United State military aid is an important component to foreign aid. This type of aid is rarely promoting development and likely promotes another agenda, and that is security. However, by assisting certain countries with military aid the U.S. is actually hurting both development and hurting security. This is because the U.S. would prefer a dictator who can ensure stability and security to the unknown. The politics behind U.S. military aid is important to the study of development because it points to the motivations behind aid. If the motivations for foreign aid are selfish, then development will become impaired. We can see that U.S. support of dictators through military aid actually assists in creating instability which therefore inhibits development. This paper will first look at what the purpose of military aid is and its history. Then we will examine three cases studies of the U.S. providing military aid to developing countries to understand why aid is provided and how it is hurting security and development. For these case studies we will examine Bahrain, Tunisia, and Poland. These countries were selected by the process of elimination. First, remove all countries where economic aid was greater than military aid in 2008. Second, remove all countries that are considered developed by the IMF standards. Third, remove the obvious states such as Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Finally, choose the three countries with the highest ratio of military aid to economic aid.[1] The objective of this study is to demonstrate how political military aid is used as a political tool, and how if security is the main goal then military aid finances should go towards human security and the rule of law.

Background

The history of U.S. military aid shows how political foreign aid started. Originally after World War II the U.S. took the lead in assisting in the rebuilding of Western Europe, which is commonly known as the Marshall Plan. Over a few years, the U.S. had realized the potential for utilizing both economic and military aid to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals.[2] The result was the Mutual Security Act (MSA) whose purpose was, “to maintain the security and to promote the foreign policy of the US by authorizing military, economic and technical assistance to friendly countries.”[3] In order for states to receive aid under the MSA they had to agree to certain conditions such as, supporting the pursuit of world peace, fulfill any military obligations to treaties which the U.S. is party to, do whatever they could to improve their own security, and effectively utilize any and all aid given.[4] These conditions were devised to expand the sphere of influence by the U.S. by accepting aid and thereby accepting these conditions, the U.S. was broadening defense against the Soviet Union. So we can see that from the beginning of U.S. foreign aid, the U.S. was political in deciding how to distribute such aid. Rather than using aid to develop for the sake of development, they utilized aid as a tool for control.

While the role of foreign aid initiated with Western Europe and evolved out of the collective security model that is NATO. The U.S. would eventually apply the same conditional agreements throughout the world, including developing countries. The next major use of military aid for political purposes is Israel and Egypt. “In 1978, Washington promised Cairo that if Egypt would make peace and normalize relations with Israel, the United States would underwrite the modernization of Egypt’s armed forces and economy.”[5] We can see now that this underwriting helped modernize the armed forces, but not so much the economy. Likewise, this policy of providing aid to Egypt only assisted in keeping Hosni Mubarak in power until recently. Investigating the fall of Mubarak and U.S. military aid would be the next step in this research, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. But we can conclude that while providing aid to Egypt assisted in preventing war between Israel and Egypt, it infuriated the people of Egypt, including Mohamed Atta, one of the hijackers on 9/11.

This leads us to our most recent historical point of reference, the terrorist attacks on 9/11. After 9/11 the U.S. recognized the importance that foreign countries have in the “war on terror”. President Bush also viewed development as being an essential part of ending terrorism, whose “first National Security Strategy named “development” as one of the three legs of U.S. foreign policy (together with “defense” and “diplomacy”).[6] While development is an important leg in diplomacy, this security strategy did not really look at what al-Qaeda was so upset about. According to the 2007 Congressional Review Service report, “Bin Laden characterized the presence of U.S. and other non-Muslim troops in Saudi Arabia after the 1991 Gulf War as cause for renewed commitment to defensive jihad and the promotion of violence against the Saudi government and the United States.”[7] This military presence, along with cooperation with middle east countries through military aid in exchange for peace with Israel are what started the wild fire that the al-Qaeda Jihad. While the expansion of military aid worked in rebuilding after World War II and the Cold War, it is a model that is outdated and will create greater insecurity for the United States and continues to restrict development by empowering autocratic governments.

