War and peace among states has remained a central question to International Relations (IR) scholars. In fact, IR scholars have for decades focused their attention in studying the diverse strategies that states have historically deployed to mitigate the use of organized violence in an anarchical (i.e. absence of a centralized political structure) context. Indeed, Hedley Bull (1977[2002]), Kenneth Waltz (1979[2010]), Robert Keohane (1984) and Alexander Wendt (1999) have built their theories by taking anarchy as the only organizing principle in the international system. In doing so, they have downplayed the virtues of hierarchy in international relations. From their perspective, hierarchy has no precedence in international politics, as it exclusively organizes state political structures (Waltz, 2010; Wendt, 1999).

This conceptual dichotomy presupposes a certain equality/horizontality between undifferentiated political units. In fact, by masking the hierarchic structures that inhabit international relations, these scholars have also masked the various forms of political authority that regulate bilateral relations among sovereign states (Lake, 2017; Donnelly 2006; Hobson & Sharman 2005). Indeed, Waltz (2010: 88) argues that in the realm of anarchy “each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command. None is required to obey”. Therefore, it would be wrong to speak of authority among sovereign states, since “authority requires legitimacy, not mere influence or power” (Wendt, 1999: 208). Anarchy and sovereignty are thus two co-constitutive principles. The former depends on the latter, and vice versa. These theoretical premises inform what is called the “Westphalian narrative” of international politics, which takes as a point of departure for theoretical analysis the experience of the European Empires at the end of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648). The Peace of Westphalia imposes itself as the cradle of a contemporary international system that has progressively expanded to the rest of the globe during the expansion of European empires (Bull, 2002). It is not only an “iconic moment” (Ikenberry, 2014) in international relations’ history, but also “the majestic portal which leads from the old into the new world” (Osiander, 2001: 264).

In the last two decades, a revisionist trend has spread into IR’s discipline. The purpose of the latter is to question these Westphalian assumptions, as well as their claim to universality. Constitutionalists argue that the absence of Westphalian principles in the treaties of Osnabruck and Munster remains proof of the mythical character of this paradigmatic narrative (Osiander 2001; Glanville 2013). These IR scholars find that the principles associated with Westphalian assumptions emerge two centuries later in the thought of modernist theorists and international jurists. Regionalist and globalist IR scholars are skeptical about the universality of a theoretical model that breaks down outside the European context (Henderson, 2008; Kang, 2004). In their view, the Westphalian narrative accentuates the “exceptional” character of the European experience and misrepresents it as a standard of global civilization (Kayaogul, 2010). For some, Westphalian narrative is only a “Western IR Theory” (Acharya & Buzan, 2010). Finally, theorists of hierarchy in IR emphasize about the two organizing principles excluded by mainstream theories of IR, notably Neorealism, Neoliberalism and Social Constructivism. These IR scholars espouse a conceptualization of international politics that avoids treating anarchy and hierarchy, as well as sovereignty and authority, as antagonistic principles. Along with them, I consider that it is possible and desirable to theorize more about their theoretical and empirical tension at the time of Global IR.

The hierarchic trend makes an important contribution to the study of international politics. It makes it possible to think about the contemporary international system as an environment where “some [states] are entitled to command and some [states] are required to obey” (Hobson & Sharman, 2005). David Lake (2014: 66) has noted more specifically that “in international relations, authority mostly rests on social contracts in which dominant states provide political orders to subordinate states of sufficient value to offset their loss of autonomy”. International hierarchies are therefore political equilibriums from which the constitutive political actors, the states, derive mutual benefits (Womack, 2006). These contractual hierarchies are similar to what anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists have defined as “clientelistic relationships”. However, analysis about political patronage has received little attention in IR. At present, little is known about the role that patronage plays in the society of states, and knowledge about how these international hierarchies affect state behavior is still embryonic.

This lack of knowledge about patronage in IR is surprising if two elements are considered. First, political patronage is present in every political system on a global scale (Berman 1974). Therefore, it can be extended to the society of states through policymakers’ personal relationships (Médard, 2000). Second, the concept of patronage is commonly used by IR scholars to describe the role (client state) that sovereign states have played historically in the international scene. Unfortunately, research on political patronage has generally adopted an a-theoretical perspective and theoretical efforts have been limited to the development of “conceptual models” (Graziano 1976; Veenendaal, 2014). Consequently, the construction of a clientelistic theory of politics remains to be done in the social sciences as well as in the discipline of IR. The purpose of this article is to lay down two theoretical movements that, I hope, could contribute to this task. In doing so, I would like to invite IR scholars to focus more on how political patronage affects international politics.

