Interethnic Conflict Between the Lou Nuer and Murle in Jonglei State, South Sudan: Emerging Ethnic Hatred 

Introduction 

After decades of civil war, the Republic of South Sudan achieved independence in July 2011 and was recognized as the newest state by the international community. However, South Sudan has been plagued by the unresolved territorial dispute over the Abyei region with northern Sudan, to which the world has paid much attention. Less attention has been paid to the country’s instability and frequent intertribal clashes, especially in Jonglei State, one of ten states in South Sudan. Traditionally, clashes between the two ethnic groups, namely the Lou Nuer and Murle, have been observed in Jonglei. The conflicts often occurred when one ethnic group entered territories of other groups, competing over scarce resources such as land and water necessary for cattle grazing. The migratory practices as a result of climate change have been a trigger of those conflicts. Although some human casualties and occasional abduction of children occur, cattle raiding was the main objective of the conflicts because cattle were sources of wealth and sustenance for many pastoralist communities in Jonglei.

The type of warfare, however, has significantly changed after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005, and the government of South Sudan (GoSS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) conducted a disarmament campaign solely targeting the Lou Nuer. This uneven disarmament destabilized the country, sharpening the ethnic division and security dilemma between the Lou Nuer and Murle. The security dilemma eventually led to war, which fueled ethnic hatred. The recent clashes are evidently more than just cattle raiding. Rather, they are characterized by indiscriminate mass killing of civilians, largely motivated by ethnic hatred. Thus, despite longstanding and persistent interethnic clashes between the Lou Nuer and Murle, the emergence of strong ethnic hatred appears to be a recent phenomenon.

The questions this research paper attempts to answer are: how do existing theories explain the occurrence of conflicts between the Lou Nuer and Murle in Jonglei? What can explain the recent increasing brutality of the conflicts? To what extent can this conflict be regarded as an ethnic conflict? The first section of the paper discusses theoretical frameworks relevant to the selected case. The second part presents the application of the theories to the Lou Nuer-Murle conflicts. The third part examines recent emergence of ethnic hatred from the perspectives of both groups. The paper argues that conflict between the Lou Nuer and Murle has experienced a fundamental shift from pastoralist war to ethnic conflict motivated by increasing mutual hatred. Based on the analyses of evidence, the paper also warns that recent interethnic conflicts can constitute genocide.

Theoretical Frameworks 

Environmental Conflict

Libiszewski defines environmental conflict as the “struggle for scarce natural resources” (3). Natural resources that are sources of wealth as well as prerequisites for sustenance directly or indirectly contribute to producing food and energy, providing living space, and maintaining one’s health (Bob and Bronkhorst 12). Scarcity of resources can be divided into several different categories: 1) physical scarcity (available amount is finite), 2) geopolitical scarcity (unequal distribution of resources on the earth), 3) socio-economic scarcity (unequal distribution of wealth gained from natural resources), and 4) scarcity caused by human-led environmental degradation (6). Bob and Bronkhorst further argue that perceived or actual scarcity of natural resources, such as water and land, plays an essential role in environmental disputes because resource scarcity would be a direct threat to human security (15). The worst-case scenario would be an outbreak of interethnic/intergroup conflict over existing resources for survival (Libiszewski 14). Several scholars also agree that “the more scarce the resource, the more bitter the fight” (Billon 564).

The impact of global climate change on people’s lifestyles has increasingly been recognized as an accelerator of environmental conflict. Climate change threatens human security by making issues of resource scarcity more “complex and intractable” (Brown, Hammill, and Mcleman 1142). In particular, less precipitation and extended drought, as a result of warmer temperatures, have accelerated degradation of water and land resources (Raleigh and Urdal 677). In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an intergovernmental body that provides scientific assessment of the risks of climate change, identified Africa as the most vulnerable region in the world to climate change because of its rudimentary capability to adapt (Brown, Hammill, and Mcleman 1145). The Christian Aid charity also estimates that the negative effects of climate change would kill more than 184 million people in Africa before the end of the twenty-first century (Nordås and Gleditsch 629).

