The arrival of the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade (27CIB) in late November 1951 as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) forces in Europe marked the return of its forces to Europe for the third time in a century and the beginning of Canada’s longest overseas peacetime deployment.[1] Prior to this decision, it had initially been expected by politicians and military leaders that Canada’s military commitment in Europe would be terminated after a few years’ time.[2] However, Canada remained there for over forty years since the initial deployment, rotating forces between three specially created infantry brigade groups and spending no less than 7.6% of its GNP on defence at the height of its commitment in 1953.[3] The rationale behind the Canadian decision to station forces in Europe can therefore best be categorized thematically in firstly, the origins of the decision to commit, secondly, the move to remain committed, and finally, explanations for fluctuations in troop numbers.[4] This paper will thusly be organized by this, following a brief historiographical examination on this topic. Originally, the Canadian decision to station troops in Europe as part of NATO resulted from military and strategic necessity. However, the Canadian choice to stay throughout the years of 1951-1991 can ultimately be attributed to two domestic political considerations: to demonstrate that Canada was a committed ally and to develop an independent foreign policy. Ultimately, the Canadian contribution to NATO in Europe was vital for protecting Canadian interests.
Historiography
There is a wide range of secondary source literature available which can be classified by the debate between historians about which consideration, political, economic, cultural, or military, had the most weight behind the decision to stationing Canadian forces in Europe. Historians such as J.L. Granatstein, Robert Bothwell, and Peter C. Dobell, argue that domestic politics and the priorities set by each government administration were the main contributors.[5] Even though the priorities of each government changed, remaining in NATO was fundamental for Canada politically. Another group of historians, such as Mary Halloran and Thomas D’Aquino, argue that while political concerns took precedence in the decision making process, economic factors were ultimately the deciding factor in explaining the fluctuation in force commitment.[6] Prevailing economic conditions restricted the flexibility in which Canada could militarily assist NATO in Europe. On the other hand, economic incentives such as the prospect of trade with the European Community, remained a decisive factor in the process. While there are few that believe that Canada’s cultural ties to Europe was the predominant factor for why Canada chose to station troops in Europe, David J. Bercuson, Joseph T. Jockel, and Geoffrey Pearson gives compelling arguments in explaining why it played a substantial role.[7] Canadian ancestry was still largely derived from Europe, and ordinary Canadians felt obliged in the early years to contribute. Military considerations and Cold War strategy, argues historians such as Sean M. Maloney, were ultimately the most important reason for Canadian involvement.[8] The implications of the Korean War[9] compelled Canada to be originally involved, and changing NATO strategies replaced the original incentive for Canada’s continuation. It is important to note that substantive analytical secondary sources covering the latter part of the period from around 1989-1991 is scarce, with the exception of those carrying a political science bias.[10] These sources reveal that different political, economic, and cultural reasons reached the zenith of its importance at different times during the period between 1951 and 1991. However, Canadian political considerations and the symbolic importance of remaining committed to NATO remains the most consistent theme in the works, and provides for the most comprehensive analysis of Canada’s decision.
Origins of Canadian Involvement
The origins of Canada’s decision to initially station troops overseas in 1951 were fundamentally political, and must be traced back to its postwar commitment to collective security. Canada was initially ambivalent about engaging in Europe, as seen through Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s refusal to participate in the 1948 Berlin Blockade.[11] By the end of that year however, there were growing calls for an Atlantic Defence Pact.[12] The following Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent’s feeling of international obligation and Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson’s worldly experience in diplomacy were important factors in developing Canada’s internationalist outlook away from King’s postwar isolationist attitude.[13] Discussions were undertaken between 1948 and 1949, and the final result was the North Atlantic Treaty, which established NATO.[14] NATO’s Charter significantly included Article Two, or the “Canadian Article,” encompassing the demands of Canadian negotiators to expand the alliance to cultural and economic relations.[15] This article was essential for the Canadian commitment to NATO, and once included, it would not have been politically acceptable to renegade in participating in the organisation. St. Laurent knew that it was vital for Canada’s image, as one of the primary proponents of NATO, to support the organisation in its first significant mission in Europe.[16] On April 11, 1951, St. Laurent’s government concluded that Canadian ground troops were needed to demonstrate Canada’s commitment to Western Europe.[17] Moreover, the political pressure from the United States contributed to the Canadian decision of deployment. The U.S. had also invested a large amount of resources to the war in Korea and to stabilizing Europe.[18] It shared the same geographical dilemma, being removed from direct conflict on the North American continent. [19] Cognizant of these factors, the U.S. compelled Canada to match its ratio of commitment. Canada’s pivotal role in the establishment of NATO and pressure from the U.S. provided the background to its political will to send forces to Europe just six years after the conclusion of World War II.
