Early in the morning on Sunday, August 13, 1961, barbed wire fences went up all over the boundary between East and West Berlin.[1] For the next twenty eight years, Berliners would remain on whichever side of the Wall they were the night before, tearing apart families, friends, and loved ones for what seemingly was an eternity. The Berlin Wall became the most iconic image of Cold War divisions and represented a physical manifestation of Winston Churchill’s 1945 “Iron Curtain” speech. For the ordinary citizen who wanted to flee to the West, no explanation could have justified the Wall’s construction. However, this event was a reflection of the tense international system at the time and an attempt to resolve some of the issues. Any discussion of the topic must consider both international events during the Cold War and domestic politics. This paper will synthesize these two aspects in examining the origins of the Berlin Wall, following a brief narrative of the status of postwar Germany and a historiographical analysis. Ultimately, this paper will argue that the construction of the Berlin Wall was a product of the refugee crisis, challenges to the Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union (USSR)’s leadership and the USSR’s failed diplomacy with the West.
Lenin famously reflected that, “whoever possesses Berlin possesses Germany, and whoever controls Germany controls Europe.”[2] After the war, European countries were anxious to make sure Germany would never threaten their nations again, and divided Germany among the Allied victors for supervision accordingly. Germany and Berlin were divided into four sectors and it was agreed that they would be collectively managed by the Joint Allied Control Council.[3] In 1949, the occupation zones under the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US) and France merged to form Trizonia, and held free elections under their newly created democratic state. Konrad Adenauer was elected as the first Chancellor for the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in May 1949. In the other half of Germany, Walter Ulbricht, the Chairman of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) declared the creation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In each of their sectors, they pursued policies and economic models similar to the occupying powers. This meant that Adenauer followed US President Dwight Eisenhower and later John F. Kennedy’s leadership, while Ulbricht followed USSR Chairman Josef Stalin and later Nikita Khrushchev’s policies. This was the political alignment to which all future events were later constructed upon.
A quick historiographical review will allow for a better understanding on the approach this paper will take. The opening of the Soviet archives in 1991 has generated most of the scholarship on the topic of the Wall’s construction.[4] While some limited traditionalist and revisionist literature exists, it is this post-revisionist scholarship which has been most influential in shaping the understanding of this topic. This scholarship can be further classified into three approaches. The first approach addresses the Wall’s construction as a product of superpower diplomacy. Scholars focusing on this perspective include Marc Trachtenberg,[5] John Lewis Gaddis,[6] and Hope Harrison,[7] whose works concentrate on the centrality of Berlin in the multilateral relations of the United States, the Soviet Union, the FRG and the GDR.[8] The second approach focuses on the impact that domestic politics have in the actions and priorities of world leaders. Robert Slusser[9] and Honoré M. Catudal[10] discussed the challenges each leader faced: Eisenhower with the U-2 incident, Kennedy with the Bay of Pigs incident, Ulbricht with the refugee exodus, and Khrushchev with repeated challenges to his leadership.[11] The third approach is related to the second and discusses the impact of the relationships that these leaders had with each other. Scholars such as Patrick Major,[12] and Michael Beschloss[13] remark on the initial overbearing influence Khrushchev had on Kennedy, the relatively amicable friendship of Mao and Ulbricht, and especially with the new archival evidence, the aggressive attitude of Ulbricht towards Khrushchev.[14] However, this paper does not assert that each approach is mutually exclusive of each other, and will synthesize aspects of each perspective to determine the most comprehensive conclusion.