Facing resource scarcity in their areas, pastoralists are required to decide whether they stay home or leave their arid land in search for better resources. Reuveny argues that pastoralists in the less developed countries (LDCs) tend to leave the affected areas, believing that net benefit from migrating is greater than not doing so (658). Leff identifies lack of pastoralists’ capacities in LDCs to adjust themselves to climate changes as a rationale for migration (189). Such migration is common in Africa, especially during dry seasons or periods of drought (Leff 192).

Climate change-induced migration has potential to erupt into interethnic conflict. Nordås and Gleditsch argue that the likelihood of conflict increases when the migrants enter the territories of other tribal groups that might also suffer from resource scarcity (633). The increase of competition between the hosts and migrants is often inevitable as the population within the area increases, while available resources decline (Young and Sing’Oei 19). Such a tense situation commonly results in various forms of violence, such as looting and killing (Nordås and Gleditsch 634). In addition, resource competition can develop into ethnic animosity if the hosts and migrants belong to different ethnic groups (Reuveny 659). Several exacerbating factors include longer droughts, which make migrants stay longer in hosts’ territories, leading to more frequent clashes (Leff 192). Unclearly defined land boundaries and ownership also prolong conflict by allowing the hosts and migrants to make claims to justify their rights (Bob and Bronkhorst 18). Empirical studies show that conflicts caused by climate change-induced migrations have occurred not only in Africa, but also in Asia, Latin America, and even the United States.

Realism – Ethnic Security Dilemma

Realism, one of the major theories of international relations (IR), maintains several assumptions regarding international politics. Realists believe in the anarchic nature of international arena, where there is no overarching government that provides security to all (Jackson and Sørensen 59). The anarchic situation inevitably urges states to ensure their security by themselves (Posen 28). To enhance security, states develop their defensive capabilities, which likely threatens the security of others. In response, those who are threatened in turn develop their own defensive capacities, eventually threatening the security of those who first initiated the game. This endless cycle of arms races is referred to as the security dilemma. In other words, although “security for us” can temporarily become “insecurity for them,” it will eventually turn into “insecurity for everyone” (Roe 184).

Once trapped into a security dilemma, states have difficulty maneuvering outside of it. “Uncertainty to others’ intensions” creates mistrust and fear of being cheated and harmed (Roe 184). Hence, being fearful of others’ malign intents, cooperation on disarmament is unlikely in the anarchic international system. An increased security dilemma can motivate states to initiate preemptive war because they believe that a first offensive strike would be more effective than defensive operations to survive and achieve greater security (Posen 29). Thus, under the anarchic situation, where no state is guaranteed its security and others are perceived as potential threats, “the occurrence of security dilemmas always remains a possibility” (Roe 186).

Security dilemmas can also occur in the intrastate context, if, as Posen argues, “conditions are similar to those between states in the international system” (quoted in Roe 188). The hard rationalist approach, one of the strands of rational choice approaches, suggests that, under the circumstance where there is no functioning government that can provide security to its citizens, anarchy will likely emerge (Kaufman 2001, 19). Anarchy, together with the tendency of ethnic groups to associate the identity of others with danger (Posen 31), often compels the groups to mobilize their security measures, including preemptive war, which threatens the security of others and, in turn, the security of those who first mobilized. An “ethnic security dilemma” will thus emerge through the similar processes seen in interstate security dilemma (Kaufman 2001, 19).

