Arguably, the most significant fact in international relations at the beginning of the 21st Century is the gradual emergence of China as a regional and global power, and the relative decline of what can be loosely termed the ‘status quo powers’ and their most powerful member, the US. A number of mini-crises in the South China Sea this year, are sparking concern about China’s rise and the potential for Sino-US conflict.
Recent mutterings in the western corridors of power for an intervention in Libya are now being translated into a potential reality. Although the Iranian opposition symbolically attempts to distant itself from the outside, the regime knows that a military intervention in Libya could have serious implications for the regime in Tehran.
NATO’s lack of success to date in Afghanistan can be attributed to four factors: the reluctance to make difficult choices in state-building, the failure to confront Islam, the failure to confront Kabul, and the influence of China. While NATO may still eventually win, it will have been at tremendous cost and time, and Afghanistan will have posed a great opportunity cost for other NATO objectives.
The accident in Japan may not prove to be as serious as that at Chernobyl in 1986, in that its direct radiological impacts will not be felt across such a wide area, but its political and economic effects could well be just as significant. The tragedy may shift priorities towards renewable energy. If so, the painful lesson that we can’t rely on nuclear technology may not have been in vain. After all, if technologically advanced Japan can’t handle nuclear power safely, who can?
When security forces, meant to protect people, are instead let loose in a killing spree, the state itself becomes the prime perpetrator of atrocities. With precisely such an unfolding scenario, Libya today is the place and time to redeem or renege on R2P’s solemn pledge.
In January 2011 the South Sudanese voted overwhelmingly for independence from Sudan. Over 98% of registered voters chose separation over unity. Much of the Western media has portrayed this vote as an indicator of a successful end to decades of conflict in the South. When South Sudan celebrates its independence, expected to take place in July 2011, the mood will indeed be jovial. But South Sudan is setting up to be a failed state.
The enduring mismatch between the US and Chinese fleets is no guarantee of an equally lasting US naval supremacy in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Beijing is pursuing imaginative antiship missile technology. If rocketeers stationed ashore can keep the US Navy out of important waters, the Chinese Navy can accomplish its goals, even with an inferior fleet.
The EU could impose its model of functioning on the rest of the world, especially through its former colonies, in a quiet, latent, and cooperative manner. That historical basis, actually encompasses the imperial, colonial past of the old European states, and undoubtedly legitimizes the EU’s process of influencing the world.
Winner-takes-all multiparty democracy is not appropriate for Africa’s nation-states. Much of Africa today is under the control of “Vampire states”. It has become a pattern: a sitting president reluctantly holds an election; deludes himself into thinking he will win; no one would dare tell him he might lose.
There is an intense sense of Sisyphean angst concerning the challenges facing Southern Sudan. With a reasonably fertile land, a young population, and plentiful resources Southern Sudan has the raw materials to build a successful nation, but only if it receives the support it requires.
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