In front of this political mobilization, the decision to station troops in Europe was originally a reactive response to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 with strong military and strategic considerations. A large majority of Western military commanders and politicians believed that the war was a distraction for a larger imminent attack in Europe, and therefore necessitated a response from the West to ensure that postwar agreements would not be violated.[20] For Canadian leaders, their agreement to contribute was largely out of strategic necessity which encompassed committing to the notion of collective security, protecting Canada’s overseas investments, fighting communism, and believing that the contribution would only be temporary.[21] Geographically, Canada’s security was not compromised, as war in Korea, or a potential war in Europe, would not engage the majority of Canadians directly in an armed conflict.[22] For Canada however, the decision to deploy forces in Europe represented a physical manifestation of its political commitment to the defence of Europe.[23] Canada had also granted $1.2 billion in loans to Europe since the end of the war, and did not want to see a war jeopardize their investment into the stability of the continent.[24] After its commitment to Europe had been clearly identified through the NATO Treaty and investment, St. Laurent and his cabinet agreed that this needed to be backed up with military strength. Furthermore, Canadian forces personnel were in great demand as highly valued experienced troops, after having extensive experience from WWII and the Korean War.[25] It is finally important to note that the initial Canadian engagement was predicated on the belief that its involvement would only be temporary.[26] It was a combination of these different military and strategic factors which resulted in the final members of the 5,800 man 27 CIB, to land in Europe on December 23, 1951.[27]
Canada Maintains its Forces
Canada’s decision to continue to station forces in Europe as part of NATO was the result of a combination of political factors. Firstly, Canada had to secure its reputation with the international community as a committed ally. On a related note, the potential diplomatic backlash of being perceived as not involved was cited most often by leaders as Canada’s reason to remain involved. Secondly, involvement in NATO and Europe fundamentally allowed Canada to develop a more independent foreign policy. Commitment to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Europe were symbolically important in influencing this. Despite the election of different governments with varying priorities and ideologies during this forty year period, these political factors remained consistent.
Once the initial shock of the war was stabilized, military and strategic considerations subsided in favour of the political necessity to secure Canada’s reputation on the world stage as a committed ally to the West, which determined a sustained commitment by Canada in the following years. Each NATO member expected the other to contribute military resources in defence of Europe, and failing to do so threatened serious diplomatic repercussions. In the context of the Cold War, cohesiveness within the Allied strategy was essential to stand up to the Soviet Union.[28] This can be best seen in Diefenbaker’s memoirs, the 1964 White Paper on Defense, the 1971 White Paper on Defense and the 1987 Challenge and Commitment. The legacy of St. Laurent’s internationalist policy was continued by Prime Minister Diefenbaker.[29] Albeit to a much less enthusiastic degree, the Conservative prime minister did not dispute the need for Canadian forces in Europe.[30] However, this was not always the case, as in 1962, he had even considered withdrawing Canada’s brigade in Germany.[31] That year, he clashed with his cabinet and Kennedy over the nuclear question, which was detrimental to Canada’s diplomatic image. [32] Countries began to wonder if Canada was willing to shoulder its commitment to NATO. By the next year, this idea of withdrawal faded, and Diefenbaker acknowledged later in retrospect that it was necessary for Western nations to relinquish a degree of their sovereignty through NATO in defence of collective security and maintaining its alliances.[33] Even though he considered withdrawal, he knew that for political and symbolic reasons that he could not follow through with this idea.