Ethnic security dilemmas precipitate violent conflict among ethnic groups. Kaufman argues that an ethnic security dilemma often indicates groups’ fear of extinction, which justifies “hostile attitudes toward the other group and extreme measures in self-defense…” (2001, 31). Young and Sing’Oei elaborate that the hostility toward “them” increases the unity of the group and encourages group members to view every incident through the ethnic lens, which solidifies ethnic hatred (quoted in Kaufman 26). Horowirz stresses that “emotions . . . are what drive ethnic violence” (quoted in Kaufman 2001, 29). Diamond also highlights that those who are fearful of extinction and tend to strike first are often marginalized in society (121). Once such a marginalized group initiates an attack on the other, a perceived threat becomes a real threat (Roe 191), which exacerbates an existing ethnic security dilemma. The worst-case scenario would be that ethnic groups are trapped into a spiral of “action-reaction process”, in which the first ethnic group initiates an attack on the other, which retaliates against the first (196). As Kaufman puts, ethnic animosity and fear of extinction activate the security dilemma, which could erupt into “mass-led violence” (1996, 157).

In the post-conflict context, disarmament campaigns led by a state or external actors can engender or exacerbate ethnic security dilemmas. Armed factions are often unwilling to disarm because the security sector of the fragile state is often incapable of providing common security. In this case, disarmament makes the parties vulnerable to rivals’ potential attacks (Walter 134). Some groups might view others’ disarmament as an opportunity to initiate a war because they perceive their military capabilities as superior to others and believe that relative security will be greatly enhanced by preemptive operations (Posen 33). This consequently exacerbates the existing security dilemma. Moreover, a weak state often uses coercive measures on certain ethnic groups to maintain social cohesion (Roe 197), which also engenders ethnic security dilemmas. Post-conflict disarmament could thus be a source of an ethnic security dilemma.

Application of Theories

Background 

Jonglei State, home to about 1.3 million people in 11 counties, is the largest and the most populous state in South Sudan (United Mission in the Republic of South Sudan: UNMISS 5). Jonglei is a multiethnic state inhabited by several ethnic groups, such as the Dinka, Nuer, and Murle (International Crisis Group 28). Most communities depend on the agriculture, including agropastoralism and pastoralism, which provides more than 80 percent of domestic employment (Food and Agriculture Organization: FAO 3).

Jonglei is also known as one of the least developed regions in the world, lacking basic infrastructure due to decades of civil war as well as marginalization by the central authority. Because Jonglei lacks functioning roads, most of the regions become inaccessible during the rainy season, which often hinders timely security response (International Crisis Group 16). The underdevelopment has also made poverty persistent in the region. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, about 48 percent of the population in Jonglei is living below the poverty line (Omondi 2). The level of food insecurity has also been significantly high. According to FAO, since 2008, approximately 39 percent of the population faces food insecurity, and 30 percent faces severe food insecurity (7).

Conflict in Jonglei: Aspect of Environmental Conflict

(1) Cattle Grazing

Environmental conflict is an appropriate lens to explain a traditional aspect of interethnic conflicts in Jonglei. In South Sudan, cattle are crucial assets for all ethnic groups because cattle are “a primary currency for these groups, representing wealth and social status, and are used for compensation and the payment of wedding dowries” (Rands and LeRiche 7). Approximately, 80 percent of the population depends on cattle grazing to survive, and the livestock industry has been one of the largest sources of employment (Ferrie 5). Because cattle are directly related to the survival of these groups, people often enter territories of other ethnic groups and loot cattle. Not only are looted cattle used for sustaining people’s lives, they are also sold in exchange for small arms (Rolandsen and Brieidlid 54). Although the primary targets in these clashes were cattle, the use of such weapons as protection increased the human lethality of conflicts.

Although cattle grazing requires water and pasture land, not all ethnic groups in Jonglei have access to those resources due to physical as well as geopolitical scarcity. Hence, during dry seasons or periods of drought, those who inhabit arid land migrate with their cattle to territories of other ethnic groups to compete for resources, often resulting in violent conflicts (Richardson 2011). The lack of clarification on ownership has often deadlocked disputes. Additionally, the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan has not yet stipulated the legal framework for pastoralists’ grazing rights (Agbor and Taiwo 14). Cattle raiding and interethnic clashes have historically been observed in Jonglei, particularly when the Lou Nuer, whose land was often affected by droughts, migrated to territories of other ethnic groups, such as the Dinka and Murle, in search of water and pasture land for cattle grazing (Rands and LeRiche 7). The empirical observations also suggest that the areas where the migrants and hosts confront each other often became conflict sites (Omondi 6). Migration of the Lou Nuer has thus been a trigger of interethnic clashes in Jonglei for centuries and gradually sharpened hostilities between the groups.

