This is a preprint excerpt from Mongolian Independence and the British: Geopolitics and Diplomacy in High Asia, 1911–1916, by Matteo Miele. You can download the book free of charge from E-International Relations.

The current Mongolian state (Mongol uls) covers over one and a half million square kilometers with a population, in 2020, of just over three million inhabitants.^[1] Geographically, however, the country represents only a part of the wider national and cultural identity of the Buddhist Mongols, who are also present in the People’s Republic of China, in particular in the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia. Another ancient presence, although numerically very limited, is represented by the Mongols of Hsin-chiang.^[2] Still others live in Russia, in particular in Buryatia and Kalmykia. The Mongols of Kalmykia moved from Zungaria in the seventeenth century. Kalmykia remained a khanate until 1771, when many Mongols returned to Zungaria and the country was fully integrated into Russia by Catherine II.^[3]

In the historical analysis of British geopolitical designs of the early twentieth century, Outer Mongolia – apparently – should have a peripheral role. The country was too far from the geographic heart of Britain’s interests in Asia. Indeed, those interests traveled the routes of the Indian Ocean and, through the vital Strait of Malacca and therefore Singapore, arrived in southern China, where the British imperial tradition was embodied in the colony of Hong Kong. The commercial dimension of a country with one of the lowest population densities in the world was certainly negligible: in 1920, shortly after the period examined in this research, the total population was estimated between two and five million inhabitants over the entire Mongolian territory (Inner and Outer Mongolia).^[4] The 1950 data, that is a few tens of years after the period analyzed by this work, refer to a total population of about 780,000 inhabitants in independent Mongolia alone.^[5] Even regarding the defense of India – from a strategic point of view – the geographical position of Mongolia was secondary.

Yet, as I will try to explain, Outer Mongolia, freed from the yoke of the Ch’ing Empire, reopened the geopolitical confrontation of Great Britain and Russia in High Asia, particularly in Tibet, although the previous years had witnessed the development of international relations that had placed the United Kingdom and Russia on the same side. ‘Russian action in Mongolia does not, I imagine, directly concern Great Britain, but indirectly it is of very great consequence indeed’ explained George Ernest Morrison, an ex-correspondent from Peking for The Times and an adviser to Yüan Shih-k’ai, writing to Dudley D. Braham, in February 1913.^[6]

Then in what terms can we speak of a new geopolitical confrontation? Probably a further analysis should be added to the then framework of international relations, to explain the importance of a region so far from Calcutta and Delhi. Mongolia – as has already been seen – was (and is) strongly linked to Tibet by cultural and religious ties. Changes in Urga had different consequences on the relations of the Western powers with Lhasa. Thinking in terms of historical and geopolitical analysis necessarily means placing a country in its own geographical and cultural context. The description made by the Italian orientalist Alessandro Bausani on the centrality of the religious element (even in a text dedicated to Persia) is very effective:

In great traditional civilizations […] the different cultural components interweave; art and religion, law and politics are not pieces of a mosaic but are closely blended into a single organism dominated and permeated by the most important of all motifs, religion.^[7]

Such a discourse is even more valid for countries where religious hierarchies, over the centuries, assumed a pre-eminent position to the point of coinciding with the very idea of ​​political power and established a theocracy. Lhasa was, from this point of view, the religious and consequently political center for a Tibetan Buddhist region that met with British objectives. As Charles Bell wrote in 1924: ‘race and religion are the strongest of ties, especially in the East’.^[8] Add to this the return of the dalai lama to Lhasa and the declaration of independence of Tibet in 1913. The end – and fragmentation – of the Ch’ing Empire was the novelty that intervened in these regions on the issues defined by the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907. Walter Langley, assistant under-secretary of state for Foreign Affairs,^[9] wrote to the India Office in March 1913 in this regard:

Recent information from Peking and India has tended to confirm the impression that a large increase of Russian influence in Thibet is to be apprehended in the near future, while the course of events since 1907, culminating in the practical acquisition of independence by the Thibetans, and in the conclusion of treaties by Mongolia with Russia and Thibet respectively, would seem to have distinctly altered the status quo in Thibet, and both Russian and British relations towards that country.^[10]

Therefore, Mongolian independence reopened, in the British view, the game: that country could become the key to open the doors of Lhasa to the Russians. The British also feared, for example, the many Mongolian monks who moved to Tibetan monasteries.^[11] Russian weapons were probably sent to Tibet by the Mongols.^[12] Let us therefore proceed in order, thus highlighting the historical-political path of independent Outer Mongolia and the dimension that it assumed in the geopolitical interests of the British Empire.

Mongolian independence

In Tibet, the thirteenth dalai lama declared independence – as seen – at the beginning of 1913. In Outer Mongolia, independence had been declared even before the official end of the empire, in December 1911. The leader of the Yellow School in Mongolia was the khal-kha rje-btsun dam-pa, in Mongolian: bogd jivzundamba hutagt haan bogd jivzundamba hutagt haan. Hutagt (Tibetan: ho thog tu), in Chinese: hu-t’u-k’o-t’u 呼圖克圖, is a title reserved for the highest leaders of Tibetan Buddhism.^[13] Ngag-dbang-blo-bzang-chos-kyi-nyi-ma-bstan-’dzin-dbang-phyug, Tibetan by birth, was the eighth in a sprul sku line that is traced back to the seventeenth century, to Blo-bzang-bstan-pa’i-rgyal-mtshan (1635-1723), son of a Halh prince, Gombodorj.^[14] In the sequence of what were considered «manifestations» of Bde-mchog, in addition to the rje-btsun dam-pa, the jo-nang master Tā-ra-nā-tha (1575-1634), who died in Mongolia in 1634: the first rje-btsun dam-pa Blo-bzang-bstan-pa’i-rgyal-mtshan, also called Zanabazar, was regarded as his subsequent rebirth by the dalai lama and paṇ-chen bla-ma.^[15] Zanabazar is also remembered for his extraordinary artistic work and for having created the «soyombo» scripture, whose first grapheme, also called «soyombo», became since 1911 one of the main symbols of independence and Mongolian identity, even during the communist period, and is still – among other things – on the flag and in the national emblem of the current Republic.^[16] The Mongolian capital was originally a monastery for Zanabazar founded in 1639.^[17]

On December 1, there was the formal declaration and a few weeks later – on December 29 – the eighth rje-btsun dam-pa Ngag-dbang-blo-bzang-chos-kyi-nyi-ma-bstan-’dzin-dbang-phyug ascended the throne as bogd haan.^[18] His government was made up of five ministries: internal affairs, foreign affairs, military affairs, justice and finance.^[19] The ministers were Tserenchimed (Internal Affairs), Handdorj (Foreign Affairs), Namsray (Justice), Gombosüren (Military Affairs), and Chagdaryaj (Finance).^[20] The name Ih Mongol Uls was resurrected by some Mongolian historians, thus underlining the link of the new country with the ancient medieval empire created by Chingis haan.^[21] The Chinese soldiers in Mongolia, unpaid because of the revolution, mutinied.^[22] The link between the Manchu dynasty and the Mongols was to be considered dissolved and there was, according to the Mongols, no continuation of this link to the Republic of China that was about to be born.^[23] In 1688 the Halh princes had asked the Manchu Emperor K’ang-hsi for protection against Galdan, the haan of the Oyrat Mongols, who was later defeated in 1690.^[24] In 1691, the princes therefore recognized the emperor’s authority.^[25] As with Tibet later, that recognition did not imply the full annexation to China; the bond was a relationship between emperor and princes, and not between Mongolia and China. Indeed, according to Luciano Petech:

Il vassallaggio accettato nel 1691 dai principi Qalqa della Mongolia Esterna era un rapporto personale fra di essi e la dinastia manciù. Durante i secoli XVIII e XIX i capi mongoli obbedirono all’imperatore manciù come avevano obbedito e pagato tributo al loro qa’an. Dal 1719 fu loro vietato di avere rapporti diretti con le potenze straniere. Ciò voleva dire che le relazioni col vicino russo venivano trattate dal governo di Pechino. Queste relazioni vennero poi regolate col trattato di Kiakhta del 1860. Gli imperatori in linea di massima non intervennero negli affari del paese, rispettando tutti i diritti dell’aristocrazia mongola.^[26]