The 1964 White Paper, commissioned by the Liberal administration under Pearson, remarked on the close relationship between Canadian defence policy and foreign policy.[34] It reaffirmed Canada’s commitment to collective security organisations, citing the Canadian involvement in Europe as a specific example.[35] It also regarded Canada’s contribution overseas as politically, if not necessarily militarily, important.[36] While the paper does challenge the existing structure of the Canadian commitment, it does not question the need for some direct military commitment, explicitly citing these political reasons:[37]
Its [Canadian Forces in Europe] presence, moreover, has a political significance for the Alliance, and its withdrawal from front-line positions at this time could be misinterpreted – by both our European allies and the Soviet bloc. The importance to the solidarity of the Alliance of a Canadian “presence” in the NATO defence forces is real.[38]
This need to maintain a positive image within the alliance should be seen in context of other emerging Canadian commitments mentioned in this paper, including Canada’s growing commitment to the United Nations.
Priorities were realigned significantly again with the election of fellow Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau as he struggled to reconcile Canada’s commitment to its allies and domestic concerns. In the 1971 White Paper on Defence, he did not dispute the necessity of maintaining Canadian forces in Europe in support of NATO.[39] He acknowledged that it was an essential component to the policy on deterrence and for Canada’s interests. The paper was the most explicit out of the three white papers as it cited NATO’s importance for purely political ends: “NATO is the sole Western forum for consideration of all these critical political and military developments, and Canada is dependent on its membership in the Alliance for access to them. Canadian membership in NATO can thus be justified solely on security and political grounds.”[40] However, the fear of missing out on access to these rights was a justification for Canadian troops to remain in Europe during the Trudeau era. Since the inclusion of Article 2 in the NATO Treaty, Canada had worked hard to ensure that NATO was a multidimensional alliance to include economic relations.[41] The importance of economics was reflected in the 1971 paper, which discussed the importance of the European Economic Community (EEC) to the Canadian market.[42] Even though Trudeau had considered a complete elimination of the Canadian mission in Europe, this incentive prompted reducing the number of troops to allow for no less than 5,000 total troops[43] to remain there.[44] This was a 50% reduction in NATO forces, but the presence of Canadian troops there indicated that he recognized the diplomatic importance of the mission.[45]
Mulroney’s government faced many constitutional and budgetary issues in their early years of power, which turned their attention away from international affairs. Significant budget reforms were undertaken to ensure that the Canadian economy would not be impacted by the economic recessions at the time, as evidenced through an eventual proposed $5.6 billion reduction in defence spending over five years beginning in 1989.[46] Despite this, the 1987 Challenge and Commitment[47] reaffirmed the importance of Canada’s contribution to NATO Europe as a political vehicle vital in promoting allied cohesiveness in Europe.[48] Even in light of domestic economic crises which would justify a complete withdrawal of troops, the Mulroney government had to at least appear to remain committed to the cause.[49] There was outrage in Germany when Minister of National Defense Erik Nielsen released his plan in March 1985 for a phased withdrawal of all Canadian ground and air forces from Germany.[50] This expressed disapproval by NATO saw the Canadian government respond in Challenge and Commitment with an urgent sense to prove its continued commitment to its allies. The text of the paper consistently reaffirms Canada’s mission in Europe as vital and necessary.[51] It was also explicitly noted that since Western Europe represented a third of Canada’s overseas trade, Canada must protect its interest there through a continued military commitment.[52] This reaffirmation was seen through a plan to increase in the number of Canadian forces in Germany from 5,500 to 12,500 personnel to demonstrate its continued commitment to NATO.[53] Even by 1990, as 75% of Canada’s exports were increasingly going to the US and the need to reduce Canada’s dependence on the US was starting to diminish, the Department of External Affairs (DEA) thought it was politically essential to retain Canadian military forces in Europe.[54] With further integration of the European market looming, it was necessary to protect Canadian trade interests abroad for future economic interests.[55] This fear of overstepping its place meant that Canada had to establish compromises in its policies through maintaining forces in Europe, while reducing the force levels. It also meant that it became more politically important for Canada to develop a more independent foreign policy during this period.
