Introduction

In February 2012, Foreign Secretary for the United Kingdom (UK), William Hague, discussed an increasing potential for a ‘new’ Cold War (Winnett and Brogan, 2012). Hague argued that the Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons could spark an arms race in the Middle East, similar to the post-World War II tensions between the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). This study forms an analysis of the nuclear relations between The Islamic Republic of Iran and The State of Israel, as two key actors in the potential for a ‘new’ Cold War, building a comparison to the nuclear relationship of the USA and USSR in the post-war era.

Increasing nuclear tensions between Iran and Israel would significantly affect Middle Eastern regional stability, alongside international security concerns. Whilst a nuclear stalemate previously occurred during the Cold War, allowing stability to supervene, the circumstances under which Iran and Israel find themselves bear little resemblance to the USA-USSR nuclear balance in the latter half of the 20^th Century. For the purpose of this comparison, this study assumes the Cold War to be USA-USSR relations between 1946 and 1990. Their relations during this period can generally be typified by three different, but inter-related, factors. The period was shaped by geopolitical tensions, ideological competition, and the introduction of the nuclear era. This study focuses on the nuclear aspect of such relations, as a response to Hague’s comments regarding nuclear-weapons. Although religious differences affect Middle Eastern tensions, the impetus for this study was centred on nuclear-weapons proliferation. Consequently, geopolitics and ideological tensions will not be discussed in this analysis of Iran and Israel creating a ‘new’ Cold War.  This work focuses on the nuclear characteristics of the Cold War tensions, as the comparative element to Iran-Israel relations.

Much of the existing literature surrounding this topic focuses on American hegemonic input into Middle Eastern relations, and its influence on Israel’s approach to Iran. Many perceive Iran to be undergoing nuclear development in order to construct a deterrent towards potential attacks by the USA or her allies (Kaye and Lorber, 2012, p57). Furthermore, Duus (2011, p134) supports this rhetoric, acknowledging that for the West – namely the USA – a great threat arises as a result of differing “mentalities embedded within a clash of civilisations”. This applies especially within the Middle East, concentrated on Iranian activity. Although it is necessary to appreciate the impact of the American influence and ideological dissimilarities, there is a need for analysis which focuses specifically on Iran-Israel nuclear relations, as they maintain a great potential to change the current international system. A repeated focus on American involvement problematically overlooks Hague’s suggestions.  Whilst the role of the USA cannot be outright ignored, this study focuses on Iran-Israel relations. Although the role of a single world hegemon and the international community are addressed within this work, they are discussed in relation to their effects on Iran-Israel relations, and not taken as a unit of analysis themselves. This study deals with predictions regarding nuclear relations between Iran and Israel, and not on the impact such development would have on America. Although it is necessary to appreciate the impact of American influence, analysis which focuses specifically on direct Iran-Israel relations is needed in order to respond to Hague’s claim.

The ‘Waltz versus Sagan’ debate concerning the proliferation of nuclear weapons provides a significant theoretical discussion regarding the threats posed by such weapons development. This study starts, in chapter 1, by analysing their arguments regarding nuclear peace, and how they manifest in interactions between the Cold War superpowers, and Iran and Israel. This theoretical dispute provides an understanding as to why nuclear relations were stabilised during the Cold War, through the Waltzian perspective. However, due to international and systemic changes, Iran and Israel’s nuclear relations cannot be justified in this way. The Waltzian theoretical perspective sufficiently explains Cold War nuclear relations, yet further supporting evidence for this view is not evident within Iran-Israel nuclear relations. Thus, based on this perspective, Hague’s claim inadequately predicts the possibility of a ‘new’ Cold War.

To complete this comparison sufficiently, three points from Waltz’s argument are addressed. Chapter 2 addresses the structure of the international system and its effects on the nuclear engagement between the USA and USSR, based on Waltz’s discussion of bi-polarity, and the possibility of this manifesting again between Iran and Israel. Thus, a comparison of the Cold War bi-polar structure and the system Iran and Israel find themselves part of, is considered. Through this comparison, it becomes apparent that Iran and Israel lack bi-relations, which characterised the Cold-War stability. Chapter 3 looks at the Waltzian claim of miscalculation as a cause of war. This was not apparent in the Cold War as a result of the interlocking nuclear relations of the superpowers. However, the developing nuclear relationship between Iran and Israel is not comparable in nature to the nuclear relationship of the USA and USSR. The Cold War superpowers experienced a direct nuclear relationship, balancing and reacting to each other, reducing the chances of miscalculation. Iran and Israel are not subject to such direct nuclear relations, and the impact of this on their creation of a ‘new’ Cold War is discussed in chapter 3. Chapter 4 forms an evaluation of the applicability of Waltz’s idea of rationality, evidenced in nuclear diplomacy. Looking at agreements and compromises, a comparison between the events and results of Cold War nuclear diplomacy are contrasted to Iran-Israel interactions, analysing the limited resemblance and what this means for the potential of a ‘new’ Cold War to develop.

Based on the Waltzian explanation of the Cold War nuclear relations, this work concludes it is improbable that such nuclear relations will develop within the case of Iran and Israel. Following the analysis of these three areas, it is evident there is little indication to suggest Hague’s claim for a ‘new’ Cold War is sufficient.

Chapter 1: Nuclear Peace Theories: Waltz Versus Sagan, Theorising Nuclear Worlds

Hague’s claims for a ‘new’ Cold War are based on observations of USA-USSR nuclear relations in the latter half of the 20^th century. Whilst nuclear weapons and such security issues have not vanished with their Cold War father, what we observe has changed. Therefore, we need to theorise the observations in today’s nuclear world, with a specific focus on Iran and Israel, compared to previous observations of the Cold War system. This can be done using nuclear peace theories. Such theorising falls into the hands of Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan. These scholars divide into two camps: the rational deterrence theory position, purported by Waltz, and the organisation theory stance, which grounds Sagan’s argument. This chapter outlines each theoretical argument, and applies it to the two contexts this work is investigating, thus theorising the nuclear worlds. This chapter concludes that Waltz’s approach provides a strong explanation for Cold War nuclear relations. However it is not applicable to the context of Iran and Israel, with Sagan reaching more appropriate considerations. This supports the wider conclusion that Hague’s claim for a ‘new’ Cold War, based on the Waltzian explanation, is weak.

According to Waltz, nuclear weapons have not proliferated, but slowly spread around the globe (Waltz 2003, p3). He argues increasing Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) ultimately leads to a promising future (Waltz, 1981, p34). As a proponent of deterrence theory, Waltz defines deterrence as the ability to punish (2003, p5). Therefore, second-strike capabilities are required. However, this is a key issue of the Waltzian application to the Iran-Israel context. The nuclear capacities and relations of both Iran and Israel are not obviously observable, demonstrating a change in the nature of the nuclear development. These issues are addressed further in chapter 3.

