It sounds great to say that all humans are equal, that human rights are unquestionably universal. But in such a large and diverse world, are there ideas and values that can truly be called universal? Do universal values come from an objective body of thought transcendent above humanity, or do they represent the values formulated under the auspices of the powerful? Central to the contested role of morality and justice in international politics is whether or not states are bound, or should be bound, by some objective and universal morality. If there is indeed such a morality, do states have an obligation to subject their policies and interests to a universal standard of justice? If not, is there any hope of creating a true world community of people?

Whether or not such an achievement is possible or desirable, it is beyond the scope of the current world order. The international system, comprised as it is of a society of sovereign states, necessarily stands as a barrier to universal morality. The ideal of cosmopolitanism, envisioning humanity as a singular and unified moral community, is impossible in a world where the primary political unit is the state.[1]

I briefly introduce the argument for cosmopolitanism before going into the grounding for my claim. In defending this claim, I look at the importance of states as the principal agents in international politics. I also explore the environment in which states operate in today, drawing connections between the modern world and different conceptions of the state of nature. Next, I discuss the importance of nationalism in shaping identity and distinguish international morality as a consensus of different state moralities from universal or cosmopolitan morality. Finally, I address the relationship between world society and world government, applying the framework of cosmopolitanism in the absence of a world government to global distributive justice.

It is important to make clear what this paper is not. It is not a claim one way or the other about the existence of universal morality or world justice. I do not speculate on the content of such a conception of morality or justice. It is also neither an apologetic nor polemical writing on the current international system. It may be true that universal morality does not exist or that the world would be better off with a world government. But, while these questions may be hinted at, I do not directly address them. What I focus on in this paper is the idea that universal morality, whatever its content may be, is impossible as long as the primary political unit remains the state.

Beitz and the Argument for Cosmopolitanism

In his seminal work Political Theory and International Relations, Charles Beitz constructs the foundation for a normative theory of international relations. He labels his theory as “cosmopolitan” and contrasts it with both the skepticism of international morality and the morality of states.[2] Beitz quickly dismisses the position of the skeptic on the grounds that one cannot believe that there are no moral restrictions for states without endorsing a general view that there are no moral restrictions for individuals.[3]

The second position, the morality of states, is derived from the conceptualization of international relations as a Hobbesian state of nature. International morality is impossible because of the constant state of war in the absence of a common coercive power. What we have is a collection of different moralities whose source lies in the state. Beitz engages this argument by disputing the claim that international relations is analogous to Thomas Hobbes’ state of nature. He posits that the international system fulfills none of the criteria necessary to be classified as a Hobbesian state of nature.[4]

From here, Beitz introduces his idea of international morality. Without specifying its precise content, he argues that there is a standard which imposes requirements on the actions of states without necessarily linking to self-interest.[5] This is the opposite of political realists like Hans Morgenthau, who argued that morality was one thing to be weighed in relation to the greater goal of interest.[6] For Beitz, interest is one thing to be weighed in relation to the greater idea of morality.[7]

The basis for a cosmopolitan ideal also conflicts with the way Hedley Bull viewed the international system, as a society of states (or international society). Such a society exists when a group of states are aware of common interests and values, work through common institutions, and “conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another.”[8] While Bull’s conception of international politics is a far cry from the realists’ state of war, it maintains the state as the crucial actor of international relations and shuns cosmopolitanism as viable within the current system.

The Importance of States as Principal Agents

Thus far, I have not challenged Beitz because I do not necessarily disagree with the points summarized above. The problem is that he claims his cosmopolitan ideal for a universal morality “is not equivalent to, nor does it necessarily imply, a political program like those often identified with political universalism, world federalism, or ‘world order.'”[9] A very similar idea can be found in the work of Immanuel Kant, who argued that the cosmopolitan right of nations, as well as the state of perpetual peace, would be based on a “federation of peoples.”[10] This federation would not be the same as an international state; Kant considered the rights of states in light of their relation to one another and not “welded together as a unit.”[11] Beitz draws a distinction between moral and political structures, arguing that global principles can be realized without a global state.