The Westphalian Narrative and the Revisionist Turn 

Westphalian narrative is a theoretical construct based mainly on two correlated assumptions. First, the international system is said to be anarchic, i.e. no Global State. Second, anarchy is said to be the consequence of state sovereignty. Both anarchy and sovereignty are considered the organizational principles of two political structures: the international system and the state. In IR, the concept of anarchy is defined in at least two ways. First, anarchy is conceptualized as the absence of order, or as a permanent state of war (Milner, 1991). However, this conception remains problematic, since mainstream theories in IR recognize that there is indeed order in the anarchic context of international relations and that the latter results from the regularization of state behavior (Bull, 2002). The second interpretation is straightforward. Anarchy simply refers to the absence of a Global State (Keohane, 1984; Wendt, 1999; Bull, 2002). In such a context, states are modern entities in that they are internally sovereign. A sovereign state is thus a formally structured hierarchy whose central administration has successfully claimed the monopoly of physical constraint over a territory and a population (Bull, 2002). But, unable to proceed in the same way internationally, sovereign states remain caught in a social environment where the formal institutionalization of politics is an incomplete process (Lake, 2014). This is why the realm of anarchy is considered “the realm of informal politics” (Waltz, 2010).

Westphalian narrative has been the subject of much criticism. For some revisionists, it is impossible to find within the Westphalian treaties the constitutive principles that form today the so called contemporary international system. Historian Derek Croxton (1999: 589) notes that “nobody began or even ended the negotiations at Westphalia with the idea of ​​creating an international system of sovereign states”. Political scientist Peter Stirk (2012: 643) insists that “those who negotiated and commented on the peace of Westphalia did not see it as binding the norm of sovereign equality [because] the normative structure of this world was hierarchical”. In fact, the concept of sovereignty does not appear in the theoretical language of IR scholars until the 18^th century and only becomes part of the normative framework of international politics during the 20^th century (Glanville, 2013). IR scholar Stephen Krasner (2001: 21) argues indeed that the great innovations attributed to the Peace of Westphalia are “antithetical to the ideas of national sovereignty that later became associated with the so-called Westphalian system”. Since “the conventional understanding of sovereignty is historically inaccurate” (Glanville, 2013: 87), it becomes imperative to look elsewhere when it comes to theorizing about international politics in a global perspective.

Revisionists also discuss the dichotomous conceptualization of anarchy and hierarchy as constitutive principles of political structures, as well as the tension between sovereignty and authority in the society of states. Jack Donnelly (2006: 141) notes precisely that “rather than thinking of anarchy or hierarchy we should attend instead to hierarchy in anarchy”. In this tradition, the concept of hierarchy, generally confused with that of “asymmetry” and “ranking”, would be better understood as a political equilibrium where “both sides become confident of the positive mutual benefit of peaceful relations” (Womack, 2006: 89). Those political equilibriums in the realm of informal politics refers to some kind of international social contracts in which Great Powers “exchange social order for compliance” (Lake, 2007: 54). In other words, Great Powers are willing to assume the costs of an international political order established and maintained accordingly to their preferences, while subordinate states will ensure their subordination to the rules of the game as long as they can derive substantial benefits in terms of military security, economic development and international prestige. This kind of “generalized exchange” among states embedded in hierarchical structures share common assumptions with the research conducted by sociologists and anthropologists on political patronage. However, IR scholars have rarely engaged with these assumptions. 

Patronage in the Discipline of IR

The concept of political patronage was first introduced in IR in the 1980s, following the publication of Patron-Client State Relationships by Shoemaker and Spanier (1984) (Carney, 1989). Shoemaker and Spanier built at the time the Patron-Client Model (PCM), which follows the anthropological tradition and defines the interstate clientelistic relationship as a negotiated solution to the problem of insecurity, especially in military terms. In this tradition, these bilateral relationships are an expression of interstate cooperation to deal with the security challenges that a Realist world impose on states. If the concept of security may be understood in military traditional terms, economic and normative concerns are not excluded from rational calculations. Accordingly, clientelistic relationships could be conceptualized as a purely instrumental strategy that responds to geostrategic and military interests, but in which solidarity and reciprocity play a fundamental role in binding actors. We cannot ignore the significance of affection in these asymmetrical structures (Carney, 1989).