Waltz reaches his conclusions based on six justifications. Firstly, as a Realist scholar, he maintains the international system is a self-help system (1981, p34). States act in ways that will help and propel themselves. A nuclear conflict would not work towards this end, due to the grave destruction such weapons would cause. Therefore, states will avoid it, creating the deterrence balance observed during the Cold War. Secondly, as a result, an “international equilibrium will endure” (Waltz, 1981, p34). To support this, Waltz cites the large numbers of nuclear warheads possessed by the American and Soviet military, further concluding the balance of deterrence is enduring. However, Waltz stumbles in his theoretical applicability to a post-Cold War world, and more importantly Iran and Israel. Whilst a system of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) did prevail during the Cold-War, it was upheld by the stable bi-polar structure of international relations, which is not observable in today’s context. This balancing act was not a result of the impossibility of one side to prevail over the other in a nuclear conflict, but a result of the international political arrangement it found itself in. The Waltzian nuclear perspective views nuclear weapons to be restoring the “clarity and simplicity” that occurred in a bi-polar world (Waltz, 2003, p15), absent in our increasingly multi-lateral structure. It was not the weapons themselves that created an order of stability, but the arrangement of international relations that upheld nuclear non-use.  This system of stability is not apparent in our world today, especially under the Iran-Israel context.  A deeper look at the international system structure as an inapplicable part of Waltz’s argument to the context of Iran and Israel is taken up in chapter 2.

Thirdly, Waltz argues, during the Cold War the superpowers did “not have to make guesses about the strength of opposing coalitions” (1981, p3-4). Waltz correctly notes most wars are products of miscalculation or misinterpretation. During the Cold War, the nuclear relationship limited the opportunity for miscalculation due to the interlocking nature of the Cold War arms race. Such a nuclear relationship allowed strong estimations of ‘enemy’ capabilities. However, this same open approach is not reflected in the Iran-Israel context. Speculation over Iranian attempts to be ‘open’ regarding their nuclear energy programme, and great mistrust from Israel and her Western allies, prevail. As a result of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the development of international norms, covert nuclear-weapons programmes are increasingly likely, thus increasing tensions. Waltz himself even acknowledges the ease at which nuclear warheads can be hidden and moved (2003, p19). Fourthly, for Waltz, miscalculations become difficult as a result of the known levels of damage even a small number of warheads can do (1981, p35), creating a deterrence relationship. Waltz deduces evidence from USA and USSR relations, arguing the chances of war between the two great powers had been reduced by their direct nuclear engagement (1981, p35). However such a direct nuclear relationship is not apparent between Iran and Israel, potentially increasing the likelihood of miscalculation. Hence, the Waltzian perspective remains inapplicable to the Iran-Israel context. Chapter 3 forms a more detailed analysis of the differing nuclear relationships between the Cold War, and Iran and Israel.

Waltz argues that hostile countries with nuclear arms will fear attack by each other (2003, p10), balancing each other and creating the deterrence ideal, as evidenced between the USA and USSR. However, fear and punishment in unstable and hostile states is not fully conclusive toward the creation of stable bi-state deterrence. This rationality that Waltz inflicts upon states, whilst evident in the Cold-War context, is not applicable to all states. Waltz’s fifth point deduces that nuclear weapons help decrease the likelihood of wars, by increasing the difficulty of winning (1981, p35), furthering the maintenance of peace. This also relies on states rationality, with actors rejecting the likelihood of major risks in the name of minor gains (Waltz, 2003, p6). However, as will be discussed in chapter 4, whilst rationality was a feature of USA-USSR nuclear engagement, such rationality is not an attribute of Iran or Israel. Finally, Waltz concludes more nuclear capable states may be better, as new NWS are subject to the same constraints of present nuclear states, (1981, p35). Thus, new NWS will be just as cautious and preventative, if not more so, regarding the actual use of nuclear-weapons. The Waltzian perspective satisfactorily explains the nuclear relations experienced during the Cold-War. However, his theoretical propositions are not applicable to Iran and Israel today, limiting the prospect of Iran and Israel creating a ‘new’ Cold War.

Sagan’s theoretical approach opposes Waltz’s, arguing the more NWS inhabiting the world, the more dangerous a place it will become. Sagan grounds his argument in organisation theory, purporting that the structure and organisation of military bodies is the main determinant within new NWS. In regard to nuclear weapons, Sagan maintains more will be worse, given weak organisational structures, creating more room for accidental or deliberate use. He doubts any state that acquires a nuclear capability is absolutely confident an accident will never occur (2003a, p73). Moreover, Sagan recognises the changed nature of nuclear-weapons programmes. During the Cold War, predictions regarding the quantitative levels the USA and USSR maintained were accessible, as a result of open NWS status. However, by noting the more covert nature of current nuclear weapons programmes, the security problems of the world are exacerbated (Sagan 2003a, p78). Knowing capabilities is crucial to the Waltzian argument of a stable deterrence system. However, as Sagan recognises, this has increased in difficulty following the Cold War. From an organisational theory viewpoint, Sagan argues such secrecy of these programmes proposes limited or insufficient safety monitoring, alongside unchallenged military objectives (2003a, p78). Whilst no concrete evidence for weapons development has risen from the Iranian nuclear programme, highlighting potential secrecy, much scope remains for limited monitoring and checks as a result of this. Moreover, emerging NWS’s will be greatly subject to military organisations (Sagan, 2003a, p83). The organisations in control of nuclear weapons are predisposed toward favouring attack. Inadequate control over such developments greatly increases the chances of deliberate or accidental use, alongside increasing the potential for terrorist acquisition through theft. He notes that potential nuclear acquisition by terrorists increases as a result of dispersed and secret programmes, furthering proliferation fears (Sagan, 2003b, p166).  Moreover, officers and military officials are “trained to focus on purely military logic when analysing security problems” (Sagan, 1994, p76).  For example, since the Iranian development of chemical weapons during the 1980’s Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian Army and Islamic Revolutionary Guards have built offensive policies regarding chemical arsenal, contrary to Tehran’s more defensive approach (Sagan, 2003b, p62). Thus, military organisations are trained to prefer preventive war, concentrating on short-term outcomes to stabilise immediate security. Sagan notes that “the ‘better now than later’ logic of preventive war is likely to be under serious consideration whenever an existing nuclear power sees a rival developing a nuclear arsenal” (1994, p82). This is reflected throughout the Israeli approach to Iran’s nuclear programme, with Israel claiming to act when Iran reaches weapons-grade enrichment levels (Netanyahu, Oct 2012).

Sagan notes (2010, p88) that during the Cold War period, nuclear weapons were a “dangerous necessity” and such nostalgia for this simplicity fails to recognise “how much the world has changed”. The international system, and political context Iran and Israel find themselves in, is greatly different from the frame which American and Soviet nuclear relations fell into. Thus, the dynamics of a nuclear world today are profoundly different to those experienced during the Cold War (Sagan et al, 2007, p142). This is where Waltz’s optimistic rhetoric fails. His assumptions regarding nuclear peace adequately explain the Cold War nuclear relations. However, change in international structures and nuclear dynamics have altered the role of nuclear weapons, consequently decreasing Waltz’s applicability to the Iran-Israel context. Sagan (1994, p103) strongly criticises Waltz on prescriptionist grounds, maintaining he confuses what rational states should do, with prescriptions of what they will do. With nuclear development becoming more covert and unpredictable, the Waltzian deterrence theory is losing ground. Using this nuclear peace theory debate to begin analysis on Hague’s claim, it becomes increasingly apparent his assumptions of replicating the Cold War are weak.