The foreign policy towards the Middle East and Africa has been seeking short-term gain at the cost of long-term problems. 9/11 marked the start of the outcome for having supported autocratic governments, limiting development and creating a hatred of the United States. We will now provide two case studies to discuss the politics behind providing military aid, and how military aid assist in perpetuating failed institutions that “are designed to ensure the authoritarian character of the regimes.”[8] We will also discuss how a shift in the Cold War model of military aid to a twenty-first century model of rule of law and security aid would benefit the countries develop and help ensure U.S. security needs. In addition, we will discuss the case of military aid in Poland which counters the argument being made here.

Bahrain

One of the countries in the Middle East where protestors hit the streets to participate in what is now known as “Arab Spring” is Bahrain. This is a small island country located in the Persian Gulf and has been ruled by the Al Khalifa house since 1766. The current king, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa is Sunni Muslim, while the population of Bahrain is predominately Shiite Muslims. This elite rule by Sunni Muslims is an important distinction because Iran is Shiite and supports the people of Bahrain, while the U.S. supports the elite Sunni class. In 2008 Bahrain received five million dollars in military aid and one million dollars in economic aid.[9] In 2010 it is reported that Bahrain received twenty million dollars in military aid.[10] Likewise, Freedom House had Bahrain listed as partially free in 2008. Despite some reports of human rights abuses and a lack of development the U.S. still supports the elite Al Khalifa family. The reason for this is the strategic location of Bahrain and its housing of the Fifth Naval Fleet which supports about 30 ships and patrols the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and the east coast of Africa.[11] This strategic location is the primary reason that the U.S. supports the Al Khalifa family which is hurting development and long-term U.S. security.

The first piece of literature that addresses the issue of military aid is an article by Edward Rowe entitled, “Aid and Coups d’Etat”. In this article, Rowe examines the relationship between U.S. military aid and Coups d’états from 1952 to 1967. While we are not examining Coups d’états in any form, his article points out the political motivations for U.S. military aid. The first justification is that military aid helps strengthen the internal and external security of friendly nations. Second, there will be increased friendliness toward U.S. interests by the elites. And third, military aid assists in undermining or combating “leftist” governments.[12] While this paper was designed in the climate of the Cold War, we will rename undermining leftist governments for undermining any unfriendly country, such as Iran.

The U.S. support of Bahrain has primarily been for increasing friendliness toward U.S. interests. This is how the U.S. has been able to have such a large military presence in a foreign government. The second reason for military aid to Bahrain is because of the Sunni rule. Anthony Cordesman with the Center for Strategic and International Studies has been interviewed on this subject and said, “Could we find some other place to put a fleet headquarters? Probably we could… But if Bahrain becomes unstable, if it comes under Iranian influence… [That] threatens the entire structure of world oil markets.”[13] As long as the Sunni elite remain in power, the power Iran has in the region remains limited.

Another important political reason to support the autocratic regime is Israel. While Bahrain has not been directly involved with the Israel-Palestine peace process, they have not hurt the process. “On July 16, 2009, Crown Prince Salman authored an op-ed calling on the Arab states to do more to communicate directly with the Israeli people on their ideas for peaceful resolution of the dispute.”[14] In exchange, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has voiced appreciation of the support by Bahrain. The politics of Israel influence everything the U.S. does in the Middle East. If any autocratic leader is willing to allow Israel to exist and support the peace process, they are likely to gain U.S. support with primarily military aid because that assists in keeping that leader in power.

The one justification for military aid that does not fit this mold is that military aid strengthens internal and external security. This is a perceived security. The uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya are examples of how security is temporary if leadership is not desired from the people. While there was an uprising in Bahrain as well, the government currently claims that they have restored order.[15] However, what would occur if the protesters take over and overthrow the U.S. supported King? This creates a great security concern in which Iran can sweep in and support the new government while forcing the U.S. fifth fleet searching for a new home in the Persian Gulf.

