In addressing John Redwood’s claims about the European Union and the process of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, I will not dwell on the rank hypocrisy that characterizes much, if not most, British political debate on the latter issue. Suffice to say that it suffuses all three major parties. Rather, in considering what passes for the substance of Redwood’s critique, we must navigate a bewildering mélange of half truth and innuendo.
This essay contends that states will continue to hold the upper hand over NGOs because the international system remains the preserve of nation-states, and nation-states remain the most adequate guarantor of human security. To be sure, the 1990s alliance between NGOs and international institutions ‘was never more than a minor affair with a minor mistress.’ When stakes are high, ultimate power in the international system resides with states.
Historically, the Arctic has held a definitive place in global politics. This history, however, is one defined and written about far from the Arctic itself. The narrative includes endless tales of national exploration and its centre stage military role during the Cold War. As such the Arctic has always provided a tell tale sign of all things political. The present-day is no exception.
The whole process of the Lisbon Treaty’s ratification over recent weeks, both here and abroad, has revealed just how undemocratic a construct the EU project has become. In France the Treaty has now been rushed through without another referendum, despite clearly expressed hostility towards the Constitution, in order to avoid […]
In the shift from a Fordist to a post-Fordist international economic system, neo-Schumpeterian theorists have come to anticipate a “hollowing out” of the state, in which sovereignty is displaced ‘upward, downward, and, to some extent, outward.’ In this transition, subnational entities are afforded an increasing prominence on the international stage; no longer simply an extension of the Keynesian welfare state, tasked with ‘offloading fiscal demands from national state treasuries’, but ‘important partners in promoting exports and attracting foreign direct investment.’
Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, over 100 major conflicts around the world have left some 20 million dead’[1]. In An Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali set out visions for preventive diplomacy and strategies to strengthen the United Nations’ (UN) capacity to maintain the peace. The collapse of Cold War bipolarity has seen a surge in demand for UN involvement. The UN has cast its net wide, beyond narrow conceptions of collective security, into human rights, environmental politics and human security. The response from the Security Council, General Assembly and member states to An Agenda for Peace was cautiously optimistic; the rhetoric, asserts Chesterman, ‘was euphoric, utopian, and short’.
Nearly half a century separate Cardinal Richelieu and Francesco Guicciardini but the parallels between the two men betray the similarities in their understanding of power politics and theories of negotiation. Richelieu may have operated outside the Renaissance and Guicciardini from its Florentine apex, but both were influenced by the developing political theories of early modern Europe and the realist raison d’ état of Machiavelli; Guicciardini counted Machiavelli as a friend, and Richelieu was his intellectual descendent – the first politician to prosecute state national interest above notions of medieval universal Christian morality.
Lyndon Johnson’s decision to “Americanize” the Vietnam war resulted in failure. Popular thought seems to suggest that his inability to judge the situation in South East Asia caused America to suffer the biggest military embarrassment in its history to date. However, a closer look at the facts, suggest that the blame should be shared with his predecessors, in particular Ike Eisenhower.
With Trident up for renewal and the replacement looking more than likely to be of United States origin, the ‘poodle’ theory seems unlikely to be dismissed. But is it fair to argue that, in acquiring a replacement for Trident from the United States, Britain’s role as America’s ‘poodle’ will be perpetuated or should Britain look to move from the role of loyal chorus to that of candid friend?
For those that lived through the Cold War, nuclear weapons are synonymous with the superpower rivalry of the USA and USSR. Although never used, they were central to the conflict. Now, in the post-Cold War environment, this rivalry has been removed and the question of the utility of nuclear weapons is being reviewed.
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