This is a preprint excerpt from Mongolian Independence and the British: Geopolitics and Diplomacy in High Asia, 1911–1916, by Matteo Miele. You can download the book free of charge from E-International Relations.

On September 30, 1914 (September 17 of the Russian calendar) the Russians and Mongols reached an agreement, signed in Kyakhta, on the Russo-Mongolian border, with which Petrograd,^[1] while recognizing the right of the Mongols to build railways on their territory, would negotiate and decide together with Mongolia, the route of a railway with the explicit objective of connecting the Mongolian railway with the Siberian Railway.^[2]

In addition to this, there was the concession given by the Mongolian government to the Central Administration of Posts and Telegraphs of the Russian Empire to build a telegraph line between the Russian settlement of Monda, in Irkut·sk, and the Mongolian center of Uliastay.^[3] For the Russians, the Agreement of September 1914 did not come into conflict with the status of Outer Mongolia defined with the Chinese in 1913, because, as seen previously, Urga was autonomous in terms of internal administration and also in decisions on commercial and industrial matters.^[4] In January 1915, Jordan therefore communicated to Grey the Russian intention to extend the Verkhneudinsk^[5]-Kyakhta Railway project to Urga.^[6] In November 1914, Ch’ing-tao 青島,^[7] a German concession in China,^[8] had fallen, opening new perspectives to Russian trade and industry in the Far East.^[9] In fact, the creation of a Sino-Russo-Japanese society was sought.^[10] Furthermore, the Russian government was also planning the introduction of a silver currency in Mongolia.^[11] The war was favoring the Russian commercial dimension in Mongolia: according to an article published in the Novosti Zhizni of Harbin, in January 1915, due to the decrease in British and German products arriving from the south, about 80% of imports into the country were under Russian control.^[12] Out of 12 million rubles (the total amount of imports into Outer Mongolia, according to the article), 9 million were Russian.^[13] A steamship service was also put into operation on the Kos Gol’ lake^[14] by the Russians, thus facilitating the reach of Uliastay from Irkut·sk (in Russia).^[15]

Meanwhile, the commercial question remained open for the British. In December 1914, the Board of Trade’s response to the July 17 communication^[16] reached the Foreign Office.^[17] In the summer the Foreign Office, as previously seen, had objected to the Board that the mere recognition of Britain’s most favored nation status (as proposed by the Board on July 7, 1914)^[18] would only apply to imported British goods into Mongolia by British subjects, while Grey asked instead for the opinion of the Board on the right to negotiate with the Mongolian government to extend the exemption to all British goods, as recognized by trade treaties with China.^[19] Also in the July communication, the Foreign Office had explained to the Board of Trade that, even in case of tax exemption for the British products in Mongolia, these goods would still carry a disadvantage compared to Russian products entering the Russo-Mongolian land border, due to customs duties and transit fees.^[20]

In its response of December 11, the Board of Trade explained to the Foreign Office that the differences between the two departments were presumably due precisely to the uncertainty of the international status of Outer Mongolia, to be considered an integral part of China – and, therefore in that case it could be expected that British goods in Mongolia would be ‘free from all duty’, because customs duties and transit taxes had already been paid – or autonomous from Peking, and consequently demanded the exemption of all taxes ‘not imposed equally on the goods of any other country (including Russia)’.^[21] In any case,

‘if Sir E. Grey is prepared to claim freedom from all duty for British goods in Mongolia instead of mere most-favoured-nation treatment the Board are not disposed to offer any objection to this course.^[22]

A few days later, on December 19, the Foreign Office reiterated Grey’s position to the India Office and, given the communication by the Board of Trade, they sought the approval of the secretary of state for India to communicate to Buchanan, in Petrograd, to inform the Russian Government of London’s position to exempt products from further taxes in Mongolia, regardless of the seller’s nationality.^[23] Crewe-Milnes agreed with Grey, suggesting, however, to the secretary of state for Foreign Affairs, on January 26, 1915, in case of Russian resistance, that the Foreign Office negotiate the matter directly with the Chinese government which, having recognized, with the Sino-Russian Declaration of November 5, 1913, Mongolia’s fiscal autonomy could not now claim to obtain ‘the same benefit from the external trade of that country as when it still formed, for fiscal purposes, an integral part of the Chinese Empire’.^[24] These instructions were sent to Buchanan on February 5.^[25]