The Wall’s construction was largely justified by the mass refugee exodus occurring from the GDR via Berlin. Fleeing from the oppressive regime which had harsh collectivization quotas, consistent shortages of daily essentials, a substantially lower standard of living, and which separated families and relatives, the citizens of the GDR could find some respite in escaping to the FRG.[15] Between 1945 and 1961, 3.5 million East Germans, or one out of every six people,[16] had fled to the West, causing the population to fall from 19.1 million to 17.1 million despite a birth surplus.[17] This exodus amounted to about thirty times the amount of people who fled the Third Reich, and was termed by the GDR and USSR leadership as “Republikflucht” or “flight from the Republic.”[18] After tighter controls were implemented to prevent this loss, more people fled via Berlin as Western access throughout the city was guaranteed by the Quadripartite Agreement of 1944.[19] By the end of 1958, over ninety percent of refugees were using this “loophole.”[20] Ulbricht’s statement at a press conference in June 15, 1961 that “no one has any intention of erecting a wall” did the opposite effect of calming the population.[21] Instead, it triggered the Torschlußpanik,[22] provoking waves of eight to nine thousand flights a week until the Wall was built. The Republikflucht necessitated a response because it threatened the stability of the GDR economically, the viability of the GDR as a political unit, and the security of the entire communist bloc.
The economic costs of the refugee crisis alone could have justified the construction of the Wall. Even as early as 1953, poor economic situations were causing over 100,000 East Germans to flee.[23] The 1953 revolt in the GDR prompted Ulbricht and the USSR to look at the situation more critically, which included proposing increasing economic incentives to try to get the intelligentsia to stay. However, this created what historian Patrick Major calls an “economic catch-22”: in order to get people to stay, the GDR needed to get money, in order to get the money, the GDR needed the people to stay in order to keep producing.[24] In 1961, Ulbricht declared that the West Berlin loophole was costing the GDR “1,000 million marks every year, and the kidnapping of our citizens, the pirating of individuals…costs another 2,500 million marks.”[25] In a meeting with Ulbricht in November 1960, Khrushchev stated that the USSR would be willing to provide the GDR with all the metal it needed for the production of goods.[26] However, top USSR officials were beginning to fear that the GDR was becoming too big of an economic burden.[27]
The economic burden was straining the viability of the GDR as a political unit to assert control over its own people. Despite many attempts at rectifying the situation, refugees were still leaving.[28] The loss of intelligentsia represented not only an economic tragedy, but also a tragedy to the overall development of the society. In particular, the massive loss of doctors and specialists made it hard for the sick to recover so that they could return to work, as well as the lack of engineers and skilled workers made it impossible to advance in the technological and specialized construction sectors.[29] Among the intelligentsia, half cited political reasons for leaving, a third for career related reasons, and less than a quarter for family-related and apolitical excuses.[30] This represented a severe challenge to the GDR as it became clear that both pull and push factors existed.[31] Realizing that these reasons were very difficult to counter, Ulbricht began to unilaterally introduce restrictions on travel to prevent people from leaving. On December 11, 1957, the East German passport law was introduced which reduced the overall number of refugees.[32] In September 1960, the GDR introduced identity cards which would only allow residents of Berlin and Allied officials access to the city, and attempted to give Berlin a separate legal status.[33] This all culminated in the Dowling incident of September 1960, when East Berlin officials refused entry to the US ambassador to the FRG without proper GDR documents.[34] Despite all this, the FRG still refused to acknowledge the GDR’s existence, and the reputation of the GDR as a strong communist member was faltering.[35]
Finally, the refugee crisis proved to be a security threat to the communist bloc. Even though reports from Ulbricht on the extent of subversive activity occurring have a tendency to exaggerate, there was some underlying truth to his claims.[36] He argued that West Berlin was being used as a base by the “imperialists” to conduct spying missions in the Soviet bloc.[37] In particular, he referenced the West Berlin refugee centres as a place where the West could recruit spies, acquire intelligence directly, and find out if there were any GDR counterespionage activity was occurring.[38] Noticing this problem, Ulbricht demanded a solution from Khrushchev to seal this security threat.[39]
Khrushchev faced challenges to his leadership and policies domestically, from Ulbricht, and from China, which are all critical components to understanding why he gave consent to Ulbricht to construct a wall. Khrushchev himself acknowledged that West Berlin was “a bone stuck in our throat,” that disrupted Soviet hegemony in the eastern bloc.[40] By the time the Wall was built, Khrushchev had consolidated his power in the USSR and was gaining confidence in his power to do something about it.[41] He had good reason to be confident as the USSR has made significant advances in the space race and was growing its international prestige. Sputnik was successfully launched as the first artificial satellite in space in 1957, Yuri Gagarin became the first human in space in 1961, and later that year, Gherman Titov became the first human to orbit the Earth multiple times.[42] With Kennedy’s election, Khrushchev was hopeful that he found a more willing partner to pursue his policy of peaceful coexistence. However, these challenges facing his leadership surrounding the issue of Berlin first had to be dealt with.
