Contention Over the Securitization of Political Issues:

Explaining the Securitization of the Iraqi Regime Using the Three Levels of Analysis

Contested concepts tend to run rampant in the discussion of international relations, primarily as a result of how difficult it can be to accurately portray the seemingly ever-evolving realm of world politics. What had once served as a complete understanding of the world can become a matter of wide debate, particularly following a major shift in the balance of power (Measheimer 2002). One such example of a shift has been the end of the Cold War, which brought with it a hope for a world no longer dictated by the fear of war. It tentatively allowed for states to feel more comfortable venturing beyond the confines of the traditional notion of state security, and into a place where what a state deems to be a threat to security goes beyond those that are exclusively external threats. Thus, with varying interpretations, particularly when it comes to political issues, the determination of whether or not an issue is a security threat is contentious.

While a clear definition of what is considered political is open for debate, according to Carl Schmitt, a “… religious, moral, economic, ethical or other antithesis transforms into a political one if it is sufficiently strong enough to group human beings effectively…” (Schmitt 1927, p.38) on the basis of an ‘us versus them’ mentality. He indicates that the development of a political issue requires a group of people to hold a belief about something that is so strong, in opposition to the beliefs of another group, they would be willing to, essentially, kill for it. With regards to the term security, Buzan views it as “… the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile” (Buzan 1991, p.432), with an emphasis on the perception of hostility as being far more important than whether or not a force of change is actually hostile. When these two definitions are brought together, deeming a political issue a matter of security is dependent on the intersection between fear and freedom from vulnerability, of both the state within the international system, and of the people within the state.

To address why contention can emerge when political issues are securitized, this essay provides a basic understanding of the evolution of security and securitization, followed by the application of the three levels of analysis – the international system, state, and individual levels – on a relevant case: the securitization of the Iraqi regime as justification for the US invasion of Iraq. The role of advocacy is highlighted at all levels, particularly the extent that it can account for securitization. On the international system level, following a general understanding of what the ‘international system’ is, there will be an examination of the role US advocacy played in deeming the Iraqi regime a threat to all of humankind. On the state level, a better understanding of US government and the inner-workings of the Bush administration, in addition to the various factors the impact state decision-making, will help in understanding how the Bush administration managed to convincingly advocate going to war to their own people. Finally, on the individual level, the relationship between the leader and the public will be explored, with particular reference to the role of public opinion on securitization, and how this factored into the US decision to go to war. Through the example of the US decision to invade Iraq, the emergence of contention will be explored in the path that the Iraqi regime took from being a political issue to becoming a security issue by the international community, the United States, and even the individual people within the United States, in order to understand why and how contention arises when it comes to the securitization of political issues.

The Evolving Definition of Security and Securitization

With the backdrop of bipolarity, the traditional notions of security had been generally accepted as standard, in large part due to the hand-on-the-trigger mentality that dominated the post-World World II international arena. The US and the USSR, the balancing powers of the Cold War, may not have engaged with each other directly, but in fact did develop a vested interest in states that could be used against the other side in some way, epitomized through proxy wars (Craig 2010, p. 4). The ‘us versus them’ dichotomy was prevalent on both sides, and many other states felt the pressure that came with defining their own place in the international community on these terms, particularly the many states emerging from colonial rule during the same period (Bradley 2010, p. 465). Security, therefore, was simply about states taking measures to prevent war. As Baldwin concisely puts it, “If military force was relevant to an issue, it was considered a security issue; and if military force was not relevant, that issue was consigned to the category of low politics” (Baldwin 1997, p. 9).

The extent to which traditional notions of security are exclusive to the understanding of state security is a contested topic. What is clear, however, is that there has been a call for an expanded definition that encompasses state dynamics in a world no longer held hostage by bipolarity. It has meant a ‘widening’ of the term, through shifting the focus from issues that impact the state to those that impact individuals, and a ‘deepening’ of the term, through the inclusion of non-military issues (Hough 2013, p. 7-11). The extreme manifestation of this expansion can be seen in the emergence of human security, which, in addition to the two elements mentioned previously, includes an added emphasis on non-state actors to assist in achieving security (McDonald 2010, p. 279). On a more moderate level, the Copenhagen School asserts that both the state and the individual can be the referent object of security, but, more importantly, threats that arise must “… be staged as existential threats to a referent object by a scrutinizing actor who thereby generates an endorsement of emergency measures” (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998, p. 5), with the emphasis being both on the need to adopt measures in response to this threat that would not normally occur otherwise, and again, on this idea of perception, in this case by the ‘scrutinizing actor’ in the form of the state.