Meanwhile, however, in January, a communication from Buchanan to Grey informed the latter of the imminent birth of a National Bank of Mongolia.^[26] The Russian presence in Mongolia was further strengthened. The bank, whose creation had been approved by the tsar’s finance minister, had a capital of one million rubles and was created ‘by a financial group in which the Siberian-Commercial Bank is largely interested’.^[27] The headquarters were in Petrograd, with branches in Urga, Uliastay and Hovd.^[28] The Mongolian government was guaranteed 15 percent of the bank’s annual net profits, as well as the possibility of buying the bank fifty years after its opening, i.e. starting from January 14, 1915 (January 1 of the Russian calendar).^[29]

On February 20, Buchanan spoke with Sazonov again on the trade question, explaining the position of the British government, but without great results, if not the guarantee given by the Russian minister to examine the aide-mémoire that the ambassador had left him.^[30] Again, Sazonov had simply suggested the possibility of bringing British products to Mongolia via Russia.^[31]

The 1915 agreement

As explained above, in the pages dedicated to the Sino-Russian Declaration of November (October) 1913, the Russians and Chinese had however planned a new meeting that should further clarify the aspects of the agreement. Above all, however, the Mongols should also be involved in the new meeting. The agreement was reached on June 7, 1915, again in Kyakhta, where Russians, Mongols and Chinese signed a new treaty of twenty-two articles by which Outer Mongolia recognized the agreements of 1913 between the Russian Empire and the Republic of China, that is the Chinese suzerainty over Outer Mongolia, while Peking and Petrograd recognized Mongolian autonomy (Article 2).^[32] Mongolia thus formally recognized the Sino-Russian Declaration of 1913 (Article 1):

La Mongolie extérieure reconnaît la déclaration russo-chinoise et les notes échangées entre la Russie et la Chine le 23 octobre, 1913 (5ᵉ jour, 11ᵉ mois, de la 2ᵉ année de la République chinoise).

This was the extension of Outer Mongolia (according to Article 11):

Conformément à l’article 4 des notes échangées entre la Russie et la Chine le 23 octobre, 1913 (le 5ᵉ jour du 11ᵉ mois de la 2ᵉ année de la République chinoise) le territoire de la Mongolie extérieure autonome comprend les régions qui ont été sous la juridiction de l’amban chinois d’Ourga, du général tartare d’Ouliassoutai et de l’amban chinois de Kobdo, et touche aux confins de la Chine par les limites des khochounes des quatre aimaks de Khalkha et du district de Kobdo, limitrophes du district de Houloun-bouir^[33] à l’est, de la Mongolie intérieure au sud, de la province de Sinkiang au sud-ouest et du district de l’Altai à l’ouest.

The same article then specified that the precise borders between Outer Mongolia and China had to be defined by a Sino-Russo-Mongolian commission:

La délimitation formelle entre la Chine et la Mongolie extérieure autonome sera effectuée par une commission spéciale de délégués de la Russie, de la Chine et de la Mongolie extérieure autonome, qui se mettra aux travaux de délimitation dans un délai de deux ans du jour de la signature du présent accord.