(2) Impact of Climate Change

Climate change has been an exacerbating factor of resource scarcity in Jonglei, which has resulted in an increased frequency and intensification of interethnic clashes. Little annual rain and extended drought caused by climate change have “reduced the number of accessible water points and other vital resources, forcing pastoralist communities to travel further into neighboring tribal areas for sustenance” (Small Arms Survey 6). While the average temperature of the earth increases about 0.1 °C per decade since the 1950s (Reuveny 657), the temperature in South Sudan has increased 0.4 °C per decade, which is the most rapid increase in the world over the last 30 years (USAID 2011).

Additionally, rainfall during the summer has decreased by 10-20 percent since the mid-1970s. As a consequence of warmer temperatures and little precipitation, the frequency and duration of droughts increased, which has reduced water points and turned lands arid. Within an environment gravely affected by climate change, the likelihood of conflicts is high. Due to extended droughts, the migrating Lou Nuer would sometimes have to stay longer in the lands of the Murle or Dinka, where more people compete over declining resources to survive at the expense of others. Thus, migratory practices dictated by the environmental degradation “bring communities with long-standing relationships of animosity into closer proximity,” contributing to frequent outbreaks of conflicts (Richardson 2011).

Ethnic Security Dilemma

(1) Disarmament

The series of recent interethnic clashes beginning in 2009 can also be viewed through the lens of the ethnic security dilemma that preexisted the CPA reached in 2005 and was exacerbated after the civilian disarmament conducted between December 2005 and May 2006. Based on the authorization of disarmament in the CPA, the government of South Sudan (GoSS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) conducted a civilian disarmament campaign in Jonglei, targeting the Lou Nuer first (Young and Sing’Oei 21). However, they refused to surrender arms, as they believed the targeted disarmament to be a concerted attempt by the central authorities to weaken their fighting capabilities. This would increase Nuer’s relative insecurity to other ethnic groups (International Crisis Group 11).

After negotiations between the GoSS and Nuer failed, the state authority turned to coercive disarmament, in which the White Army, a loosely organized army mostly comprised by Lou Nuer youth, and SPLA soldiers engaged in a series of fights (Rands and LeRiche 11). As a result, while over 3,000 arms were collected, approximately 1,600 soldiers and hundreds of civilians were killed (Garfield 17). The GoSS and SPLA were planning to disarm Murle militias as well, but the plan was not implemented due to concerns of the international community regarding potential casualties following the disarmament (International Crisis Group 11). Subsequently, another round of disarmament led by the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) targeting Murle militia resulted in the collection of a small amount of arms, suggesting that people were successfully hiding some of their weapons to prepare for potential conflicts (Leff 197).

The fact that the GoSS and SPLA failed to disarm all ethnic groups in Jonglei simultaneously made the Lou Nuer extremely vulnerable to the Murle, which regarded themselves as Nuer’s victims and claimed to have the right to retaliate against the Lou Nuer (Rands and LeRiche 8). Uncertainty between the Lou Nuer and Murle regarding their fighting capabilities exacerbated the ethnic security dilemma. After the completion of the first round of the disarmament campaign in 2006, the Lou Nuer gradually rearmed themselves largely by looting collected arms (UNMISS 6). However, viewing the situation of the Lou Nuer as being weakened, the Murle attacked them in Akobo County in January 2009, killing about 300 Lou Nuers (Small Arms Survey 3). This was followed by the retaliation of the Lou Nuer in March, which resulted in the deaths of 450 Murle.