However, this distinction is artificial at worst and problematic at best. One cannot separate moral and political structures because the former flow from the latter. The principal agent determines morality. In domestic society, people are the principal agents. It is from people that government is created, that conceptions of morality are given substance. The state represents an aggregation of will because it – theoretically at least – maintains order for the sake of the interests and goals of society as defined by society.[12] This is true for Hobbes as well. On some level the establishment of the sovereign requires the rise of a power greater than others to dominate. However, consent from the people is also vital because the people are authors of this establishment in that they transfer the rights of governing themselves to the sovereign.[13] The state then embodies the will and goals of society, although at the same time the ruling body has power to choose those goals and the best ways of achieving them.[14]

From principal agents (people) comes the political structure (the state). From the political structure comes society’s concept of justice. Moral structures are a vital component of domestic society. Augustine said that if you take justice out of a kingdom, what is left is nothing but a “gang of criminals on a large scale.”[15] However, it is society and not morality that is prior to the political construct. Before the political structure is in place, society may simply be a great mass of people with similar values. The establishment of a state gives voice and substance to morality, transforming society from a great mass into a unified body working towards defined societal ends.

In the international realm, morality flows from the principal political structure, the state. Beitz’s condition that states be the only actor in the international sphere need not hold in order to maintain states as the source for morality in international politics. All that is necessary is to establish that states are principal agents. This is a rather easy task. It is difficult to imagine an actor of greater importance than the state. Whether in the news, in school, or in daily conversation, states are the main focus in international affairs.

For neorealist Kenneth N. Waltz, the state is the “acting unit” of international politics despite being an abstraction.[16] This is because the state is an established unit to a degree that its decisions are largely seen as the decisions of the whole. State policy is formulated, presented, and accepted as the general will of the state. Dissenters within are either those who failed to translate their convictions into concrete change, or those who perceive their long run interest in remaining loyal and attempt to influence decision-making from within domestically accepted means[17]. Moreover, in times of crisis, any effort to garner a nearly unanimous backing for foreign policy is likely to succeed. The sense of states as unitary actors draws upon “not only indigenous factors, but also the antagonisms that frequently occur in international relations.”[18]

Although there are exceptions, the field of political science largely views the state as the main actor of world politics.[19] This does not deny the importance of non-state actors. International organizations, terrorist groups, transnational movements, and corporations are just a few examples of the non-state actors that are becoming increasingly more important. Yet, many of these actors largely exist in relation to states. Relations with states often define non-state actors. International organizations are comprised of states. Terrorist groups often react against states. Most individuals cannot influence international politics except through the apparatus of the state.[20] Despite the rise of privatized monopolies of violence, transnational networks, and global interdependence, there is little evidence that these factors will displace the relations between states as the main driver of international politics.[21] Various NGOs have been able to function as norm entrepreneurs, reaching within states to create and reshape social norms. However, that there is a need for such non-state actors to do this implies the importance of states as acting units. The state is primary conduit for concrete action and change in the international system. The fact that NGOs seek to influence social norms within a state does not challenge this assertion, but rather reinforces the need to direct state action because of its importance.

While some abstract and objective body of morality might theoretically exist in the clouds, it will generally be imperfectly embodied and enforced by any institution that is composed of a multitude of sovereign units. The source of morality is not the greater institution tasked with enforcement but the political units that comprise the institution. The argument that legitimacy in international politics descends from a “willowy, disembodied international level rather than handed upwards from concrete, legitimate democratic publics… virtually invites abuse on the part of elites who are then free to interpret the will of the international community to suit their own preferences.”[22] Beitz’s critique of the morality of states rests on his refutation of international relations as a Hobbesian state of nature. But, all that is needed to establish the morality of states is that the state is the primary political unit of the international system. Beitz’s critique is insufficient to dismiss the morality of states. The cosmopolitan morality that he calls for cannot truly emerge until the source of morality no longer lies at the level of the state. In other words, the main political unit of international relations must change.

Understanding the Condition of International Relations

Acknowledging that states are the principal agents of international relations does not mean that the interaction among states must resemble a Hobbesian world. Beitz’s critique of realism is valid on many levels. Of course, one can easily conceive of the world as a more uncertain and dangerous place than any particular state. The size and diversity of the world, acting “like a confluence of waters,” implies that there is more potential for danger compared to any other conceivable community.[23] However, this alone does not prove that the international system is analogous to Hobbes state of nature.

