Last year’s debates regarding NATO’s involvement in the 2011 Libyan Civil War raised questions throughout the international community as to the legality of what supporters called a mission “to prevent mass murder” and what its malcontents deemed a case of “imperial madness.”[1] [2] Within the United States, legislators from both parties not only engage in debate about the constitutionality of President Obama’s decision to commit to U.S. airpower towards establishing a no-fly-zone above Libya,[3] [4] but also disputed the scope of United States’ interest, duty and responsibility in protecting people beyond America’s borders.[5] It is interesting to note, that questions as to the legality of violating Libya’s sovereignty were not raised to any significant effect within American policy-making and legislative circles.[6]

On March 28, 2011, President Obama presented his justification for U.S. involvement in Libya to the American public.[7] Inasmuch as heads of Western-style democracies are accountable to their population, a presidential address justifying military action was rather typical. However, it was the manner in which Obama advanced his argument that made the speech noteworthy. President Obama argued that U.S. involvement in Libya was grounded on the humanitarian needs of a foreign population under duress and that the common humanity shared by Americans and Libyans alike obliged the U.S. to respond to their calls for help. The president claimed that, “[t]o brush aside America’s responsibility…would have been a betrayal of who [Americans] are.”[8] Further claiming that it is incumbent upon the United States to employ military means not only when directly threatened, but also when its interests and values are under threat.[9] His speech begs the question: if states act according to self-interest and material capacity, as the dominant paradigm suggests,[10] why do values and common humanity even matter? The constructivist approach to foreign policy analysis may be better equipped to draw out an answer consistent with the president’s rhetoric, namely the effect of the emerging international norm known as the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) on American foreign policy.

To effectively evaluate the potential of R2P to influence the decision-making process of the U.S. with regard to Libya, this paper will employ constructivist theory. With this pursuit in mind, this paper will attempt to answer the following four questions: 1) Are states obliged to act only in pursuit of their own citizenry’s material interest? 2) Do norm-based values play a role in forming those interests? 3) What role, if any, do norms play within the realm of inter-state relations? 4) Can and do states have responsibilities to peoples beyond their borders? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to establish the primary tenets of constructivism and its application to the field of international relations; then suitably define Responsibility to Protect and its origins; and finally, determine R2P’s place within the foreign policy decision-making process by using the aforementioned constructivist framework.

Constructivist Foundation

Since the publication of Nicholas Onuf’s seminal “World of Our Making” in 1989, his coined constructivist theory has gained an increasingly strong footing in the field of international relations (IR). Constructivist theory is based on the simple notion that humans are social beings and, as Onuf’s book title suggests, the world is of our making (i.e. it is socially constructed).[11] [12]Agents (individuals, states, etc.) interact with other agents and structures (the physical world, society, institutions, etc.), thereby deriving meaning of themselves, one another and the world around them.[13] [14]Agents and structures are mutually constitutive.

However, that is not to say that “brute facts” such as the atomic weight of gold, do not exist; rather, that the value of gold is resultant of both inter-agent and structural interactions like trade and culture. Agents interact autonomously with the world around them, limited only by the autonomy of other agents. The limited autonomy results in a mutually constitutive institution that limits and is limited by the behaviour of agents.[15] One example of this phenomenon is “the invisible hand” which pushes the value of commodities (in this case, gold) up or down. It does not exist objectively, but is a “social fact” drawn out of observed patterns of interaction that constrain the behaviour of agents.[16]

In order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to draw attention to the divergent schools of constructivism: the North American and European variants.[17] Both schools agree that the world is socially constructed, that there are brute and social facts, and that agents and structures are co-constitutive.[18] However, these schools differ in their focus. North American constructivists stress the role of social norms and identity in the construction of values, interests, institutions and other social facts. Their European counterparts emphasize the role of linguistic discourse in shaping the social facts outlined above.[19] This paper seeks to scrutinize the role of norms in shaping behaviour, specifically, R2P’s influence on the U.S. decision to intervene in Libya, so the North American variant is the most useful within this discussion.