Participation in the NATO mission in Europe was a chance to this independent foreign policy, which was consistently described as an incentive to remain in the region. As there is vast scholarship available on the reasons for this independence, this paper will focus exclusively on its manifestation in the Canadian mission in NATO. The notion of being “Canadian” in Europe was an important recurring theme, beginning as early as 1951 with the first deployment of troops. This provided Canada a unique opportunity to showcase their forces as distinctly Canadian, as opposed to being heavily influenced from British or the Americans commands.[56] Under the British, the Canadians would have a chance to interact with the Belgians or Dutch, and this was politically important as it allowed Canada to directly interact with smaller powers.[57] This was vital for Canadian interests as it helped them to counterbalance the dominating American influence in the Western bloc.[58] After 1961, the Canadians were placed under American command, and the need to develop a more culturally Canadian force which better reflected the composition of Canadian society was more prevalent. In 1965, Marcel Cadieux, Canada’s first French-speaker to occupy the role of defence minister, proposed the creation of French-speaking troops and French units to be integrated in the NATO mission.[59] By 1969, in reflection of Trudeau’s own domestic policies to encourage bilingualism, there was a stipulation to make the Anglophone to Francophone ratio in the military to be 72% to 28%.[60] Nonetheless throughout this period, Ottawa always believed that participation in NATO Councils would always ensure that its voice would be heard.[61]
The Trudeau government was instrumental in the development of an independent foreign policy, and this was the beginning of the general trend of Canadian public opinion throughout the years. Canada’s proximity to the US and their growing trade relationship was a cause for concern. Just after Trudeau was elected, the Harmel Report was released in late 1967 which stated that Canada’s geographic situation prevented it from neutrality in the Cold War, as it was compelled to align itself with the US.[62] With this in mind, Trudeau’s Foreign Policy for Canadians forecasted the tone to which the 1971 White Paper on Defence would be set.[63] Both resolved that the first national aim of defence policy would be to ensure that Canada secures its status as an independent entity.[64] Trends in public opinion began to reflect this in later years, and a 1986 report stated that 60% of Canadians wanted a more independent foreign policy.[65] Even until 1990, the Gallup poll indicated that support for Canadian presence in Europe was at a high of 72%.[66] It became obvious that while there was a general trend towards a more independent foreign policy from the Americans, Canadians believed that this could be done by maintaining a close relationship with NATO. This connection with NATO was also partially reflected in Canada’s close cultural ties with the FRG.
For many Canadians, Europe and the FRG represented a special role in their lives, and it was therefore politically important to ensure that foreign policy was a reflection of these domestic connections. Historian John English argues that Pearson became more attached to his Canadian identity as a result of his experience with Europe.[67] Ordinary Canadians also felt a certain connection to Europe, with a large percentage of the population having served in either or both World Wars, or being personally affected by it. The 1961 census showed that 96% of Canadians had European forbearers, and this attachment to Europe was reflected in their tourist spending.[68] About 80% of total Canadian spending in this area was spent in Europe.[69] Despite the initial animosity WWII Allies felt about Germany, Canadian soldiers in particular began to develop a close relationship with the West Germans. They had been stationed near the Cold War frontline in Germany since 1951, and had developed a special sense of fondness towards the West German military.[70] The West Germans, as reflected through extensive press coverage on the matter, deeply respected the Canadians for taking financial responsibility for their troops, instead of relying on their status as a victorious nation for the Germans to fund their occupation.[71] This respect and attachment they had for their fellow NATO troop members was held for an extensive period of time, even as the threat of communism was diminishing. In fact, when the Canadians indicated their consideration of withdrawing troops in the spring of 1991, the Germans immediately expressed their concern.[72] The inconsistency of the level of Canada’s commitment was disconcerting to the Germans and other members of the alliance, but it remained fundamental to the Canadians that they remain, at least in some capacity, in Europe for the majority of 1951-1991.
The political importance of the NATO mission in Europe as a chance for Canada to show that it was a committed ally and to develop an independent foreign policy compelled its mission in Europe to remain there. Diplomatic and cultural incentives also helped to explain Canada’s motivations. However, the extent of the Canadian willingness to stay was tested on multiple occasions as evidenced through fluctuations in the financial and military levels of its commitment.
Fluctuations in Commitment
Despite the political importance of the NATO mission in Europe to Canada which did not allow Canada to withdraw their troops from the region, Canadian leaders struggled to justify maintaining the 1953 level of commitment.[73] Conflicts in international affairs may have provided the justification for the increases in forces, but the constant economic pressure of supporting their troops resulted in a steady decline in force commitments. This meant that the Canadian force left in 1991 remained largely a token version of its commitment in the past.