In an international Hobbesian state of nature, we would expect to see no binding agreements between states in the absence of a regulatory power. Yet states appear to frequently abide by international treaties and customs despite the lack of such a regulatory body. In Hobbes’ international world, states would have the “posture of gladiators” with “their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed upon the frontiers of their kingdoms.”[24] However, we do not see this as the dominant feature of international relations today. International anarchy has not prevented international trade and cooperation. Furthermore, the possibility of war breaking out between states at any moment is not so overwhelming that international order is only a fantasy. Just as order in a domestic society is not maintained solely by fear from the supreme power, so it is that other factors such as “reciprocal interest, a sense of community or general will, and habit or inertia” play a role in maintaining order in the international sphere.[25]

A common realist challenge to these points is that many states simply have a coincidence of interest. When states do not have to sacrifice anything substantial, then there is no real cooperation. What some label cooperation, realists simply see as coordination of different policies towards the same common interest. For Morgenthau, international law exists because of the distribution of power in the system and identical or complementary interests among states.[26] States sign treaties when it is in their interest and do not sign when it is not. However, this is far too simplistic to be an effective counter-argument because it assumes that state interests are fixed. The treaty making process plays a role in shaping the interests and goals of states. It is a “creative enterprise through which the parties not only weigh the benefits and burdens of commitment but explore, redefine, and sometimes discover their interests.”[27] Treaty making is a learning process.[28]

It is also very difficult to explain overall compliance with international agreements. Such a sweeping statement about how states generally observe treaty obligations cannot be supported by any rigorous statistical or empirical calculus.[29] Even Morgenthau concedes that there are moral rules that prevent states from taking certain actions of political expedience.[30] Moreover, to say that a state observes international agreements only when it aligns with its interests is tautological. At some level, a state always sees it in its interest to comply. To argue that morality or law is largely irrelevant based on coincidence of interest is to miss the point in the first place. The importance of international law is not found in “the willingness of states to abide by its principles to the detriment of their interest, but in the fact that they so often judge it in their interest to conform to it.”[31] Indeed, there have been many examples of a “restraint in the exercise of power, of [a] refusal to exploit an advantage, where the motive seems to have been… better relations.”[32]

As opposed to Hobbes’ condition of everyone against one another, Bull argues that the international system bears much more resemblance to John Locke’s state of nature.[33] Like Hobbes, Locke’s world is devoid of a common power. However, the Lockean version has a “Law of Nature” that obliges everyone not to “harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.”[34] Not only is each person the executor of the law, but all rulers of “independent governments… are in a State of Nature” with one another.[35] Correspondingly, states in the international system are the ones who interpret and execute international law. Men can make compacts and agreements with one another without leaving the state of nature, explaining how states can make international agreements amongst themselves without ending the state of nature in the international system.

Locke also distinguishes between the state of nature and the state of war. Entering the latter requires “Word or Action… [by] Design, upon another Mans Life.”[36] The state of war, when one threatens the life or freedom of another, entitles the threatened person to fight until the “actual force is over” and the state of war comes to an end.[37] Just war theory seems an appropriate international analogy to the distinction between a state of nature and a state of war among men. As in Locke’s division, just war theory highlights not only when war is an appropriate measure to take – at its core for self-defense, although modifications to the theory have expanded the reasons for war – but also what constitutes just conduct in war.[38]

Since just war theory has been a long-accepted practice among states, it seems clear that sets of expectations, maybe even reciprocity, play a role in international politics similar to their role in Locke’s state of nature. As the principal agent in international politics, a state has an inherent right to protect the lives of its citizens and the political territory that constitutes itself. Beitz argues that war under the justification of self-preservation disappears once the scope of “national survival” extends beyond the protection of the state’s citizens.[39] However, this assertion cannot possibly hold if states are considered the principal agents of international relations. It is not just the people that comprise the state but also the territory, the institutions, the regime, and the relationship among all of these elements. As a political community, states have the right to self-preservation of their whole because an attack on a state is an attack “not only [on individual] lives, but also [on] the sum of things [the people] value most, including the political association they have made.”[40]

Nationalism and Identity

The following story is a familiar one. People are said to be of a nation because they were born from the earth. The god that fashioned people mixed different metals or elements into each person’s body at birth: gold for the rulers, silver for the defenders of the order, and iron and bronze for the rest of the masses. In this society, everyone has a particular role in caring for and defending the land.[41] The purpose of Plato’s noble lie was to foster a sense of nationalism and make people willing to fight, and if necessary die, for the protection of their land. The myth served the purpose of “making [the people] care more for the city and one another.”[42] Nationalism, then, is simply a social and political construction.