The struggle for the leadership of the USSR after Stalin’s death in March 1953 and the events following were critical in shaping Khrushchev’s commitment to the GDR. During the GDR revolt later that year, Soviet leader Lavrentiy Beria expressed his exasperation at the regime at Pankow and suggested liquidating the GDR.[43] This was immediately denounced, which committed Moscow to help the GDR when needed in the future.[44] Khrushchev cited this incident in a conversation with Ulbricht in late 1960 as reason to continuously be receptive to GDR requests for assistance.[45] If the GDR acted unilaterally, the USSR was compelled to support him or else seem weak as to not being able to control a member of their bloc.[46] Furthermore, after putting down an coup against him in June 1957 and bolstered by technological prestige, Khrushchev’s confidence permitted him to announce his first ultimatum to the West in November 1958.[47] This ultimatum was an attempt at resolving the outstanding German question, by re-evaluating the status of the four occupying powers of the country. In pursuant of his policy of peaceful coexistence, he proposed that the status of Berlin become a “free city.”[48] If not accepted, Khrushchev would sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR, passing on the rights of the city to Ulbricht.[49] Khrushchev needed to appear tough so that he could be taken seriously by the West, and to satisfy Ulbricht’s wishes for a harsh stance to resolve the Berlin problem.
The most vocal challenge for Khrushchev to act in response to the refugee crisis was from Ulbricht. Historian Hope Harrison puts it best: “Khrushchev struggled to put the East German genie he had created back into the bottle.”[50] Since the FRG joined NATO and the announcement of the Hallstein Doctrine in 1955, Ulbricht lobbied for a drastic response by the communist bloc to stand up in protest.[51] Despite Ulbricht’s greatest convictions that a Wall had to be constructed, he could not do so without Khrushchev’s approval.[52] Since the 1953 revolt, Ulbricht had been investigating the possibility of constructing a Wall to stop the Republikflucht, but was not able to make any headway due to Khrushchev’s preoccupation with his peaceful coexistence policy.[53] Khrushchev, who was much more focused about the international repercussions of an Allied retaliation against the construction of the wall, was hesitant to approve any policy which might exacerbate international tensions.[54] However, guarantees that it would not kept coming from Ulbricht, with the strongest reassurances in mid-1961. Senator William Fulbright[55] suggested in a television interview on July 25, 1961 that the East Germans could close the border without conceivably violating any treaty.[56] This provided Ulbricht with further ammunition to pressure Khrushchev into constructing the Wall. After two and a half years of negotiations, Khrushchev finally gave the green light to proceed. He believed that the Allies would not retaliate over Berlin, partially as a result of Ulbricht’s constant assurances.[57] Starting from January 1961, Ulbricht had badgered Khrushchev about these plans at least two or three times a month.[58] Regardless, he had been collecting barbed wire and concrete secretly in March 1961, and starting in May, he had transferred some of GDR’s riot police to Berlin.[59] Khrushchev eventually became convinced enough that Ulbricht would take the least aggressive course of action, and gave into Ulbricht’s demands about building a Wall. In doing so, he was still firm about retaining his influence over Ulbricht. After he provided his verbal consent on August 1, Ulbricht said, “Thanks, Comrade Khrushchev. Without your help we could not solve this terrible problem,”[60] to which Khrushchev famously replied, “But not one millimetre further.”[61] As the refugee situation worsened and as will be shown, the Sino-Soviet split deepened, Khrushchev evidently became more receptive to Ulbricht’s pressure.