The country could not conclude international treaties on political and territorial issues (Article 3), but it had total autonomy for commercial and industrial agreements with other countries, as well as, of course, in internal administration (Article 5), while the Republic of China had the right to confer ‘[l]e titre Bogdo Djembzoun Damba Khoutoukhtou Khan’ (Article 4). The Chinese dignitary in Urga could have an escort of no more than two hundred men, while no more than fifty men would be assigned to each of his assistants in the other Mongolian cities, at the time Uliastay, Hovd and the Mongolian side of Kyakhta (Article 7). The Russian consular guard in Urga, on the other hand, was not to exceed one hundred and fifty men, while the limit was set at fifty for the men placed to defend the other consulates or vice-consulates of Petrograd in Mongolia (Article 8). The commercial aspects were regulated by Article 12 as follows:

Il est entendu que des droits de douanes ne sont pas établis pour les marchandises de quelque provenance qu’elles soient importées par les marchands chinois dans la Mongolie extérieure autonome. Néanmoins, les marchands chinois payeront toutes les taxes de commerce intérieures qui sont établies dans la Mongolie extérieure autonome et qui pourront y être établies dans l’avenir, payables par les Mongols de la Mongolie extérieure autonome. De même, les marchands de la Mongolie extérieure autonome important toute espèce de marchandises de provenance locale dans la Chine intérieure payeront toutes les taxes de commerce qui sont établies dans la Chine intérieure et pourront y être établies dans l’avenir payables par les marchands chinois. Les marchandises de provenance étrangère importées du côté de la Mongolie extérieure autonome dans la Chine intérieure seront frappées des droits de douanes stipulés par le règlement pour le commerce par voie de terre de 1881 (de la septième année du règne Kuanghsui).

Two days after the signing of the agreement, on June 9 (May 27 according to the Russian calendar) Sazonov communicated to Buchanan in a verbal note that, precisely on the basis of Article 12 of the agreement, ‘il n’y aura pas de douanes sur la frontière de la Mongolie autonome et de la Chine propre’ and that, therefore, the Chinese merchants would only pay the internal Mongolian taxes.^[34] Furthermore, this was the interpretation of the Russian government:

Le Gouvernement russe interprète cette stipulation dans les sens que les marchandises étrangères importées en Chine par voie de mer et ayant acquitté les tarifs de douane et de transit pourront comme auparavant pénétrer en Mongolie sans être frappées d’autres taxes, c’est-à-dire que ces marchandises seront traitées en Mongolie tout comme dans les autres provinces de la Chine.^[35]

The Russian government thus hoped to have fulfilled British demands for trade in Outer Mongolia.^[36] Indeed, for Sir Edward Grey, based on that interpretation of Article 12 of the Kyakhta Tripartite Agreement, London’s claims on British goods imported into Mongolia by Chinese merchants were upheld.^[37] However, for the secretary of state for Foreign Affairs, that was not necessarily the outcome of Article 12, because the Mongolian government retained the right to impose unfavorable taxation on goods imported by Chinese merchants.^[38] For Grey, the approval of the Mongolian government was required with respect to the Russian interpretation of Article 12.^[39] The Foreign Office also required that the status of most favored nation, implicitly recognized by the Russian government in two notes of May 1914, was also formally recognized by the Mongolian government.^[40] On these two points Grey wished to reach the signing of an agreement between Urga and London.^[41] The Board of Trade agreed with the line suggested by the secretary of state for Foreign Affairs, but also asked for clarification in communications with the Russian government that the exemption on customs duties should also cover goods produced in British factories in China and not just foreign goods imported into China by sea.^[42] Even according to the ambassador to Peking, Jordan, in his letter addressed to Grey and dated November 8, 1915, the Sino-Russo-Mongolian Tripartite Agreement did not in itself guarantee British commercial interests in Outer Mongolia, but the diplomat suggested to Grey about being more detailed on the disadvantages of the Kyakhta agreement for British.^[43] Jordan reiterated to the secretary of state for Foreign Affairs that, while it is true that, theoretically for many years, British subjects had enjoyed the treatment of most favored nation, in reality they were at a disadvantage compared to Russian goods which could, as reiterated several times, enter Mongolia by land and without duties.^[44] Therefore, even not having had further taxes in Mongolia in the past still did not compensate for the entry and transit duties.^[45] Jordan continued:

It was of no use in the past to claim from China the privilege of the most favoured nation, because the answer would have been that, on the one hand, all that this privilege would effect would be to allow British merchants to import across the Russian frontier on the same terms as Russian merchants–a valueless concession–and that, on the other hand, Russian goods imported through China proper were already subject to the same taxation as British goods.^[46]

For the ambassador it was not possible to overcome the initial fiscal disadvantage, ‘which is due largely to geographical conditions’, but it was necessary to aim to obtain, for British goods, the same treatment that the goods of the other countries received, or to preserve the situation prior to Urga’s autonomy.^[47] Jordan also gave a concrete example of the damage:

Prior to 1912 a case of English-made cigarettes sent from Tien-tsin [T’ien-chin 天津] to Urga, after paying import duty (nominally 5 per cent.) at Tien-tsin, paid there an additional half-duty, and was given a certificate exempting it, whether in British or Chinese hands, from all inland charges whatsoever to its destination, including, it may be remarked, any charges that might otherwise have been levied by the taxing station referred to in the Russian Memorandum of the 21st May, 1914, as having been established at Urga in 1911. British goods were thus, in Mongolia, free, like Russian goods, from all internal taxation. After Mongolia became autonomous, the same procedure was followed, and is followed to this day, as regards the issue of transit pass, but the Mongol authorities, refusing to recognise the Chinese pass, now levy on the cigarettes, on arrival at Urga, a destination tax amounting to 10 per cent ad valorem.^[48]

According to Jordan, the tripartite agreement of 1915 would continue to guarantee ‘this extra levy’ to the detriment of British products, often brought to Mongolia by Chinese merchants, with the simple condition of not exceeding the taxation on Mongolian merchants.^[49] Jordan reasonably did not understand the basis of the Russian interpretation of the agreement.^[50] Furthermore, the diplomat complained that he had no possibility of exerting diplomatic pressure on the Mongolian government, as could be done on Peking when illegal taxes were applied to British goods in some provinces (which in any case were also imposed on other foreign merchants).^[51] For the British ambassador, the strangeness of the situation lay precisely in the tripartite agreement, with a Chinese government that issued ‘transit passes’ for Urga, formally part of the Chinese territory, but which at the same time did not control the internal administration of the country.^[52] Jordan proposed two options: the British had to ask Peking to recognize Mongolia as a foreign country, and therefore ask for a refund of the import taxes on goods that entered and then left China, or they had to ask the Mongolian government to recognize the validity of Chinese transit permits in Outer Mongolia and therefore waive further taxes.^[53] The problem with this negotiation, Jordan explained, was that, in return, London had nothing to offer Peking and Urga.^[54] For the British diplomat, the cause of everything was Russia and ‘it seems to me that we are entitled to look to Russia alone to readjust that position’.^[55]

On May 29 of the following year, Grey therefore wrote to Buchanan to communicate to the Russian government precisely the objections to the agreement (and the practical example) made by Jordan.^[56] It had to be explained to Sazonov that the Sino-Russo-Mongol agreement did not guarantee British trade in Mongolia at all:

The agreement, moreover, contains no provision calculated to preserve the facilities, for many years enjoyed by British subjects, for themselves importing goods on the same terms as the most-favoured nation ; nor is it clear whether the exemption from customs duty in Mongolia will, under the terms of article 12, apply to goods manufactured in British factories in China, as well as to goods imported into China by sea.^[57]

Sazonov’s intervention with the Mongol authorities in favor of English trade was therefore requested.^[58] As previously mentioned, however, Grey was well aware of the delicacy of the moment and of the impossibility, given the world conflict, to offend the sensibilities of the allies and left Buchanan to decide the best time to give these communications to the Russian foreign minister.