Only from the beginning of the twentieth century, from 1902 to be precise, did the Ch’ing dynasty authorize the Chinese (Han) colonization of Outer Mongolia, which had been banned before then.^[27] Even in Mongolia, as seen for Tibet, the «New Policy» (新政 hsin cheng), inaugurated in 1901, was implemented.^[28] In 1906, a Bureau for the Colonization of Mongolia was born.^[29] Therefore, colonization, at the time of independence, was still just beginning and the Chinese had settled only in the fertile valley between Urga and Kyakhta.^[30] To encourage the sinization there was also the action of Sando (in Chinese 三多 San-to), the last amban of Urga, who – still in 1911 – had opened another bureau for colonization.^[31] Sando, an anti-Russian, had arrived in Urga in March 1910.^[32] Certainly his management of power, his harshness and disrespect towards the Mongols – despite being of Mongolian origin himself^[33] –as well as his greed to tax the population, had contributed greatly to the end of the centuries-old bond with the Ch’ing. Indeed, according to T. A. Rustad, a Norwegian who worked for the British and American Tobacco Company:

The mongols have got horses that every year they dedicate to the Living-God. These horses are brought into Urga during the summer festival, when horse-racing etc takes place. Well the Amban with his soldiers took these horses by force from the mongols and branded them with his own brand saying that they were to be used only by the army hereafter. Well you can imagine what effect that had on the mongols, who are very religious, in their way. The amban taxed every little bit that the mongols produced and needed. The building of the barraks near Urga, just about 3 miles to the East of the town was also done with mongol money. There were some fine trees in a certain valley near Urga that the mongols thought a lot of. Well the first thing the Amban did was to cut down these trees and use them in the barrack buildings. The Amban in fact did everything that he knew the Mongols did not like. He sat on them, properly speaking. Treated them just like animals, not as well as he treated his own overfed ponies. The mongols are very peaceful people, but this was more than any human being could stand. Those that had any valuables were put in prison and what they had was taken away from them. I have heard hundred of stories of how he managed to get what they had […]. Well the behaviour of the Amban was the cause of the Mongol rising against the government of China. ^[34]

G. E. Morrison simply accused the two high imperial officials of the cruelty in Mongolia (by Sando) and in Tibet (by Chang Yin-t’ang); in short, according to him, it was simply a matter of personal responsibility, as if there had not been a broader plan of colonization and total submission of territories for centuries completely autonomous from the central imperial power.^[35] Morrison’s opinion must obviously be filtered and understood in his role as adviser to Yüan Shih-k’ai. The British ambassador Jordan did not have great sympathy towards the adviser, considering him – according to Morrison himself – essentially Chinese (‘My chief difficulty is the hostility of Sir John Jordan who appears to regard me as a Chinese’).^[36]

In Inner Mongolia, Han colonization had begun as early as 1840.^[37] By 1913, there were 82,000 Chinese in the district of T’ao-nan 洮南, while Mongols were just 23,000.^[38] Sinization, however, meant not only colonization in the lands of the Mongols, but also and above all a cultural and social process, a radical change in the traditional lifestyle, since one of the fundamental lines of demarcation between Chinese and Mongols was the nomadic lifestyle: of the 23,000 Mongols in the district of T’ao-nan, 4,000 had become farmers.^[39] Furthermore, the Mongols were removed from the fertile lands – which the Chinese kept for themselves – and only the arid highlands remained to raise their livestock.^[40] With loans at usury rates, the Mongolian tribes were losing land and livestock to the newcomers^[41] and at the same time the Mongols’ hatred of the Chinese was fueled.^[42] The Chinese government also banned the Mongols from obtaining loans from the Russians.^[43] Basically, the attempt by the Chinese was to make Mongolia a Chinese province in all respects. Similar projects also involved Tibet. Indeed, Wen Tsung-yao 溫宗堯, after his removal from the post of junior amban of Lhasa in 1910,^[44] prepared a plan for Tibet for the practical transformation of Tibet into a Chinese province, although not formally calling it in that way: ‘不必遽改為行省，而當以治行省之道治之’. ^[45] It is useful to remember, in this regard, that even today outer Tibet and inner Mongolia are not formally «provinces» (省 sheng) of the People’s Republic of China, but «autonomous regions» (tzu chih ch’ü 自治區 / 自治区).

The Russians and Mongolia

In the days following the Mongol declaration of independence in 1911, the role of Russia was also being decided. In 1854, at the height of the Revolt of the T’ai-p’ing, certain of the end of the Ch’ing dynasty, Nikolay Murav’yëv-Amurskiy (1809-1881) had explained to the Russian government the need to avoid Chinese dominion over Mongolia after the end of the Manchu rule.^[46] At the time, Murav’yëv-Amurskiy was the Governor General of Eastern Siberia.^[47] In the seventeenth century the Russians had sent several missions to the Mongols with the aim of convincing the princes to recognize the tsar’s authority, without, however, obtaining real results, with the exception – perhaps – of Altan han Ombo Erdene.^[48] The difficulties increased in the second half of the seventeenth century, with border incidents and Mongolian incursions into Siberia.^[49] Only in 1689, under the pressure of Chinese troops, did the Treaty of Nerchinsk establish the border between the two empires along the Argun’ and Shilka rivers and the Stanovoy mountain range, excluding the Russians from the Amur region.^[50] Between 1858 and 1860, other treaties extended the borders of the Russian Empire at the expense of the Ch’ing empire, towards Central Asia and the regions of Amur, Priamur’ye and Ussuri.^[51] The hero of the conquest of the new territories was precisely Murav’yëv-Amurskiy.^[52] His 1854 proposal on Mongolia had won some favor in the government; a special commission had espoused his ultimate goal to extend Russian influence over Mongolia, albeit in a peaceful way.^[53] The Russian caution, however, about a possible subjugation of Mongolia and Manchuria, as protectorates, stemmed from a possible Western reaction: in response, other powers could annex other territories – for example Korea – as explained by the Amur Commission to the tsar in 1861.^[54] The following year, however, the same commission expressed its favor, in the event of the fall of the Ch’ing dynasty, for the independence of Mongolia and Manchuria, thus clarifying the next Russian policy on the issue.^[55]

On January 11, 1912, with an official communiqué, Saint Petersburg responded positively to the request of the Chinese and Mongols for mediation, but placed as a precondition the absence of Chinese officials, soldiers or settlers in Mongolia.^[56] Naturally, the Chinese, for their part, had asked for Russian help with the aim of averting the full independence of the country.^[57] The Russians could try to persuade the Mongols not to permanently abandon their ties with China, but in the event of full independence, Saint Petersburg had to establish business relations with Mongolia, given the country’s commercial interests.^[58] Sergey Sazonov, Russian foreign minister, however, immediately explained to the Chinese ambassador in Saint Petersburg that the communiqué did not mean a Russian attempt to annex Mongolia, but only to ensure real autonomy for the Mongols.^[59] At the same time Sazonov told Sir George Buchanan, the British ambassador to Saint Petersburg, that Russia did not want to establish a protectorate over Urga.^[60] Indeed, to such a proposal, previously made by some Mongol princes, Russia had already given a negative answer.^[61] Shchekin, the Russian chargé d’affaires in China, also told Jordan that the only Russian goal was the autonomy of Mongolia and not independence.^[62]

Mongolian military actions in 1912

On January 15, 1912, the Mongols had occupied the Chinese city of Haylaar (Hai-la-erh 海拉爾), in Manchuria – today in the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia, near the Russian border – put the tao-t’ai on the run and also proclaimed the independence of the border area between Outer Mongolia and Manchuria, between Haylaar and Man-chou-li 滿洲里.^[63] In fact, the fall of the Chinese city of Haylaar was followed by a march to the west which saw the assault on the Dalai nuur.^[64] On February 2, the Chinese sector of Man-chou-li was attacked.^[65] The Mongol military successes concerned cities today in Chinese territory, in the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia.