The framework that we will use to help analyze the Bahrain case is from Steve Cook’s article, “The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform.” This is the more honey, less vinegar framework. In Cook’s article he applies this framework to the Egypt case where the U.S. has given billions of dollars in military aid while ignoring actual development. This approach uses an incentive-based approach “where the United States can leverage its influence to encourage political and economic change.”[16] It also provides a lens for which we can better understand both the challenges and potential solutions or opportunities with the politics of U.S. military aid to Bahrain and how both security and sustainable development can be achieved.

The greatest problem with the more honey less vinegar framework when applied to Bahrain is that some policy experts do not believe that conditions can be put with aid because “to do so would jeopardize key U.S. priorities in the region.”[17] This challenge however ignores the fact that the ruling elite need U.S. support to remain in power. While the U.S. does receive a large benefit from Bahrain hosting the Fifth Fleet, it is only in exchange for regime stability. The U.S. can always find a new country to host the Fifth Fleet, whereas the stakes are much higher for the elite to remain in power. Because Bahrain has more to lose, it is possible that the U.S. could provide some incentives in exchange for development programs such as the Millennium Challenge Account. This initiative rewards poor countries with increased aid (military or economic) “if they meet 16 different standards on issues ranging from good governance, the rule of law, and public education to health care and economic transparency.”[18]

While this would be a difficult sell to Bahrain, the window of opportunity could have been opened with the protest throughout the country. Leaders may currently be more willing to support improvements to the rule of law and good governance if it can help assure them that their regime will stay in power. This may be why in President Obama’s speech he referenced Bahrain in which he recognized the influence of Iran and that leaders in Bahrain must respect the rule of law:

“Bahrain is a longstanding partner, and we are committed to its security.  We recognize that Iran has tried to take advantage of the turmoil there, and that the Bahraini government has a legitimate interest in the rule of law. Nevertheless, we have insisted both publicly and privately that mass arrests and brute force are at odds with the universal rights of Bahrain’s citizens, and we will — and such steps will not make legitimate calls for reform go away.  The only way forward is for the government and opposition to engage in a dialogue, and you can’t have a real dialogue when parts of the peaceful opposition are in jail. The government must create the conditions for dialogue, and the opposition must participate to forge a just future for all Bahrainis.”[19]

As you can see Obama is trying to do just this, balance supporting the rule of law with keeping the elite in power to prevent Iran from taking control of the state. One theme to this speech that pundits have ignored is that the U.S. will start using their lease on countries that accept military aid (with exception to Saudi Arabia) to support the rule of law. This is a turn in the right direction because the U.S. must support the peoples of these countries before they eventually come to power.

The evidence that the U.S. needs Bahrain lies in the fifth fleet. The fifth fleet originally existed during World War II and was dismantled at the end of the war, only to be resurrected in July of 1995 after the Gulf War when the future military presence was made apparent. Military aid is often used as a bargaining chip in deals. To settle a peace between Israel and Egypt, the U.S. has devoted billions of military aid to Egypt. Military aid to Bahrain helped give assurance to the elite that they could remain in power by providing them with the best military weapons and training. While this is difficult to show with empirical evidence, we can discuss development rankings and establish the fact that Bahrain is not developed, then compare this to how much military aid Bahrain received per population capita.

According to many major development measurements Bahrain is close to being considered developed, but still remains far from that goal. Transparency International ranked Bahrian 43^rd in the world in 2008 with a rating of 5.4 out of 10.[20] Meanwhile, according to the International Monetary Fund Financial Development report, Bahrain’s level of financial development ranks high amongst Middle East and North African countries.[21] This contrast between transparency and financial development points towards a government elite that retains the wealth rather than investing in the country.

We can observe how this imbalance occurs with the amount of military aid Bahrain received from the U.S. in 2008, $5 million US dollars. The population of Bahrain is roughly 700,000 which means that for every person in the country, the U.S. gave $7.14 to each person in military aid. While this seems like a small amount, the amount of economic aid provided to the people of Bahrain in 2008 equated to $1.42 per person. This disparity demonstrates the U.S. interest at protecting the elite instead of assisting development in the country.