Patronage is also used by those IR scholars who have focused their studies on hegemonies and peripheral states’ bilateral relations but avoid treating the latter in terms of pure political and economic dependence. Sylvan and Majesky (2003) argue that the concept of patronage applies well to bilateral relations established and maintained historically by the United States and some sovereign states in Latin America and in the Middle East, including Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Colombia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Iran (1953-1979). This research program shows that international clientelistic networks are at work in international politics and that they form a particular kind of international hierarchy little studied by IR scholars. It would therefore be wrong to approach political patronage as an epiphenomenon in IR. What is more, the concept of patronage also appears among other IR scholars, such as Kenneth Waltz, for whom the Great Powers’ military interventions during the Cold War were generally conducted with the purpose of defending and promoting the expansion of its Client states in places like China, Korea and Vietnam (Waltz, 1993: 47 [emphasis added]). Unfortunately, Waltz does not insist on the role played by these clients in international politics. This blind spot stems out from Waltz theoretical orientation. On the one hand, Waltz (2010) argues that systemic theories should focus exclusively on those structural forces that affect state behavior and, therefore, must avoid any theoretical engagement with units’ interactions. On the other hand, Waltz adheres to the idea that one cannot theorize about international politics from the periphery. The only actors that matters are “the major ones” (Waltz, 2010). Notwithstanding, Waltz’s views of the bipolar order as an international struggle for the acquisition, protection and expansion of client states, is a claim that IR scholars cannot ignore. Patronage is important for Great Powers.

The image of political patronage emerges with greater clarity among IR scholars such as David Lake, which promotes the idea that international hierarchies are “negotiated solutions” to the problem of political order. More precisely, international hierarchies are “ social contracts “ based on “feelings of mutual obligation” (Lake, 2017). Certainly, international hierarchies are structures of command and compliance in terms of political authority, but they are also political structures that generate mutual benefits for both the Great Powers and the subordinate states. The legitimacy of international hierarchies’ rests “on the ruler’s ability to deliver the goods demanded by the ruled and the latter’s willingness to recognize as legitimate the status of the former” (Lake, 2007: 55). Legitimization results thus from a generalized exchange of international goods. At the heart of this process, Great Powers are obliged to distribute the benefits generated by the international order if they want to ensure the satisfaction of subordinate states (Battistella, 2004). Among states, political authority is never absolute, but “relational” and “contingent” (Lake, 2007). Finally, the concept of political patronage seems very useful to scholars interested in the study of subordinate powers’ foreign policy options, particularly micro-states (Veenendaal, 2014). To this IR scholar, the concept of patronage has an important implication for the study of peripheral powers. In fact, it questions the conceptualization of subordinate states as being merely vulnerable and dependent political entities. Although this view is partially correct, it is incomplete because it tends to ignore the fact that all states, big or small, strong or weak, must make the international system work to their advantage. Agency is not exclusive to Great Powers. Subordinate states are powerful actors in international relations because their “satisfaction” with the international order provided by Great Powers is a necessary condition for international peace. Of course, IR scholars do not generally specify where satisfaction comes from and how it helps to maintain political order in the realm of anarchy.

While relevant to the analysis of peripheral states’ foreign policy options, the Patron-Client Model (PCM) is however limited in scope. Research based on this model remains circumscribed to bilateral relations and no theoretical systematization efforts have been made. This is largely due to the conceptualization of clientelistic relationships around the dyadic structure, that is, two political actors. But if IR scholars look closely, there are too many clientelistic dyads in international politics. Still, theoretical knowledge and methodological tools to tackle this international phenomenon are lacking. Second, this research program considers states as unitary and rational actors endowed with anthropomorphic attributes. This theoretical twist is always problematic in social sciences. It is in fact very pernicious to treat corporate structures as human beings. I believe that by opening the black box of the state, IR scholars are better suited to understand how policymakers participate in the construction of international clientelistic hierarchies. Third, I also find problematic that the PCM does not engage directly with the concept of hierarchy, but rather opts for that one of asymmetry, which is more flexible and imprecise. At present, it is impossible to establish a threshold to determine how much asymmetry is needed to talk about a clientelistic relationship between states. What about United States and Canada, or between sovereign states within the European Union? Finally, and not least, the PCM borrows a rationalist-materialist epistemology that prevents IR scholars from grasping the normative dimensions of these political hierarchies as well as their structural effects on the constitutive units. Here too, as Waltz noted years ago, the creators become the creatures of the structures they help to build.