The collapse of Manchu imperial power, with the Chinese troops who – as mentioned above – had mutinied and were now dedicated to banditry, necessarily had to push the Russians to act directly to preserve their commercial interests.^[66] According to Henry Edward Sly, the British consul in Harbin,^[67] the Russians themselves pushed the Mongols to intervene in Manchuria.^[68] And actually several clues supported that idea. The formal neutrality of the Russians, invoked by the Chinese and Mongols as mediators to resolve the crisis, was contradicted by the Russian weapons used by the Mongols in their operations in Manchuria and the bullets found on the ground were also Russian.^[69] Saint Petersburg officially recognized the legitimacy of Chinese claims on the region just conquered by the Mongols in Manchuria.^[70] In the meantime, however, before attacking the Chinese sector of Man-chou-li, the Mongols were in the city’s Russian barracks and returned there after the operation.^[71] Furthermore, the body of a Russian officer had been found on Chinese territory.^[72] There were, therefore, without a shadow of a doubt, direct actions by the Russian authorities in the area, actions that Konovalov, former head of the Imperial Maritime Customs at Harbin, in a conversation with his old friend Sly, had dismissed as ‘blunders’.^[73] General Martinov had given the order and at the end of March 1912 he alone was considered responsible and therefore punished.^[74] Basically, as Jordan wrote to Grey,

it would appear that General Martinof, in command of the Chinese Eastern Railway Guards, has been made the scapegoat for what M. Konovalof described as a “ blunder ” on the part of the Russian authorities on this occasion.^[75]

Indeed, the area of the Mongol attacks was also located within the largest Russian sphere of influence that Saint Petersburg had agreed with Tokyo in the aforementioned secret convention of 1907, later confirmed in another secret agreement of 1910.^[76]

Meanwhile, according to a memorandum drawn up by the military attaché of the British Embassy in Peking sent by Sir John Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, in August 1912,^[77] in the district of T’ao-nan 洮南, there had been an uprising of a part of the eastern Mongolian tribes and those tribes then moved towards Ch’ih-feng 赤峰 (in Mongolian: Ulaanhad), in the province of Chih-li,^[78] causing some skirmishes between the Chinese and the Mongols the following winter.^[79] The ‘Talikangai’ district was occupied by a thousand Mongols from eastern Mongolia (south of Haylaar) who had left Urga at the end of January and by another six hundred from the capital of Outer Mongolia, who also had left at the end of January and were well received by the Mongolian inhabitants of the district.^[80] The thousand people from eastern Mongolia were actually under the orders of a raider who had helped the Russians in the Russo-Japanese conflict.^[81] These soldiers were to be joined by four thousand men from Uliastay (today in the Republic of Mongolia), who also gathered in Urga before proceeding to Talikangai in February.^[82]

In response to the attacks, the Chinese had strengthened the garrisons along the Mongolian border, for a total of between 30 and 40,000 soldiers.^[83] Half of these (15-20,000 soldiers), under the command of the Military Governor of Jehol, were located in the north-east, from Jehol^[84] to the borders of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria.^[85] Between 10 and 12,000 men instead defended the territory that went from Doloon nuur towards the southwest, up to Haalgan^[86] and the prefecture (fu 府) of Ta-t’ung 大同,^[87] and were under the command of the military governor of Haalgan.^[88] The remaining 5 or 6,000 men were located within a radius of 50 miles around the city of Kuei-hua-ch’eng 歸化城 and were taking orders from the military governor of that city.^[89]

These garrisons were mostly composed of less than 500 soldiers, therefore exposed to the violence of the nomads.^[90] These few men had to face the fast Mongolian gangs, able to travel, with camels, 30 miles a day and without difficulty in obtaining horses and provisions.^[91] For weapons, on the other hand, the Mongols clearly relied on the Russians; it seemed that the Mongol deputation in Saint Petersburg had ordered, in 1911, 5,000 old pattern rifles, 500 of which had been delivered to Urga in 1912^[92] and the Russians had always supplied three batteries of quick-firing guns and twenty machine guns.^[93]

The Russo-Mongol agreement of November 3, 1912 and the Mongolian delegation in Saint Petersburg

On November 3, 1912 (October 21 of the Russian calendar) Russia and Mongolia signed an agreement of friendship and trade in Urga.^[94] The French translation of the text, based on the Chinese version and printed in H. Triepel, Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités et autres actes relatifs aux rapports de droit international, Troisiéme Série, Tome VII, Leipzig 1913, states that:

Pour permettre à la Mongolie de conserver sa situation actuelle d’indépendance, la Mongolie a le droit de former une armée nationale, et le gouvernement chinois ne pourra envoyer en Mongolie ni soldats ni colons.

Anyway, according to the German translation of the Russian text printed in the same book:

Die kaiserlich russische Regierung erweist der Mongolei ihre Hilfe bei der Aufrechterhaltung der von ihr eingeführten autonomen Ordnung wie auch des Rechts, ihr nationales Heer zu unterhalten und nicht zuzulassen, dass ihr Territorium von chinesischen Truppen betreten und von Chinesen kolonisiert werde.

Russia thus recognized Mongolia – although its independence was recognized only in Chinese – and also guaranteed itself a long series of rights and privileges aimed at strengthening its political, economic and commercial role, as well as the status of most favored nation in Mongolia. In fact, the second point of the document reads: ‘Aucune puissance ne peut avoir en Mongolie des droits et privilèges plus grands que ceux des Russes’. Furthermore, according to the third point:

Si le gouvernement mongol estime nécessaire de faire un traité avec le gouvernement chinois ou un autre gouvernement étranger, ce traité devra d’abord être approuvé par la Russie et rien, dans ce traité, ne pourra être en opposition avec le présent traité.

Furthermore, as seen, according to the German translation of the Russian text, Russia was directly committed to the protection of Mongolian autonomy.

A few weeks after the agreement, in January 1913, a Mongolian delegation of sixteen went to Saint Petersburg as a sign of gratitude for the Russian recognition of independence.^[95] The mission was led by Handdorj, the Mongolian foreign minister,^[96] a pro-Russian man, and was accompanied by Yakov Parfent’yevich Shishmarëv, the Russian consul-general in Urga.^[97] Also Tserenchimed – who held the post of minister of the interior^[98] – and Haysan Bayantömöriyn joined the mission.^[99] On January 23 the delegation was received by the tsar in Tsarskoye Selo and the next day by the minister of war, General Vladimir Sukhomlinov, to whom the Mongolian representatives asked for modern weapons and instructors to defend themselves from the Chinese, obtaining positive responses from both Sukhomlinov and the tsar.^[100] The position of the Mongols with respect to the extent of their territories was different from that of Great Britain and Russia. In a conversation with the editor of the Russian newspaper Novoye Vremya, published on January 31, 1913, the members of the delegation argued that their idea of Mongolia coincided with all the lands inhabited by Mongols and, therefore, also Inner Mongolia had to fall under the authority of the new state and the task of the mission was also to persuade the Russians on this point.^[101] However, the Mongols had not answered the question of whether they had succeeded.^[102]

The Mongols also asked for a meeting with the ambassadors of France and Great Britain, allies of Russia in the Triple Entente, but not with those of Germany and Austria-Hungary, surprising Sazonov with their knowledge of European affairs.^[103] Both the British and French ambassadors, however, declined the invitation.^[104] At the center, of course, was the question of the recognition of Mongolian independence, to which the British preferred the word ‘autonomy’ under the Chinese suzerainty.^[105] This position was formally shared by Sazonov in his conversations with the British ambassador, citing, as an explanation of the Mongolian claims, the lack of distinction, in the Mongolian language, between the term «autonomy» and the term «independence».^[106] Mongolia had asked Great Britain to recognize its independence and to enter into a trade treaty with a letter from the Mongolian Foreign Board addressed to the Foreign Office and delivered to the British consulate in Harbin on December 13, 1912.^[107] The letter officially announced that the bogd haan was now the monarch of the country.^[108] ‘I do not propose that any reply should be made to this communication’ had written Edward Grey to Buchanan in Saint Petersburg.^[109] The Mongolian foreign minister had also approached Yüan Shih-k’ai’s Political Advisor Morrison to have the address of the British diplomat Charles William Campbell in London to help him obtain London’s recognition and also to hire Campbell himself as an advisor.^[110]

A doubt regarding the effects of independence was related to the economic effects. It was not clear at this point of the status of British rights with respect to Outer Mongolia. The country’s independence had not yet been recognized by the United Kingdom, nor of course by the newly formed Republic of China.^[111] The British Board of Trade therefore wondered whether the rights acquired by the previous treaties signed with China should be considered unaltered, considering Outer Mongolia still as part of the Republic.^[112] Alongside the issue of Mongolia’s international status, the British refusal to meet the delegation was explained by not wanting to create unnecessary misunderstandings with Russia regarding British interests in the region,^[113] but this aspect will be analyzed more carefully later. The economic and commercial question was secondary; there was instead a political and geopolitical point, a broader reading of the Mongolian question for the interests of the British Empire in Tibet. The mission in Saint Petersburg ended in March, after obtaining an agreement for the Russian supply of ammunition for the Mongolian army.^[114]