In Conclusion, the U.S. support of the Bahrain leadership has been focused on temporary self-interest. These political interests include keeping Iranian influence out of Bahrain, supporting the Israel-Palestinian peace process, and support with counter-terrorism efforts. These political interest hurt development because it incentivizes the U.S. to support an autocratic government whose primary interest is to remain in power over their interest to develop. Likewise, recent actions in Tunisia and Egypt will only support Bahrain leaders to hold back on development because more development leads to a more educated population. As a population increases their education the more aware they become of their political situation which may drive them to revolt. This was the problem that Ben Ali and Mubarak faced, and Al Khalifa will surely take note of what has happened to his neighbors.

Tunisia

Tunisia is now known to most Americans as the country that started the recent Jasmine Revolution. Part of their capability to ignite revolution and succeed is that despite being under autocratic rule they have moved towards becoming more developed. In the 1960s Tunisia’s aid-to-gross domestic product ratio was 8.1 per cent, while during 1990-2003 it decreased to 1.5 per cent.[22] However, despite this decrease in aid and increase in development, autocratic rule supported by the U.S. has held Tunisia back from its potential. In 2008 Tunisia received $10 million in military aid, which is ten-times greater than the amount of economic aid.[23] This section will demonstrate how the U.S. provided military aid to buy an ally in North Africa; however the U.S. will soon learn to regret that alliance because of the uprising by the people.

Now former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had been in power since 1987. However, the importance of Tunisia extends back to World War II in which the Allied forces first worked to expel the Axis from North Africa so that they could work their way up through Italy.[24] The relationship and support with Ben Ali existed primarily because he was viewed as a moderate Arab ruler and assisted the western world with counterterrorism efforts.[25] Despite the relationship of combating terrorism in exchange for military aid and regime security, Tunisia and the U.S. have been critical of one another. Tunisia did not support the Gulf War or Iraq War, while the U.S. has often criticized Tunisia for human rights violations.[26]

Aid to Tunisia has been very moderate for the region; however it has focused solely around military assistance and not economic assistance. Likewise, with the recent Jasmine Revolution there has been a rapid push for more holistic aid such as the State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative which would assist in establishing “independent media, civil society, political parties, a new electoral framework, and economic reforms.”[27] The U.S. is starting to provide the type of assistance that will help development, but aid would have also helped had the U.S. supported programs like the Middle East Partnership Initiative.

As with Bahrain, Tunisia is a country that Islamic terrorist groups like al-Qaeda detest. Tunisia is more secular than most Arab states and al-Qaeda views Tunisia and other states as being puppet governments on behalf of the U.S.[28] This concern plays a significant role in the decision of the U.S. to support an autocratic Tunisia. Policy has leaned towards supporting the known, known’s; instead of supporting the unknown, unknown’s. This has always been a problem with supporting autocratic leaders. The U.S. policymakers often live in fear of what they do not know. This is one reason that development is not supported more than security. Development happens at different rates and involves many variables; meanwhile an autocrat with a military is likely to remain in power for some period of time.

Now let us apply the more honey, less vinegar framework to Tunisia. Again, this is a model in which positive support is applied to developing Arab countries. This model promotes democratization while attempting to work with autocratic leaders with whom the U.S. must support as long as they desire to combat terrorism in the Middle East and use their oil. What we see occurring now in Tunisia is the application of this more honey, less vinegar framework.