In view of the somewhat controversial nature of this subject, I would leave it entirely to your Excellency’s discretion to decide upon the favourable moment for presenting the above reply to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.^[59]

1916

On December 12, 1915, Yüan Shih-k’ai had comically tried to restore the Empire, changing the name of the Republic to «Chinese Empire» (中華帝國 Chung-hua ti-kuo).^[60] On January 24, 1916, another agreement was signed in Urga between the Chinese, Mongols and Russians, which transferred the Haalgan-Urga-Kyakhta telegraph line to the Mongolian government.^[61] According to George Ernest Morrison it was a very bad agreement for the Chinese, but they had renounced everything in order to have the recognition, in the text, of the first year of Hung-hsien 洪憲 – that was the emperor’s name of Yüan Shih-k’ai – considering the acceptance of that date by Russia equivalent to the approval of the Empire:

China has signed many disastrous agreements since then [since the Revolution]. Her telegraph agreements seem to be specially injurious. On January 24th she signed a Telegraph Convention at Urga, the only advantage of which, but a very great one in the opinion of the Ministry at the time, was the absurd one that the Convention was signed in the first year of Hung Hsien. In order to obtain the date inserted in this way, China was prepared to give away any advantage demanded of her. She thought that by having the Hung Hsien date inserted it meant the thin edge of the wedge, the tacit approval of Russia to the Empire, and the first step towards recognition. ^[62]

Meanwhile, on January 27, 1916, the British political officer in Sikkim communicated to the Government of India the presence in Tibet of a Buddhist Kalmyk, a certain ‘Khrumche Olienob’.^[63] He had left Rgyal-rtse on January 11, together with a friend, ‘Jambel’ (’Jam dpal) and a monk from the monastery of Bras-spungs on his way to Russia, passing through China.^[64] He had with him a passport issued in Kyakhta on February 10, 1915 and a ‘letter from some eminent lama authorising him for religious reasons to visit Dalai Lama’, but the real purpose of his trip was not known to the political officer.^[65] According to the trade agent in Rgyal-rtse, David Macdonald (who first broke the news to the agent in Sikkim), the Kalmyk was a friend of aeDorzhiyev.^[66] ‘Khrumche Olienob’ had also visited the paṇ-chen bla-ma in Gzhis-ka-rtse.^[67]

The opportunity to send a British agent to Lhasa, as decided in the Simla Convention, arose in the early spring of 1916. The Tibetans, in fact, in the framework of the program of modernization of the country and of the army set up by the thirteenth dalai lama, intended to buy machine guns from Japan through the Japanese consul in Calcutta; the Tibetan ministers had written to the political agent in Sikkim that they would in fact send a delegation to Calcutta, but if it was not possible to buy these weapons there, they would go straight to Japan.^[68] Tibetans had obtained assurances regarding the sale through the consul in Calcutta from Aoki Bunkyō^[69] (1886-1956), a Japanese monk who studied in the Tibetan capital between 1913 and 1916.^[70]

There were three options for the Government of India, ‘all of which appear objectionable’: the British could supply the Tibetans with weapons, thus avoiding the Japanese (however recognizing ‘a practical difficulty, viz., that we have no machine guns which we could spare’); they could explain to the Tibetans that it was not possible to allow machine guns purchased in Japan to pass through Indian territory, ‘though we hope later on to provide a few ourselves’; the third option was authorizing the Tibetans to do what they required.^[71]

However, according to Austen Chamberlain, who had succeeded Crewe-Milnes as secretary of state for the India Office on May 27, 1915,^[72] the issue could not be dealt with in writing: it was necessary to send someone to the Tibetan capital to discuss and convince the Tibetan government to renounce.^[73] On the basis of the agreements made with Russia and extensively analyzed previously, the consent of the Russian government was needed, but, as far as Chamberlain knew, the Russians had significantly decreased their interest in Tibet after the start of the war and also the Russians were ‘probably, on general grounds, no less mistrustful than His Majesty’s Government of Japanese activities in outlying portions of the Chinese Empire’.^[74] Based on this reasoning, according to the India Office, ‘[i]t would seem possible, therefore, that, if the special circumstances of the case and the purely temporary nature of the action contemplated were fully explained to them’, the Russians would have no reason to prevent the sending of a British agent to Lhasa.^[75]