Constructivism’s focus on norms and values do not negate interests, nor is it the antithesis of rationality.[20] Notable constructivists, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, note: “Agents strategize rationally to reconfigure preferences, identities or social context.”[21] Agent-agent and agent-structure interactions delineate and give interests their value. As agents are limited by one another and the norms of behaviour that they constitute, interest are likewise limited and shaped by interactions. Agents must consider the limits imposed by structure, norms and convention. The process of navigating through normative structures in pursuit of interests is a rational one.[22][23]

Constructivism and International Norms

Constructivism within IR holds that the international order has been socially constructed over time. Concepts like nations, states, borders, interests and other institutions that we now take for granted result from social construction.[24] The fact that we take such things for granted demonstrates that we have indeed been socialized into thinking that they are innate to humanity. While investigating normative development throughout history is outside of the scope of this essay, it is still worth mentioning how international norms in general take form.

States are just as constrained as individual agents by the mutual constitution of agentive and structural interaction. For instance, the sovereignty of one state has no meaning unless it is juxtaposed against the sovereignty of other states and–more importantly–without the mutual respect for sovereign territory stemming from such a recognition.[25] [26]This mutual constitution is what creates new actors, norms and institutions like states, anarchy, sovereignty, interests, and the international community.[27] Such norms establish a level of “oughtness” to behaviour according to repeated agentive and structural interaction.[28] A change in identity and interest consequently constitutes a change in the international structure by expanding the parameters of oughtness.[29] [30]In turn, oughtness or norms define who states are, what they want, and how they can get it.[31] [32]

Like the invisible hand, anarchy and sovereignty are not objective facts; they are merely social constructions manifested through interaction of states with one another.[33] ^[34]Nevertheless, states act as if these constructions are brute facts that are inviolable and pursue their interests accordingly.[35] However, the process of agent-structure co-constitution in no way establishes sovereignty (or any institution, for that matter) as monolithic.[36] In fact, this process points to an intriguing notion that the sovereignty of one will become the sovereignty of the other. Consequently, the anarchic structure of international relations constructed through mutual recognition, is only as valid as state behaviour renders it. In other words: “Anarchy is what states make of it.”[37]

Explaining certain state behaviour, such as the fact that states form alliances with some and rivalries with others solely through the realist prism of anarchy, egoism and material power, is insufficient at best.[38] [39]Alliances indeed place actors that have similar interests in one group competing against those with opposing interests, but by applying realist logic, is it not more likely that states with similar interests compete rather than ally?[40] Constructivism notes that there is another component at play here. As stated above, interests much like anarchy are constructed through social interaction. Likewise, collective interests (from which alliances derive) are not inherent unto themselves. Groups with a shared experience and thus a shared identity construct collective interests.[41] Identities are consequently the locus of interest formation.[42] Agents evaluate the world through a certain identity, make value judgements, and derive interests.

Through this lens, Jutta Weldes posits that the recognition that states are not unitary actors allow one to evaluate state behaviour as the reflection of the identities of agents who act in its name.[43] Foreign policy decision makers are agents acting on the state’s behalf according to their own identity i.e. the socialized conception of their place in the state and the state’s place the world, “these state officials do not approach international politics with a blank slate on to which meanings are written only as a result of interactions among states.”[44] States gain certain identities based on the historic interaction between agents within their own states and those abroad.[45] Therein we find relevance to the topic of international norms formation.

The realization that norms and institutions are socially constructed through interaction of not only states, but also agents within the state, allows for the possibility that agents can change and adjust to new forms of social and structural interaction.[46] A shift in the thinking of individual agents within a state can instigate a change in their state’s behaviour. The fact that a sovereign state in the first half of the nineteenth century and a sovereign state in the twenty-first are almost two different creatures entirely indicates that the normative interpretation of what constitutes statehood and sovereignty evolved over time.