Discuss the specific theory or framework or paradigm that will help analyze and explain issues, challenges, problems, solutions, and opportunities for understanding politics of development necessary for achieving sustainable development goals. Since Ben Ali has been removed from power the U.S. has promised Tunisia millions in democracy aid. This aid includes $20 million for the U.S. State Department Middle East Partnership Initiative, U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation which provides financial support and stability to the public, as well as general humanitarian aid to assist with Libyan refugees. In addition to the increase in development aid, military aid is being transformed. Foreign military financing has decreased from $18 million in 2010 to $4.9 million in the 2011 budget request.[29] In contrast, there will be an increase in International Military Education and Training from $1.9 million in 2010 to $2.3 million in 2011.[30] While this could be considered military aid still, training is significantly different than general military financing. Training allows for U.S. ethics towards military to be taught while general military financing increases the number of weapons without the quality of security enhancement.

Prior to the Jasmine Revolution the U.S. did not seek that strong enough of honey to vinegar ratio in aid. In 2008 Tunisia received ten times the amount of military aid than economic aid. The U.S. could have sought to receive more incentives to pre-revolution Tunisia. While Tunisia is a good ally, it does not have the same strategic benefits that come along with other Arab countries such as Bahrain or Saudi Arabia. The U.S. could have pushed Ben Ali more towards development by attaching development requirements to military aid.[31] All that the U.S. was receiving from Tunisia was support with counter-terrorism, which all western supported autocratic nations are in favor of. So Ben Ali was being given assistance in exchange for his support for a policy that he would already support.

One of the reasons that protestors took to the streets to remove Ben Ali was the economic challenges which allowed for many educated people to remain unemployed. The U.S. can also use this as a case study to show other autocratic leaders that if they wish to remain in power, military aid will only help today while development assistance will help prolong their reign. While this may not be the ethical solution, it creates the stability the U.S. seeks along with investing in the future after the autocratic rule.

Empirical evidence in this argument is difficult to demonstrate. Instead, we will look at how the need for development does not match the response to development demonstrated by U.S. foreign aid. The main evidence for the case of Tunisia is to compare it to Bahrain which is more developed. Despite the gap between the two countries, Tunisia received no more economic aid, but twice the amount of military aid. This is surprising because the security concern is much greater in Bahrain than Tunisia. However the size of the population is vastly different and could be one reason to account for this contrast; Tunisia has over 10 million people while Bahrain has almost 900 thousand people.

According to Transparency International’s Corruption Index in 2008 Tunisia ranked 19 spots behind Bahrain, and is 62^nd worldwide with a rating of 4.4 out of 10.[32] Part of this lower rank than Bahrain could be credited to Tunisians being more educated and more aware of the corruption. Similarly, in 2008 Tunisia was categorized as not free according to the Freedom House ratings with a political rights score of 7 and civil liberties score of 5 on a scale of 1 to 10 with free being 1.[33] Tunisia has also been developing at a slightly better rate than Arab states according to the UN Human Development Index. In 1980 Tunisia had a score of 0.45 while Arab states had 0.4, in 2008 Tunisia had a score of 0.68 while Arab states had a score of 0.59.[34]

All of this information quantifies the lack of development in Tunisia. It is important to understand how it contrasts to Bahrain and later to Poland. Bahrain received the same amount of economic need ($1 million), when they do not necessarily need it as much as Tunisia, meanwhile Tunisia received far more military aid ($10 million compared to $5 million).[35]

In conclusion, the U.S. is now pursuing a policy towards Tunisia that they should have pursued prior to the Jasmine Revolution. The public is not likely to forget that the U.S. supported the continued power of the Ben Ali regime. This could lead towards a decline in U.S.-Tunisia relations as the government becomes democratic. This concern is why the U.S. is rushing to provide millions towards democratization efforts. Had the U.S. made democratization efforts conditional on military aid perhaps Ben Ali would have allowed for more freedom in Tunisia. In contrast to Bahrain, Tunisia is an example of a U.S. ally where the U.S. has less to lose with democracy in the country. Selfish politics play an important role in how the U.S. has responded to the Jasmine Revolution in both countries. While it should appear obvious that Bahrain leadership will eventually fall. The U.S. will probably treat Bahrain like Tunisia where democratization aid is provided ex post facto. The Bahrain people will not be as forgiving as the Tunisian people are likely to be.