The clashes in 2009 were the most fatal in the post-CPA period (UNMISS 6), and there is no doubt that the two ethnic groups are trapped in the spiral of “action-reaction process.” Although another disarmament campaign targeting both the Lou Nuer and Murle was conducted between August 2009 and March 2010, both groups resisted and were apparently successful in hiding some of their weapons (UNMISS 6). The ethnic security dilemma was clearly an essential source of resistance to disarmament. Thus, the 2006 disarmament is the primary reference point of escalation of the ethnic security dilemma between the Lou Nuer and Murle, which erupted into the cycle of brutal attack and revenge.

(2) State’s Lack of Capacity

The lack of government capabilities to provide security to its citizens that created a state of anarchy within the country also made the ethnic groups resist disarmament and feel responsible for their security. The UNMISS reported that both the national police and security forces lacked capacities to provide security because of inadequate logistical, human, and financial resources and the difficulty of accessing many of the regions which lack functioning roads (26). The absence of a formal justice system has also created a lawlessness situation and resulted in culture of impunity, in which perpetrators of violence are rarely prosecuted (International Crisis Group 15).

There are two major security apparatus in South Sudan: the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) and SPLA. The quality of SSPS is “abysmal” (International Crisis Group 19). Because the SSPS was often outnumbered and outgunned by armed pastoralists, it failed to stop interethnic clashes. Lou Nuer youth have expressed their grievances against the SSPS, which always failed to arrest the Murle, who conducted cattle raiding, murder, and abduction (UNMISS 9). Most of the SSPS personnel are former SPLA soldiers, “who were not asked to join the post-CPA army and thus are mostly second-tier quality or worse” (International Crisis Group 19). In addition, many personnel are old and lack proper training and education. The absence of police stations in Jonglei also prevents the SSPS from timely responding to violent incidents. Moreover, because the police is not seen as an attractive occupation for qualified youth in South Sudan, recruitment of young people to the police will continue to be a great challenge.

The credibility of the SPLA has also been questioned. Although the SPLA as a national army of South Sudan is responsible for dealing with external threats, it is often mobilized to halt domestic incidents due to the SSPS’s lack of ability to do so (International Crisis Group 20). However, the SPLA does not intervene in every interethnic clash, which creates “confusion among communities about its role and mandate” (21). Ethnic identities of SPLA soldiers explain the inconsistent responses. A local journalist whom the International Crisis Group interviewed revealed that soldiers tend to abandon their original mandate and “often stand with their tribe,” when interests of their groups are at stake. Recently, some SPLA personnel were arrested and punished due to their heavy use of force in the local conflicts in which they intervened, which discouraged the SPLA from further involvement. Corruption within the SPLA has also undermined the legitimacy of the organization (Leff 194).

UNMISS’s Lack of Capability

The presence of international actors in South Sudan has also not successfully improved the security situation and consolidated peace. In July 2011, the United Nations Security Council, in Resolution 1996, established the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) with a civilian protection mandate. However, due to lack of personnel and equipment, UNMISS often failed to provide security in a timely and effective manner (Saferworld 2011). When thousands of Lou Nuer youth were mobilized for a retaliatory attack against the Murle in December 2011, UNMISS was able to deploy only half of its troops due to a lack of helicopters (Small Arms Survey 9). Locals also criticized that UN peacekeepers cannot reach places that are inaccessible via helicopter. Furthermore, UNMISS was silent about obvious human rights violations committed by the SPLA during the disarmament campaigns. UNMISS thus far has not helped the concerning parties to overcome the security dilemma by providing security to assure people in Jonglei.

To summarize, ethnic groups in Jonglei are reluctant to disarm because 1) they need arms to protect their communities and cattle from other ethnic groups, 2) disarmament has not been conducted with all ethnic groups simultaneously, making disarmed groups insecure, and 3) in Jonglei, there is virtually no security apparatus that can equally and effectively protect citizens without ethnic bias, and maintain internal stability.