The outbreak of conflict which threatened an ally outside North America was often the impetus for NATO to adapt its military strategy, which called for an increase in Canada’s military commitments in Europe through either conventional or nuclear forces.[74] The suppression of the East German revolt in 1953 by the Soviets strengthened the Canadian resolve to continue stationing its forces in West Germany to defend the territory against a potential spillover of the conflict.[75] The brutal Soviet crushing of the Hungarian uprising in November 1956 was a turning point which demanded a different response from NATO.[76] The response was outlined in the 1957 document MC 14/2, which specified a role for Canadian forces in Europe to be equipped with nuclear warheads.[77] This tested the degree to wish Canada was willing to follow NATO and contribute to its global mission. Domestic politics seemed to triumph the overarching political considerations outlined above as evidenced in the political stagnation experienced under Diefenbaker in the decision of whether Canada would accept a nuclear role of its troops. However, Canada accepted the role with the arrival of the Pearson government in 1963, highlighting the political value of retaining the image as a commitment ally.[78] American President John F. Kennedy called for strengthening of NATO in response to the construction of the Berlin Wall.[79] This crisis perpetuated an increase of Canadian troops in West Germany to 6,600 men.[80] It should be noted that a significant abnormality of the Canadian response to increase its commitments as a result of crises was seen in the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.[81] In this case, the Trudeau’s personality and priorities played a more dominant role than the political ramifications of not contributing troops.[82]
On the other hand, international crises which threatened the security of North America were grounds for Canada to reduce its forces overseas in favour of contributing more to continental defence. The creation of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in 1957 meant that Canada had to divide its resources between the organisation, NATO, and the United Nations.[83] The importance of NORAD to Canada’s security throughout its creation until 1991 cannot be overstated, especially beginning with the eruption of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. For the first time, Canada’s immediate security was threatened as long range missiles or nuclear weapons had the potential to strike Canadian cities.[84] Contributions to NATO Europe seemed for the first time as an ineffective tool for Canada’s national security interests.[85] This sentiment was especially substantiated by Trudeau, as the 1971 White Paper on Defence prioritized the defence of North America over its NATO commitments.[86] Furthermore, the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) I and SALT II treaties meant that Canada could not be convinced to spend more on conventional forces as the threat of nuclear Armageddon appeared to diminish.[87]
While the outbreak of international crisis encouraged Canada to increase its commitment in Europe as per NATO strategy, it also reduced the urgent need for Canada to remain in Europe in the later years. Economic reasons further provided support for the latter, which challenged Canada’s commitment to the mission. The logical economic rationale would have been to eliminate Canadian forces in Europe. This was demonstrated in force reductions as other budgetary priorities took precedence and disillusionment with the lack of European spending occurred. However, economic incentives as realized through the Trudeau administration, demonstrated the necessity of at least maintaining a token force there.
The extent of Canada’s contributions was limited to its economic capacity to provide military and financial assistance in light of other budgetary priorities. After WWII, Canada’s booming economy allowed it to contribute significantly to its original mission in NATO Europe.[88] In the first eight years of NATO’s existence, Canada contributed more money and materials as a ratio to gross national product than any other ally.[89] As the immediate threats subsided, governments turned to invest their money in different areas. Costs were increasing from contributions to NORAD under Diefenbaker and the UN under Pearson.[90] Despite experiencing a budget surplus since the beginning of the postwar era, Pearson’s government refused to allow increases in defence budget to keep up with inflation.[91] Trudeau’s policies reoriented Canada away from defence to domestic priorities in developing bilingualism and Canadian society, resulting in a proposal to drastically cut Canada’s NATO forces in Europe to 3,500.[92] Mulroney had to invest his efforts in policies to improve the Canadian economy from a recession.[93] He focused on negotiating the free-trade agreement with the US in 1988.[94] In 1989, over 50% of the federal budget was allocated to transfers to people and different levels of governments as part of his program to stimulate the economy.[95] Despite this fluctuation in economic will to support the troops, Canadian forces still remained in Europe at least in some capacity because of the political reasons outlined previously.
Since 1957, questions about the relevance of the Canadian contribution were emerging because of the resurgence of the European economy. On a strictly economic view, it did not make sense to simply maintain a small contingent of Canadian forces in Europe, especially since the Europeans could provide for a larger force more inexpensively.[96] Well-advertised economic successes in Italy, Germany, and France meant that North American military and political leaders were hoping that the Europeans could contribute more to their own continental defence.[97] Beginning with Pearson’s government, it was becoming hard for Canadian leaders to justify to their taxpayers about the benefits of placing Canadian troops in Europe versus the costs.[98] This disillusionment with the importance of Canadian military contributions strategically was manifested in the continued reductions in troop numbers. In 1967, then Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin noted that Canada’s contribution was lower than any other member except for Denmark and Luxembourg.[99] This general decline in the overall Canadian contributions continued in the subsequent years.