The Tibetan-Mongolian mutual recognition and the Tibetan delegation in Saint Petersburg

On January 17, 1913, the Russian foreign minister delivered to George Buchanan a memorandum about an agreement, signed in the name of the dalai lama by Dorzhiyev, with which Urga and Lhasa mutually recognized their independence from Peking.^[115] The copy of this treaty was then delivered by the Russian government to Buchanan together with a dispatch from the Russian actual state councillor in Urga, Ivan Yakovlevich Korostovets.^[116] The treaty was signed in Urga on January 11, 1913.^[117] The 1912 Treaty with Russia was taken as a model for the Tibetan-Mongolian treaty.^[118] The treaty consisted of just nine articles. In the first two articles the two rulers mutually recognized and approved the creation of the two states. Article 3, on the other hand, provided for cooperation between Urga and Lhasa in favor of Buddhism, while Article 4 ensured mutual help against external and internal dangers. Article 5 guaranteed support for travelers from one country to another, whether they were pilgrims or on a state visit. Article 6 guaranteed the continuation of mutual commercial relations as well as the openings of industrial plants.

By signing this treaty, both countries, therefore, openly rejected the concept of Chinese suzerainty, and reaffirmed their full independence in matters of foreign policy. In the preamble, Lhasa and Urga made clear to the world their liberation from the Manchu yoke, but also their separation from China. Western diplomats of the time expressed several doubts about the validity of the treaty: first of all, there was no formal authorization of Dorzhiyev – a Buryat and subject of the tsar – to sign a treaty in the name of the sovereign of Tibet.^[119] Sazonov doubted that Dorzhiyev was legitimated in this sense^[120] and Korostovets himself, in his dispatch from Urga, considered the signatories lacking legal authority, denying the treaty validity in terms of international law, but still recognizing its substance and also the usefulness of the agreement: China now had to witness the rapprochement between two leaders whose private relationship had been particularly difficult in the past.^[121] In fact, it seems that the rje-btsun dam-pa did not like the popularity of the dalai lama during his stay in Mongolia. According to Zhwa-sgab-pa-dbang-phyug-bde-ldan, the rje-btsun dam-pa offended Thub-bstan-rgya-mtsho on various occasions, even forcing him to change his residence.^[122] The dalai lama himself criticized the rje-btsun dam-pa in the meeting held in Peking with the prince of Sikkim, Srid-skyong-sprul-sku-rnam-rgyal.^[123] Another interesting description comes from a report written by A. Rose, of the Embassy in Peking, after the conversation with Frans August Larson. ^[124] On March 10, 1913, Jordan sent the report to Sir Edward Grey. ^[125] The bogd haan

is described as a weak man, almost always intoxicated with the champagne which he obtains from France, owning a modern-furnished and luxurious palace, but preferring to sit on the carpets of his tent.

He was highly respected by lay and religious. He had a wife: Dondogdulam. A. Rose wrote:

Larson describes her as a vigorous woman, with strong business instincts, and two shops of her own in Urga. She has not only induced the Lama Church to recognize her, but she has been granted the rank of a reincarnation, little, if any lower than that of the Bogdo himself. Larson considers her as a decided factor in the situation. It is interesting to know that she is the advocate of the Chinese cause in Urga.

The report is also interesting as a further source to see the military situation. According to the text, in Urga the Russians were training two thousand Mongol soldiers, four thousand were the reservists, while in the city there were six hundred Cossacks. The number of Chinese present in Haalgan was not clear: according to some there were 45,000 men, while Larson estimated them to be between ten and fifteen thousand. ‘The Commander-in-Chief of the Mongol army’ instead it is defined as a ‘robber chief’, an elderly opium addict who owed his popularity to raids during the Russo-Japanese War.

Formally, also for the British government ‘in the absence of evidence as to the legal rights of the signatories,’ the Tibetan-Mongolian agreement ‘does not possess any political significance’.^[126] However, Dorzhiyev had personally explained to Korostovets that the treaty was an idea of the dalai lama himself.^[127] On February 10, 1913, the British ambassador to Peking, Sir John Jordan, communicated to Sir Edward Grey that

[i]t appears that the Dalai Lama took the initiative in negotiating this compact which formally declares the separation from China and the independence of Thibet and Mongolia. The two States agree to uphold the Buddhist religion and to assist each other against external or internal dangers.^[128]

Feeling doubtful, on March 9, 1913, the Government of India wrote to the secretary of state for India, Robert Crewe-Milnes:

We think that, while we are waiting for text of agreement, political officer in Sikkim should be instructed to write to Dalai Lama informing him that His Majesty’s Government, having heard a report that the agreement has been concluded, wish to know whether it was authorised by his Holiness, and, if so, what are the terms of the agreement.^[129]

The political agent in Sikkim at the time was Charles Alfred Bell who, therefore, sent a communication of the British trade agent, the Anglo-Sikkimese^[130] David Macdonald, according to whose sources, the dalai lama had not actually authorized to sign a treaty between the two countries:^[131]

I have the honour to state that the first-named person “ Ku-char Tsan-shib Khen-chen Lob-sang Ngak-wang ” is the notorious Buriat Dorjieff.

2. The second-named person “ Dro-nyer Ngak-wang Chho-dzin ” has been stationed at Urga to look after the many Thibetans who are residing there.

3. The third person “ Ye-she-gyam-tso ” is a monk official who is in charge of the bank belonging to the Dalai Lama at Urga.

4. The fourth person “ Gen-dün-gyal-tsan ” is a clerk to Ye-she-gyam-tso.

5. I learn on good authority, that the Dalai Lama has not authorised the above-named persons to sign a treaty between Thibet and Mongolia. Thibetans declare that the Mongolians are the disciples of his Holiness the Dalai Lama and his Serenity the Tashi Lama and profess the Buddhist religion. The Dalai Lama when visiting Mongolia founded the bank and appointed the persons above-named.^[132]

At the same time, however, Charles Alfred Bell wrote to the Government of India:

Mr. Macdonald thinks that the Dalai Lama has not authorised the so-called plenipotentiaries on behalf of Thibet to sign the agreement. However, this may be, there can be no doubt that such an agreement would be welcome to the Dalai Lama in the present position of affairs.^[133]

Certainly, at the Foreign Office, however, the treaty not only could not be ignored, but was considered a fact, the concrete document that openly linked – via Mongolia – Lhasa and Saint Petersburg:

Recent information from Peking and India has tended to confirm the impression that a large increase of Russian influence in Thibet is to be apprehended in the near future, while the course of events since 1907, culminating in the practical acquisition of independence by the Thibetans, and in the conclusion of treaties by Mongolia with Russia and Thibet respectively, would seem to have distinctly altered the status quo in Thibet, and both Russian and British relations towards that country.^[134]

As Alex McKay rightly writes: ‘The Tibet-Mongol treaty was one of many contemporary factors which indicated that the changes in Tibet required new international agreements’.^[135] In Morrison’s aforementioned letter to Dudley D. Braham of February 1913, Yüan Shih-k’ai’s adviser wrote about the positions of Saint Petersburg and London with respect to the treaty between Urga and Lhasa:

Russian action in Mongolia does not, I imagine, directly concern Great Britain, but indirectly it is of very great consequence indeed, for you must remember that Mongols who live on the Mongolian border which borders on the province of Chihli and on the border of Manchuria have made it known, no doubt from interested motives, that Great Britain and Russia are acting in accord in protecting Mongolia and Tibet and that these two great Nations are privy to the Mongolian Tibetan agreement. Statements made at rare intervals in the House of Commons denying these suggestions can do little to counteract the evidence furnished by the Mongols themselves.^[136]

The Russians took two paths to extend their influence over Tibet. Firstly, Russian weapons had been supplied to the Tibetans to help repel the Chinese invasion in the last period of the Ch’ing dynasty.^[137] According to Charles Alfred Bell:

It is also indubitable that the agreement, if acted on, may prove a source of considerable embarrassment to us, for Mongolian assistance under article 4 brings appreciably nearer the danger of Russian intervention in Thibet.^[138]