Poland

The final case we will look at is a different case than both Bahrain and Tunisia. While both Bahrain and Tunisia were governed by autocratic leaders whom the U.S. felt comfortable with, Poland is a democracy. However, the basic concept that U.S. security needs come before development applies to Poland as well. Poland qualifies for this study because they receive more military aid than economic and are considered a developing country by the International Monetary Fund.[36] This lack of developing has kept them out of completely integrating in the European community because they have only satisfied one of the five requirements to join the eurozone.[37] Despite the enormous economic needs, the U.S. has pursued a strong defense relationship with the former Warsaw Pact state since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In March of 1999 Poland along with the Czech Republic and Hungary joined the NATO alliance, turning their security dependence towards the U.S. out of fear from Russia. Since this time the U.S. has sought to install a missile defense system in Poland and it is this system that has been the focus of military aid, while ignoring development.

The first step towards an alliance between the U.S. and Poland came after the collapse of the Soviet Union when the U.S. supported Poland with its debt. In 1990 through the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative the U.S. forgave Poland of $2.46 billion.[38] The only other countries to receive this type of assistance have been Egypt and Israel. This assistance after the fall demonstrates how powerful the U.S. felt that an alliance with Poland would be.

The alliance between the two countries has led to Poland supporting the U.S. with every military intervention including the current Iraq war. “[From 2005-2008], Poland has contributed a significant number of troops to the U.S.-led operation in Iraq.”[39]  This military support is in-spite of 85% opposition to deployment in Iraq according to a 2008 poll of the Polish public.[40] The only rational reason for such a high domestic opposition to the war is the high importance Poland leaders view in supporting the U.S. Another example of how close this relationship is can be best worded by former Secretary of State Rice who in September 2006 described the two countries as “the best of friends.”[41]

Another important issue in this relationship during the George W. Bush administration was the proposed a missile defense site in Poland. The goal of this system was to protect NATO allies from Iranian missiles. There were many politics involved with this issue because the Polish leadership supported this plan as did the U.S. In contrast, Russia believed that the proposed defense system was planned to protect Europe from them. The Polish people also felt this way and wanted greater security assurances to protect Poland from any Russian attacks.[42] To help reassure the Polish people the U.S. provided military aid, specifically $29 million in 2008.[43] In contrast, in 2008 the U.S. provided $2 million in economic aid.

This military assistance did not support an autocratic leader in Poland as in Bahrain and Tunisia. Instead, this military assistance was aimed against Russia. Justifiably so, in 2008 Russia increased military presence along its border with Georgia border. The relationship between Russia and the U.S. went from lukewarm to cold during the Bush Administration. No matter how many times the U.S. claimed that the defense system was intended for Iran, Russia never believed it. Russia offered other locations closer to Iran for the system but the U.S. preferred Poland.

This tension between the U.S. and Russia would come to an end with the Obama administration who has since scrapped the proposed missile defense system in Poland. To replace this plan President Obama has decided to deploy smaller SM-3 interceptors by 2011.[44] While this decision came with applause from Russia, it faced criticism by Representative John Boehner who said, “Scrapping the U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic does little more than empower Russia and Iran at the expense of our allies in Europe.”[45] Politics surround this issue greatly. Many Republican politicians support this missile defense plan and military aid of Poland while only a few Democrats support this plan.

We can see that this is another case in which the U.S. is not following the more honey, less vinegar approach towards security. While military assistance in Poland does not support terrorism as in Tunisia or Bahrain it does lead to international security instability. The more the U.S. supports Poland militarily the more concerned and threatened Russia becomes. A way in which the U.S. could use a more honey approach is through supporting economic transformations to help Poland become part of the eurozone. By associating military aid to economic reform the U.S. can create an incentive for Poland to meet the requirements for the eurozone. These include lowering their inflation rate to below 1.01%, reduce annual government deficit to GDP to below 3.01%, and lower the long-term interest rate to below 6.01%.