The above theoretical debate demonstrates the Cold War world order has crumbled, thus not providing a suggestive order towards a ‘new’ Cold War arrangement. Waltz gives a strong explanation of the Cold War nuclear experience, using this period to identify how stable nuclear relations can occur. This is the Cold War Hague relies on, predicting Iran and Israel will face a similar stable deadlock. However, this nuclear stability only occurred because it was propped up by a bi-polar international arena, with rational actors engaging in a system of interlocking nuclear development. This experience of nuclear stability came crashing down with the Berlin Wall in 1989. Waltz’s argument is a definite product of its time. He strongly typifies Cold War nuclear relations as aiding stability. However, the major downfall of this argument comes as Waltz fails to recognise a differing world, consequently leading to a change in nuclear relations. These capabilities are no longer supported by a trustworthy bi-polar deterrence system, but have created and entered an age whereby their threat is becoming increasingly real, most notably between Iranian and Israeli tensions. Sagan stands stronger on this aspect, noticing a changed world and role of nuclear weapons. The consensus around nuclear weapons has changed. Whilst the practical applicability of Sagan’s argument and view on terrorist acquisition is not addressed within this study, he provides a theoretical alternative to the Waltzian nuclear peace.  Developments are no longer as predictable and open as they were in the Cold War, thus leading to covert programmes and potential miscalculations. As a result of this the nuclear danger increases, with insufficient checks on the systems. Furthermore, nuclear relations, especially between Iran and Israel, are not underpinned by a stable bi-state relationship; the current world system is disjointed, no longer reflecting the Waltzian approach.

Following this breakdown of the ‘Waltz versus Sagan’ debate and its application to this study’s comparative contexts, Iran and Israel have little potential to become a ‘new’ Cold War. Theoretically, Waltz has a good grounding for a Cold War analysis, but is outdated in its applicability to Iran and Israel. Waltz provides a strong theoretical explanation for the Cold War nuclear relations. The remainder of this study looks at three important points of Waltz’s argument: the international system structure, the absence of miscalculation based on direct relationships, and the role of rationality in nuclear peace. It demonstrates that, whilst they adequately explain the Cold War nuclear world, they are not applicable to the nuclear relations of Iran and Israel, consequently indicating Hague’s claim is weak. 

Chapter 2: The International System Structure: A Bi-Polar Cold War to a Uni-Polar and Multi-Lateral Nuclear Order

Waltz observed that during the Cold War, the international system structure was characterised by bi-polarity, allowing a stable nuclear system between the USA and USSR to occur. However, the international system structure has moved beyond Cold War bi-polarity, reducing the chances of reproducing the stable nuclear relations apparent during that period. Nuclear stability prevailed as a direct result of the bi-polar structure. The nuclear interactions of Iran and Israel differ from those of the Cold War superpowers, resulting from the role of extra actors, for example America, the United Nations (UN), the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). During the Cold War, the international structure was bilateral, primarily concerning the USA and USSR. It is important to note Iran and Israel do not dominate the international system structure; therefore they are not immediately comparable to Cold War superpower relations. However, this chapter addresses the implications of the international system structure in relation to Iran and Israel’s accessibility to create a bi-state nuclear relationship, similar to that of the USA and USSR. As a result of current regional and international structures, bi-state relations are less likely to occur, replicating Cold War stability. The role of the USA as a world hegemon, alongside the governing traits of international institutions, result in multi-lateral supervision. This chapter argues the Waltzian bi-polar stability that supports his strong theoretical explanation of the superpowers nuclear relationship, will not prevail in the Iran-Israel context, reducing the chances of a ‘new’ Cold War.

A frequent observation regarding Cold War stability is often attributed to the bi-polar system (Saperstein, 1991, p68). Waltz argued that during the Cold War, bi-polarity established “remarkable stability” (1964, p882). It was a direct result of this system structure that peaceful nuclear relations prevailed. For Waltz, bi-polarity became the stabilising feature of the post-war international system (Crockatt, 1993, p62). This view is a prominent position taken up by Realists. Strong bi-polarity was a paramount feature of the Cold War (Gamson and Modigliani, 1971, p3); without such an international system structure, nuclear stability would have been significantly less likely to succeed. Within the Cold War bi-polar system, anarchy prevailed. Contained by the structure of bi-polarity, the ‘pole’ states directly engaged with each other, with no overarching authority or institution. The USA and USSR only had to answer to themselves and cope with each other. Furthermore nuclear stability, as Waltz argued, did not cause bi-polarity (Lebow, 1994, p256). The Cold War international system structure was bi-polar, allowing a stable nuclear relationship to occur; it was not the fear of nuclear weapons that caused bi-polarity to ensure stability, but a direct effect of the system itself. According to Donnelly (2000, p111), Waltz claims the Cold War peace “rests on two pillars: bi-polarity and nuclear weapons”. However, this observation is not entirely accurate.  Peace did not ensue during the Cold War as a direct result of both these factors; peace ensued as a direct result of the international structure typified by bi-polarity. Nuclear stability, which epitomised the peaceful period, was a product of bi-polarity. Bi-polarity was the mechanism that allowed stability to occur, enabling the two prominent actors to resolve disturbances through negotiation, not force, in order to balance each other and prevent uni-lateral gain (Chatterjee, 1975, p182). Bi-polarity in the Cold War cemented the two superpowers at the top of the international system. Consequently, each became the other’s “principle adversary” (Wagner, 1993, p82), sustaining the bipolar system. For Waltz, bi-polarity reduces uncertainty, making calculations easier (Wagner, 1993, p90). It reduces the risk of the superpower states engaging in a direct war (Copeland, cited in Donnelly, 2000, p108). Lebow acknowledges (1994, p254) that states’ behaviour is indirectly affected through bi-polarity, as it structures the constraints imposed. For example, because each pole – in this case the USA and USSR – is only concerned about the other, they both act rapidly to adjust to each other. Both poles share an interest in retaining their superior systemic positions (Donnelly, 2000, p109). Through being able to easily recognise the other significant player in the system, and act in direct accordance with them, bi-polarity reduces uncertainty, supporting the pursuit of stability. Thus, under a bi-polar system, peace is more likely to ensue. With the Cold War international system structured by bi-polarity, nuclear stability prevailed.

The bi-polar system structure created and supported Cold War superpower relations, allowing nuclear stability to supervene. However, such a system structure is not in place today. Currently, international order is experiencing the beginnings of a shift from a uni-polar world, dominated by America, towards a more multi-lateral world, with a dispersed dominance between states and institutions such as the UN, and in nuclear cases the NPT and the IAEA. The NPT and IAEA have been selected for this study due to their relevance in nature to the wider nuclear context of this work. The following section of this chapter addresses a unipolar world and its implications for Iran and Israel creating a ‘new’ Cold War, and then looks at such implications regarding a move towards multi-lateralism.