Buzan (1991) manages to capture the essence of the shift in the concept of security through defining specific sectors of it, and developing a framework through which issues become a security concern. He defines the sectors of security as military, political, environmental, economic, and social, where “political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government, and the ideologies that give them legitimacy” (Buzan 1991, p. 433). In this regard, and with reference to the way in which the term political has previously been defined, not only does the international system in which the state resides impact it, but political security can also be impacted by individual actors who serve as advocates for a particular ideology. Therefore, a social construction of reality, through the way an issue is perceived by an individual and/or a state, creates a role for the influence of individual identity in determining political action (Flockhart 2012, p. 82).

Buzan and Waever (2009) argue that middle-scale referent objects, like the state, are usually more readily accepted as referent objects due to how much easier it is for people in these groups to reinforce the ‘us versus them’ mentality, as addressed by Schmitt (1927) in his definition of the political. While political issues are traditionally based on threats to states, it does not necessarily imply that securitization cannot happen at the international system or individual levels. In fact, they argue that there is a need for the expansion of security studies to focus more on the impact of these levels (Buzan & Waever 2009). The complexity that arises when there is a question of whether a certain political issue should be a matter of security, therefore, can be addressed on the basis of these levels: the international system level, the state level, and the individual level.

Securitization and the Three Levels of Analysis

In order to better understand the reasons why escalating a political issue to a security issue can be contested, it is necessary to explore the way in which a political issue can emerge from the individual, state, and international system levels. Initially presented by Waltz (2001, p. 12), as ‘images’ used to better address the many questions that emerge in the study of international relations, the three levels of analysis were used by Buzan as a means of developing a better approach to the understanding of security issues, through viewing security from both micro and macro, and establishing the extent to which people or groups of people contribute to the securitization of threats (Stone 2009, p. 2-3). These levels are an effective tool for the establishment of reasons why the securitization of a political issue can be contested, as they address the various hurdles and complications that a political issue face before becoming a matter of security. Table 1.1 gives a brief overview of the way the levels will be used, including the referent objects, which are impacted by the securitization, and the advocates, who serve to advance political issues towards securitization.

 Table 1.1: Overview of Analysis

The International System Level

When it comes to securitization on the international system level, the referent object is, in some form, meant to constitute all of humankind, and it is through what the implications of this are that contention can occur (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998, p.36-37). The international state system can best be explained through the extent to which it has changed following the end of the Cold War. Some would argue that the end of bipolarity signaled the beginning of this change, whereby the security issues of the past no longer applied, as states stopped seeing each other as merely potential military rivals. Yet, “Structural change affects the behavior of the states and the outcomes their interactions produce. It does not break the essential continuity of international politics” (Waltz 2000, p. 39), indicating that while there may have been a shift in the relationship between and among states, it did not necessarily imply that the international system itself had shifted. Despite changing dynamics, as long as the notion of statehood exists, and as long as states remain the primary actors in politics, the international system will remain the same (Mearsheimer 2002, p. 26).

According to Wohlforth (2012), the main driving force behind the perception that states have of each other as being potential military rivals is the notion that the international system is anarchic, or that there is no authority higher than the state. The implications of this include that a state can never guarantee that another state will not take up arms against it, and that problems which could have been solved by mediation by a higher authority have a tendency to escalate to war (ibid, p. 38). Thus, the international system is made up of states that exist in anarchy, making them sovereign entities that act in their own interest, because every other state will act the same way, and therefore, there is no guarantee of absolute safety for any state. It is with this perception that states have tended to approach the international community when it comes to political issues that they deem to be security threats to all of humankind, so securitization at this level really depends on what threatens the advocating state’s own security and how convincing that state can be in making it a threat to all.

The problem with a political issue that threatens all of humankind is twofold: it must be wide enough to cover a vast physical area, and threatening enough so that all people feel that it is a threat to their security. Beyond this, however, is that as the current international system is made up of a collection of states, with each looking out for their own interest, it can be difficult to bypass state politics in order to adequately securitize a political issue at this level. A good means of understanding how the state can act as this representative is through how “it is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions” (Wendt 1992, p. 397), placing the focus on the fact that perception is key in understanding state behavior within the system. Paired with the notion of anarchy, what a state perceives to be a security threat to itself may be pushed onto the international community as a security threat to all of humankind, if a state can convincingly frame it in a way that makes other states believe it. Contention can arise in terms of which political issues are securitized, depending on the extent that the state sees an issue as a security threat, and how convincingly a state advocates for it.