Secondly, the role of the Tibetan-Mongol religious bond was fundamental. This connection was materially realized in the monasteries, the focal points of the political, legal, and economic system of Tibet. Indeed, according to Sir Walter Langley:

The monastic influence is being exerted even more energetically, the similarity of religious language and the solidarity and unity existing between the monastic establishments in both countries enabling the Mongolian monks, who are apparently migrating in large numbers at the present time into Thibetan monasteries, to act with considerable effect as the apostles of Russian ideas and influence.^[139]

With no Chinese authority able to manage Tibetan issues formally (however completely inefficient – as seen – on a practical level), even the section relating to Tibet of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 was put into crisis. The collapse of the Ch’ing dynasty and the full independence of Tibet and Mongolia crumbled, in the Far East, the political substratum of what was established in 1907. As already seen in the previous pages, the agreement had recognized Peking’s suzerainty over Lhasa, while the British and Russians had to refrain from any interference in the internal administration of Tibet, in addition to the prohibition to send their representatives to the capital or to aspire to any concessions. Considering what has been explained so far, however, were these impediments still working for Russia? It was necessary for London to re-discuss the matter. The problem, however, was that – as we have seen – the 1907 agreement was articulated through a series of mutual exchanges and delicate balances which also affected Persia and Afghanistan. Some provisions of the agreement had not yet been implemented and furthermore the Afghan emir Ḩabīballāh Khān had not recognized the Anglo-Russian Agreement.^[140] Therefore it was necessary to proceed with extreme caution with respect to a new negotiation on Tibet to avoid a Russian counterproposal on Afghanistan.^[141] Indeed, despite visiting India in early 1907, the emir of Afghanistan was not informed of the 1907 agreement until after the signing and this discourtesy – which the Viceroy of India, the Earl of Minto, had sought to avoid – had led the emir to reject it.^[142] The Russians, however, in 1908, had confirmed, through foreign minister Izvolskiy, the validity of the agreement, regardless of the position of the emir.^[143]

One way to go could be to link the acceptance of the Russo-Mongol agreement of 1912 by the British Government to a redefinition of the agreements on Tibet, without the Russian side asking for a ‘quid pro quo’:

Sir E. Grey would suggest, therefore, that in replying to the Russian Government’s request for a favourable reception of the recent Russo-Mongolian Treaty, the whole situation should be frankly laid before them, and a discussion invited of the bearing of this treaty upon the position of Thibet, but that in doing this His Majesty’s Government should not at first ask directly for a revision of the convention, but should merely invite the Russian Government to a discussion of the situation in the hope that by so doing a request for a quid pro quo might be avoided.^[144]

Another important piece in the construction of these new geopolitical balances in Asia was also the arrival in Saint Petersburg, in February 1913, shortly after the arrival of the Mongolian mission, of a Tibetan delegation, with gifts for the tsar from the dalai lama.^[145] Fifteen Tibetan boys who were to study in Russian schools also came with the delegation.^[146] Dorzhiyev’s goal, who arrived in the Russian capital before the arrival of the rest of the delegation, was to push Russia to act as mediator between Lhasa and London, ‘the Thibetans being much incensed with England at the proposal made by her to China in regard to Thibet and the possibility of a Chinese protectorate’.^[147] Dorzhiyev, however, was officially considered a subject of the tsar and, therefore, could not, according to the Russians, represent the dalai lama.^[148] Furthermore, the letter from the ruler of Tibet to the tsar, asking for the establishment of an Anglo-Russian protectorate on the Land of the Snows, could not be taken into consideration either by London or by Saint Petersburg as formally in contrast with the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907.^[149]

Anyway, the earthquake triggered by the Hsin-hai Revolution had opened new scenarios that authorized the British to move diplomatically to try to redefine the order and balance of power in High Asia.

Urga to the Russians, Lhasa to the British

In September 1912 G. E. Morrison wrote to the editor of The Morning Post, Howell Arthur Gwynne:

Look also at the way the Government are acting in connection with Tibet. Major W. F. O’Connor, who was with Younghusband in the Tibetan Expedition, desires the post of Consul General in Lhasa. I think it would be an excellent thing if we were to have a Consul General in Lhasa. I have always thought so. Presumably Russia will also have a Consul General, each Consulate having an official guard of its own Nationals. It would be a great advantage to our prestige in Nepal and on the frontier of India to know that there is a powerful British escort stationed in Lhasa. Russia is at present working for the autonomy of Mongolia. Japan is working for the recognition of her special rights in Manchuria. It has been an immense advantage to both Russia and Japan that England should seize this opportunity to interfere in the international administration of Tibet. […] We have informed the Chinese that we will not recognise the Republic unless they have first signed with us an agreement regarding Tibet. We have thus convinced every Chinese that the policy of Japan in Manchuria, and of Russia in Mongolia is the guide of British policy in Tibet. We are to do in Tibet as those two friendly powers are doing in Manchuria and in Mongolia.^[150]

The real British fear, however, remained that of a Tibet under Russian control and the fate of Mongolia alone was of little interest to London as far as this did not interfere with the defense of the northern border of the Raj. Grey himself had confided to the German ambassador in London, Paul Metternich, at the beginning of 1912, in the still poorly defined moments of the birth of the Republic of China, that if the Russians wanted to transform Mongolia into a buffer state between them and China, the British wished the same for Tibet, although maintaining Chinese suzerainty:

I said that the Russians had long wished Mongolia to be at least semi-autonomous, and a sort of buffer State between their territory and China proper. I did not think that they had departed from this policy. As for Thibet, we were not interfering with it, though our desire was similar to the Russian wish, as we should like to have Thibet as a buffer State under the suzerainty of China.^[151]

But this fear of Mongolia as a springboard to Tibet existed: ‘The situation is, in fact, very similar to that of 1903’ explained the India Office in March 1913, with the notable difference, however, of the new attitude, certainly more favorable to Britain, of the dalai lama, ‘now friendly, or, at all events, not yet openly hostile’.^[152] Independence, however, left Tibet at the mercy of another power and if the country, as they wrote from the India Office to the Foreign Office, ‘must be subject to some influence’, the only conceivable influence then was British influence.^[153] Two different options to achieve that goal in relation to Mongolia were outlined. On the one hand, there was the idea of Lord Crewe, secretary of state for India, who felt it necessary to meet the Mongolian delegation in Saint Petersburg, ‘obtaining a footing in Mongolia which might prove of great value in future dealings with the Russian Government’:

The Marquess of Crewe fully appreciates the general grounds of policy on which His Majesty’s Ambassador was instructed in Sir E. Grey’s telegram No. 96 of the 4th February last not to receive the Mission. But he would submit for the consideration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that, by holding entirely aloof at the present juncture, His Majesty’s Government may lose an opportunity, which is probably unlikely to recur, of obtaining a footing in Mongolia which might prove of great value in future dealings with the Russian Government. Stress was laid by Sir J. Jordan in his telegram No. 64 of the 6th March, 1913, on the close connection of Mongolia with Thibet, and Lord Crewe cannot but fear that, if Russia and its subjects come to enjoy by treaty or practice a predominating influence in Mongolia as compared with other foreign States and their subjects, a revival of Russian influence in Thibet, which it has been the policy of His Majesty’s Government for the last ten years to counteract, must inevitably follow. ^[154]

The position of Grey was different. Not that there were no clear openings on the Mongolian side to His British Majesty’s Government. The Mongolian prince Haysan Bayantömöriyn, according to a letter sent to Morrison and written by T. A. Rustad – a Norwegian in Mongolia on behalf of the British and American Tobacco Company – saw in the British the possibility of limiting Russian interests.^[155] According to Rustad:

Hai-Shun-Gung is the only man of the new Mongol government that realy [sic] does anything. The rest of them just drink and let things go as they best can, and leaves everything to Hai-Shun-Gung. He takes no salary and spends his own money. He wants the Mongols to be treated like human beings that is all he works for he says. ^[156]

In 1912, as explained by Rustad, Haysan Bayantömöriyn had decided to lease his gold-rich territories to any company that had the backing of the British government, in exchange for only 10% of the profits.^[157] Mongolia was – and is – particularly rich from a mining point of view: the last amban had looked for gold mines, but his experts had been regularly placed on the wrong paths by the local guides.^[158]