Of course, we do not need to analyze Plato to realize this underlying truth of nationalism. Simply looking at territorial borders today can illuminate the point as well. Consider many post-colonial regions such as the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Most of the countries in these places today did not exist a century ago. Are we to expect that the countries of Tanzania, Iraq, or Cambodia actually embody a national group united in ethnic, religious, historical, and linguistic heritage? Or consider Belgium, where the division between the Flemish and the Walloons has led some to say that Belgium “does not exist.”[43] The idea of national identity corresponding to national boundaries appears ridiculous in the case of Indonesia, where one country encompasses thousands of inhabited islands and hundreds of ethnicities and languages.

Yet this social and political construction has been one of the most influential forces in world affairs. Nationalism helped drive a majority of the revolutions in the twentieth century. Today, nationalism stands as one of the strongest barriers to Beitz’s cosmopolitan ideal. Nationalism is not inherently bad, but it is often used to differentiate people. Collective bonding can often “bolster our narrow selves” by providing a limited but intensely strong base of support that gains influence at the expense of broader connections with those in different crowds.[44] Because nationalism clearly defines an “us” and a “them,” it can lead to polarized and unfavorable views towards people who are not part of the same national group. Often, the “gifts of inclusion” are accompanied by the “adversity of exclusion.”[45]

It is important not to exaggerate national identity too much. After all, one type of identity does not completely define a person. An Irish citizen living in Ecuador can identify with the culture in both countries while also being a Buddhist. One of the most distinguishing traits of humans is that we are defined by a multiplicity of identities which can change in terms of relative importance depending on the context.[46] The problem generally occurs when one particular identity is emphasized over all others. What Amartya Sen calls “choiceless singularity” can have the devastating effect of not only reducing the capacity of social and political reasoning but also igniting hatred and violence.[47] However, it is clear that Plato’s noble lie, despite being a myth, holds much relevance in the world today. National identities cannot be dismissed simply because they might be social constructions. Just as there is some truth in most stereotypes, there is also some truth in most national identities. What is important is not so much whether or not people can actually be defined in terms of multiple identities, but rather how people respond when faced with singular classifications.

For example, Lee Kuan Yew, the former Prime Minister of Singapore once explained the fundamental difference between Western and East Asian values with this qualification: “[W]hen I say East Asians, I mean Korea, Japan, China, Vietnam, as distinct from Southeast Asia, which is a mix between the Sinic and the Indian.”[48] Whatever the reality of the differences between and among East Asian and Southeast Asian cultures, Lee Kuan Yew clearly saw a particular identity that grouped Korean, Japanese, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Singaporean cultures together while excluding Malaysian, Thai, Laotian, Indian, and Burmese cultures.

Another example is the Shia community of Iraq. Shias constitute a majority of both Iraq and Iran. In the war between these two countries during the 1980s, Iran urged the Shias of Iraq to rise up and overthrow the ruling Ba’thist regime. Iran’s leadership appealed to commonalities in religion and belief, as well as their oppressed condition under Saddam Hussein. But while some of Iraq’s Shias did follow Iran, many were unconvinced and continued to support their national government, despite the fact that Hussein’s government was predominately Sunni. Even though Shias in both countries were linked by the bonds of faith, most Iraqis pledged their allegiance to the Iraqi territorial state.[49]

Morgenthau defined world public opinion as “opinion that transcends national boundaries and that unites members of different nations in a consensus with regard to at least certain fundamental international issues.”[50] After the First World War, many people accepted the definition of self-determination found within President’s Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points. Groups struggling for independence would repeatedly assert the right of self-determination with Wilson’s speech as the philosophical foundation and justification. Morgenthau also argued that the victory of nationalism in the twentieth century signaled the death of the internationalism and shared morality that was present in nineteenth-century Europe.[51] If world public opinion can be said to exist today, nationalism is one of those fundamental international issues over which there is a consensus. Most people in the United States probably see themselves as the “us” and Mexicans, Japanese, Russians, French, and Iranians as the “them.” This is true all over the world. By nature, humans tend to identify more with people in their more immediate environments.