Following the end of the Cold War, the USA found itself in a uni-polar, hegemonic position, diminishing the stability of the Cold War balancing act (Rhodes, 2004, p174). The USA has maintained this role since the collapse of its Soviet counterpart, shaping a unipolar international system structure. Resulting from uni-polarity the USA created a strong global influence, frequently involving itself in bi-lateral disputes, for example nuclear relations between Iran and Israel. The USA has acted as an arbiter and guarantor for regional actors (Miller, 2004, p260), therefore changing the balance bi-polarity produced during the Cold War. Having such a role affects the balance between Iran and Israel. During the Cold War, both the superpowers were directly preoccupied with each other (Wirtz, 2004, p127). However, a uni-polar system changes this, limiting the recreation of bi-state relations that previously aided stability. From a Neorealist perspective, a uni-polar world is the most unstable, increasing the threat to other states (Wohlforth, 1999, p5). This is evident within Iran-Israel-US relations, as the USA supports Israel and plays an intimidating role over Iran. An example of such intimidation is embodied in President Obama’s speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2012. In his speech, Obama claimed the USA will “do what it must” to hinder a nuclear armed Iran (Obama, 2012). This demonstrates American support for Israel, increasing the tensions and potential threat felt by Iran. Such support was reinforced by US Secretary of State, John Kerr, who reasserted an USA-Israel alliance, following the failure to diplomatically address the Iranian nuclear problem at Almaty in April 2013. As a result of uni-polarity, states are more inclined to introduce the sole superpower into relations as an alliance on their side. During the Cold War, allies made no strategic difference to the superpowers (Wagner, 1993, p81). This allowed relations to be direct, aiding stability. However, this is not possible under a uni-polar system; the sole superpower will become involved on one side or another. Within the case of Iran and Israel, the USA supports Israel, tipping the balance and potentially increasing instability. Furthermore, Donnelly (2000, p109) acknowledges in such systems, the chance of being “ganged up on” increases fear and antagonisms. For Iran and Israel, it is likely the structure of such relations will become imbalanced, directly resulting from the US-Israeli alliance. Moreover, as a result of uni-polarity governing the international structure, state relations have to cope with the additional actor of the USA as a hegemon. During the Cold War, the two superpowers did not have to account for more than each other (Waltz, 1979, p170). Therefore, it is nearing impossible that relations between Iran and Israel could replicate a bi-state system of stability. With the role of an international hegemon, an Iranian-Israeli dialogue replicating direct bipolarity is highly unlikely. Therefore, the Waltzian perspective has little applicability to Iran and Israel’s nuclear context, significantly reducing their ability to recreate the Cold War bi-polar nuclear stability.

Many argue we are moving away from a uni-polar international system towards a multi-lateral structure. Whilst this debate cannot be addressed within this work, it discusses the role of such a system structure in creating a ‘new’ Cold War between Iran and Israel. In considering a multi-lateral system, this section specifically looks at the UN, the NPT and the IAEA, and their effects on recreating the Cold War. Whilst the USA and USSR acted independently within their bi-polar system, the same is not true for Iran and Israel. This is discussed regarding the UN’s role, the NPT and the IAEA.

The UN plays a great role in mediating bi-lateral agreements, alongside regional affairs. This means neither Iran nor Israel are free to act as they please, without imposed consequences. As a result of multilateralism, relations replicating the Cold War will struggle to emerge, as actions not considered consistent with the UN are penalised. This is evident within UN sanctions imposed on Iran (Davenport, 2012). Such sanctions requested (UN Resolution 1737, 2006) and reinforced (UN Resolution 1747, 2007; 1803, 2008; 1929, 2010) that states within the international system refrain from allowing individuals and technologies associated with Iranian nuclear development through their territories, and refrain from providing direct support themselves. This suggests the anarchic system structure is slowly giving way to multi-lateral institutions, governing differing spheres of state actions. Iran and Israel are placed within a fundamentally different system structure than that of the Cold War superpowers, creating differing circumstances. Evidence for this manifests in multiple international meetings, for example the most recent April 2013 Almaty talks, involving Iran and the P5+1 members (USA, Russia, UK, France China, and Germany) of the UN Security Council (UNSC), regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. The international community is fully involved in the Iranian nuclear issue, thus reducing the likelihood of Iran and Israel establishing a bi-state relationship, reminiscent of the Cold War.

The UN is not the only multi-lateral player creating a differing international system structure to the Cold War bipolarity. As a signatory to the NPT, Iran is limited in its legal actions. As an overseeing institution, the NPT reinforces the multi-lateral system that has increasingly developed since the Cold War. During the Cold War, the system structure was at the whim of the two superpowers. However, irrespective of the fact Iran and Israel are not leading superpowers, they are still significantly unable to create a bi-state nuclear relationship, as a result of multi-lateralism. The NPT places legal limitations on nuclear development for its member states, allowing ‘peaceful’ usage only (NPT, 1970, Article 4). Moreover, it provides regulatory governance regarding signatory states nuclear actions. Therefore, resulting from Iran’s NPT signature, Iran and Israel are not free to create independent bi-state agreements surrounding their nuclear relations, consequently not replicating the actions of the USA and USSR.

The IAEA aims to impose the nuclear safeguards described under the NPT (IAEA, 2011). As a further multilateral actor, the IAEA limits the chances of bi-polarity emerging between Iran and Israel. As Zak (2006, p68) acknowledges, the IAEA functions based on the norms of an international organisation, thus becoming part of the multi-lateral international order. The IAEA “seeks to verify” states declarations regarding their nuclear materials (IAEA Safeguards Agreement, 2011, p10), through inspections and information analysis. Dealing with a lack of compliance is the responsibility of the UNSC, demonstrating that multiple actors are increasingly involved within states actions, specifically nuclear development. With such institutions moving beyond a state-based system, it is evident that multi-polarity is increasing. Although this work is not claiming to predict such an international system is going to be less stable than Cold War bi-polarity, it is claiming the system structure has changed, and is still doing so, thus not satisfying Waltzian bi-polarity as a cause of Cold War nuclear peace in the Iran-Israel context. The opportunity for Hague’s claim to manifest, based on the international system structure, is unlikely. Consequently, due to the international order being fundamentally different from the Cold War bi-polar system, Iranian and Israeli relations will struggle to replicate the bi-state relations required for the Waltzian nuclear stability.

The Cold War international system was typified by the bi-polar relationship between the two superpowers. Due to the current international system structure, Iran and Israel are unable to provide further evidence for Waltz’s nuclear peace theory and recreate such a system. The input of the USA,  as well as institutions such as the UN, the NPT and IAEA, help rearrange the international system structure, moving further from a Cold War-like system emerging between Iran and Israel. This chapter has looked at the changing international system structure as evidence for Iran and Israel’s possibility of recreating the Cold War. However, the international system is fundamentally different to the Cold War, thus not providing strong evidence in favour of Hague’s argument for the potential of a ‘new’ Cold War developing between Iran and Israel. Bi-polarity during the Cold War allowed direct balancing relations. However, Iran and Israel are limited in their possibility of recreating such a relationship, as a result of the international system structure they find themselves in. With a hegemonic USA and other internationally governing institutions, both Iran and Israel are subjects within an imposing system. They would find it increasingly difficult to set up an independent bi-state nuclear engagement. Therefore, the Waltzian explanation of the Cold War is limited in its modern application, reducing the potential of Iran and Israel replicating such a nuclear system.