Gratitude as Political Power and Structures of Roles/Identity. A Research Agenda

If this way of thinking, speaking and writing about international politics is abundant, it is nevertheless surprising that theoretical systematization around political patronage has attracted little attention. At present, there is no theoretical framework to understand international relations in purely clientelistic terms. So, how to get there and what must be the primary functions of this theory? In my opinion, a clientelistic theory of international politics should fulfill two main analytical functions: 1) to identify the nature (ontology) of these international hierarchies, and 2) to understand how they affect their constitutive units. To advance in this direction, one must embrace a double movement. First, IR scholars must adopt a more structural perspective of the clientelistic relationship, without ignoring that these political hierarchies are produced and reproduced by political actors. Interactionism is the path to follow. Second, it is crucial to embrace some elements of Social Constructivism to better grasp the normative aspects. With this double movement, a “clientelistic relationship” can be conceptualized in two manners. First, it can be defined as a political hierarchy made of specific norms and rules that constrain and enact state behavior. Second, it can be said to be a “structure of roles” made of representational practices of Self and Other (Patron & Client). In doing so, research about patronage in IR must seek to find out how the performance of these roles affect state behavior, its foreign policy options and national preferences. This is how this research program can contribute to the advancement of knowledge on political patronage, especially in IR.

In order to deal with the ontological question, I invite IR scholars to engage the discussion with the unfinished work of Marcel Mauss (The Gift). The primary goal is to understand how gratitude becomes a source and a manifestation of political power in asymmetrical relationships and how it binds political actors in moral contracts. Mauss’s conception of reciprocity challenges ideas about gratitude developed early by philosophers as Immanuel Kant, who argues that self-interested benevolence cannot be considered as benevolence at all (Leithart, 2014). In Mauss terms, self-interested behavior is not something humans learn during socialization, but rather “is a human tendency” (Leiphart, 2014: 195). Anthropologically speaking, feelings of gratitude have a “survival value” in that they are essential to build and maintain social cohesion (Komter, 2004).

Contrary to other social sciences, where the concept of gratitude has been defined as “the positive emotion one feels when another person has intentionally given, or attempted to give, one something of value” (Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006: 319), little has been said about it in IR. Indeed, feelings of gratitude are still an unexplored element of international politics. In fact, IR scholars are still blind to the assumption that feelings of gratitude encourage reciprocity, as well as the creation of bonds of trust that preserve the positive quality of relationships. It is well known in social psychology that ingratitude, the opposite of gratitude, is generally perceived as a moral deviation, because it shows the lack of capacity and will to reciprocate those who have been acting in a benevolent manner to us (Komter, 2004). Ingratitude is one of the dark sides of gratitude, but not the only one. Indeed, gratitude can also operate as an instrument of moral coercion, or as I argue here, a source and a manifestation of political power. In fact, gratitude is first and above all “a moral barometer” that regulates behavior by reinforcing and motivating appropriate responses to attitudes of benevolence (Shelton, 2004). That said, the concept of gratitude, when introduced in the realm of politics, hardly escapes normative quarrels over good and bad forms of political gratitude. In this aspect, the relationship between politics and gratitude has attracted the same kind of normative concerns (bias) that are frequently involved in research about patronage.

In order to avoid normative debates, IR scholars will be best served by a term first coined by social psychologists: “debt of gratitude”. Applied it to the context of international politics, the concept of debts of gratitude can be better understood as reciprocity with “strings attached” (Callard, 2019). In other words, a debt of gratitude in the political domain is a moral contract between two or more political actors which is established during socialization in asymmetrical structures, but not exclusively. As a moral contract, a debt of gratitude is thus governed by norms of reciprocity that regulate the reception of benefits and also the obligations attached to the actions of reciprocity itself (Callard, 2019; Helm, 2019). In other words, the underlying principle behind the exchange of gifts is reciprocity, “with the connected feelings of gratitude as the moral cement of human society” (Komter, 2004: 196). Just as Marcel Mauss argued almost 100 years ago, gratitude is a structural force that compels humans to maintain the circularity of gifts and counter-gifts. The refusal of a gift could be at the origins of tensions and conflicts, or even war, between the beneficiary and the benefactor (Helm, 2019). Political hierarchies built upon gratitude are consequently governed by the three sociological obligations coined by Marcel Mauss in his seminal work: to give, to receive, and to reciprocate. And since the concept of political clientelism has been generally assimilated to the gift system theorized by Marcel Mauss (Eisenstadt & Roniger 1980; Graziano 1976), it is accurate to define political patronage appealing to the concept of debts of gratitude. In order to better understand this association, it is important to start the analysis with Mauss’s (1924: 7) research question: “[what is] the rule of law and interest which makes that a gift is obligatorily rendered”? According to Mauss, it is the hau, namely “the spirit of the given thing”. In fact, Mauss notes that the thing received as a gift binds the donor and the beneficiary, magically, in a moral contract. If the association is accurate, clientelistic hierarchies have thus a moral dimension that must be understood if one wants to grasp how political patronage is at the origins of mutual solidarity and reciprocity between political actors embedded in hierarchical structures. This assumption is significant if IR scholars take seriously the assumption that international politics is, essentially, a stateless society (Bull, 2002) in which reciprocity plays a significant role. Notwithstanding, political scientists have treated political gratitude as “the most pestilential form of… gratitude” (Hewitt, 1924). But, Hewitt itself recognizes that political gratitude has virtues that one cannot ignore. In fact, the author notes, ingratitude can be very costly in the long run since those political actors cultivating the reputation of being ungrateful can find themselves in a difficult situation when asking for help in the future (Hewitt, 1924: 46).