By reflecting upon three benchmarks, the Abolition movement, colonization and decolonization, Finnemore (1996) attributes much of the structural change within this period to the spread of liberal ideals conceived during the Enlightenment. For instance, Finnemore explains that the Enlightenment constructions of the universal equality of man and individual rights translated into self-determination and sovereignty.[47] These emerging norms also had the effect of expanding with whom states identified and thus on whose behalf they would intervene.[48]

Contingent on the validity of Finnemore’s process tracing, this seems to confirm Weldes’ assertion as to the capacity of the worldview of individual domestic agents to initiate norm transformation within the state. These individual domestic agents informed by their own identity and experiences within a state become, what Finnemore and Sikkink term, “norm entrepreneurs.” Domestic norm entrepreneurs attempt to promote new norms within their state; states, in turn, become norm carriers once new domestic norms become internalized and begin to frame their interests and behaviour.[49] ^[50]By participating in agent-agent and agent-structure interactions, norm-carrying states passively or actively transmit new norms into the international system, becoming norm entrepreneurs themselves.

Change does not come easily. As norms and institutions constitute behaviour and vice versa, they become increasingly mutually reinforcing. Structural modification may threaten the interests of agents invested in the status quo and they may fight to preserve it.[51] [52]The process of normative change relies on the capacity of norm entrepreneurs to affect the rational or “strategic social construction” of states outlined by Finnemore and Sikkink in order to allow for such change.[53] Those norms consistent with existing normative structures are more likely to take hold; those that are not are lost to posterity.[54] If and when institutionalized, new norms and behaviour again become mutually reinforcing, enabling related norms to emerge while compelling other agents to conform as to avoid conflict or de-legitimization.[55] [56]

This compulsion to conform is best illustrated by the propensity of new states to apply for United Nations membership and accede to international treaties like the Geneva Conventions soon after declaring independence, even though such actions are not required by the Montevideo Convention. This applies domestically as well. President Obama’s March 28^th speech demonstrates the compulsory power of norms in framing behaviour. The push-pull dynamic of domestic and international norms explains why governments in general tend justify behaviour to their publics in terms of domestic norms.[57] When President Obama claimed that inaction would be an affront to American values, he was acknowledging and attempting to bridge the gap between international and domestic norms. In accord with Weldes claim, his decision demonstrates state behaviour is informed by the socialization of domestic and international agents. This perspective stems from constructivism, which argues that state foreign policy decision-making is always guided and framed by norms. Since co-constitution is omnipresent, state behaviour also guides and frames the normative formation of domestic and international agents.

The credibility of norm carriers is also important to norm promotion. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo posed a paradox based on the notion that states “have moral right to intervene to prevent mass atrocities, even absent UNSC approval.”[58] NATO’s mission had the effect of advancing humanitarian norms, whereas the 2003 invasion of Iraq had the opposite effect.[59] [60] Frequent contributors to R2P literature, Thomas G. Weiss and Alex J. Bellamy, claim the difference lay with the credibility of the norm carriers.[61] [62] [63] They argued that the “disingenuous” characterization of the Iraq War as a humanitarian mission hampered the ability of R2P to take root as an international norm.[64] Ironically, Bellamy notes that same invasion reduced the normative significance of sovereignty amongst Western States, which could explain why the question of sovereignty was all but absent during the American debates on Libya. [65] [66]

Constructing the Responsibility to Protect

In the wake of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, which was viewed later as an  “illegal but legitimate” use of force, the international community was pressed to develop an appropriate response to gross violations of human rights that does not violate international law while upholding humanitarian principles.[67] Acknowledging the tension between the principle of non-interference and emerging humanitarian norms, Secretary General Kofi Annan, pleaded for a way forward.[68] It seems fitting that a middle power like Canada, which prides itself on its reputation as a good global citizen, responded to Annan’s call. The report titled “The Responsibility to Protect” presented by the Canada-based International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), was clearly an attempt at creating new norms, if not reframing old ones.[69] The main principles proposed by R2P are as follows:

• State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.[70]

• Where a population is suffering serious harm…and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.[71]

In an effort to reconcile the tension between sovereignty and humanitarian intervention, the ICISS attempted to redefine sovereignty as contingent, claiming that such an interpretation was a result of their evaluation of state practices, precedent, established norms, and customary law.[72] As a result, R2P established that states have a responsibility to prevent, react, and protect the populace of a state in response to situations of “compelling human need with appropriate measures,” placing prevention, above all, in the hands of the state in question.[73]

The unanimous adoption of R2P by the UN General Assembly in the 2005 World Summit Outcome indicated an acknowledgement by the international community of their responsibility to protect–at least in principle.[74] By adopting the two paragraphs states implied that they “accept that responsibility” and agreed to “act in accordance with it.”[75] However, some states like U.S. and China, were apprehensive about R2P because on the one hand, they perceived it to be a potential constraint on national security policy, and on the other, R2P threatened the principle of non-interference. [76] [77] This tension highlights the struggle faced by norm entrepreneurs in challenging the established normative order–in this case, against the principle of non-intervention.[78]

Although, the positive and negative constraints placed on states by R2P has been a point of contention since its adoption, normative pressures have had the effect of compelling states to frame and justify their behaviour according to the norms it advances.[79] [80] [81] Moreover, the adoption of R2P illustrates the effectiveness of norm carriers and entrepreneurs in discrediting the use of sovereignty as a shield for “anything goes” policies.[82] [83]However, the concern by some states that R2P and humanitarian intervention presents a means to justify the material interests of the Great Powers remains. Algerian President Abdelazia Bouteflika best summarized these reservations in 1999:

“We do not deny that the United Nations has the right and the duty to help suffering humanity, but we remain extremely sensitive to any undermining of our sovereignty, not only because sovereignty is our last defence against the rules of an unequal world, but because we are not taking part in the decision-making process of the Security Council.”[84]

Finnemore (1996), among others (Bellamy: 2005; Weiss: 2004), admits that indeed “[h]umanitarian justifications have been used to disguise baser motives in more than one intervention,” but asserts these motives are often mixed.[85] Humanitarian justification may be authentic, but also augmented by other material state interests.[86] Yet, as the onus of the state is first to its citizens, there is nothing necessarily malevolent in this. Every state action is responsive to the calculus balancing state interests and values derived from their domestic normative structure and those imposed on them by international community. To this point, notable international ethics scholar Chris Brown from the London School of Economics explains that agents “balance between different conceptions of the good for oneself and others, and between short-, medium- and long-term conceptions of one’s own interests.”[87] He denies that considerations of interest necessarily negate the morality of an action.[88] Furthermore, Weiss, states that adhering strictly to norms without concern for interests is, “to deny the relevance of politics, which proceeds on a case-by-case basis by evaluating interests and options, weighing costs, and mustering necessary resources.”[89] To ignore the interest-based calculus and politics within states would be, in and of itself, a norm violation.

The justification of state behaviour in terms of norms and values such as those enshrined in R2P, indicates an acknowledgement by state agents of the “shared values and expectations held by other decision makers and other publics in other states,” as well as an recognition of the “standards of appropriate and acceptable behaviour.”[90] Weiss attests to the validity of this line of reasoning, arguing that the adoption of paragraphs 138 and 139, presented an “accurate snapshot of mainstream views of sovereignty as responsibility.”[91] Obama’s willingness to justify his decision using language provided by R2P supports this claim.