More realistically, however, the Foreign Office realized that it was not possible to undermine the Russians from that position that they were slowly building in Urga and, above all, the possibility of competing for a commercial primacy seemed distinctly impracticable – despite the possibility of an ‘equal commercial treatment’ – with Russia in the country and thus try to limit Russian influence on Tibet.^[159] Therefore, the strategy had to use the Russian role in Mongolia as a pretext ‘to justify any British action that it may be desirable to take in Thibet’.^[160] Already on November 16, 1912, therefore a few days after the Russo-Mongol agreement, Jordan had written to Grey from Peking:

An opportunity of negotiating a revision of our Thibetan arrangement with Russia would seem to be presented by the conclusion of the recent Russo-Mongolian Agreement, which has caused much perturbation in China.^[161]

The most adequate means, according to the Foreign Office, to gain influence over Tibet was to deal with the Chinese and Tibetans in India, perhaps through Nepal, and not get lost in a vain race with Saint Petersburg in the Mongolian grassland.^[162]

This explains the true dimension of the importance that Mongolia held for the fate of the British Empire: a sort of exchange to peacefully redefine with the Russians what the 1907 Agreement had sanctioned so rigidly. Urga to the Russians and Lhasa to the British. Saint Petersburg was not to be confronted even on Mongolian territory, but a barter to be enforced on the diplomatic table was far more advantageous for both. For this reason it was of great importance to specify British lack of interest in Mongolia in the clearest way: in the first place by refusing to meet the Mongolian delegation in Saint Petersburg, a meeting that would have only fueled ‘the suspicion of Russia and the hostility of China with very little compensating advantage’.^[163] In short, a much cheaper and more reasonable political and diplomatic action that had convinced, without too many problems, even Lord Crewe, who thus renounced the meeting between Buchanan and the delegation, happy to know that also Grey understood the importance of continuing to exclude the Russians from the Land of Snows.^[164]

The Simla conference, between 1913 and 1914, therefore, had to reshape the status of Tibet and at the same time undermine, with due caution, the results of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 regarding Lhasa. To do this it was therefore also necessary to obtain Russian consent. On May 23, 1913, Grey communicated to his ambassador in Saint Petersburg about the British decision to reach an agreement with the Chinese Tibetan governments on Tibet

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that His Majesty’s Government have decided to invite the Chinese and Thibetan Governments to a joint conference in India with a view to arriving at a settlement of the Thibetan question. ^[165]

The goal was to have Peking and Lhasa recognize Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and therefore the internal autonomy of the country.^[166] The British and Chinese had to pledge to respect territorial integrity and Peking could not colonize Tibet or send soldiers to the Roof of the World, with the exception of no more than three hundred men as an escort for the Chinese representative in Lhasa.^[167] Additionally, China was to be exempt from the Trade Regulations commitments of April 20, 1908, but responsibility passed directly to the Tibetans.^[168] According to Grey and the British government, London was entitled to deal with the issue by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 itself since the Saint Petersburg agreement did not concern the 1906 agreement made by China and Great Britain in 1906 and Article 1 committed the two countries to implement the Anglo-Tibetan Agreement of 1904:

I am to state that His Majesty’s Government base their action upon their rights under article 2 of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which excepts from the operation of the convention the engagements entered into by Great Britain and China in article 1 of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, among which is that “to take at all times such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of the terms specified in the Anglo-Thibetan Agreement of 1904”. ^[169]

The British government would inform the Russian government on the progress of the negotiations, but Grey preferred not to enter into negotiations with Saint Petersburg immediately.^[170] The secretary of state for Foreign Affairs preferred to wait first for the progress of the negotiations with Tibet and China:

If the negotiations in India result in the conclusion of a satisfactory tripartite agreement, it will probably be necessary to approach the Russian Government again with a view to securing sufficient freedom of action to enable His Majesty’s Government to ensure that the agreement is carried out.^[171]

---

^[1] Монгол Улсын Үндэсний статистикийн хороо (https://www.nso.mn).

^[2] On their history see O. LATTIMORE, Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia, Boston 1950, pp. 134-137.

^[3] On the history of the region see K. N. MAKSIMOV, Kalmykia in Russia’s Past and Present National Policies and Administrative System, translated by A. Yastrzhembska, Budapest – New York 2008.

^[4] Foreign Office, Historical Section, Peace Handbook, Mongolia, No. 68, London 1920, p. 13.

^[5] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, Vol. I: Comprehensive Tables, New York 2011, p. 88.

^[6] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 574, G. E. Morrison to D. D. Braham, February 18, 1913, p. 90.

^[7] A. BAUSANI, Religion in Iran: From Zoroaster to Baha’u’llah, translated by J. M. Marchesi, New York 2000, p. 248.

^[8] C. BELL, Tibet Past and Present, Oxford 1924, p. 106.

^[9] British Documents on the Origins of the War: 1898–1914, edited by G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley, Vol. IX: The Balkan Wars – Part I: The Prelude ; The Tripoli War, London 1933, p. 804.

^[10] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 137, Foreign Office to India Office, March 17, 1913, p. 98.

^[11] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 137, Foreign Office to India Office, March 17, 1913, p. 99.

^[12] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 137, Foreign Office to India Office, March 17, 1913, p. 99.

^[13] See the entries «‘Hut‘ukht‘u» (No. 589) and «Cheptsundampa ‘Hut‘ukht‘u» (No. 596) in W. F. MAYERS, The Chinese Government: a manual of Chinese titles, categorically arranged and explained with an appendix, second edition with additions by G. M. H. Playfair, Shanghai – Hongkong – Yokohama – London 1886; see also P. SCHWIEGER, The Dalai Lama and the Emperor of China: A Political History of the Tibetan Institution of Reincarnation, New York 2015, pp. 35-36.

^[14] See: K. SAGASTER, The History of Buddhism among the Mongols, in: The Spread of Buddhism, edited by A. Heirman and S. P. Bumbacher, Leiden – Boston 2007, p. 406; W. HEISSIG, The Religions of Mongolia, translated by G. Samuel, Berkeley – Los Angeles 1980, p. 31).

^[15] On this see: A. BAREJA-STARZYŃSKA, The Mongolian Incarnation of Jo nang pa Tāranātha Kun dga’ snying po: Öndör Gegeen Zanabazar Blo bzang bstan pa’i rgyal mtshan (1635-1723): A case study of the Tibeto-Mongolian Relationship, in: The Tibet Journal, Vol. 34/35, No. 3/2, Special Issue: The Earth Ox Papers, Autumn 2009-Summer 2010, pp. 243-261; F. SANDERS, The Life and Lineage of the Ninth Khalkha Jetsun Dampa Khutukhtu of Urga, in: Central Asiatic Journal, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2001, pp. 278-286.

^[16] On this and for a history of the national symbols of independent Mongolia see J. BOLDBAATAR – C. HUMPHREY, The Process of Creation of National Symbols and Their Adoption in the 1992 Constitution of Mongolia, in: Inner Asia, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2007, pp. 3-22.

^[17] C. KAPLONSKI, Truth, History and Politics in Mongolia: Memory of Heroes, London 2004, p. 29. For a biography of Zanabazar see S. ICHINNOROV, The biography of Öndör Gegeen, translated by Baasanjav, in: The History of Mongolia, Vol. III, edited by D. Sneath and C. Kaplonski, Folkestone 2010, pp. 674-682.

^[18] A. ANDREYEV, Soviet Russia and Tibet: the debacle of secret diplomacy, 1918-1930s, Leiden 2003, p. 54. On the Mongol declaration of independence of 1911 see M. TACHIBANA, The 1911 Revolution and “Mongolia”: Independence, Constitutional Monarchy, or Republic, in: Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 3:1, 2014, pp. 69-90.

^[19] TACHIBANA 2014, p. 72.

^[20] TACHIBANA 2014, p. 73.

^[21] U. ONON – D. PRITCHATT, Asia’s First Modern Revolution: Mongolia proclaims its Independence in 1911, Leiden 1989, p. 16. The translation of Ih Mongol Uls provided by Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt in their book is “great Mongolian nation”.

^[22] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 137, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, January 14, 1912, p. 165.

^[23] T. NAKAMI, Mongolia from the Eighteenth Century to 1919, in: History of Civilizations of Central Asia, pp. 348-349.

^[24] L. PETECH, Asia Centrale, in: Le civiltà dell’Oriente. Storia, letteratura, religioni, filosofia, scienze e arte, Vol. I: Storia, under the direction of G. Tucci, Firenze – Roma 1965, p. 948.