The Sino-Soviet split provided Ulbricht with greater leverage when advocating for the Wall, and also compelled Khrushchev to take decisive action in regards to Berlin.[62] Since Khrushchev’s Secret Speech in February 1956, Mao became increasingly agitated with his ally’s calls for peaceful coexistence with his enemies and denouncement of the cult of personality.[63] In light of this speech, Mao and Ulbricht grew closer for a number of reasons. Firstly, the leaders both ruled by the same personality cult which Khrushchev denounced, and felt as if they were personally under attack.[64] Secondly, both felt as if the West had encroached on their territory unjustly: West Berlin in the GDR and Hong Kong in China.[65] They both suffered from refugee crises as a result.[66] Finally, both regarded themselves as frontiers of the communist bloc, and were appalled that the geographically protected USSR was encouraging them to reconcile with the enemy that threatened their border daily.[67] Even though Ulbricht depended heavily on Soviet support and therefore could not openly support Mao, Khrushchev noticed that this relationship threatened his leadership of the bloc.[68] In 1961 when the Sino-Soviet split was beginning, Khrushchev began to listen more closely to what Ulbricht was asking for as he needed the support of a strong communist state.[69] In doing so, Ulbricht had greater leverage in his requests as he was playing off the alliance.[70] Parallel to these events was the Taiwan Straits crisis, where China attacked the islands of Quemoy and Matsu much to the disdain of Khrushchev.[71] This threatened Khrushchev’s attempts for peace, and he was desperate to make sure that Ulbricht did not undertake any irrational unilateral action like Mao. These pressures helps to explain why Khrushchev felt compelled to listen to Ulbricht’s calls for assistance, as he did not want to be the Soviet leader who lost the influence of the communist bloc to China.[72] Even though Ulbricht wanted a quick and aggressive solution, Khrushchev proceeded cautiously.
The crisis in Berlin had the potential to trigger another world war, so it was necessary that the superpowers at least try to resolve the issue diplomatically.[73] However, the question of what to do with Germany and Berlin became more important since the conclusion of WWII. The unification of Bizonia in 1947, and later Trizonia in 1949, posed a serious military and economic threat to the USSR and the GDR.[74] This was compounded by the introduction of the Deutschmark in 1949, to which Stalin hastily responded with the Berlin Blockade.[75] Stalin’s death in 1953 seemed to be the perfect chance to restart negotiations, however, the 1955 inclusion of the FRG in NATO threatened this opportunity.[76] The GDR put more pressure on the USSR than ever to stop the rearming of its enemy neighbour.[77] Given this deep-rooted historical context, it becomes clearer to see that the chance of finding a quick peaceful solution to the Berlin crisis was slim. In its place, the Wall became a more viable solution.
Upset at the stalemate over the German problem, Khrushchev’s ultimatum over Berlin was successful in regards that it was able to restart talks with the US.[78] Between 1955 and 1958, Khrushchev had withdrawn approximately 2.3 million Soviet forces from postwar occupied land and allowed for the neutrality of Finland and Austria to occur.[79] However, he was not able to successfully win the attention of Eisenhower and receive credit for these actions, and the ultimatum was intended to restart dialogue.[80] The Geneva summit occurred during the summer of 1959 and actually yielded significant gains to the USSR as the West agreed to consider recognizing the GDR.[81] However, Khrushchev’s peace plan was ultimately rejected.[82] Furthermore, Khrushchev was also able to secure a visit to the US in the fall, which the two sides viewed as a positive experience.[83] This was an important symbolic experience, as he would be the first USSR head of state to do this. After a successful trip with impressive honours, he returned back to the USSR with the “spirit of Camp David.”[84] In fact, Khrushchev unilaterally cut Soviet armed forces by 1.2 million men shortly after returning as he was optimistic that further progress would be made on the issue of Berlin.[85] They had agreed to meet again in Paris in May 1960, but this short-lived meeting with Eisenhower decisively changed Khrushchev’s approach to the German problem.
