Fragments of the Afghan Frontier combines painstaking anthropological field research with extensive historical analysis to assess Afghanistan’s frontier regions and people.
Drones will be part of the future of warfare as their advantages can be exploited by political leaders. Yet, drones are only part of a wide array of surveillance and military options.
Memogate reveals that Pakistan’s politics is as dysfunctional as ever. American policymakers and pundits have become so vehement about Pakistan’s failure to cooperate on counterterrorism that more pressing problems in the country have been overlooked.
Considering China’s unease with a large foreign military presence on its borders, one would expect the U.S. drawdown of military forces in Afghanistan to be welcomed in Beijing and result in greater U.S.-China cooperation on Afghanistan. However, the U.S. and China have different goals and timetables regarding this conflict, which pose challenges to their bilateral relationship.
Using an approach that is as much anthropological as it is historical or political, Anatol Lieven’s ‘Pakistan: A Hard Country’ provides a more intimate portrait of the country than other recent publications. It also lends a fresh perspective on a country that is often misunderstood by Western observers. The book’s central message is that Pakistan is cohesive and dysfunctional all at once.
CIA director Leon Panetta is currently engaged in talks in Islamabad, arriving the day after the head of the Pakistani Army, attempted to win back some respect from the Pakistani population by urging the US to divert some of its $3 billion a year aid to ‘help the common man’ while also forcefully re-asserting Pakistan’s sovereignty. These concerns would be heartening if they were not so transparent.
Effective political and legal institutions; economic stimulation; and a fully functioning and strong army and police force are goals that for the most part can only be realised once conflict has subsided; which in turn requires a political solution. However, the groundwork for this has to be prepared while the Coalition forces are still in Afghanistan.
The death of Osama bin Laden is far more important for the United States than it is for Islamic terrorism. While the shooting of Al Qaeda’s leader will certainly damage the morale of would-be jihadists around the world, the most significant impact will be at home.
NATO’s lack of success to date in Afghanistan can be attributed to four factors: the reluctance to make difficult choices in state-building, the failure to confront Islam, the failure to confront Kabul, and the influence of China. While NATO may still eventually win, it will have been at tremendous cost and time, and Afghanistan will have posed a great opportunity cost for other NATO objectives.
One of the enduring features of Western strategic thinking over the past half-century has been to immediately write off one’s less powerful enemy, if the latter has been militarily overpowered. As the history of contemporary warfare suggests, very often this approach is couched on the realist thinking that a vanquished enemy is incapable of making a comeback.
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