Sun Tzu has much to tell us about how wars are and should be fought today, while Clausewitz’ contribution to the discussion of contemporary conflicts is more limited.
How can we set limits to state sovereignty and power without lapsing into a form of utopianism, directed towards an end point, that entails the paternalistic and imperialistic policies of cosmopolitanism?
There is no strategic theory that can, yet, fully replace the classical strategists Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. The information age and modern technology have not altered the fundamental nature of war. As long as the nature of war remains unchanged, it is the same phenomenon that Sun Tzu contemplated millennia ago and that Clausewitz studied in the nineteenth century.
Despite Kofi Annan’s warning that ‘the United Nations is passing through the gravest crisis of its existence’ and a burst of diplomatic activity at the World Summit in 2005, reform of the UNSC has not been easy to achieve. This essay will explore the reasons behind the impasse as well as briefly considering possible alternatives. It will critically analyse the notion that failure to reform represents a ‘crisis’ at the UN.
IN 1992, Milton Friedman asked: “how many more fiascos will it take before responsible people are finally convinced that a system of pegged exchange rates is not a satisfactory financial arrangement for a group of large countries with independent political systems and independent national policies?” Maybe the Greek debt crisis is the fiasco.
Actor-based and context-based analyses of spoiler problems in peace processes should not be construed as two distinctive, divergent models but rather as complementary and mutually reinforcing.
The Arab Spring has reinvigorated the appeal of democracy, and has shown that America does not need to drive transitions to democracy.
With torture reportedly rife, tens of thousands of Libyans in early graves, and a government instilled that could be as bad as the last, the people of Libya are far from protected.
Lyndon Johnson’s decision to “Americanize” the Vietnam war resulted in failure. Popular thought seems to suggest that his inability to judge the situation in South East Asia caused America to suffer the biggest military embarrassment in its history to date. However, a closer look at the facts, suggest that the blame should be shared with his predecessors, in particular Ike Eisenhower.
American aversion to counterinsurgency is deeply ingrained in the American way of warfare. Since the 1940s the US Army has trained, equipped, and organised for large-scale conventional operations against like adversaries. They have traditionally employed conventional military operations even against irregular enemies. I hope to show that America’s conventional supremacy and in particular their approach to war may prove to be counterproductive in this new century of small wars.
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