In attempting to determine whether the most recent economic crisis or that of 1998 is more damaging for the Russian economy it is important to acknowledge, preliminarily, that these two crises are different. The international economic, political and strategic contexts in which they occurred were different; the origins were different; the triggers were different; the indirect victims are different; and, most importantly for this analysis, the recoveries were and will be different.
There is an incompatibility between the purpose and mode of Middle Eastern economic development to date and the fraught efforts towards forms of democracy across the region. Additionally, the importance of certain economic developments to specific actors has successfully outweighed the importance of democracy in the region, and will persist in doing so for the foreseeable future.
The concept of security is changing. The critical approaches that have emerged to challenge traditional ones in recent decades have earned significant support. A definitive characteristic that binds these critical security schools is their rejection of realism. In security language, critical approaches agree that the state does not deserve the privilege of being the solitary referent object of security studies.
The role of the European powers was crucial in the making of the Middle East system not only because they were responsible for the incongruence of land partition after the Ottoman Empire and its consequent conflicts, but also because they established very important starting points for many trans-national phenomena by aiming to incorporate the area to the global capitalist system.
This essay is concerned with possible Chinese motives for accepting, responding to, and reciprocating American overtures and relatively friendly diplomatic moves in the early 1970s. It suggests that strategic understandings of motives carry the greatest weight and the more persuasive argument.
This essay suggests that ‘Europe’ cannot be primarily identified in terms of shared histories, cultures, or even geographies. Consequently, attempts to define the EU supranational paradigm as a teleological institution have failed, no European grand narrative of ‘unity in history’ (or culture, or religion) exists, nor can it exist.
The strategy of the MST meets numerous challenges from within and outside of the movement. This essay will argue that those challenges are obstacles to its success in the fields of social transformation and political change. Therefore it is questionable if the movement’s strategy for social change has a future in Brazil or if it has reproducible strategy in other national contexts.
There is widespread acknowledgement that Putin’s federal reforms have had considerable success in subordinating regional authorities to the will of central government. And undoubtedly, Putin believed that such reforms were a necessary aspect of reigning in the “emotionalism” and resultant chaos of the Yeltsin years.
Neopatrimonialism is the foundation stone for the system which drives African politics. Because it is social accepted, neopatrimonial politics have managed to permeate all political levels, affecting the distribution of resources and distorting development plans and diverting aid funds to ensure the survival of the system.
Chinese nuclear policy serves their grand strategy aimed at maintaining a calm international strategic environment. China’s nuclear policy is inherently defensive and, excluding proliferation concerns, practically benign. However, one should remember that this does not mean it isn’t based on self-interest.
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