Khrushchev had high hopes for success at the Paris meeting in May 1960, but a number of circumstantial issues reduced solving the Berlin issue to a stalemate. A meeting of Western allies and ministers in late 1959 revealed that there were sharp divisions as to how to est approach the topic.[86] This division foreshadowed a very difficult conference, even before the U-2 incident.[87] The USSR was successfully able to shoot down an American spy plane in May 1960, much to the embarrassment of the US. Khrushchev, still hoping that peaceful coexistence was possible, did not initially believe that Eisenhower personally authorize this incident.[88] However, Eisenhower came out a few days later and not only admitted to ordering the mission, but he also publicly justified the use of espionage.[89] Khrushchev faced harsh criticism within his communist bloc for this incident, as China criticized his relations with America to be tantamount to betrayal of the communist system.[90] At home, his leadership was questioned behind closed doors for initiating the troop reductions when the U-2 incident clearly illustrated that there was no reduction of tensions between the two sides.[91] Understandably, Khrushchev took a very hostile stance at the Paris Summit and left after being unable to receive an apology from Eisenhower.[92] Diplomatic relations between the US and USSR were icy throughout the rest of the year, but Khrushchev hoped they would be assuaged by Kennedy’s inauguration in January 1961.
Even though Khrushchev faced harsh criticisms at home and received desperate pleas for help from Ulbricht, he remained hopeful that dialogue with Kennedy might retun better results. When the two leaders met in Vienna in June 1961, it became obvious however that the topic of Berlin was both foremost on their minds.[93] Despite that the tone of the overall conference was cordial enough, when Kennedy arrived back the US, he announced a massive increase in defense spending and a dispatch of additional US troops to Europe.[94] This was in response to another ultimatum Khrushchev left him, and Ulbricht was at this point increasingly agitated for Khrushchev to allow him to do something concrete. It is important to note that Khrushchev’s consistent plans for peaceful coexistence were not in conflict of building a Wall. Once it became clear to him that the Wall’s construction would not be met with armed resistance, harsh economic or diplomatic repercussions, he agreed that the Wall could proceed. The final event which empowered Khrushchev to act, alongside the Fulbright statement, was a speech Kennedy gave on July 25, 1961. Kennedy reaffirmed his commitment to West Berlin, but did not mention domestic East Berlin actions which would not affect the West as cause for retaliation.[95] Khrushchev proceeded with this as cautiously as possible, initially only allowing Ulbricht to put up a temporary barbed wire barricade to test how the West would act.[96] The Wall became a fait accompli as the West did not reveal any indication of challenging the new status quo. Kennedy remarked after its construction, “It’s not a very nice solution, but a wall is hell of a lot better than a war.”[97]
The significance of the origins of the Wall is precisely a reflection of these circumstances. The Republikflucht, instability Khrushchev faced within the communist bloc, and failed attempts at peaceful solution all could have led to nuclear Armageddon. Any miscommunication conducted by both sides could have resulted in a situation similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis a year later. Instead, the Wall represented an attempt between the West and East at co-operation over the heated German Question, and when that failed, an attempt to rectify the situation unilaterally. It was also an example of how the agendas of superpowers in maintaining their prestige or position often had harsh consequences for the ordinary citizens. As historian Patrick Major puts it aptly, “13 August 1961 was to go down as the darkest day of Germany’s Cold War.”[98]
Given the Republikflucht, challenges to Khrushchev’s leadership and failed diplomacy with the West, building a Wall was conceivably a logical solution to these problems. However, it is important to remember that it was not an inevitable outcome, but a rational conclusion to the crises in the circumstances. In a state where elections are meant to only be a rubber-stamp approval of the party’s activities, the citizen voting with their feet was an unacceptable ballot cast which demanded a response. This response was the Berlin Wall.