Intensification of Conflict and Emerging Ethnic Hatred

Since the series of lethal attacks and revenges between the Murle and Lou Nuer in 2009, which changed a perceived ethnic security dilemma to a real threat, the objective of the attacks is no longer merely cattle raiding, but also massive civilian killing. In February 2011, the clash between the two groups was initiated by the Murle’s attacks on the Lou Nuer in Uror County, resulting in the deaths of 8 people including local chiefs (Ferrie 2). In April and June, the Lou Nuer conducted retaliatory attacks, in which 600-700 people were killed, hundreds of thousands were displaced, and children and women were abducted. In August, Murle’s retaliation killed more than 600 Lou Nuer (UNMISS 11). The most fatal clash in 2011 was the attack of 8,000 Lou Nuer youth on the Murle communities in Pibor County between December 23 and January 9, 2012 (12). The attack resulted in more than 1,000 deaths (Small Arms Survey 3). This was immediately followed by retaliation of Murle youth, which lasted until February 4. Although a large number of cattle were looted through these conflicts, there is no doubt that the aim was not only cattle raiding based on the significant increase in human casualties.

Proliferation and availability of high-powered small arms in Jonglei is one of the exacerbating factors for the high casualty levels of these conflicts. Historically, primitive tools, such as sticks, spears, and machetes were used to carry out cattle raiding and violence (International Crisis Group 1). However, in the recent clashes, the use of sophisticated weapons, including AK-47, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and machine guns has increased the lethality of the conflicts. The ethnic groups often gain weapons from the SPLA and the Sudan Armed Force (SAF), who sell their arms to local communities for profit (International Crisis Group 9). Additionally, the Sudanese government, in particular the National Congress Party, provides arms to pastoralists in South Sudan “to destabilize the government of Southern Sudan’s power base, and to challenge the authority of the SPLA” (Leff 194).

In the recent clashes, it is important to investigate the emerging ethnic hatred between the Lou Nuer and Murle and its application to actual tactics. For instance, when the large number of Lou Nuer youth attacked Murle communities in December 2011, they not only looted cattle and killed some Murle, but also “burnt tukuls, and the Anglican church, and ransacked the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) clinic . . .” which turned out to be the only functioning medical clinic in the county (UNMISS 18). In addition to their large scale, organized and systematic attacks, the Genocide Watch reports that the Lou Nuer indiscriminately killed women, children, and the elderly in Murle’s communities (2012). In fact, before entering the Murle’s communities, the Lou Nuer announced “their intent to commit genocide” by stating, “We have decided to invade Murle land and wipe out the entire Murle tribe on the face of the earth” (Genocide Watch 2012).

After Lou Nuer youth retreated from the Murle communities, the walls of schools and other buildings were covered by hate messages that explicitly showed their intent to destroy the Murle as an ethnic group, such as “We come to kill all of Murle” and “We come again don’t sit again in your payam” (UNMISS 15). The Lou Nuer also expressed their hatred against the Murle through the mass media (Rands and LeRiche 12). In short, mobilization of the large number of youth, attacks on infrastructure in the communities, indiscriminate killing of non-combatants, and verbally expressed ethnic hatred suggest that Lou Nuer’s actions can be best interpreted as genocide against the Murle.

In contrast, fear of extinction and grievances due to decades of marginalization have led the Murle to initiate the strikes against the Lou Nuer. Historically, the minority Murle have been marginalized socially, economically, and politically. Other ethnic groups in Jonglei discriminate against the Murle, view the Murle as “‘backward’ or ‘hostile’ . . .” and always label them as perpetrators of violence and cattle raiding (Rands and LeRiche 12). Additionally, the Murle are often “harassed in town and insulted when they are heard using their own language” (Young and Sing’Oei 18). The Murle were not even allowed to receive development funding, which made their communities remain underdeveloped and entrapped in the cycle of poverty (Ferrie 6).

Moreover, the Murle have been politically marginalized. On one hand, most of the senior governmental positions are occupied by either Dinka or Nuer including presidency (Dinka) and vice presidency (Nuer) (International Crisis Group 2). Dinka and Nuer are also well represented in state government, including governorship (Dinka) and deputy governorship (Nuer) (12). On the other hand, the Murle are underrepresented at all levels largely because the elections tend to be voted along ethnic lines (Ferrie 7). Hence, their voices are hardly reflected in both national and state policies, which created grievances and ethnic animosity against dominating groups.