The rational in focusing more on economic aid rather than military is to strengthen Poland from within so that their security does not need to become dependent upon the U.S. If Poland can secure itself, any threat Russia feels from the U.S. will decline. Likewise, helping Poland become integrated with the rest of Europe is a necessary step towards a more secure Europe. Throughout its history Poland has been occupied and the site of lots of war. Dependency upon the U.S. is not what Poland needs, independence is what they need.

While Poland is part of the European Union, they remain a developing country. According to the 2008 Transparency International report Poland ranks 58^th with a score of 4.6 which puts them ahead of Tunisia and behind Bahrain.[46] However Poland is vastly freer than either Tunisia or Bahrain as they have received a free rating from Freedom House with scores of 1 in both political rights and civil liberties.[47] This means that Poland is on the path in the right direction towards being developed. The U.S. should see potential in this country whose population is slightly higher than the state of California at 38 million.

It is also important to point out that in 2008 the Czech Republic received $4 million in both U.S. military aid and economic aid. This 1:1 ratio is far less than the Polish 1:13 ratio. This again points to the politics of military aid in using Poland as a tool against Russia. The Czech Republic does not border Russia, while Poland borders the isolated Russian seaport Kaliningrad. Beyond this one issue, there is no other reason for why the U.S. provided so much more military aid to Poland than the Czech Republic.

While U.S. foreign policy since 2001 has focused on the Middle East, Eastern Europe was the focus for the 1990s and it is important that the U.S. does not forget that region of the world. Military aid will not help Poland develop. While military aid will not help keep autocratic rulers who support the U.S. in power, it will hurt relations with Russia. The only way to support U.S.-Russia relations and Poland security is by providing greater economic aid to Poland so that they can have a strong enough economy to join the eurozone. While Poland is a different situation, the U.S. could still apply the more honey, less vinegar framework to its foreign aid.

Conclusion

Military aid demonstrates how the U.S. is distracted in its attempts for peace. Military aid of autocratic regimes fuel terrorist support, it also weakens any support from future democracies in those countries. The goals of military aid could also be achieved in many cases by supporting more democratic principles such as the rule of law. By utilizing a more honey, less vinegar approach the U.S. can support development while supporting security. Development and security do not need to be antonyms; they can be harmonious and thrive together. The narrow view that the U.S. must support repressive regimes that restrict development will hurt U.S. security in the span of history. While supporting Mubarak in Egypt helped provide security for Israel, it also gave a talking point for Osama bin Laden who criticized western backed dictators. Another important point for the U.S. to consider and accept is that development may not always support them. Development may require the U.S. not becoming the primary beneficiary, but over time development in any country will eventually benefit the U.S. by creating stability in a region and a potential trading partner.

Recommendations

• Attach more conditions on military aid to transform the rule of law, government transparency, public education, health care, and good governance. Especially to Arab countries who have not seen a successful revolution yet; Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan, etc.
• Reconsider all foreign aid every few years. Evaluate how many goals that aid is achieving. While lots of military may satisfy one goal for a short period of time, perhaps the U.S. could satisfy multiple goals over a long period through aid reconfiguration.
• Broaden the concept of security and view it through a holistic lens. Security cannot mean what will keep people safe in a short period of time. What will work today may not work tomorrow and today’s ally may become tomorrow’s enemy. Develop a security strategy that can work with that reality.

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Warner, Margaret. “Bahraini Foreign Minister: ‘We’ve Restored Law and Order’.” PBS Newshour. 18 May 2011.

The White House. Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa, 2011. Washington, DC: OPS.

Further Reading on E-International Relations

• Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge: U.S. Arms Transfer Policy
• ‘Almost Perfect’: The Bureaucratic Politics Model and U.S. Foreign Policy
• The Puzzle of U.S. Foreign Policy Revision Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program
• Jimmy Carter’s Liberalism: A Failed Revolution of U.S. Foreign Policy?
• War and Crisis: The Impact of Narratives on the Militarisation of U.S. Police
• Shifting Hegemony: China’s Challenge to U.S. Hegemony During COVID-19