Because state sovereignty embodies nationalism, the support of world public opinion for nationalism is also support for maintaining the current state system. Of course, there are broad movements of people who argue that all humans are entitled to the same rights. A person suffering in Darfur should receive the same moral consideration as someone enslaved by the Burmese military junta. People in underdeveloped countries are humans just like those in Canada or Britain. But right now, the strength and exclusivity of nationalism prevents the notion of humanity as a single moral community from emerging. Until world public opinion moves away from the current conception of nationalism, cosmopolitan morality will remain impossible because “world society and universal morality [will] not exist.”[52]

“International” Morality vs. Cosmopolitan Morality

While I argue that universal morality is impossible under the current international system, I do not deny that it is possible for a majority of states to come to a general consensus on the content of morality as it applies to states. For example, virtually all states have signed and ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Putting aside the fact that current adherence to the UDHR is laughable, perfect compliance and enforcement are not required to make the declaration part of an international morality. As with law, a system of moral restraints does not mean that specific rules are never disregarded. In any example where “conformity between actual and prescribed behavior can be regarded as a forgone conclusion,” making rules would be meaningless.[53]

However, there are two things to keep in mind. First, we are a long way from an ideal scenario where the gap between actual and prescribed behavior simply represents the measure by which we can understand what the moral rules clearly are. Right now, this gap represents a serious shortcoming of international law, not a solidification of its content. To recognize that international law and morality exist and influence states does not mean that these forces are effective[54] in influencing state behavior. The decentralized nature of international law and morality is one factor that makes their source so ambiguous. In addition, there is a serious flaw in that the subjects of morality and law are also arbiters and enforcers.[55] An actor as the subject, interpreter, and enforcer of morality and law is problematic in both the international realm and the Lockean state of nature since states and humans are generally “partial to themselves and their Friends” and overly harsh on their enemies.[56]

Second, an alignment of the morality of states towards a consensus on the content of morality as it applies to states is not the same as Beitz’s universal morality. We can call it international morality insofar as it is a morality shared by a large portion of the international community. However, it is not the same as a universal conception of morality. This is not simply semantics with words. An international consensus of the morality of states may greatly resemble a cosmopolitan morality in theoretical content, but this consensus still has the focus of morality on states rather than people. The moral structure lacks a corresponding political structure – such as a world federation or world state – and the existence of state sovereignty prevents a truly universal conception of morality from emerging. The status of international morality will remain as it is now until states make a pact to transform the primary political unit of international politics into something capable of embodying universal morality.

Why a World Community Needs a World Government

Morgenthau addressed the possibility of a world state emerging through two possible ways: conquest or the unification of many sovereign territories into a single federal state. He dismissed conquest as simply impractical and impossible, noting that most historical political structures established through conquest rarely survived the lifetime of the founders.[57] Regarding unification into a federal state, Morgenthau provides the examples of Switzerland and the United States. These could easily be conceived as models for a world state because both originally had a number of territories that gave up individual sovereignty for a broader political identification. However, in both cases there was already a “preexisting moral and political community… [needed for]… any state… expected to endure.”[58] In the case of the United States, sovereignty was more nominal than actual. The thirteen colonies also shared the same language, the same national experience, the same heritage, and the same or similar culture. From this, we can see that just as “[t]he community of the American people antedated the American state,… a world community must antedate a world state.”[59] The European Union is a better example – one not available to Morgenthau during the writing of his book – since many states have relinquished some national sovereignty and entered a supranational community.[60]

The emergence of a world community would also mean that world society has found a set of shared values and goals to work towards. If world society came to embody the goals and values of cosmopolitan morality, then they would be obliged to create a corresponding political structure such as a world federation or world state. This obligation arises because the goals and values of cosmopolitanism cannot be embodied by the system of state sovereignty. World society would have to reform the principal agent of international politics. Choosing not to do this would mean one of two things: a failure to recognize the limitations of the sovereign state system or a false claim to believe in cosmopolitan morality. Either way, universal morality would remain a pipe dream.

Imagine attempting to achieve distributive justice on a world scale under the current state system. Although the concept of distributive justice has been defined in different ways, we can consider its fundamental principle to be a more equal allocation of rights and resources among all people in a given society (city, state, world, etc.) based on their need.[61] Beitz’s international distributive justice stems from the ideas of states as interdependent cooperatives and the natural distribution of resources as morally arbitrary.[62] Taken to its logical end, Beitz’s argument is that states do not have inherent entitlements to resources and that they should distribute these resources among humanity as a whole, giving more to those who need more. The problem with this principle of international distributive justice in a world of sovereign states is that it views the world in terms of humans when the main political unit is still the state. Global distributive justice conceives of world order with humans as the principal unit, but under a system of state sovereignty any “framework of international order is inhospitable” to these cosmopolitan forms of justice and morality.[63]