Using the example of the United States’ advocacy of the invasion of Iraq in 2002, the various difficulties in securitizing a political issue at this level can be seen, where the advocating state plays a major role in the outcome. Arguably the dominant hegemon of the current system, the US greatly influences securitization by taking measures against a political issue it considers a security threat to all humankind, even without international consensus (Wallerstein 2006, pg. 14). The US position on the role of the state within the international community is that “… the nation [is] free to use force against any foe it perceived a potential threat to its security, at any time of its choosing and with any means at its disposal” (Malone & Chitalkar 2013, p. 5), and, prompted by revised policies following the 9/11 attacks, the US certainly felt threatened by the Iraqi regime. Yet, when presenting the issue of the Iraqi regime to the United Nations, the language used indicated that the Iraqi regime posed a threat to the security of everyone, and the possibility of invasion was used as a means of responding to this so-called international system level threat (The White House 2001). In an address to the United Nations General Assembly in 2002, Bush claims that, “The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace… The Security Council resolutions will be enforced — the just demands of peace and security will be met — or action will be unavoidable” (The White House 2001, p.139-147), using the speech to outline reasons why the Iraqi regime should be considered a threat to all. As a result of the power position of the US within the international system, their perception is highly influential, and traditionally, states have come together to support such initiatives advocated by the US, which can be seen in how what the US did in Afghanistan in 2001 was viewed by many states as an act of self-defense rather than an invasion (Smith & Thorp 2010, p. 6).

The international response to the possibility of the Iraqi invasion was not favorable, with three of the other permanent members of the Security Council – France, Russia, and China – expressing explicit opposition to it (Copson 2003, p. 6), yet sometimes even majority view does little to impact securitization at this level. This leads to the very center of the complexity that comes with securitizing a political issue: despite being brought forth by the dominant hegemon, and despite claiming to meet the requirements of being a security issue, there was still contention as to whether or not the Iraqi regime should become securitized due to how people within a state, and eventually, how a state itself, constructed justifications for it. Yet, the lack of consensus did not prevent the use of emergency measures in this case, which adds another dynamic to the contentious nature of securitization: a state can act on its own accord on the basis of eradicating a security threat that it believes affects all of humankind, regardless of whether or not is actually does, which allows for any state to impose its own perceptions of securitization on others. This is bound to only lead to more debate as to which issues warrant securitization.

Contention will occur at this level as a result of state power structures, particularly the extent to which a state can be convincing regarding which issues should be securitized, whether through communication or a ‘with-us-or-against-us’ ultimatum, as was the case with the United States and the securitization of the Iraqi regime (The White House 2001). While each state will have its own perception of what should qualify as a security threat, it is easy to see why contention will arise. Additionally, the relative power of the state within the international system will play a key role in securitization – at times, a state can declare an issue a security threat to all of humankind without waiting for any consensus from the rest of the international community, which again, the United States did with regards to the Iraqi regime. Overall, the securitization of political issues is greatly impacted at the international system level through state perception, advocacy, and a willingness to act alone, all of which can be highly debated among states in the international arena.

The State Level

On the state level, the referent object of a security threat would be the state itself, and because several factors influence state decisions, the securitization of political issues can become contentious. There are many elements within a state that influence securitization, including:

a) Type of government, which can be seen in the manifestation of the democratic peace theory;

b) Economic system and performance, reflected through how economic gains can influence state behavior;

c) National style, affected by both geography and history;

d) Cultural identity, with regards to how cultural affinity can impact state relations;

e) Interest groups and public opinions, or how larger groups of influential people can push for certain decisions (Bova 2012, p. 73-75).

The nature of these elements implies a certain level of contention among them, as, for example, a cultural affinity to a particular state could potentially outweigh an economic incentive to securitize a certain political issue, depending on how it is framed and who is advocating it. It is in this way that contention may arise on the state level, where the varying factors that impact state decisions are all taken into consideration, and advocated by certain people, before a decision can be made.