References
Barket, Elisabeth. “The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962.”International Affairs. no. 1 (1963): 59-73. http://www.jstor.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/stable/2610505 (accessed March 15, 2014).
Bavendamm, Gundula. Like a Tinderbox: The Berlin Crisis and the Construction of the Wall. Berlin: Berlin Story Verlag, 2011.
Beschloss, Michael R. The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963. New York: Edward Bulingame Books, 1991.
Catudal, Honoré. M. Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis: A Case Study in U.S. Decision Making. Berlin: Berlin-Verlag, 1980.
“East German Ministry of State Security, ‘New Methods of Operation of Western Secret Services'” November, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, BStU, ZA, MfS-HA IX Nr. 4350, pp. 341-360. Translated by Paul Maddrell. Names redacted in accordance with the German Law on State Security Records. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118653
Fulbrook, Mary. History of Germany 1918-2000: The Divided Nation, Second Edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2002.
Garthoff, Raymond L. “34.Berlin 1961: The Record Corrected .” Foreign Policy. no. 3 (1991): 142-156. http://www.jstor.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/stable/1148787 (accessed March 17, 2014).
Gray, William Glenn. Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.
Harrison, Hope M. Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations 1953-1961. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.
Harrison, Hope M. Ulbricht and the Concrete “Rose”: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961. Washington, D.C.: Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1993.
Hertle, Hans-Hermann. The Berlin Wall Story: Biography of a Monument. Berlin: Ch.Links Verlag, 2011.
Kempe, Frederick. Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth. New York: Berkley Pub Group, 2012.
Klein, David, and James S. Sutterlin. Berlin: From Symbol of Confrontation to Keystone of Stability. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989.
“Mao Zedong, Outline for a Speech on the International Situation” December, 1959, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao’s Manuscripts since the establishment of the PRC], v. 8 (Beijing, 1993), pp. 599-602; translation from the Chinese by David Wolff. Published in CWIHP Working Paper No. 30. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118893
Major, Patrick. Behind the Berlin Wall: East Germany and the Frontiers of Power. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
McAdams, A. James. East Germany and Détente: Building authority after the wall. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Newman, Kitty. Macmillan, Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis 1958-1960. New York: Routledge, 2007.
“Record of Meeting of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev with Comrade W. Ulbricht” November 30, 1960, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Fond 0742, Opis 6, Por 4, Papka 43. Published in CWIHP Working Paper No. 5, “Ulbricht and the Concrete ‘Rose.'” Translated for CWIHP by Hope Harrison. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112352
Shick, James M. The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971.
Smyser, W.R. From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle Over Germany. Houndsmills, Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1999.
Smyser, W.R. Kennedy and the Berlin Wall: “A hell of a lot better than a war”. Toronto: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2009.
Trachtenberg, Marc. A Constructed Peace: the Making of the European Settlement. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
Williamson, Richard D. First steps toward détente: American diplomacy in the Berlin crisis, 1958-1963. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012.
Footnotes
[1] A. James McAdams, East Germany and Détente: Building authority after the wall, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 9.
[2] Frederick Kempe, Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth, (New York: Berkley Pub Group, 2012), xiii.
[3] Hans-Hermann Hertle, The Berlin Wall Story: Biography of a Monument, (Berlin: Ch.Links Verlag, 2011), 29.
[4] Richard D. Williamson, First steps toward détente: American diplomacy in the Berlin crisis, 1958-1963, (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2012), xvii.
[5] The specific work referenced here is A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963.
[6] The specific works referenced here are We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History and Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States: An Interpretive History.
[7] The specific works referenced here are Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations 1953-1961 and Ulbricht and the Concrete “Rose”: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961.