^[25] PETECH, Asia Centrale 1965, p. 948; P. C. PERDUE, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia, Cambridge – London 2005, pp. 175-176.

^[26] PETECH, Asia Centrale 1965, p. 956.

^[27] PETECH, Asia Centrale 1965, pp. 956-957; S. K. SONI, Mongolia-China Relations: Modern and Contemporary Times, New Delhi 2006, p. 30; M. LAN, China’s “New Administration” in Mongolia, in: Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan, edited by S. Kotkin and B. A. Elleman, Armonk – London 1999, p. 40.

^[28] T. E. EWING, Between the Hammer and the Anvil? Chinese and Russian Policies in Outer Mongolia 1911-1921, Uralic and Altaic Series, Vols 138-139, London – New York 2006, pp. 23-24.

^[29] S. K. SONI, Mongolia-Russia Relations (Kiakhta to Vladivostok), New Delhi 2002, pp. 27-28.

^[30] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 184, Notes by Lieutenant Binsteed on the Mongolian Situation, March 20, 1913, p. 165. The Russian name of the city, Kyakhta, was adopted in this work. Hiagt is the Mongolian name, the Buryat one is Kyaagta and in Chinese is known as Ch’ia-k’o-t’u 恰克圖. In English it is often transcribed as Kyakhta or Kiakhta. Kyakhta is today in Russia, in the Republic of Buryatia. In this work the Russian name of the city was adopted: Kyakhta.

^[31] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 184, Notes by Lieutenant Binsteed on the Mongolian Situation, March 20, 1913, p. 165.

^[32] ONON – PRITCHATT 1989, p. 5.

^[33] LAN 1999, p. 47.

^[34] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 554, T. A. Rustad to G. E. Morrison, November 5, 1912, pp. 48-49.

^[35] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 574, G. E. Morrison to D. D. Braham, February 18, 1913, pp. 90-91.

^[36] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 550, G. E. Morrison to C. W. Campbell, October 24, 1912, p. 41.

^[37] PETECH, Asia Centrale 1965, p. 956.

^[38] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 184, Notes by Lieutenant Binsteed on the Mongolian Situation, March 20, 1913, p. 165.

^[39] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 184, Notes by Lieutenant Binsteed on the Mongolian Situation, March 20, 1913, p. 165.

^[40] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 137, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, January 14, 1912, p. 165.

^[41] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 137, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, January 14, 1912, p. 165.

^[42] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 184, Notes by Lieutenant Binsteed on the Mongolian Situation, March 20, 1913, p. 165.

^[43] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 184, Notes by Lieutenant Binsteed on the Mongolian Situation, March 20, 1913, p. 167.

^[44] TNA, FO 535/13, No. 48 A, Government of India to Viscount Morley. – (Communicated by India Office, March 21.), March 19, 1910, p. 44*; TNA, FO 535/13, No. 48 C, Government of India to Viscount Morley. – (Communicated by India Office, March 22.), March 22, 1910, p. 44*.

^[45] TNA, YA HAN-CHANG 牙含章 1984, p. 231. Ya’s source for the transcript of the plan of Wen Tsung-yao 溫宗堯 is: CHU CHIN-P’ING 朱錦屏, Hsi tsang liu shih nien ta shih chi 西藏六十年大事記.

^[46] EWING 2006, p. 18.

^[47] I. V. NAUMOV, The History of Siberia, edited by D. N. Collins, London – New York 2006, p. 123.

^[48] C. R. BAWDEN, The Modern History of Mongolia, London – New York 2009, p. 50; EWING 2006, pp. 16-17.

^[49] EWING 2006, p. 17.

^[50] M. KHODARKOVSKY, Non-Russian subjects, in: The Cambridge History of Russia, Vol. I: From Early Rus’ to 1689, edited by M. Perrie, Cambridge 2006, p. 528. The complete text of the treaty (in French) is in J. B. DU HALDE, Description géographique, historique, chronologique, politique, et physique de l’empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie chinoise, enrichie des Cartes générales et particulieres de ces Pays, de la Carte générale et des Cartes particulieres du Thibet, & de la Corée ; & ornée d’un grand nombre de Figures & de Vignettes gravées en tailledouce, Tome Quatrième, La Haye 1736, pp. 242-245.

^[51] EWING 2006, p. 18.

^[52] EWING 2006, p. 18.

^[53] EWING 2006, p. 18.

^[54] EWING 2006, p. 18-19.

^[55] EWING 2006, p. 18.

^[56] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 48, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, January 11, 1912, p. 52. English translation of the communiqué: TNA, FO 405/208, Enclosure in No. 66, Official Communiqué from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published in the “Official Messenger” dated December 29, 1911 (January 11), 1912, pp. 99-100.

^[57] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 56, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, January 14, 1912, p. 57.

^[58] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 48, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, January 11, 1912, p. 52; TNA, FO 405/208, Enclosure in No. 66, Official Communiqué from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published in the “Official Messenger” dated December 29, 1911 (January 11), 1912, p. 100.

^[59] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 56, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, January 14, 1912, p. 57.

^[60] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 56, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, January 14, 1912, p. 57.

^[61] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 137, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, January 14, 1912, p. 165.

^[62] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 137, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, January 14, 1912, p. 166.

^[63] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 215, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, January 29, 1912, p. 235. The source of the British ambassador is Mr. Sly, the British consul in Harbin. Man-chou-li is known in English as Manchuria Station and in Mongolian as Manjuur.

^[64] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 356, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, February 20, 1912, p. 330.

^[65] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 356, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, February 20, 1912, p. 330.

^[66] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 356, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, February 20, 1912, p. 331.

^[67] Current capital of the Hei-lung-chiang province (Chinese: Ha-êrh-pin哈爾濱).

^[68] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 356, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, February 20, 1912, p. 331.

^[69] TNA, FO 405/208, Enclosure in No. 434, Acting Consul Sly to Sir J. Jordan, February 28, 1912, p. 388. Consul Sly’s source was the American consul who had heard from a doctor, Dr. Jee, about Man-chou-li’s (TNA, FO 405/208, No. 215, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, January 29, 1912, p. 235).

^[70] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 356, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, February 20, 1912, p. 331.

^[71] TNA, FO 405/208, Enclosure in No. 434, Acting Consul Sly to Sir J. Jordan, February 28, 1912, p. 388.

^[72] TNA, FO 405/208, Enclosure in No. 434, Acting Consul Sly to Sir J. Jordan, February 28, 1912, p. 388.

^[73] TNA, FO 405/208, Enclosure in No. 460, Acting Consul Sly to Sir J. Jordan, March 5, 1912, pp. 438-439.

^[74] TNA, FO 405/208, Enclosure in No. 539, Acting Consul Sly to Sir J. Jordan, March 31, 1912, p. 529.

^[75] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 539, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, April 5, 1912, pp. 528-529.

^[76] The text of the secret Convention of June 21, 1910 (July 4, 1910, according to the Gregorian calendar) in French (original text) and English translation is in PRICE 1933, pp. 113-116.

^[77] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 165, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, March 14, 1913, p. 133; full text of the memorandum: TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Military Situation in Mongolia, pp. 135-137.

^[78] The province of Chih-li no longer exists and Ch’ih-feng is located in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

^[79] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Military Situation in Mongolia, pp. 135-136.

^[80] The source in this case is George Ernest Morrison, TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Military Situation in Mongolia, p. 136.

^[81] The source in this case is George Ernest Morrison, TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Military Situation in Mongolia, p. 136.

^[82] The source in this case is George Ernest Morrison, TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Military Situation in Mongolia, p. 136.

^[83] The source in this case is George Ernest Morrison, TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Military Situation in Mongolia, p. 136.

^[84] Jehol (Je-ho 熱河), today known as Ch’eng-te 承德, in the current province of Ho-pei.

^[85]  The source in this case is George Ernest Morrison, TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Military Situation in Mongolia, p. 136.

^[86] In Chinese: Chang-chia-k’ou 张家口. It is in historical Inner Mongolia, today in the province of Ho-pei. In English it is normally transcribed as Kalgan.

^[87] Ta-t’ung is in Shan-hsi.

^[88] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Military Situation in Mongolia, p. 136.

^[89] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Military Situation in Mongolia, p. 136.

^[90] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Military Situation in Mongolia, p. 136.

^[91] The source in this case is Frans August Larson, TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Military Situation in Mongolia, pp. 136-137.