Applying distributive justice on a global scale without changing the principal agent of international relations undermines the central purpose of distributive justice, to achieve a better distribution of rights and resources for humanity. Distributive justice in a world where the sovereign state system remained in place would entail a transferring of resources to states and not individuals – since in such a world the state would still represent the aggregate will of its society on an international level. Bull points out the practical problem in that a more equal distribution of wealth among states would not necessarily lead to a more equal distribution among individuals.[64] A state that receives development aid can choose not to appropriately channel it to its people, relying on sovereignty to limit the power of outside actors to impose conditions.

Undoubtedly, this could also be a problem in a world state. After all, the central government of a state cannot easily keep track of all the aid it gives to domestic actors. Corruption and other abuses of power in domestic society can prevent a proper distribution of resources. This would only be magnified on a world scale. The absence of state sovereignty may reduce this problem, but we can imagine an analogous (although probably lesser) difficulty in a world state where the greater size and complexity of the system would make it more difficult to keep track of resources and enforce principles of distributive justice. However, the greater normative problem remains. Despite whatever practical outcomes occur, a global redistributive principle in a world of sovereign states means that the direct recipient of rights and resources are states, not individuals. If a cosmopolitan conception of morality includes an application of this principle for humanity, then a failure to reform the condition of international relations accordingly is tantamount to a failure of global distributive justice.

Conclusion

The current form of international relations as a system of sovereign states necessarily stands as a barrier to cosmopolitan morality. This is because states are the principal agents of international politics. International morality – whatever its content – rests at the level of the state. It is impossible to conceive of any form of universal morality in a system of sovereign states. The manner in which nationalism can powerfully shape identity is another substantial obstacle to emerging conceptions of global morality and human justice.

While a universal political structure such a world state could embody conceptions of cosmopolitan morality, a world society must exist prior to the creation of any form of world government. This makes the odds of a universal morality emerging anytime soon quite low, since the current consensus of world public opinion is more in favor of exclusive nationalism than an embrace of humanity as a single moral community. This is not to say that it will always be impossible to achieve the cosmopolitan morality that Beitz argues for. However, the achievement of such a moral structure will need to accompany the creation of a parallel political structure if it is to last. As long as the source of morality lies in the state, realizing a truly universal morality will remain out of reach for international society.

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[1] It is difficult to provide a single definition of morality because the meaning changes among the different authors I examine. In this paper, we can roughly think of morality a force that guides actors towards actions not solely representative of self-interest.

[2] Charles E. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, with a new afterword by the author (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999),9.

[3] Ibid., 15-27.

[4] Ibid., 13-14, 36-50. Beitz’s has four criteria for states: being the only actors in international relations, relatively equal power among themselves, independence of one another regarding their internal affairs, and no expectations for reciprocity. According to Beitz, states do not fit any of these prerequisites for the Hobbesian state of nature.

[5] Ibid., 50-58.

[6] Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th ed., rev. Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David Clinton (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006), 240-241.

[7] Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 50-58.

[8] Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 13.

[9] Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 182-183.

[10] Immanuel Kant, excerpts from “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” in International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War, ed. Chris Brown, Terry Nardin, and Nicholas Rengger (2002. Reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 438.

[11] Ibid., 439.

[12] Augustine City of God book XIX ch. 14; Bull, The Anarchical Society,4-19, 51-52.

[13] Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. XVI.

[14] Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. XIV § 6-17, ch. XVII, ch. XVIII § 1-6.

[15] Augustine City of God book IV ch. 4.

[16] Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, with a new preface (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 175-176.

[17] Ibid., 178.

[18] Ibid., 179.

[19] See Waltz, Man, the State, and War, 159-238; Martin Wight, “Western Values in International Relations,” in Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), 92-95; Bull, The Anarchical Society, 8-19, 65-71; G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 1-20; John J. Mearsheimer The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001),14-25.

[20] Morgenthau, although he is concerned with human nature, sees the state as the medium through which people influence international politics; see Politics Among Nations, 3-4, 17-19, 29-35. Even in constructivist thought, which emphasizes the importance of non-state bodies in shaping norms, states are often considered the primary political actors; see Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (1999. 11th reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1-7.

[21] See Bull, The Anarchical Society, 248-271.