The second theoretical move proposed here is a call for the endorsement of some elements of Social Constructivism in order to grasp the normative elements of these international hierarchies. To realize this task, IR scholars must combine Social Constructivism with Role Identity Theory. Alexander Wendt has already done this in Social Theory of International Politics. By espousing symbolic interactionism as a theoretical bridge between those social theories, Wendt is able to define anarchy as a “structure of roles” created and maintained in a process of collective identification. By appealing to the concept of “role”, Wendt is able to argue that anarchic structures are macrostructures of multiple realizations: hobbesian, lockean, and kantian (Wendt, 1999). Consequently, anarchic structures are not “empty vessels”, but rather “what states make of [them]” (Wendt, 1992). In following Wendt, we argue that clientelistic hierarchies can also be understood as “structures of roles” made of representational practices of Self and Other (Patron & Client). Patron and Client are thus two complementary roles/identities that political actors must internalize and perform in order for these structures to acquire a certain materiality, stability and historicity. IR scholars must look at the constitutive processes of these international hierarchies to better understood how role performativity affects state-building processes.

In order to explore how gratitude works empirically at the international level, I am currently conducting a doctoral thesis on the study of two constitutive processes of international clientelistic hierarchies. I seek to understand more precisely the relationship between gratitude and institutional change by analyzing two periods of Cuba’s history (1898-1902/1960-1976). For both periods, Cuba has benefited from external intervention in its internal political affairs, as well as military, economic and ideological support from Great Powers with hegemonic ambitions. In both cases, Cuba has also adopted a political constitution that mirrors the political constitution of the friendly hegemon. In the particular case of Cuba, the mirroring process seems fueled by “debts of gratitude”. The evidence consulted until now, mainly composed of primary sources, shows that Cuba was in fact locked into two international hierarchies built upon debts of gratitude, first with the United States, and later with the Soviet Union. To United States, Cuba owed its emancipation from colonialism and its ascension to the community of sovereign states. Cuban political leaders, such as Generals Máximo Gómez and Antonio Maceo, frequently invoke these ideas in discursive practices. Indeed, these revolutionary leaders recognize both the obligations and the perils of contracting “debts of gratitude with such a powerful neighbor” (Pérez, 2008). These political actors also saw Cuba’s emancipation from colonialism as a poisonous “gift”. In fact, the independence from Spain was represented as the result of Americans’ sacrifices, military efforts, and financial expenses. Even if Cubans have been fighting Spain for almost 30 years, the birth of the modern state in Cuba was presented to Cubans independentistas as a result of American intervention and generous altruism. In fact, Cubans were not only excluded from negotiations at the Treaty of Paris in 1898 and under military occupation until 1902, but they were also obligated to reciprocate America’s first hegemonic enterprise. As historian Louis A. Pérez has noted, “the demand for Cuba gratitude called for more than an acknowledgment of debt. It implied, too, acts of appreciation […] a performance of gratitude as a means to reciprocate North American sacrifices” (Pérez, 2008: 187). The Platt Amendment introduced in the Constitution of 1901 was just an amount of the price that Cubans had to pay for America’s altruism. Gratitude was indeed the “moral currency” of imperialism (Pérez, 2008) and reciprocity implied conditional sovereignty.