Alternatively, the British could write to the Tibetan government, and if it was not possible to convince the ministers of the dalai lama to renounce the purchase, then they had to communicate directly to Japan, in any case a British ally, about the impossibility to allow a passage in India to Japanese machine guns.^[76] However, Edward Grey, while agreeing on the problems highlighted by the Government of India and the India Office, did not want to open new questions with the governments of Petrograd or Tokyo at that delicate moment, or risk offending the Japanese.^[77] Instead of sending the British agent to Lhasa, a written communication from Charles Bell to the Tibetan government was preferable for Grey.^[78] In any case, if the First World War was redefining certain interests in High Asia, no less so were the Russian Revolutions of 1917, in particular, of course, the October Revolution. The results of the Bolshevik Revolution had, in the following years and decades, direct effects on the political institutions of High, East and Southeast Asia, as well as in the rest of the world, both by contrast and by imitation. The conditions were created for new confrontations and conflicts while the ideology veiled but did not eradicate the geopolitical aspects: regardless of Marx, Lenin or Mao Tse-tung, the Himālaya remained (and still remains) the Roof of the World.

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^[1] This is the name assumed by the Russian capital in the summer of 1914.

^[2] TNA, FO 535/17, Enclosure in No. 256, Agreement respecting Railway Construction in Mongolia, p. 292.

^[3] TNA, FO 535/17, Enclosure in No. 257, Telegraph Concessions in Mongolia, p. 293.

^[4] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 3, Mr. Macleay to Sir Edward Grey, December 10, 1914, p. 2.

^[5] Ulaan Üde (in Russian: Ulan Ud·e) is the current capital of the Republic of Buryatia (Russia).

^[6] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 8, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, Peking, January 11, 1915, p. 5; TNA, FO 535/18, Enclosure 1 in No. 8, Extract from the “Harbinski Viestnik” of December 14 (27), 1914, p. 5; TNA, FO 535/18, Enclosure 2 in No. 8, Construction of the Verkhneudinsk-Urga Railway, Extract from the “Novosti Zizni” of December 16 (29), 1914, p. 6.

^[7] Ch’ing-tao 青島 is better known in the West with the transcription of the postal romanization system (郵政式拼音 yu-cheng-shih p’in-yin): Tsingtao.

^[8] On the concession see J. E. SCHRECKER, Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism: Germany in Shantung, Cambridge, MA 1971.

^[9] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 8, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, Peking, January 11, 1915, p. 5; TNA, FO 535/18, Enclosure 2 in No. 8, Construction of the Verkhneudinsk-Urga Railway, Extract from the “Novosti Zizni” of December 16 (29), 1914, p. 6.

^[10] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 8, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, Peking, January 11, 1915, p. 5; TNA, FO 535/18, Enclosure 2 in No. 8, Construction of the Verkhneudinsk-Urga Railway, Extract from the “Novosti Zizni” of December 16 (29), 1914, p. 6.

^[11] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 8, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, Peking, January 11, 1915, p. 5.

^[12] TNA, FO 535/18, Enclosure in No. 12, Russian Affairs in Mongolia, Extract from “Novosti Zizni” of January 4 (17), 1915, p. 9.

^[13] TNA, FO 535/18, Enclosure in No. 12, Russian Affairs in Mongolia, Extract from “Novosti Zizni” of January 4 (17), 1915, p. 9.

^[14] In Mongolian: Khövsgöl nuur. The word nuur means ‘lake’ in Mongolian.

^[15] TNA, FO 535/18, Enclosure in No. 12, Russian Affairs in Mongolia, Extract from “Novosti Zizni” of January 4 (17), 1915, p. 9.

^[16] TNA, FO 535/17, No. 218, Foreign Office to Board of Trade, July 17, 1914, p. 218.

^[17] TNA, FO 535/17, No. 259, Board of Trade to Foreign Office, December 11, 1914, p. 294.

^[18] TNA, FO 535/17, No. 202, Board of Trade to Foreign Office, July 7, 1914, p. 199.