The role of advocacy at this level is particularly important as changing world dynamics force states to change their perception of what constitutes as a security threat. To elaborate on this, Buzan claims that, “States have boundaries other than their territorial ones, as can be seen by the way they define threats, for example, in ideological terms” (Buzan 1983, p. 36). If threats to a state are not tangible, then the way a state arrives at securitizing a political issue is that much more complicated as various actors, with different interests, can form arguments advocating a particular approach. The construction of state polices, and therefore the securitization of issues, becomes achievable through the extent to which a group advocates a strong belief that an issue is a matter of security, and then manages to convince the state to pursue drastic measures to rectify this.

The securitization of the Iraqi regime within the US can serve as a means of understanding the complications that can arise when issues are made a matter of security. The primary advocates pushing this perception of the Iraqi regime forward were the president at the time, George W. Bush, and his administration. As such, this greatly impacted the course of the decision-making process on the government level within the US. In terms of the way declarations of war occur within the US, “while the Constitution does not prescribe the form of congressional approval for the use of force abroad, it does require Congress to enact the approval either by formal declaration or statute (The Constitution Project 2005, p. 12). In this way, it ensures that it is political consensus, rather than the will of one person, that initiates and continues war. However, as asserted by Fisher (2003), in the case of the Iraqi invasion, this system failed because the Bush administration did not provide Congress with correct facts, and despite the lack of any legitimate reasons for it, Congress approved the war, and gave Bush more power than the Constitution allows. Some would argue that the reasons for the invasion came down to the influence that certain lobby groups had on the present administration, with a particular focus on the economic gains that may come out of it (Hinnebusch 2007; Fisher 2003; Gershkoff & Kushner 2005). Regardless of the reasons for war, the securitization of this political issue was essentially put forth in a similar manner to how it was presented to the international community: the Bush administration made the decision, decided to propose it to Congress, said what they needed to say to get approval, and were planning on going ahead with it regardless (Fisher 2003, p. 395). In this way, the different tensions that exist on the various levels of government can lead to varying perceptions on what qualifies as a security threat, which can be contested.

Advocacy at the state level can be carried out by various actors, but arguably one of the most influential state actors is the leader of the state. With regards to the Bush Administration’s advocacy of the securitization of the Iraqi regime, what began as an option, turned into a distinct possibility within only a few days (Fisher 2003, p. 392). To understand the reasoning behind the administration’s decision to go to war, it is necessary to understand that:

“[Bush] believed that effective management meant delegating to a group of capable and loyal advisers… this delegation had to take place within an environment modeled on a corporation, where there was a clear and ordered hierarchy and the roles among actors were clearly delineated and defined” (Mitchell & Massoud 2009, p. 272).

This was an ideal environment for policy divisions and conflicts to arise among members of the administration, where advisors would either give Bush what he wanted to hear, or grow more resentful of the advisors that managed to get their opinions across to him (ibid, p. 283). This, in combination with the administration’s post-9/11 view of the necessity of preventive war and the influence of the neoconservatives, meant that the invasion of Iraq very quickly revolved around the marriage between anti-terrorism and this notion of strong advocacy (Record 2008). In this case, the best advocates were those that managed to convince the administration to go to war, and the administration in turn convinced both the government and the people of its necessity. Therefore, dynamics within the leadership of a state do impact state decisions, and advocacy can be seen as vital to the development of securitization, and, essentially, the leader can easily become the strongest advocate when it comes to these issues.

Contention will occur at this level as a result of perceptions, of the people, of lobbies, and even of the leader, regarding the securitization of a political issue. These state ‘actors’ only need to convince others, as the Bush administration did with Congress and the people, that an issue warrants extraordinary measures, and it can become a security issue. As a result of conflicting interests with regards to different factors that influence state behavior, however, not all of these actors will agree to what should become a security issue. Overall, the securitization of a political issue on the state level is made more complex through two factors: the difficulty in defining the nature of the state, and in the influence that, at times conflicting, factors and actors have on state decisions.