Furthermore, because the Lou Nuer enjoy better access to technology and communication networks than the Murle, they are able to promote their own narratives of each event domestically and internationally (Small Arms Survey 6). In fact, international actors have only responded to the clashes initiated by the Murle because the Lou Nuer utilize their connections with humanitarian NGOs, who are only aware of the narratives of the Lou Nuer (Ferrie 7), which also fuel Murle’s animosity against the Lou Nuer. This is how the Murle have developed their identity as victims and regarded the Lou Nuer as aggressors (Rands and LeRiche 8).

Their victimization effectively served as a justification for the Murle to commence war against the Lou Nuer, which made the Lou Nuer highly insecure and exacerbated the ethnic security dilemma. Looking at the recent Murle’s fighting features, their targets were not only cattle, but also civilians, implying that they were motivated by ethnic hatred and grievances against the Lou Nuer. In the most recent clash of February 2013 initiated by heavily armed Murle youth, 103 people were killed, most of who were the elderly, women, and children who failed to escape (Gettleman 2013). This suggests that Murle’s grievances against the Lou Nuer’s oppression have developed into ethnic hatred, changing the original objectives of the assault and exacerbating the brutality of the conflicts.

Conclusion/Final Warning 

Interethnic conflict between the Lou Nuer and Murle in Jonglei has evolved over time. The conflicts in the pre-CPA period are well explained through the lens of environmental conflict, in which the two ethnic groups fought over scarce resources. The level of competition was exacerbated by little precipitation and increased arid land due to climate change. More frequent climate change-induced migration also increased the likelihood of conflicts. The lethality of conflict was exacerbated due to the proliferation of small arms.

More importantly, a security dilemma and an ethnic hatred gradually emerged between the groups through these clashes. The failure of the GoSS in simultaneously disarming all ethnic groups in the post-CPA period exacerbated the already anarchic situation, in which disarmed Lou Nuer felt insecure, while the Murle, who remained armed, viewed the situation as an opportunity to preemptively strike the Nuer. The Murle’s attack in 2009 changed a perceived security dilemma to a real threat. The culmination of ethnic hatred is evidenced through the high brutality of following attacks involving indiscriminate killings against non-combatants and destruction of the communities. At this point, the clashes are beyond the scope of the environmental conflict. They are now fighting an ethnic conflict, in which both parties are trapped in the ethnic security dilemma.

The increasing role ethnic hatred plays in mobilizing people to fight for their survival and elimination of others must not be overlooked. Considering Lou Nuer’s hate messages and their intent to eliminate Murle’s communities, the clashes might develop into greater-scale mass killing or genocide. The inhumane acts and tactics undertaken on both sides, and particularly the Nuer’s repeated expression of “intent” to destroy the Murle communities, led Genocide Watch to categorize Lou Nuer-Murle conflicts as Stage 7 (Extermination) of its eight-stage indicator of genocide.

“Extermination” can quickly become a mass killing, namely “genocide.” Perpetrators of genocide often regard their enemies as subhuman to justify the use of any inhuman tactics against them. In the worst-case consequence, genocide could be followed by counter-genocide, in which those who were attacked retaliate, and the genocide eventually becomes a cycle. Needless to say, extermination has been happening in Jonglei. With respect to the scale, what is happening in Jonglei has not yet amounted to some cases of genocide, such as Rwanda, Bosnia, and Darfur. However, what matters in determining genocide is, as the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide or the Genocide Convention stipulates, the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group . . .” (UN General Assembly Resolution 260 (III)). Therefore, on-going conflicts in Jonglei clearly possess an element of genocide and have potential to erupt into a large-scale massacre. There must be zero tolerance of the potential occurrence of such a massacre.

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Written by: Yuki Yoshida
Written at: New York University Center for Global Affairs
Written for: Professor Colette Mazzucelli
Date written: May 2013

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