^[19] TNA, FO 535/17, No. 218, Foreign Office to Board of Trade, July 17, 1914, p. 218.

^[20] TNA, FO 535/17, No. 218, Foreign Office to Board of Trade, July 17, 1914, p. 218.

^[21] TNA, FO 535/17, No. 259, Board of Trade to Foreign Office, December 11, 1914, p. 294.

^[22] TNA, FO 535/17, No. 259, Board of Trade to Foreign Office, December 11, 1914, p. 294.

^[23] TNA, FO 535/17, No. 260, Foreign Office to India Office, December 19, 1914, pp. 294-295.

^[24] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 4, India Office to Foreign Office, January 26, 1915, pp. 2-3.

^[25] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 6, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, February 5, 1915, pp. 3-4.

^[26] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 5, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, January 13, 1915, p. 3; TNA, FO 535/18, Enclosure in No. 5, Memorandum respecting National Bank of Mongolia, January 13, 1915, p. 3. The source is the Russian official Trade Gazette.

^[27] TNA, FO 535/18, Enclosure in No. 5, Memorandum respecting National Bank of Mongolia, January 13, 1915, p. 3.

^[28] TNA, FO 535/18, Enclosure in No. 5, Memorandum respecting National Bank of Mongolia, January 13, 1915, p. 3.

^[29] TNA, FO 535/18, Enclosure in No. 5, Memorandum respecting National Bank of Mongolia, January 13, 1915, p. 3.

^[30] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 11, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, February 20, 1915, pp. 8-9.

^[31] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 11, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, February 20, 1915, p. 8.

^[32] The full text of the treaty in French is in TNA, FO 535/18, Enclosure in No. 30, Treaty signed at Kiatkta, June 7, 1915, pp. 40-43; TNA, FO 535/18, No. 21, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, June 7, 1915, p. 34.

^[33] In Mongolian: Hölönbuyr. In Chinese: Hu-lun-pei-erh 呼倫貝爾.

^[34] TNA, FO 535/18, Enclosure in No. 28, Note verbale, le 27 mai (9 juin), 1915, p. 38.

^[35] TNA, FO 535/18, Enclosure in No. 28, Note verbale, le 27 mai (9 juin), 1915, p. 38.

^[36] TNA, FO 535/18, Enclosure in No. 28, Note verbale, le 27 mai (9 juin), 1915, p. 38.

^[37] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 34, Foreign Office to India Office. (Also to Board of Trade, mutatis mutandis), July 23, 1915, p. 45.

^[38] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 34, Foreign Office to India Office. (Also to Board of Trade, mutatis mutandis), July 23, 1915, p. 45.

^[39] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 34, Foreign Office to India Office. (Also to Board of Trade, mutatis mutandis), July 23, 1915, p. 45.

^[40] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 34, Foreign Office to India Office. (Also to Board of Trade, mutatis mutandis), July 23, 1915, p. 45.

^[41] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 34, Foreign Office to India Office. (Also to Board of Trade, mutatis mutandis), July 23, 1915, p. 45.

^[42] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 38, Board of Trade to Foreign Office, September 10, 1915, pp. 46-47.

^[43] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 54, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, November 8, 1915, p. 63.

^[44] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 54, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, November 8, 1915, p. 63.

^[45] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 54, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, November 8, 1915, p. 63.

^[46] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 54, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, November 8, 1915, pp. 63-64.

^[47] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 54, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, November 8, 1915, p. 64.

^[48] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 54, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, November 8, 1915, p. 64.

^[49] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 54, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, November 8, 1915, p. 64.

^[50] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 54, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, November 8, 1915, p. 64.

^[51] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 54, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, November 8, 1915, p. 64.

^[52] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 54, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, November 8, 1915, p. 64.

^[53] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 54, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, November 8, 1915, p. 64.

^[54] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 54, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, November 8, 1915, p. 64.

^[55] TNA, FO 535/18, No. 54, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, November 8, 1915, p. 64.