The Individual Level

On the individual level, the referent object would be the individual, and this can be understood in terms of how individual actors within a state influence securitization, and how contention can occur as a result. Buzan claims that, “… if the security of individuals is irreversibly connected to the state, so, as state and society have become increasingly indistinguishable, is their security” (Buzan 1983, p. 21), which does provide support for the shift to human security that has become subject to discussion in recent years. The shift has meant that “… the guarantee of national security no longer lay in military power, but in favorable social, political and economic conditions, the promotion of human development, and the protection of human rights” (Tadjbakhsh 2005, p. 5). This can serve as an indication that state policies are impacted now more than ever by the will of the people within the state, or more precisely, actors within a state who advocate a particular position. Yet, different actors will have different interests, and the impact of individual actors can usually only be seen in their ability to rally a group that will fight for their cause (Buzan & Waever 2009, p. 255). Therefore, the securitization of issues on the individual level depends on how convincing the advocating actor can be, and as a result, the extent to which the receptive audience is willing to fight for the particular issue.

In this regard, individual impact can be reflected in the form of public opinion, particularly as it pertains to either enabling or preventing the securitization of a political issue. Determining the cause and effect relationship between public opinion and policy is difficult and debatable, as “Even if public opinion is truly a proximate cause of policy, it may itself be affected by factors not wholly compatible with normative concepts of democracy” (Page & Shapiro 1983, p. 189), including manipulative interest groups or highly influential leaders. Similarly, Chan and Safran (2006, p. 145) argue that the nature of the electoral system within states can greatly impact the extent to which public opinion is considered when it comes to war, particularly how it could potentially affect the leader of the state. Therefore, the relationship that exists between the citizens of a state and their leader does seem to play a role in shaping state policies. Burris (2008, p. 30-31), in an analysis regarding the changing attitudes of US citizens towards war pre- and post- Vietnam, argues that social distribution is necessary in understanding public opinion about war, where importance should be placed on the support of highly educated people, as they tend to be more active in politics, and on young people, whose growing antiwar sentiment could impact military recruitment. Taking into account both the varying elements that can impact public opinion, particularly the leader of the state, and the fact that some opinions tend to impact state decisions more than others, public opinion can be said to be most effective on policy making when a majority of a particular sect of the population feels especially strongly about an issue that happens to correspond, or is even influenced by, the views of the leader.

The impact that US citizens had on the initial decision to invade Iraq can be used to show how much the influence of public opinion on state polices can affect the securitization of political issues, as an invasion of Iraq indicates the securitization of the regime. When the US first declared war on Iraq, more than 70 percent of Americans supported the effort, despite having a multitude of reasons not to, including: its anticipated negative affect on the economy, the increased possibility of terrorist attacks on US soil, the lack of UN authorization, and large antiwar protests all over the world (Gershkoff & Kushner 2005, p. 525). One explanation for the decision to go to war is, “That the antiwar voters never commanded a plurality over their pro-war fellow citizens before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom” (Chan & Safran 2006, p. 147), which serves to show the extent that advocacy can have in putting forth a particular policy, as those who supported the war represented the outspoken majority.

With regards to the specific people who supported and opposed the war, one of the more interesting findings was that while those with a higher income tended to support the war, those with higher education levels tended to oppose it, where wealthy Republicans determined to stay loyal to their president can be used to explain the discrepancy (Burris 2008, p. 25). Yet, if those that are more highly educated play a larger role in the determination of policies, there remains the question of why the opinions of the more educated did not reflect the final decision of the state. This can be explained by the overwhelming majority that did support the war, and also just how far this support went, which can be seen through the fact that prior to the invasion, 40 percent of Americans believed that antiwar protests should not be held in case it negatively impacted the war effort, and 55 percent of Americans believed that the war should be proceeded even if the UN directly opposed it (Gershkoff & Kushner 2005, p. 529-530). This shows how much advocacy can play a role in shaping public opinion, and that even if the so-called more influential groups opposed war, what mattered more was how strongly people advocated the decision to go to war.

Despite all the reasons the American public had to respond unfavorably to war, they instead showed an unrelenting favorable view and the reasons for this can help in understanding the importance of the influence of the leader of a state. It can be explained primarily with the way in which the Bush administration managed to frame Iraq within the context of the 9/11 attacks; while never directly implicating Saddam Hussein, Bush nonetheless managed to connect Iraq to Al-Qaeda and terrorism (Gershkoff & Kushner 2005). Many speculations have come out regarding the extent to which the proclamations made by Bush and his administration in order to convince the public were actually factual (Pfiffner 2004), and this serves to further the point that the leader will do what must be done in order to steer public opinion in a particular direction. Thus, it would appear as though the decision to invade Iraq reflects on the relationship between public opinion and policy making, where, in this case, the strongest advocates supported the war, as did the leader, and eventually, the decision that was made reflected the will of them both.