R2P, Libya and Obama

Senior Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, Stewart Patrick, framed the Libyan intervention, “[…] as the first unambiguous military enforcement of the Responsibility to Protect norm,” and that “Qaddafi’s utter defeat seemingly put new wind in the sails of humanitarian intervention.”[92] Pending a good outcome in Libya, the continued promotion of the intervention in Libya through the lens of R2P by President Obama, his administration, and his NATO allies, may eventually lead to the internalization of R2P norms and prove them all to be credible norm promoters. A good outcome in Libya would allow policymakers to say, “no more Holocausts, Cambodias, and Rwandas—and occasionally mean it.”[93] Bellamy (2011) attributes the world’s response to the crisis in Libya, including that of the United States, to the spread of norms contained in R2P.[94] The language throughout UNSC Resolution 1973 is a clear testament to that fact.[95] However, Bellamy (2011) maintains the same pessimism of Weiss (2004), explaining that intervention in Libya should not be viewed as a bellwether for the success of R2P in shaping state behaviour as it came as a result of “clarity of threat,” a short window of opportunity, and the fact that Gadhafi was disliked throughout the region.[96]

It may very well be as Bellamy (2011) and Weiss (2004) say, that finding morality within foreign policy decisions depends on the confluence of “humanitarian and strategic interests” and a “window of opportunity.”[97] This may have been the case for the Obama Administration since Libya was a coincidence of time, opportunity and interests.[98] Nevertheless, the confluence of humanitarian values, strategic interests and opportunity does not negate the normative and structural forces driving his decisions. Weldes’ acknowledgment of the ability of co-constitution of domestic-international agentive interaction and experiences in shaping behaviour resonates well here. The decision to intervene was clearly based on the calculus of values, interests, capacity and opportunity. President Obama admitted to this quite bluntly, stating, “[…] given the costs and risks of intervention, we must always measure our interests against the need for action.” However, he immediately added a short but profoundly indicative normative marker: “But that cannot be an argument for never acting on behalf of what’s right.”[99]

Foreign policy decision-makers do not enter into international relations with a clean slate, as Weldes, Finnemore, and Sikkink argue to varying degrees. Americans having been borne out of the Enlightenment incorporated its ideals into their self-proclaimed role as “Leader of the Free World” and the “Shining City Upon a Hill.” By viewing themselves as a nation that defeated Fascism and Communism, Americans believe themselves a force for good and have experienced both faces of humanitarian intervention, including the consequences of inaction. All these factors and more may have contributed to the constructed self and world perceptions of agents within the Obama administration. Their conception of the world, including what states ought to do and how they should do it, all matter in shaping their interests and values. Absent this, normative judgments of right and wrong cannot exist. With this in mind, we can reasonably infer that norms indeed had an effect on the decision to intervene in Libya.

Conclusion

Constructivism argues that the influence of norms on state behaviour is ubiquitous and unrelenting, succumbing only to the agent-structure interactions from which it manifests. If a given state developed norm-based interests of a moral character–like the ones mentioned by Obama–the foreign policy that results is not out of convenience or coincidence, but out of agent-structure interaction that guides and informs every action.

President Obama’s March 28 and May 19, 2011 policy speeches, State Department press releases and others (Clinton 2011; Panetta 2011), demonstrate quite poignantly the influence that humanitarian norms had on American decision-making and how American interest assumed an increasingly normative form with complex considerations distinct of material interests alone.[100] [101]Nevertheless, due to the endogeneity of norms, it is almost unknowable whether the decision to intervene in Libya was because of R2P specifically, as claimed by its supporters, or a result of the compounded agent-structure interactions developed over time.

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Further Reading on E-International Relations

• To What Extent Was the NATO Intervention in Libya a Humanitarian Intervention?
• Obama and ‘Learning’ in Foreign Policy: Military Intervention in Libya and Syria
• The Third Pillar: The Vulnerable Component of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’
• Sovereignty with Chinese Characteristics? Norms in a Changing World Order
• The Responsibility to Protect: A Disputed Matter
• Egypt’s Security Paradox in Libya