^[56] TNA, FO 535/19, No. 8, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, May 29, 1916, p. 7.

^[57] TNA, FO 535/19, No. 8, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, May 29, 1916, p. 7.

^[58] TNA, FO 535/19, No. 8, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, May 29, 1916, pp. 7-8.

^[59] TNA, FO 535/19, No. 8, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, May 29, 1916, p. 8.

^[60] P’ENG TSE-CHOU 彭澤周, Chin tai Chung kuo chih ke ming yü Jih pen 近代中國之革命與日本, T’ai pei 臺北 78 [1989], p. 171.

^[61] TNA, FO 535/19, No. 2, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, February 23, 1916, p. 3; the full text of the agreement is in Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 1894-1919, Vol. II: Republican Period (1912-1919), compiled and edited by J. V. A. MacMurray, New York 1921, pp. 1259-1265.

^[62] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 809, G. E. Morrison to F. E. Taylor, March 31, 1916, p. 504.

^[63] TNA, FO 535/19, Enclosure in No. 3, Political Officer, Sikkim, to the Government of India, January 27, 1916, p. 4. The communication was forwarded by the India Office to the Foreign Office on March 18, TNA, FO 535/19, No. 3, India Office to Foreign Office, March 18, 1916, p. 3.

^[64] TNA, FO 535/19, Enclosure in No. 3, Political Officer, Sikkim, to the Government of India, January 27, 1916, p. 4.

^[65] TNA, FO 535/19, Enclosure in No. 3, Political Officer, Sikkim, to the Government of India, January 27, 1916, p. 4.

^[66] TNA, FO 535/19, Enclosure in No. 3, Political Officer, Sikkim, to the Government of India, January 27, 1916, p. 4.

^[67] TNA, FO 535/19, Enclosure in No. 3, Political Officer, Sikkim, to the Government of India, January 27, 1916, p. 4.

^[68] TNA, FO 535/19, Enclosure in No. 4, Government of India to Mr. A. Chamberlain, March 24, 1916, p. 5.

^[69] TNA, FO 535/19, Enclosure in No. 4, Government of India to Mr. A. Chamberlain, March 24, 1916, p. 5.

^[70] See R. KOBAYASHI, The Tibet-Japan Relations in the Era of the 1911 Revolution: Tibetan Letters from the Aoki Bunkyō Archive, in: チベット・ヒマラヤ文明の歴史的展開 The Historical Development of Tibeto-Himalayan Civilization, edited by Iwao Kazushi 岩尾一史 and Ikeda Takumi 池田巧編, Kyōto 京都 2018, p. 103.

^[71] TNA, FO 535/19, Enclosure in No. 4, Government of India to Mr. A. Chamberlain, March 24, 1916, p. 5.

^[72] The India Office List for 1928, compiled from official records by direction of the Secretary of State for India in Council, London 1928, p. 118.

^[73] TNA, FO 535/19, No. 4, India Office to Foreign Office, March 31, 1916, p. 4.

^[74] TNA, FO 535/19, No. 4, India Office to Foreign Office, March 31, 1916, p. 4.

^[75] TNA, FO 535/19, No. 4, India Office to Foreign Office, March 31, 1916, p. 4.

^[76] TNA, FO 535/19, No. 4, India Office to Foreign Office, March 31, 1916, p. 4.

^[77] TNA, FO 535/19, No. 5, Foreign Office to India Office, April 7, 1916, p. 5.

^[78] TNA, FO 535/19, No. 5, Foreign Office to India Office, April 7, 1916, p. 5.

Further Reading on E-International Relations

• New Book – Mongolian Independence and the British: Geopolitics and Diplomacy in High Asia, 1911–1916
• Mongolian Independence and the British: The Chinese Backdown
• Mongolian Independence and the British: The Parallel Negotiation
• Mongolian Independence and the British: Twentieth-Century Geopolitical Notes
• Mongolian Independence and the British: At the End of the Great Game
• The End of the Manchu Dynasty and Tibetan Independence