^[92] The source in this case is Lieutenant Binsteed, TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Military Situation in Mongolia, p. 137.

^[93] The source in this case is George Ernest Morrison, TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Military Situation in Mongolia, p. 137.

^[94] Full text (German translation of the Russian text and French translation of the Chinese version): H. TRIEPEL, Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités et autres actes relatifs aux rapports de droit international, Troisiéme Série, Tome VII, Leipzig 1913, pp. 11-17.

^[95] TNA, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, January 13, 1913, FO 535/16, No. 23, p. 13.

^[96] TNA, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, January 13, 1913, FO 535/16, No. 23, p. 13; BAWDEN 2009, p. 194.

^[97] TNA, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, January 13, 1913, FO 535/16, No. 23, p. 13.

^[98] TACHIBANA 2014, p. 73.

^[99] BAWDEN 2009, p. 194.

^[100] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 50, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, January 26, 1913, p. 44. In this regard, the tsar himself had already expressed his agreement, TNA, FO 535/16, No. 50, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, January 26, 1913, p. 44.

^[101] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 61, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, January 31, 1913, p. 50.

^[102] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 61, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, January 31, 1913, p. 50.

^[103] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 82, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, February 5, 1913, p. 61.

^[104] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 82, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, February 5, 1913, p. 61; TNA, FO 535/16, No. 136, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, March 13, 1913, p. 98.

^[105] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 82, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, February 5, 1913, p. 61.

^[106] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 82, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, February 5, 1913, p. 61.

^[107] TNA, FO 405/211, Enclosure in No. 28, Mongolian Foreign Board to the British Foreign Office, p. 25.

^[108] TNA, FO 405/211, Enclosure in No. 28, Mongolian Foreign Board to the British Foreign Office, p. 25.

^[109] TNA, FO 405/211, No. 52, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, January 16, 1913, p. 60.

^[110] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 574, G. E. Morrison to D. D. Braham, February 18, 1913, p. 91.

^[111] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 41, Board of Trade to Foreign Office, January 22, 1913, p. 28.

^[112] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 41, Board of Trade to Foreign Office, January 22, 1913, p. 28.

^[113] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 168, Foreign Office to India Office, March 29, 1913, p. 141.

^[114] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 136, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, March 13, 1913, p. 98.

^[115] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 30, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, January 17, 1913, p. 20.

^[116] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 88, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, February 11, 1913, p. 66; TNA, FO 535/16, No. 88, Mongol-Thibetan Treaty, concluded at Urga December 29, 1912 (January 11, 1913), 1913, pp. 66-67; TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 88, Despatch from Actual State Councillor Korostovets, dated Urga, January 6 (19), 1913, pp. 67-68.

^[117] English translation of the treaty: TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 1 in No. 88, Mongol-Thibetan Treaty, concluded at Urga December 29, 1912 (January 11, 1913), 1913, pp. 66-67.

^[118] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 88, Despatch from Actual State Councillor Korostovets, dated Urga, January 6 (19), 1913, p. 67. In the English translation of the dispatch in the Confidential Print there is an error in the dating, according to the Gregorian calendar, of the Russo-Mongol treaty: the treaty dates back to October 21, 1912, that is November 3, 1912, and not September 3, as indicated in the Confidential Print’s document.

^[119] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 44, Foreign Office to India Office, January 24, 1913, p. 30.

^[120] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 80, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, February 8, 1913, p. 60.

^[121] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 88, Despatch from Actual State Councillor Korostovets, dated Urga, January 6 (19), 1913, pp. 67-68.

^[122] ZHWA SGAB PA DBANG PHYUG BDE LDAN, Vol. II 1976, pp. 135-136.

^[123] TNA, FO 535/12, Inclosure 1 in No. 7, Memorandum respecting an Interview between the Dalai Lama and the Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim, held at the Yellow Temple, Peking, on November 25, 1908, p. 9.

^[124] Full text of the report: TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 164, Notes by Mr. Rose on Mongolian Affairs, pp. 131-133.

^[125] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 164, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, March 10, 1913, pp. 130-131.

^[126] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 130, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, March 11, 1913, p. 94.

^[127] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 88, Despatch from Actual State Councillor Korostovets, dated Urga, January 6 (19), 1913, p. 67.

^[128] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 112, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, February 10, 1913, p. 80.

^[129] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 129, Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe, March 9, 1913, p. 94.

^[130] His mother was a Lepcha, while his father was a Scottish planter. See MCKAY 1997, p. 44.

^[131] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 255, British Trade Agent, Yatung, to the Political Officer, Sikkim, May 3, 1913, p. 255.

^[132] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 255, British Trade Agent, Yatung, to the Political Officer, Sikkim, May 3, 1913, p. 255.

^[133] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 1 in No. 255, Political Officer, Sikkim, to the Government of India, May 9, 1913, p. 255.

^[134] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 137, Foreign Office to India Office, March 17, 1913, p. 98.

^[135] MCKAY 1997, p. 56.

^[136] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 574, G. E. Morrison to D. D. Braham, February 18, 1913, p. 90.

^[137] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 137, Foreign Office to India Office, March 17, 1913, p. 99.

^[138] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 1 in No. 255, Political Officer, Sikkim, to the Government of India, May 9, 1913, p. 255.

^[139] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 137, Foreign Office to India Office, March 17, 1913, p. 99.

^[140] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 137, Foreign Office to India Office, March 17, 1913, p. 98.

^[141] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 137, Foreign Office to India Office, March 17, 1913, p. 98.

^[142] SYKES 1940, pp. 226-229 and pp. 235-236.

^[143] SYKES 1940, pp. 236.

^[144] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 137, Foreign Office to India Office, March 17, 1913, p. 99.

^[145] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 92, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, February 13, 1913, p. 69.

^[146] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 92, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, February 13, 1913, p. 69.

^[147] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 92, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, February 13, 1913, p. 69.

^[148] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 89, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, February 14, 1913, p. 68.

^[149] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 89, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, February 14, 1913, p. 68.

^[150] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 541, G. E. Morrison to H. A. Gwynne, September 1912, pp. 27-28.

^[151] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 165, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, February 7, 1912, p. 190.

^[152] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 151, India Office to Foreign Office, March 25, 1913, p. 110.

^[153] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 151, India Office to Foreign Office, March 25, 1913, pp. 110-111.

^[154] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 152, India Office to Foreign Office, March 25, 1913, p. 111.

^[155] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 554, T. A. Rustad to G. E. Morrison, November 5, 1912, p. 51. Full text of the letter: The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 554, T. A. Rustad to G. E. Morrison, November 5, 1912, pp. 47-53.

^[156] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 554, T. A. Rustad to G. E. Morrison, November 5, 1912, p. 52.

^[157] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 554, T. A. Rustad to G. E. Morrison, November 5, 1912, p. 51.

^[158] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 554, T. A. Rustad to G. E. Morrison, November 5, 1912, p. 51.

^[159] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 168, Foreign Office to India Office, March 29, 1913, p. 140. The full text of the document is in the Annexes.

^[160] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 168, Foreign Office to India Office, March 29, 1913, p. 141.

^[161] TNA, FO 535/15, No. 285, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, November 16, 1912, p. 223.

^[162] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 168, Foreign Office to India Office, March 29, 1913, p. 141.

^[163] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 168, Foreign Office to India Office, March 29, 1913, p. 141.

^[164] TNA, FO 535, No. 176, India Office to Foreign Office, April 2, 1913, p. 154.

^[165] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 231, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, May 23, 1913, p. 237.

^[166] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 231, Revised Draft of Treaty with China respecting Thibet, p. 238.

^[167] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 231, Revised Draft of Treaty with China respecting Thibet, p. 238.

^[168] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 231, Revised Draft of Treaty with China respecting Thibet, p. 238.

^[169] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 231, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, May 23, 1913, p. 237.

^[170] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 231, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, May 23, 1913, pp. 237-238.

^[171] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 231, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, May 23, 1913, p. 238.

Further Reading on E-International Relations

• New Book – Mongolian Independence and the British: Geopolitics and Diplomacy in High Asia, 1911–1916
• Mongolian Independence and the British: The Parallel Negotiation
• Mongolian Independence and the British: Twentieth-Century Geopolitical Notes
• Mongolian Independence and the British: The Chinese Backdown
• The End of the Manchu Dynasty and Tibetan Independence
• The British and the Kyakhta Accords