[8] For more scholarship using this approach, please see Mary Fulbrook’s History of Germany 1918-2000: The Divided Nation, Second Edition, and Gundula Bavendamm’s Like a Tinderbox: The Berlin Crisis and the Construction of the Wall.
[9] The specific work referenced here is Berlin Crisis of 1961: Soviet-American relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin, June-November 1961.
[10] The specific work referenced here is Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis: A Case Study in U.S. Decision Making. While this book has a political science bias, it is valuable in its historical content for understanding the years preceding the construction of the wall.
[11] These challenges refer to both domestically with regards to his leadership by Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Beria, but also challenges to his leadership of the communist bloc by China. For more scholarship using this approach, please see James Richter’s Khrushchev’s Double Bind: International Pressure and Domestic Coalition Politics, and Renata Fritsch-Bournazel’s Confronting the German Question: Germans on the East-West Divide.
[12] The specific work referenced here is Behind the Berlin Wall: East Germany and the Frontiers of Power. Another work by him which is of interest is his “Going West: The Open Border and the Problems of Republikflucht” article.
[13] The specific work referenced here is The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963.
[14] For more scholarship using this approach, please see Frank A. Mayer’s Adenauer and Kennedy: A Study in German-American Relations, 1961-1963, Kitty Newman’s Macmillan, Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis 1958-1960, and W.R. Smyser’s From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle Over Germany.
[15] Patrick Major, Behind the Berlin Wall: East Germany and the Frontiers of Power, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 50, 52, 79, 82.
[16] Kempe, Berlin 1961, xix.
[17] Hertle, The Berlin Wall Story, 32.
[18] Major, Behind the Berlin, 56.
[19] This, alongside some travel and visitors agreements, allowed East Berliners to travel to West Berliners. From there, they could take a flight to the FRG and never return. Other GDR citizens could do the same through entering East Berlin. Kitty Newman, Macmillan, Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis 1958-1960, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 4.
[20] Hope M. Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations 1953-1961, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 99.
[21] Major, Behind the Berlin, 107-108.
[22] Translated from German, Torschlußpanik refers to “panic from fear that the escape hatch would be closed.” Honoré M. Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis: A Case Study in U.S. Decision Making, (Berlin: Berlin-Verlag, 1980), 204.
[23] W.R. Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle Over Germany, (Houndsmills, Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1999), 120.
[24] Major, Behind the Berlin, 46.
[25] Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin, 165.
[26] “Record of Meeting of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev with Comrade W. Ulbricht” November 30, 1960, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Fond 0742, Opis 6, Por 4, Papka 43. Published in CWIHP Working Paper No. 5, “Ulbricht and the Concrete ‘Rose.'” Trans. Hope Harrison. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112352
[27] Major, Behind the Berlin, 49.
[28] Harrison, Driving the Soviets, 99.
[29] Major, Behind the Berlin, 78-79.
[30] Ibid, 82.
[31] Ibid, 75.
[32] Harrison, Driving the Soviets, 99.
[33] James M. Shick, The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 130.
[34] Harrison, Driving the Soviets, 145.
[35] W.R. Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall: “A hell of a lot better than a war”, (Toronto: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 55.
[36] Shick, The Berlin Crisis, 13.
[37] David Klein, and James S. Sutterlin, Berlin: From Symbol of Confrontation to Keystone of Stability, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989), 56.
[38] Gundula Bavendamm, Like a Tinderbox: The Berlin Crisis and the Construction of the Wall, (Berlin: Berlin Story Verlag, 2011), 48; An evaluation from the Stasi in November 1958 also noted the ramping up of espionage activity in Berlin. “East German Ministry of State Security, ‘New Methods of Operation of Western Secret Services'” November 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, BStU, ZA, MfS-HA IX Nr. 4350, pp. 341-360. Trans. Paul Maddrell. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118653
[39] Elisabeth Barket, “The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962,”International Affairs, 39, no. 1 (1963): 60, http://www.jstor.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/stable/2610505 (accessed March 15, 2014)
[40] Raymond L. Garthoff, “Berlin 1961: The Record Corrected ,” Foreign Policy, 84, no. 3 (1991): 143, http://www.jstor.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/stable/1148787 (accessed March 17, 2014).