Chapter 3: Nuclear Relations and Nuclear Strategy

Waltz’s nuclear peace argument observes during the Cold War stability resulted from the direct nuclear relationship experienced by the USA and USSR. For Waltz, war is often initiated due to miscalculations and misinterpretations. However miscalculations did not occur during the Cold War as a result of the direct nuclear relationship and open nuclear strategy, limiting the opportunity for such war. This chapter discusses the inapplicability of this principle to Iran and Israel, analysing the differing proliferation strategies of the USA and USSR, Iran and Israel. America and the Soviets underwent an interlocking weapons-development battle, producing an absence of miscalculation. However, such a direct engagement is not evident within Iran-Israel relations. Moreover, the strategy regarding such weapons differs greatly. The Cold War powers limited miscalculation through their knowledge of the other’s nuclear status, reducing the opportunity for war; now secrecy and uncertainty prevails. This chapter discusses American and Soviet nuclear acquisition, compared to Iran and Israel’s programmes, evidencing Waltz’s inapplicability to the modern context and weakening Hague’s prediction of a ‘new’ Cold War.

In 1945, an American nuclear monopoly existed, initiating the nuclear weapons era. Following this was the only ever use of such weapons; the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic-bombings. Strong (1982, p11) recognises deterrence against the USSR helped evolve American nuclear justifications. A rationale of fear and threat warranted American nuclear development, following war-time conditions, driving proliferation toward “getting…a bigger bomb” (Charnysh, 2009, p2). Consequently, nuclear weapons proliferation was developmental, increasing technologies and yields for ‘bigger and better’. From the 1951 ‘George’ test, confirming thermonuclear reactions can be produced by a fission device, to the 1952 ‘Ivy-Mike’ tests, detonating the first hydrogen bomb (H-bomb) (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2012a), America focused on developing nuclear weapons technology, as opposed to creating original-design stockpiles. The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation acknowledges (2012a); “the highest priority was placed on developing new and more potent strategic weapons”. By the late 1950’s, nuclear programmes focused on “increasing the yield…and size of nuclear weapons” (Nuclear Weapons Archive, 2005). Thus proliferation was developmental. Prior to the ‘Ivy-Mike’ test, President Truman announced American intentions toward H-bomb development, citing an impetus of Soviet fission bomb acquisition (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2012a). Truman’s H-bomb decision resulted from the USSR becoming a NWS (Charnysh, 2009, p2), demonstrating the direct proliferation relationship which evidences the reduction of miscalculation. As Holloway (n.d, p15) discusses, “nuclear deterrence was…the organizing principle of US national security policy”. American acquisition opened the door to the nuclear world, prompting Soviet development. To remain a post-war power, Soviet capabilities needed to balance America’s monopoly. Therefore, direct action-reaction proliferation created the Cold War nuclear relationship, limiting miscalculation and supporting the Waltzian nuclear peace.

The first Soviet nuclear tests followed in 1949 (Holloway, n.d, p4). By 1951, the USSR demonstrated advancing capabilities through testing a second, and improved, plutonium bomb, followed by the 1953 and 1955 H-bomb tests (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2012a), furthering Soviet capabilities. Although the first thermonuclear explosion was American, the USSR were less than a year behind, with their first tests in 1953 (Army Centre of Military History, 1975, p315) and by 1955 demonstrated H-bomb building capabilities through a second test (Holloway, n.d, p10). Soviet nuclear weapons development was a direct response to American NWS status. As Holloway acknowledges (n.d, p10), Truman’s 1950 announcement of USA intentions to develop the ‘super-bomb’ was directly reacting to the 1949 Soviet nuclear tests. Subsequently, Soviet and American nuclear stockpiles grew between 1950 and 1962 from a “handful” to around 3,300, and from 369 to 27,000 respectively (Holloway, n.d, p17), demonstrating an action-reaction nuclear development. This stabilising race kept the Cold War ‘cold’, with an interest in scientific and technological development, not preventing the others acquisition. Furthermore, developments of the Soviet nuclear threats were “blatant” (Army Centre of Military History, 1975, p5), reducing the chance for miscalculation as a Waltzian cause for war. Both superpowers were undoubtedly known as NWS. Thus obvious proliferation produced a stable outcome, leading to the balance of terror and MAD that prevailed throughout the Cold War. This was acknowledged in American security strategy, observing the “USSR will not deliberately initiate general war”, (NSC 162/2, 1953). Direct nuclear competition allowed deterrence to prevail, becoming the organisational norm of security. This was predicted in the Killian Report 1955, which stated “mutual US-Soviet expansion of nuclear forces…would proceed to a perilous stalemate”, (cited in Columbian Peoples, 2008, p62-63). This balance of terror purported the proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies, directly resulting from increased thermonuclear stockpiles of both superpower states (Army Centre of Military History, 1975, p179). Such an interlocking chain of development supports Waltz’s claim that limiting miscalculations is conclusive towards stability. Therefore, the Cold War nuclear relationship resulted as a response to direct developments, and remained stable as a consequence of accepting the others capacities. Subsequently, miscalculation regarding the opposition’s nuclear status and development was limited. Waltz’s theory uses this as evidence to support his claims that the Cold War stability was a result of such a relationship reducing the potential for miscalculation. However, nuclear developments in Israel and Iran are not intertwined and obvious as in the Cold War, creating possible instability through opacity and suspicion.