Even though international crises and economic considerations changed the degree of Canadian commitment, it remained fundamentally important politically for Canada to remain in the mission. Canada’s involvement in NATO began largely under military auspices. However, it was continued as it helped to define its relationship with its allies and was instrumental for the development of an independent foreign policy. These were both in Canada’s best interests as it helped to protect its diplomatic image, contribute to international security, and protect economic interests. Despite not having a numerically significant number of troops on the ground deployed, Canada’s involvement was vital for the NATO mission. The consistent presence of Canadian troops in Europe indicated that Canada’s commitment to collective security abroad was not simply a phase. Instead, it represented a longstanding trend in Canadian foreign policy which reflected its desire to be an active participant in the international community.
References
Bercuson, David J. “Canada, NATO and Rearmament, 1950-1954: Why Canada Made a Difference (But Not for Very Long).” In Making a Difference? Canada’s Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order, edited by John English and Norman Hillmer. Toronto: Lester Publishers, 1992.
Bothwell, Robert. The Big Chill: Canada and the Cold War. Corcord, Ont: Irwin, 1998.
Bothwell, Robert, and J.L. Granatstein. Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990.
Bureau of Current Affairs. Canadian Forces in Europe. [map]. Scale not given. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1956.
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Halloran, Mary. “Canada and the Origins of the Post-War Commitment.” In Canada and NATO: Uneasy Past, Uncertain Future, edited by Margaret O. MacMillan and David S. Sorenson, 1-21. Waterloo, Ont: University of Waterloo Press, 2010.
Jockel, Joseph T. “U.S. Interests and Canadian Defense Policy in the 1990’s: New Epoch, New Era; Old Agenda.” In Canada and NATO: Uneasy Past, Uncertain Future, edited by Margaret O. MacMillan and David S. Sorenson, 102-103. Waterloo, Ont: University of Waterloo Press, 2010.
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Endnotes
[1] Sean M. Maloney, War Without Battles: Canada’s NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951-1993, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1997), 14.
[2] John Gellner, Canada in NATO, (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1970), 19.
[3] J.L. Granatstein, and Norman Hillmer, Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World into the Twenty-First Century, (Toronto: Thomas Nelson, 2008), 186.
[4] Please note that for the purposes of simplicity, the term “Canadian forces in Europe,” and all its associated forms will refer to all land, naval, and air troops which Canada had stationed throughout Europe. While these forces can be divided by branch and location, it does not contribute to the argument of this essay.
[5] The specific works referenced are James Eayrs’ In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied., John Gellner’s Canada in NATO, J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell’s Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy, Andrew Cohen Lester B. Pearson, and Peter C. Dobell’s Canada’s Search for New Roles: Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era.
[6] The specific works referenced are Mary Halloran’s “Canada and the Origins of the Post-War Commitment” article in Margaret MacMillan’s Canada and NATO: Uneasy Past, Uncertain Future and Thomas D’Aquino’s “Paying the Bill: Canada’s Share of the NATO Requirement” article in Guns and Butter: Defense and the Canadian Economy edited by Brian MacDonald.
[7] The specific works referenced are David J. Bercuson’s article, “The Return of the Canadians to Europe: Britannia Rules the Rhine,” Joseph T. Jockel’s article, “U.S. Interest and Canadian Defense Policy in the 1990’s,” and Geoffrey Pearson’s “Canada, NATO and the Public Mood,” in Margaret MacMillan’s Canada and NATO: Uneasy Past, Uneasy Future.
[8] The specific works referenced is Sean M. Maloney’s War Without Battle: Canada’s NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951-1993.
[9] Please see the section on the origins of Canadian involvement for further explanation on this matter.
[10] David G. Haglund, ed., What’s NATO for Canada?, (Kingston: Queen’s University, 2000).
[11] Urs Obrist, “An Essential Endeavour: Canada and West Germany, 1946-1957,” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2006), ii.
