Strategy.” (n.p. ACSC, 1997), 12

[13] Chubin, Shahram. Iran National Security Policy (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), 12.

[14] Accessed July 11, 2006 Online: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull462/treaty_nukes_3.html

[15] Accessed July 11, 2006 Online: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/nuke/index.html

[16] “Russian-Iran Protocol provides Evidence of Discussion, But No Firm Agreement, On Sale of Centrifuge Plant for Uranium Enrichement,” Natural Resources Defense Council, New Release, May 10, 1995.

[17] An Assessment of Iran’s Nuclear Facilities (The Nonproliferation Review, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Spring-Summer 1995, Vol.2., No.3), 3.

[18] An Assessment of Iran’s Nuclear Facilities (The Nonproliferation Review, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Spring-Summer 1995, Vol.2., No.3.), 5.

[19] Perry, Richard M. Rogue or Rational State?: A Nuclear Armed Iran and US Counter Proliferation Strategy (Air Command and Staff College, 1997), 16-17.

[20] Triplett, William C. III. Rogue State How a Nuclear North Korea Threatens America (Regnery Publishing Company, 2004), 171.

[21] “Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes – A Net Assessment.” (International Institute for Strategic Studies, Sept. 6, 2005), 3.

[22] Federation of American Scientists Shahab-3; Accessed online June 19, 2006. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/shahab-3.htm

[23] “Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes – A Net Assessment.” (International Institute for Strategic Studies, Sept. 6, 2005), 4.

[24] Accessed July 28, 2006 Online: http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/transcripts/2006/jan/060123.gradstein.html

[25] al-Turabi, Hassan. (untitled article in al-Mustaqbal al-‘Arabi (Arabic) vol.8, May 1985), 77.

[26] Marty, Martin and Appleby, Scott. Fundamentalisms Observed, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 819.

[27] Accessed July 11, 2006 Online: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/israel/palestin.htm

[28] Accessed July 28, 2006 Online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1908671.stm

[29] Bard, Mitchell. Potential Threats to Iran (Accessed June 2006) Available on-line at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Threats_to_Israel/Iran.html

[30] Sands, David. Israelis urge U.S. to Stop Iran’s Nuke Goals (The Washington Times, Sept. 30, 2005)

[31] Accessed July 28, 2006 Online: http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/transcripts/2006/jan/060123.gradstein.html

[32] Accessed July 11, 2006 Online: www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/Lotz.html

[33] Accessed July 11, 2006 Online: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Iraq/IraqAtoZ.html

[34] Analytical Center for Non-Proliferation. Earth Penetrating Weapons; Accessed Online July 2 2006 http://npc.sarov.ru/english/digest/32001/appendix6.html

[35] New Iranian Missile ‘Can Reach Israel’ (The Daily Telegraph (London), 6 October 2004.)

[36] US to Sell Bunker Bombs to Israel (BBC 28 April, 2005 Available On-line: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4493443.stm)

[37]Mossad the Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks; Accessed On-line July 9, 2006 http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/israel/mossad.htm

[38] Accessed July 11, 2006 Online: http://europa.eu/pol/comm/index_en.htm

[39] Accessed July 11, 2006 Online http://www.cato.org/dailys/7-24-98.html

[40]IAEA Information Circular; Accessed July 9, 2006 Online: www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf

[41] Israel is assumed to have nuclear weapons, however it denies possession and has never tested any to date.

[42] FM Livni addresses EU Ministers in Luxemburg (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 14, 2006; Available Online see: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/MFA+Spokesman/2006/FM+Livni+addresses+EU+ministers+in+Luxemburg+14-Jun-2006.htm)

[43] An agreement to create such a force was originally created in 1999, but until 2004, it was not finalized.

[44] Accessed July 11, 2006 Online: http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html

[45] Stern, Jessica. The Ultimate Terrorists (Harvard University Press. 1999), 89.

[46] Penny Morvant. Army Housing Shortage Continues (OMRI Daily Digest 2 April, 1996.)

[47] Stern, Jessica. The Ultimate Terrorists (Harvard University Press. 1999), 89.

[48] Jon B. Wolfsthal. “Russia: Surveying Nuclear Cities” (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2001(vol. 57, no. 04)), 15-17.

[49] Jack Boureston and Charles D. Ferguson “Schooling Iran’s Atom Squad” (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists May/June 2004(vol. 60, no. 03)), 31-35.

[50] Ibid.

[51]“Iran Crisis: World Powers at odds” (CNN.COM Wednesday, January 18, 2006, On-line at: http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/01/17/iran.nuclear/)

[52] “Putin: Step Carefully with Iran” (CNN.COM Monday, January 16, 2006, Online at: http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/01/16/russia.iran/index.html)

[53] Viewed live by author, transcript available Online: http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0606/21/ldt.01.html

[54] CIA World Fact Book: Accessed June 20, 2006 On-Line: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html

[55] Bezlova, Antoaneta. “China Iran tango threatens US leverage” (Asia Times Nov 30, 2004.)

[56] Gundzik, Jephraim P. “The tie that bind Russia, China and Iran” (Asia Times; June 06, 2005.)

[57] “Global Trends 205: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts” NIC Publication, Feb. 2000.

[58] Bezlova, Antoaneta. “China Iran tango threatens US leverage” (Asia Times Nov 30, 2004.)

[59] Gundzik, Jephraim P. “The Ties that Bind Russia, China and Iran” ( Asia Times; June 06, 2005.)

[60] Phillips, James A. “Rethinking US Policy in the Middle East” (The Heritage Foundation, April 1992.)

[61] Accessed July 11, 2006 online: http://www.worldalmanac.com/newsletter/200601WAE-Newsletter.html

[62] Rockwell, Kara. “A Tale of Three Countries: The Iran-Contra Affair” (Answer Point.org March 10, 2005 On Line at: http://www.answerpoint.org/columns2.asp?column_id=1165&column_type=feature)

[63] Accessed July 28, 2006 Online: http://www.gravmag.com/oil.html

[64] Phillips, James A. “Rethinking US Policy in the Middle East” (The Heritage Foundation, April 1992.)

[65] Accessed July 28, 2006 Online: http://www.randomuseless.info/gasprice/gasprice.html

[66] Based on military successes in Iraq and Afghanistan during both Gulf Wars

[67] Accessed July 15, 2006 online: http://www.dailyindia.com/show/33789.php/The-Almanac
[68] Bennis, Phyllis New War Dangers: Iran, the U.S. and Nukes in the Middle East (Institute for Policy Studies March 15, 2006.)

[69] http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/01/24/opinion/fenton/main668668.shtml

[70] Lockwood, Dr. Jonathan S., and Kathleen O. Lockwood. The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) (Monograph with 1994 Copyright pending. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 1993), 54.

 —

Written by: Chad Cooper
Written at: American Military Academy
Date written: 2006

Further Reading on E-International Relations

• The Puzzle of U.S. Foreign Policy Revision Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program
• Deterrence and Ambiguity: Motivations behind Israel’s Nuclear Strategy
• Cybersecurity: A National Security Issue?
• Halakhah and Omnicide: Legality of Tactical Nuclear Weapons under Jewish Law
• Security as a Normative Issue: Ethical Responsibility and the Copenhagen School
• Directors of the Apocalypse: A Tale of Russo-Soviet Nuclear Mismanagement