Contention will occur on the individual level primarily as a result of how much advocacy matters, and how the influence of particular actors, namely the leader of a state, can have on shaping public opinion. Despite the more influential groups having a particular opinion about an issue, a strong majority can serve as a more important reflection of public opinion, at least when it comes to the policies that are made. Yet, this provides opportunity for contention, as public opinion itself is a highly contested topic, and as such, the extent to which it accurately reflects the population can be questioned, particularly by those making the decisions. Overall, the securitization of a political issue is impacted by individuals, as represented by public opinion, and can be based on what groups share an opinion on an issue, and, more importantly, how strong the advocacy is of the majority on a particular issue.

Conclusions

There are many reasons why contention will emerge when it comes to the securitization of political issues that can best be understood through seeing how interactions on the international system, state, and individual level influence securitization. While security issues do need to meet up to certain requirements in order to be classified as such, the most important element of the transformation of a political issues into a security issue is advocacy. Whether it be individuals, or groups of individuals, the leader of a state and his/her administration, or the state itself, the extent to which an actor is able to convince others of the legitimacy of a security threat plays a large role in its securitization. With different actors, comes different opinions, and this is where contention begins to become an issue, regardless of the level. In the case of the securitization of the Iraqi regime, the influence that the advocacy by the United States at the international system level, the Bush administration at the state level, and public opinion at the individual level had on the final decision to go to war serves to show the connection between advocacy and securitization, but more importantly, why and how contention can emerge.

On the international system level, state power structures within the system influence the securitization of issues, as an anarchic system creates a need for states to focus on their own security first and foremost. In order to gain the support of other states when it comes to an issue that a particular state views as a matter of security, this state will need to convincingly advocate their position. Yet, as was the case with the US and the securitization of the Iraqi regime, their willingness to act alone adds further complications to the contentious nature of securitization, as although they initially sought for it, support from the international community did not have a primarily role in their decision to eventually act on this security threat.

On the state level, the various factors impacting state decisions, and the difficulty in determining what issues qualify as security threats in a changing global dynamic, allow for contention to emerge when it comes to securitization. Advocacy becomes even more important at this level, as exemplified through the Bush Administration’s unyielding push for the securitization of the Iraqi regime. By managing to convince both Congress and the people that the Iraqi regime warrants extraordinary measures, they were successful in advocating for the invasion of Iraq. Yet, contention can emerge as a result of the interaction of lobby groups, administrations, and even individual opinions and leadership when it comes to securitization within a state.

Advocacy plays an even larger role at the individual level, where public opinion can serve as a means of understanding how political issues can be securitized from the perspective of the individual people of a state. The overwhelming support both for Bush’s policies and the decision to invade Iraq show the influence that the will of the people can have on securitization. While different groups may influence decisions of security more than others, as there are many different groups and individuals that interact within this environment, contention is inevitable.

Schmitt (1927) argues that determination of the political lies in the very nature of people: that opposition to one’s beliefs can lead to an even more determined, steadfast, and, at times, violent conviction of those beliefs. Advocacy at any level, therefore, is a vital component in securitization as the ability to convince others, whether individuals, those making state decisions, or the international community as a whole, that an issue is a matter of security, serves as the primary means of escalating political issues. With states only looking out for themselves in the international community, with various lobby groups and leadership perspectives within a state, and with a vast number of individual opinions and advocacy groups among the people, reaching a consensus when it comes to securitization is difficult. What this has meant for the securitization of the political is, in a word, contention – among states, among actors within a state, and among individuals. It would seem as though the very nature of politics itself continues to ensure this.

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Written by: Dana Shamlawi
Written at: Middlesex University
Written for: Dr. Cody Paris
Date written: November 2014

Further Reading on E-International Relations

• “In sight of surrender”: Critical Analysis of the 2022 Sanction Regime on Russia
• Neo and the ‘Hacker Paradox’: A Discussion on the Securitization of Cyberspace
• A Well-Intentioned Curse? Securitization, Climate Governance and Its Way Forward
• The Anomaly of Democracy: Why Securitization Theory Fails to Explain January 6th
• The Securitization of Christianity under Xi Jinping
• Three Lessons for the Intra-Afghan Talks, Courtesy of Iraqi Power-Sharing