[12] David S. Sorenson, “Canadian Military Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany,” in Canada and NATO: Uneasy Past, Uncertain Future, ed. Margaret O. MacMillan and David S. Sorenson. (Waterloo, Ont: University of Waterloo Press, 2010), 67.
[13] James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Growing Up Allied, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 13.
[14] Gellner, Canada in NATO, 14.
[15] Ibid, 14-19.
[16] Maloney, War Without Battles, 18. Canada was also the first of the twelve signatories to ratify the NATO Treaty. Gellner, Canada in NATO, 15.
[17] Maloney, War Without Battles, 21. SACEUR is the highest military official in NATO and the post has always been occupied by an American. NATO, “Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).” Last modified May 13, 2013. Accessed March 1, 2014. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50110.htm.
[18] Gellner, Canada in NATO, 108.
[19] David J. Bercuson, “Canada, NATO and Rearmament, 1950-1954: Why Canada Made a Difference (But Not for Very Long),” in Making a Difference? Canada’s Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order, ed. John English and Norman Hillmer (Toronto: Lester Publishers, 1992), 108.
[20] Roy Rempel, Counterweights: The Failure of Canada’s German and European Policy, 1955-1995, (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996), 109.
[21] Maloney, War Without Battles, 15.
[22] Peter C. Dobell, Canada’s Search for New Roles: Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 23.
[23] Rempel, Counterweights, 110.
[24] John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 50. and Dobell, Canada’s Search, 1-2.
[25] Rempel, Counterweights, 111.
[26] Maloney, War Without Battles, 491.
[27] Ibid, 21.
[28] Robert Bothwell, The Big Chill: Canada and the Cold War, (Corcord, Ont: Irwin, 1998), 89.
[29] Maloney, War Without Battles, 17.
[30] John G. Diefenbaker, vol. 3, One Canada: Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker, (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1977),63.
[31] Maloney, War Without Battles, 164.
[32] Nash Knowlton, Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing Across the Undefended Border, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990), 112-113.
[33] Diefenbaker, One Canada, 58.
[34] Louis-Joseph-Lucien Cardin, and Paul Theodore Hellyer, White Paper on Defence, (Ottawa: Dept. National Defence Canada, 1964), accessed January 15, 2014, 5. http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/D3-6-1964-eng.pdf
[35] Ibid, 21.
[36] Ibid, 30.
[37] Ibid, 21.
[38] Ibid, 21.
[39] Donald Stovel Macdonald, White Paper on Defense, (Ottawa: Dept. National Defence Canada, 1971), 31. Accessed January 15, 2014. http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/D3-6-1971-eng.pdf.
[40] Ibid, 34.
[41] Mary Halloran, “Canada and the Origins of the Post-War Commitment,” in Canada and NATO: Uneasy Past, Uncertain Future, ed. Margaret O. MacMillan and David S. Sorenson. (Waterloo, Ont: University of Waterloo Press, 2010), 13.
[42] Macdonald, White Paper, 32.
[43] This includes air force troops and ground troops.
[44] Ibid, 34.
[45] Robert Bothwell, and J.L. Granatstein, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 25.
[46] Rempel, Counterweights, 164.
[47] This was also known as the 1987 White Paper on Defence.
[48] Ibid, 166.
[49] Ibid, 148.
[50] Germany had much symbolic value for the NATO mission in Europe, as it was regarded the “front line” of defence. This was seen as a responsibility all members should have shared. 23-152
[51] Canada, Department of National Defence, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada, (Ottawa: Dept. of National Defence Canada, 1987), 3-6. http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/D2-73-1987-eng.pdf
[52] Ibid, 6.
[53] Canada, Department of Finance, Budget Papers 1989, (Ottawa: Dept. of Finance, 1989), accessed March 9, 2014. http://www.budget.gc.ca/pdfarch/1989-pap-eng.pdf
[54] Rempel, Counterweights, 167.
[55] Ibid,168.
[56] Bercuson, “The Return of the Canadians,” 15.
[57] Maloney, War Without Battles, 27.
[58] Ibid, 27.
[59] Bothwell and Granatstein, Pirouette, 244.
[60] Ibid, 244.
[61] Joseph T. Jockel, “U.S. Interests and Canadian Defense Policy in the 1990’s: New Epoch, New Era; Old Agenda,” in Canada and NATO: Uneasy Past, Uncertain Future, ed. Margaret O. MacMillan and David S. Sorenson. (Waterloo, Ont: University of Waterloo Press, 2010),103.