Israel was first acknowledged as a NWS around 1967 (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2012b). However, directly pinpointing Israeli attainment is difficult, with no official evidence regarding Israeli nuclear testing available (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2012b). Following the Suez War (1956), Israeli leaders pursued the Dimona reactor plant (Barnaby, 1989, p6). Experiencing isolation following the end of US supplies, Israel desired arms production self-sufficiency. Cohen recognises (1998, p4) that “Israel was a small friendly state surrounded by larger enemies.” This differs from Cold War proliferation as American, followed by Soviet acquisition, resulted from a direct power competition. Israel did not choose nuclear capabilities as a direct result of Iran’s positioning, thus not providing a strong similarity to the USA and USSR. France provided great nuclear assistance to Israel’s early nuclear programme (Steinbach, 2009, p331). Support also came from Norway through trading heavy-water, based on the assurance it was solely for peaceful purposes (Steinbach, 2009, p333). Through such assistance, Israel built the Dimona nuclear facility (NRDC, 2003, p73). Israel proliferated independently of a direct balancing relationship. This demonstrates a proliferation difference from the Cold War superpowers through reliance on outside assistance.  The USA and USSR had the resources to engage in an independent action-reaction development, evidencing the Waltzian stability. Such a direct relationship reduced uncertainty and miscalculation. However, Israeli proliferation has not become locked into a direct and stable bi-state nuclear competition. By pursuing nuclear opacity, Israel has altered nuclear strategy. Cold War nuclear relations produced stable relations, through balancing assured capabilities and reducing miscalculations. Israel, and specifically its relations with Iran, has not replicated this. The Cold War nuclear system prevailed as a result of predictable strategies. Without this, nuclear stability cannot be preserved. Cohen (cited in Barnaby, 1989, p60), argues nuclear proliferation only provides stability if a symmetrical strategic relationship is apparent. This is evident within the Cold War nuclear proliferation structure, as the USA and USSR were both known to be NWS, reducing miscalculation. However, the prospect for such a relationship is not likely between Israel and Iran. Through pursuing nuclear weapons opacity, Israel weakens the likelihood of a ‘new’ Cold War, increasing the opportunity for miscalculation. Cold War nuclear relations resulted from the interlocking balance of the superpowers certain strategies; they were developing such weapons as a direct deterrent of the other. However for Israel and Iran, there is no interlocking bi-state relationship supporting an action-reaction nuclear proliferation chain. Due to opacity, only estimates can be made about the relationship, increasing the risk of miscalculation and thus tensions. This lack of knowledge furthers instability, therefore failing to recreate the Cold War regime and provide further evidence for Waltz nuclear peace theory.

Iran’s nuclear development can be traced to the 1973 oil crisis, which influenced the Shah to advance the Iranian nuclear energy programme (Lodgaard, 2007, p96). The claimed civilian programme started with assistance from America (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2012c). As with Israeli development, Iranian proliferation differs greatly from the Cold War superpowers. Iranian development was interrupted by the 1979 revolution, postponing the proposed Bushehr plant operation date of 1980 (Lodgaard, 2007, p96). Following the revolution, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini expressed little interest in nuclear initiatives (Lodgaard, 2007, p96). However, the programme was reinstated during the Iran-Iraq war (Kerr, 2009, p14). The second Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei (1989 to present), acknowledges nuclear energy, but denounces nuclear weapons in Iran. Khamenei has issued a fatwa, stating that acquiring, stockpiling or using nuclear weapons is a “grave sin against Islam” (Kahl et al, 2012, p11). This is contrary to IAEA publications regarding Iranian nuclear facilities, which suggest a weapons programme is underway (IAEA, 2011, p10; IAEA 2013, p12), thus leading to miscalculations, increasing tensions and the potential for conflict. Furthermore, international restrictions hinder Iran from freely entering the exclusive NWS club. In 1968, Tehran signed the NPT, ratifying it in 1970 (Kerr, 2009, p1; Lodgaard, 2007, p96), making it illegal for Iran to develop nuclear weapons. This demonstrates further differences in proliferation strategy between the Cold War and Iran; it is more feasible for Iranian development to reach threshold point, making acquisition quick and easy, without becoming a NWS. Iran is privy to international law on nuclear-weapons development, thus not allowing proliferation to occur openly as during the Cold War. This hinders the development of a Cold War rationale of direct nuclear relations, as it is evident the acquisition path has changed. This has great potential to force proliferation underground and create unstable nuclear relations. Therefore miscalculations become more likely, limiting any further evidence for Waltz’s nuclear peace.

The world is politically different now than at the end of the 1940s and beginning of the 1950s. The proliferation undergone by the USA and USSR typically fitted Meyer’s three-stage proliferation model (1984, cited in Ogilvie-White, 1996, p50). Meyer argues at the first stage governments make an explicit decision to “develop a latent capacity” (Ogilvie-White, 1996, p50). This is followed by developing this latent capacity into an “operational capability” (Ogilvie-White, 1996, p50). The final stage of the nuclear decision is converting nuclear capabilities into a weapons development programme (Ogilvie-White, 1996, p50). Identifying the nuclear-decision stages of proliferation within the Cold War superpowers is more clear-cut, a result of open strategies and weapons development to counter the other. However, international restrictions have hindered Iran and Israel from clearly following Meyer’s three-stage path, preventing them from progressing past the first stage, continuously pursuing more covert paths. Israel has openly reached the second stage, but chooses opacity to prevent the completion of Meyer’s model. Iran’s development is slowly moving towards the second stage, however it continuously cites peaceful uses, keeping any weapons development underground. Through covert or undeclared proliferation, miscalculation is increasingly likely to occur, resulting in an uncertain nuclear relationship between Iran and Israel. The nuclear programmes are not directly intertwined, as were the USA and USSR during the Cold War, consequently not directly balancing each other, aiding the development of stability. Iran and Israel’s nuclear development, and resulting relationship, has increased the risks of miscalculation, therefore not providing further evidence for the Waltzian nuclear peace theory.

Hague suggested Iran and Israel possess great potential in replicating the nuclear relationship the USA and USSR encountered during the Cold War. However, there is little proliferation evidence supporting this. Prior to American acquisition, nuclear technology and weapons were new concepts. The USA and USSR rationale towards nuclear weapons centred around developing technologies, not solely on the acquisition of capabilities, directly balancing one-another. Based on the Waltzian model, this reduced the risk of miscalculation, and thus war. However, current proliferation debates surrounding Iran and Israel focus on acquisition, not on developing new technologies. Furthermore, strategy regarding nuclear proliferation is dissimilar. The USA and USSR acquisition resulted in a deadlock of a development race, causing stability. However, such deadlock between Israel and Iran is unlikely for two reasons. Firstly the initiation of nuclear programmes was not a direct result of the other. Their nuclear development was not interlinked and related to a direct rivalry, as was the USA and USSR. Secondly, the nuclear programmes of Israel and Iran are both contested concepts. Although it is widely believed Israel is a NWS, they still maintain an official policy of opacity. Iran claims the sole purpose of their nuclear facilities is civilian-use. Consequently it becomes increasingly difficult to enter a direct nuclear relationship, as experienced during the Cold War, when both states pursue nuclear policies surrounded by secrecy. This increases the potential for miscalculation, and therefore amplified tensions. Iran and Israel are not replicating the Cold War balance, but lean towards instability fuelled by secrecy and opacity.  Thus, the Iran-Israel nuclear relationship doe not provide further evidence for the Waltzian principle of absent miscalculation as a cause of stability.

Chapter 4: Rationality and Nuclear Diplomacy

Waltz’s theory of nuclear peace relies upon the assumed rationality of states. According to Waltz, nuclear stability prevails as a result of rationally acting states, evidenced in Cold War diplomacy. This chapter further discards Waltz’s nuclear peace theory as applicable to Iran-Israel relations, following its rational actor assumptions, weakening claims of a potential ‘new’ Cold War. This chapter provides evidence regarding rationality through nuclear diplomacy in both the contexts considered. It concludes that Iran and Israel lack the rationality experienced between the superpowers, and consequently lack the potential to reproduce Cold War nuclear relations.