[41] Kempe, Berlin 1961, 22.
[42] Barket, “The Berlin Crisis,” 60. and Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin, 98.
[43] Smyser, From Yalta to, 121.
[44] Ibid, 122.
[45] “Record of Meeting,” November 30, 1960.
[46] Smyser, Kennedy and the Berlin, 93.
[47] Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: the Making of the European Settlement, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 252.
[48] Hertle, The Berlin Wall Story, 36.
[49] Bavendamm, Like a Tinderbox, 16.
[50] Harrison, Driving the Soviets, 139.
[51] Smyser, From Yalta to, 131.
[52] Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963, (New York: Edward Bulingame Books, 1991), 267.
[53] Smyser, From Yalta to, 120.
[54] Newman, Macmillan, Khrushchev, 2.
[55] He was also the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin, 201.
[56] Ibid, 201.
[57] Ibid, 111.
[58] Beschloss, The Crisis Years, 266.
[59] Major, Behind the Berlin, 109.
[60] Beschloss, The Crisis Years, 266.
[61] Ibid, 266.
[62] Harrison, Driving the Soviets, 165.
[63] “Mao Zedong, Outline for a Speech on the International Situation” December, 1959, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao’s Manuscripts since the establishment of the PRC], v. 8 (Beijing, 1993), pp. 599-602; trans. David Wolff. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118893
[64] Harrison, Driving the Soviets, 80.
[65] Ibid, 79.
[66] Ibid, 79.
[67] Ibid, 142.
[68] Ibid, 80.
[69] McAdams, East Germany and, 25.
[70] Harrison, Ulbricht and the, 5.
[71] Shick, The Berlin Crisis, 7.
[72] Harrison, Driving the Soviets, 3.
[73] Bavendamm, Like a Tinderbox, 24.
[74] Mary Fulbrook, History of Germany 1918-2000: The Divided Nation, Second Edition, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2002), 128, 133.
[75] Major, Behind the Berlin, 28.
[76] William Glenn Gray, Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 30.
[77] Ibid, 30.
[78] Harrison, Driving the Soviets, 121.
[79] Kempe, Berlin 1961, 22.
[80] Ibid, 21
[81] Harrison, Driving the Soviets, 121.
[82] Ibid, 121.
[83] Klein and Sutterlin, Berlin: From Symbol, 56.
[84] Ibid, 56.
[85] Kempe, Berlin 1961, 32.
[86] Williamson, First Steps Towards, xiii.
[87] Ibid, 54
[88] Shick, The Berlin Crisis, 113.
[89] Ibid, 114.
[90] Kempe, Berlin 1961, 33.
[91] Kempe, Berlin 1961, 33.
[92] Ibid, 34.
[93] Shick, The Berlin Crisis, 140.
[94] Hertle, The Berlin Wall, 37.
[95] Major, Behind the Berlin, 111.
[96] Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin, 211.
[97] Major, Behind the Berlin, 115.
[98] Ibid, 108.
Written by: Emily Tsui
Written at: University of Toronto
Written for: Professor Vasilis Dimitriadis
Date written: March 2014
Further Reading on E-International Relations
- The Origins of Regionalism in the EU and ASEAN
- Neo-Colonialism in Africa? An Analysis of a UK-Funded Volunteer Abroad Programme
- Two Nationalists and Their Differences – an Analysis of Trump and Bolsonaro
- Queer Asylum Seekers as a Threat to the State: An Analysis of UK Border Controls
- Risk Theory vs. Securitisation: An Analysis of the Global Surveillance Program
- Globalisation, Agency, Theory: A Critical Analysis of Marxism in Light of Brexit