[62] Bothwell and Granatstein, Pirouette, 11.
[63] Tom Keating, Canada and the World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy, (Toronto: Oxford University Press Canada, 2002),9.
[64] Macdonald, White Paper, 3.
[65] Geoffrey Pearson, “Canada, NATO and the Public Mood,” in Canada and NATO: Uneasy Past, Uncertain Future, ed. Margaret O. MacMillan and David S. Sorenson. (Waterloo, Ont: University of Waterloo Press, 2010), 123.
[66] Remarkable to note the disparity between the provinces is huge. The 72% figure indicates the support from the Prairie provinces, while in Québec, support was only 34%. Pearson, Canada, NATO and the Public Mood, 125.
[67] Andrew Cohen, Lester B. Pearson, (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2008), 29.
[68] Dobell, Canada’s Search, 96.
[69] Ibid, 96.
[70] The West Germany military came into contact more prevalently as FRG joined NATO in 1955. Keating, Canada and the World, 90.
[71] Maloney, War Without Battles, 117.
[72] Rempel, Counterweights, 172.
[73] Ibid, 132.
[74] NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969, ed. Gregory W. Pedlow, (Casteau, Belgium: NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Historical Office, 1997), 1. http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/intro.pdf and Maloney, War Without Battles, 74.
[75] William Glenn Gray, Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 21.
[76] Dean F. Oliver, Canadian Museum of Civilization, “Canada and NATO: Dispatches: Backgrounders in Canadian Military History,” accessed March 12, 2014. http://www.warmuseum.ca/education/online-educational-resources/dispatches/canada-and-nato/.
[77] North Atlantic Military Committee, “Final Decision on MC 14/2,” declassified report, 23 May 1957, in NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969, ed. Gregory W. Pedlow, (Casteau, Belgium: NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Historical Office, 1997), 1. http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/intro.pdf and Gellner, Canada in NATO, 61.
[78] While the purpose of this essay is not to venture too deeply behind Canadian domestic politics, it should still be noted that this indecisiveness existed as a result of a multitude of reasons. This included his personal relationship with the US, his cabinet, and other world leaders. 20-62
[79] Knowlton, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 138.
[80] Rempel, Counterweights, 122.
[81] Peyton V. Lyon, NATO as a Diplomatic Instrument, (Toronto: Atlantic Council of Canada, 1970), 25-26.
[82] His personality was vastly complex, and for the purposes of this essay, it will not be discussed in detail. It can be noted that one of his greatest priorities was his project on Canadian unity, which he devoted much of his time to.
[83] Cohen, Lester B. Pearson, 125.
[84] Bothwell and Granatstein, Pirouette, 8.
[85] Maloney, War Without Battles, 14.
[86] Sorenson, “Canadian Military Forces,” 68-69.
[87] Rempel, Counterweights, 29.
[88] NATO Temporary Council Committee, “Country Annexes, Canada,” declassified report, part VII section 26, 1951 (TCC-DR/26 CA), 1, accessed January 21, 2014. http://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/4/0/40614/TCC-DR_26_CA_ENG.pdf
[89] Gellner, Canada in NATO, 30.
[90] Canada, Department of National Defence, Challenge, 25.
[91] Rempel, Counterweights, 126.
[92] Ibid, 127.
[93] Ibid, 163.
[94] Andrew Cohen, “Canada’s Foreign Policy: The Outlook for the Second Mulroney Mandate,” in Towards a New World: Readings in the History of Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. J.L. Granatstein, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1992),281.
[95] Canada, Budget Papers 1989.
[96] Rempel, Counterweights, 27.
[97] Dobell, Canada’s Search, 23-24.
[98] Bothwell, The Big Chill, 76.
[99] Canada, Privy Council Office, “Canada- Collective Security and NATO,” (Ottawa: Privy Council Series, 1967), 13. http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/conclusions/001039-119.01-e.php?&sisn_id_nbr=29624&page_sequence_nbr=1&interval=20&&PHPSESSID=2d5i9728ojrfkptoe1dbbfvv56
Written by: Emily Tsui
Written at: University of Toronto
Written for: Professor Robert Bothwell
Date written: March 2014
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