Rational actor theory, originating in economics, purports that actors follow basic principles of maximising utility. States, as primary actors, act in relation to means that support the achievement of their preferred ends (Slatchev, 2005, p2). Waltz argues that states seek security as a way to manage their survival (Bordner, 1997), resulting from the anarchic international system. As observed during the Cold War, rational states would not pursue nuclear attacks, with the escalation to nuclear war being probable, as it would not sustain their survival. Thus, nuclear attacks were contrary to states’ rational interests. This rationality empirically manifested itself during the Cold War, epitomised through USA-USSR nuclear diplomacy. However, such an idea is not apparent between Iran and Israel. Whilst the Waltzian idea of nuclear stability, based on rationality, prevailed within Cold War nuclear diplomacy, nuclear relations between Iran and Israel cannot be typified in the same way. The USA and USSR shared the common goal of stemming global proliferation, resulting from nuclear devices being a new weapons concept, alongside rationally preventing nuclear usage. Cold War diplomacy provides strong empirical evidence for Waltz’s nuclear peace perspective and its rationality undercurrent. However, this has not been recreated between Iran and Israel, and therefore does not support the initiation of rational nuclear diplomacy.

There is much evidence, especially the post Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), to suggest nuclear stability prevailed as a result of the superpowers’ rationality. It is important to acknowledge numerous meetings occurred, often achieving little concrete success. However, this section acknowledges three key agreements within Cold War nuclear diplomacy, providing evidence of the nuclear stability achieved through the USA and USSR’s rationality: 1) the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link, 1963 (Hot-Line Agreement); 2) Treaty Banning Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Underwater, 1963, (PTBT); and 3) the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War, 1973 (Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement). The predominantly bi-lateral talks demonstrated rationality towards achieving nuclear weapons non-use, as both states acted towards achieving their goal of preventing nuclear war. Early evidence of this resulted from the Cuban crisis, in the form of the ‘Hot-Line’ agreement (1963). This agreement set up a “direct communications link between the U.S and Soviet heads of state”, aiming to minimise the risk of misinterpretation or accident (Hot-Line Agreement, 1963). This agreement exemplified the rational nature of the Cold War superpowers; it was in both their interests to avoid nuclear usage to ensure their survival. The Hot-Line Agreement supported continuing notions of Cold War security, deeming the intentional use of nuclear-weapons unlikely (Mutimer, 2011, p60). As the Waltzian perspective notes, such usage was likely to occur through misinterpretation or miscalculation. This agreement demonstrates the rational actions taken towards avoiding such a scenario, furthering nuclear stability. Thus the rationality of the Cold War superpowers upheld nuclear diplomacy, significantly reducing the risk of actual use to nearly zero.

For Waltz a significant aim of states is survival. Both the USA and USSR acted rationally within nuclear diplomacy to minimise the risk of actual use, thus supporting Waltz’s nuclear stability. The rationality of Hot-Line continued through further nuclear diplomacies. Another significant agreement initiated by superpower negotiations was the PTBT. The initial signing of the agreement also included the UK, however, it is still of great importance to the rationality of nuclear diplomacy between the USA and USSR. The agreement sought to discontinue all test explosions of nuclear devices (PTBT, 1963, p1) as a way of limiting development. For the USA and USSR, nuclear testing was crucial to the “proliferation ladder, for both technical and political reasons” (Cohen, 1998, p6). By limiting tests, the USA and USSR rationally moved towards successfully maintaining a stable nuclear relationship. The political impact of the PTBT was of great significance (Hopmann and King, 1976, p106), with the USA and USSR rationally approaching nuclear relations with one another. Graebner (1976, p47) notes the actions pursued by the USA and USSR “closed the door to any result but the Cold War”.  Through rational diplomacy, actual nuclear war became significantly less likely, consequently increasing stability. Both the USA and USSR recognised the indefensible destructive power of nuclear weapons, and such a need to avoid their use. In order to avoid such a risk, both actors rationally undertook a diplomatic approach. Without states acting rationally, the chances of achieving such stability would have been significantly reduced. The USA and USSR engaged through diplomacy to prevent nuclear war, demonstrating their rationality toward achieving a stable nuclear relationship.

Stability was further advanced by the 1973 Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement. Under Article 1 of the Agreement, the opposed superpowers agreed a joint policy objective, aimed at eradicating the danger of nuclear war and significantly limiting the chances of actual nuclear use.  This clearly demonstrates the rationality of both superpowers, as opposing forces working together to maintain individual survival. This rationality aids the Waltzian nuclear stability, reiterated in Article IV of the Agreement (1973), which states:

If at any time relations between the Parties [USA and USSR] or between either Party and other countries appear to involve the risk of a nuclear conflict, or if relations between countries not parties to this Agreement appear to involve the risk of nuclear war between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or between either Party and other countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, acting in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, shall immediately enter into urgent consultations with each other and make every effort to avert this risk.

For both superpowers to sustain their regimes, rationality was imperative. Achieving direct diplomatic results with the opposing superpower in order to maintain such a position clearly demonstrates the rationality that ensued. Nuclear stability prevailed, as the superpowers pursued rational engagement in order to survive. Therefore, the Waltzian theory of nuclear stability, reliant on rationality, is evident within Cold War nuclear diplomacy. Whilst it is important to acknowledge nuclear diplomacy was not straight forward and easily attained, the unified goal of survival through non-nuclear use and thus stability, were achievable as a direct result of both the USA and USSR being rational actors. It was not in either’s interest to pursue policies of nuclear weapons usage. Therefore nuclear stability succeeded in the Waltzian way during the Cold-War.

Nuclear stability during the Cold War resulted from the USA and USSR’s rational diplomacy. However, stability resulting from rationality is not evidenced within Israeli-Iranian relations.  Israel is hindering the replication of this through acting irrationally. A central Israeli foreign policy is concentrated on preventing Iranian attainment of nuclear-weapons (Netanyahu, Oct 2012). A possible solution to this is through the creation of a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ), something which Iran claims to be in favour of. However, Israel has set peace and security within the Middle East as a precondition to NWFZ talks, deflecting progress (Johnson, 2007). In his statement at the 56^th General Conference of the IAEA, Dr. Shaul Chorev (2012), Head of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, argued discussions surrounding a NWFZ in the region can only begin following the establishment of peaceful regional relations, and the creation of adequate confidence between neighbours. Iran first proposed a Middle East NWFZ in 1974 (Aly, 2012). However, the idea was delayed until the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and then again until the 2010 NPT Review Conference, where it was agreed to convene a discussion before the end of 2012. Furthermore, the proposed December 2012 talks on a Middle East NWFZ were cancelled by Israel, and America, in November 2012. Although there has been little justification for this, it can be inferred Israel cancelled the talks following an outbreak of violence with Palestine. However, due to Israel’s irrational preconditions, the prospect of nuclear stability, established through NWFZ diplomacy, is doubtful. Israel is acting irrationally, creating a circular block to achieving its goals in relation to Iran; Israel won’t act towards achieving nuclear related stability, until stability itself is created. However, stability will not ensue until confidence and security building measures are initiated, possibly through nuclear diplomacy. Samore (2004, p.14) argues that current conditions within the Middle East hinder regional disarmament negotiations. Without an extensive Middle East peace settlement, Israel will refrain from considering disarming its regional nuclear monopoly (Samore, 2004, p14). However, a NWFZ discussion presents the arena in which such measures can be initiated. Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu’s UN speech (September 2012) furthers evidence for Israeli irrationality. During his speech, he visually depicted the point at which Israel would ‘attack’ the Iranian nuclear programme. Netanyahu used a picture of a bomb to acknowledge Iran’s current levels of uranium enrichment of around 20%, then demonstrated Israeli ‘attack’ would occur once these levels reached the 90% enrichment line. Israel argues that it is not in their interest to let Iran develop nuclear weapons capabilities. However, Israel appears to be waiting to implement a policy of cure rather than initiate prevention, for example through NWFZ talks. Therefore, Israel is acting irrationally. Israel is limiting the potential of nuclear diplomacy as a means to stability, by not acting rationally, denying the applicability of Waltzian nuclear peace to Israeli relations with Iran. Consequently, rational diplomacy is unlikely to manifest and replicate the stability that prevailed following the rational nuclear diplomacy between the USA and USSR.