[22] Francis Fukuyama, “Has History Restarted Since September 11?” (lecture, Grand Ballroom, Grand Hyatt Melbourne, Australia, August 8, 2002).

[23] Augustine City of God book XIX ch. 7.

[24] Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. XIII § 12.

[25] Bull, The Anarchical Society, 45-46.

[26] Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 285.

[27] Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “On Compliance,” International Organization 47, no. 2 (Spring 1993), 180.

[28] For related literature on norm internalization see Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” in Ideas and Foreign Policy, edited by Goldstein and Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 21; Harold Hongju Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” Yale Law Journal 106, no. 8 (1997): 2599-2659; and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917.

[29] Ibid., 177.

[30] Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations,241

[31] Bull, The Anarchical Society, 134.

[32] Wight, “Western Values in International Relations,” 129. Wight’s examples include St. Louis’ generosity to Henry III at the Treaty of Paris in 1259, Castlereagh’s and Wellington’s magnanimity to France after Napoleon’s defeat, and perhaps the British grant of independence to India. We might also consider the formation of international institutions after World War II and the strengthening of these institutions, as well as the creation of new ones, towards the end and after the Cold War.

[33] Bull, The Anarchial Society, 46.

[34] John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ch. II § 6.

[35] Locke, Second Treatise of Government,ch. II § 13-14. The difference between the Lockean state of nature and international relations seems to be that in the former an objective law clearly exists while such an existence in uncertain in the latter. However, just like men in Locke’s world, states interpret and enforce the law imperfectly; see ch. II § 13. The analogy holds.

[36] Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ch. III § 16.

[37] Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ch. III § 17-20.

[38] The distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 4th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 21-25.

[39] Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 52-56.

[40] Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 53.

[41] Plato Republic 414d-415c.

[42] Plato Republic 415d.

[43] Ian Traynor, “‘Belgium? Something that does not exist’ Political fault lines divide nation,” The Guardian (UK),September 17, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/sep/17/iantraynor.international (accessed December 16, 2008).

[44] Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 23.

[45] Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (2006. Reprint, New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 3.

[46] Ibid., 19-21, 23-32.

[47] Ibid., 1-17. Sen provides a good example of this. A Hutu laborer from Kigali is not simply a Hutu but also a Kigalian, a Rwandan, an African, a laborer, and a human being. A Tutsi laborer from Kigali shares every single one of these identities except for the ethnic group. The two have much in common with each other. However, the Hutu laborer may be incited to kill Tutsis if he is pressured into seeing himself solely as a Hutu.

[48] Fareed Zakaria, “Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,” Foreign Affairs 73 (March/April 1994), 113.

[49] Kenneth Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (2004. Reprint, New York: Random House, 2005), 195. Although fear of reprisal from Saddam Hussein certainly played a role in pushing the Iraqi Shia community to fight for their national state, scholars also believe that nationalism played an important role. Also see Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 141 and Efraim Karsh, Islamic Imperialism: A History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 226.

[50] Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 271.

[51] Ibid., 251-261.

[52] Ibid., 279.

[53] Bull, The Anarchical Society, 131.

[54] By the word effective I mean the ability to act as a powerful influence on state behavior independent of pure interests (harkening back to my definition of morality in footnote 1).

[55] Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 289-292.

[56] Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ch. II § 13.

[57] Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 516-517. He notes that the sole exception in Western Civilization is the Roman Empire. However, in this case, the Romans constantly redefined their political community through an amalgamation of conquered civilizations.

[58] Ibid., 519.

[59] Ibid., 520.

[60] There are a variety of interpretations over what the evolution of European integration resembles, but notions of shared values underpin many viewpoints. See Marja Gastelaars and Arie de Ruijter, eds., A United Europe: The Quest for a Multifaceted Identity (Maastricht: Shaker Publishing, 1998). However, the limitations of the EU are obvious enough. It has significant difficulty acting as a unitary actor on many levels, especially in coordinating security policy. See Kathleen R. McNamara and Sophie Meunier, “Between National Sovereignty and International Power: What External Voice for the Euro?” International Affairs 78, no. 4 (2002): 849-868.

[61] See Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics book. V § ii.v.ix; Bull, The Anarchical Society, 77-78; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (1999. 6th reprint, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 4-7, 52-56; Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 129-136.

[62] Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 138-145.

[63] Bull, The Anarchical Society, 83.

[64] Ibid., 279-282.

—

Written by: Colin Cronin
Written at: University of Puget Sound
Date written: 2008

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