By analyzing discursive practices, I also find that debts of gratitude are at work between Cuba and the Soviet Union. To the latter, the former owed the survival of the Cuban Revolution, mostly during its first years. The debt of gratitude is more explicitly visible in the aftermath of the missile crisis of 1962, when Cuban-Soviet relations were marked by tensions that resulted from American-Soviet negotiations. Here too, Cubans revolucionarios were excluded from international negotiations, even if they were defending the survival of a political process committed to resolve internal governance problems and to consolidate international sovereignty. In order to resolve tensions, political leaders from both sides, Cuba and the Soviet Union, built diplomatic relations by appealing to gratitude and reciprocity in the face of adversity. In 1962, just two months after the end of the missile crisis, Nikita Khrushchev emphasize in a conversation with Cuban official Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, just as Americans did before, that all the military efforts, human sacrifices, and financial expenses that the Soviet Union has made to « save » Cuba from imperialist aggression and annexation have been done for the benefice of Cubans[1]. In other words, the mere existence of a Revolution with the adjective of “Socialist” is a gift that has been done to Cubans by another altruistic and benevolent Great Power with hegemonic ambitions. Not recognition would implied ungrateful behavior from Cuban leadership and surely the end of the relationship. Cuban leadership had thus the obligation to show some degree of gratitude, mostly because Soviet’s intervention made possible the existence of Cuba Libre. In order to fulfill these demands for recognition, Fidel Castro expressed Cuba’s gratitude eloquently during his first visit to Moscow in 1963. In his first speech, the Cuban leader emphasize the fact that « it was logically for Cubans to be eternally and deeply grateful to the Soviet Union and its leadership»[2]. A few years later, in 1976, the Cuban parliament adopted the socialist constitution which would henceforth define the character of the Cuban nation.

Conclusion

How feelings of gratitude shape institutional change and international behavior is still the puzzle to solve by IR scholars in future research. To deal with it, IR scholars must first engage analytically with both discursive practices and institutional change. The idea is to better understand “if” and “how” institutional change is fueled by gratitude as a structural force that compels states to return a counter part of the benefit they have received from other states. In this paper, I have argued that international clientelistic hierarchies are a pervasive phenomenon in international politics and that they are political structures built upon gratitude as a source and a manifestation of political power. I have also shown that in order to deal ontologically and structurally with these particular international structures, IR scholars must refine the Patron Client Model by introducing two theoretical moves: structuralism and social constructivism. Scholars are thus invited to engage with Marcel Mauss’s work to better understand how political gratitude is at the origins of mutual reciprocity and solidarity among actors embedded in asymmetrical structures. Here, I want to insist on the fact that gratitude seems to be the key element that helps to explain and to understand the way political actors pursue self-interest in altruistic manners. Political power goes in both directions. Gratitude is a moral weight that all states must carry on in order to avoid the manifest destiny of those perceived as ungrateful within the international society of states: international ostracism. Thus, subaltern states get locked into these international hierarchies in order to avoid political isolation and economic sanctions. Here too, the case of Cuba offers a good case study. But, gratitude is also a valuable moral resource for Great Powers with hegemonic ambitions. In fact, the positive feelings of gratitude expressed by subaltern states help hegemons to represent themselves as benevolent actors. Consequently, feelings of gratitude reinforce the will to pursue regional or global hegemony. 

Notes

[1] « Documents Concerning Conversations in Moscow between Cuban Communist Official Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Soviet Leader Nikita Khrushchev », December 11, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Provided by the Cuban Government for the October 2002 Havana conference (« La crisis de Octubre: Una vision politica 40 años despues ») organized by the National Security Archive. Translated from Spanish for CWIHP by Chris Dunlap.

[2] Castro, Fidel. «Discurso Pronunciado por el Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz, Primer Secretario del Partido Unido de la Revolucion Socialista y Primer Ministro del Gobierno Revolucionario, en la Plaza Roja de Moscu, en el Gran Acto de Bienvenida», 28 de abril de 1963, Departamento de Versiones Taquigraficas del Gobierno Revolucionario. (Translation has been made by the author of this paper)

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Womack, Brantly. China and Vietnam. The Politics of Asymmetry, Cambridge University Press, 2006. 

Further Reading on E-International Relations

• ‘Politics of Gratitude’ – Bridging Ontologies: Patronage, Roles, and Emotions
• Indian Diplomats and the Social Hierarchies of Global Order
• International Political Sociology Contributions to International Relations
• The Global South as a Political Project
• Russia’s Status as a Colonial Power
• The International Political Economy of Health: The Covid-19 Vaccine Distribution