Much of the Western world, and Israel, depict Iran as an irrational actor. In his address to the UN General Assembly (September 2012), Netanyahu voiced Israeli opinions on Iranian irrationality, claiming during the Cold War, the USSR accepted deterrence because “every time…[they] faced a choice between their ideology and their survival, they chose survival”. However, Netanyahu believes this approach with Iran will be unsuccessful, following the irrational Iranian logic to pursue ideology over survival, thus not epitomising Waltz’s idea of states rational drive. Iran’s nuclear diplomacy has been prevalent, with frequent interactions with the IAEA. As a signatory to the NPT, Iran is subject to IAEA inspections and verification regarding its nuclear facilities. As previously discussed, unlike Cold War nuclear relations, states such as Iran are now subject to international demands. Iran has met with the IAEA on numerous occasions to discuss its nuclear facilities. In early 2012, Iranian and IAEA officials met to discuss a way forward in relation to Iran’s nuclear development (Crail, 2012). However, following this cooperation, Iran acted irrationally. Since these talks, Iran declined IAEA visits to the Parchin military site (Crail, 2012), thus not acting rationally to build international confidence around its suspect nuclear developments. The IAEA have recognised “Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation” which would give the Agency the ability to credibly assure “the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran” (IAEA, 2011, p10). In order to reduce the risk of nuclear hostility and instability, the rational action would be to comply with agreements and inspection requests. To apply the Waltzian theory to this context, Iran would need to act in a way to ensure its survival, through disregarding nuclear suspicion, diffusing tensions and not becoming subject to further sanctions. However, by failing to comply Iran puts itself at risk of serious action. Iran is not acting rationally towards a stable nuclear future. This is dissimilar to the Cold War superpowers nuclear diplomacy, as neither Iran nor Israel appears to be acting rationally. For the Waltzian nuclear peace theory to manifest empirically, as it did during the Cold War, the actors involved need to be rational. However, in the case of Iran and Israel, rationality does not prevail. Thus, nuclear peace from the Waltzian perspective is unlikely to ensue. With a lack of rational diplomacy creating nuclear stability, Hague’s prediction of a ‘new’ Cold War is improbable. The non-use policy developed throughout the Cold War was a result of rational nuclear diplomacy. However, as this is increasingly lacking in relations between Iran and Israel, the prospect of recreating Cold War nuclear relations is diminishing.

Currently, there is little evidence supporting the claim Iran and Israel will replicate rational engagement in nuclear diplomacy to avoid nuclear weapons usage. Rational nuclear diplomacy during the Cold War was a key factor in the maintenance of stable nuclear relations. However, with Israel and Iran not satisfying as rational actors, recreating such a nuclear relationship seems unlikely. Therefore, based on Waltzian explanations, relations between Iran and Israel pose a limited chance of becoming a ‘new’ Cold War.

Conclusions

This work was a reaction to Hague’s claim regarding the potential creation of a ‘new’ Cold War, based on Iranian nuclear development. This work has demonstrated nuclear relations between Iran and Israel are unlikely to replicate such a situation experienced between the USA-USSR. This study began by discussing the Waltz versus Sagan nuclear peace debate. The Waltzian approach to a peaceful nuclear relationship took much evidence from the Cold-War, and successfully theorised the superpowers nuclear relations. However, following the theoretical discussion of the Waltzian approach, this study argued that Iran and Israel will not replicate the Cold War nuclear relations. By taking three main points of Waltz’s argument, this study demonstrated how he successfully explains the Cold War nuclear experience, but is not applicable to Iran-Israel nuclear relations, hence suggesting a ‘new’ Cold War will not emerge. Firstly, this study looked at the differing international systems, arguing that the system of bi-polarity that supported a stable nuclear relationship during the Cold War, will not be easily reproduced between Iran and Israel. The international system these two states find themselves in is fundamentally different to the Cold War, affecting the chances of Iran and Israel directly balancing each other. This work discussed the role of the USA, UN, NPT and IAEA as evidence for a changed international system structure, thus greatly reducing the opportunity for a ‘new’ Cold War to occur. Although Waltz found evidence of bi-polar stability within the Cold War context, and successfully used this to explain the stable nuclear relationship, such a system will not be replicable between Iran and Israel. Following this analysis, this work then compared how the nuclear relationship of Iran and Israel was dissimilar to that of the USA and USSR. For Waltz, war is often initiated due to miscalculations and misinterpretations. This did not occur during the Cold War as a result of the direct nuclear relationship the USA and USSR engaged in. This study has argued this has implications for Iran and Israel replicating the Cold War nuclear relations because of the dissimilar proliferation interactions. The USA and USSR nuclear programmes developed as a direct result of each other, locking the programmes together and aiding the creation of Waltz’s stable relationship through the reduction of miscalculation. However, this has not been the case for Iran and Israel. Their nuclear engagement is neither direct nor interlocking, but covert and shrouded with secrecy, resulting in Waltz’s theory not being applicable. The final factor discussed in relation to arguing against Iran and Israel replicating the Cold War nuclear relations, was their ability to recreate the rational nuclear diplomacy experienced between the USA and USSR. The Cold War superpowers were rational actors, allowing them to engage in a nuclear diplomacy, which enabled stability to ensue. However, Iran and Israel struggle to be classified as such rational actors, reducing the prospect of their engagement in a stable nuclear diplomacy, weakening the applicability of Waltz’s nuclear theory to Iran and Israel’s nuclear relations. This work has demonstrated the Waltzian explanations of the nuclear Cold War are not applicable to Iran and Israel, limiting their ability to recreate such stable relations. The international system structure is fundamentally different: the nuclear relationship is not interlocking and directly connected increasing the probability of miscalculation, and the chances of a rational nuclear diplomacy occurring are doubtful. Therefore, based on the Waltzian explanation of the Cold War nuclear relations alone, Iran and Israel provide little evidence in supporting the creation of a ‘new’ Cold War.

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Written by: Cristina Varriale
Written at: University of Southampton
Written for: Darryl Howlett and Tony McKeown
Date written: April 2013