Why does my heart sink when I hear the current UN-mandated action in Libya described as “humanitarian intervention”? After all, over the last 20 years the term has acquired currency — not only among Western politicians but also academics — as a description of coercive, usually military, intervention ostensibly for humanitarian purposes.
Because of the deep mutual mistrust from both sides, especially the US concern over China’s military build-up, friction and cooperation will coexist in the development of the China-US naval relationship. Only when political mutual trust reaches a high level, can the military relationship stride forward beyond the stop and go cycle of the last 30 years.
The key element in shaping the Libyan intervention’s impact will be whether the operation can overcome the recurrent problems humanitarian interventions have been facing in the past two decades. The West’s reluctance toward renewed humanitarian interventions will only be revised if the operation attains its mission objective without becoming entangled in a protracted internal conflict.
While the lessons of the Libyan crisis for international relations are many, the most important lesson is the need to change the way that humanitarian interventions are conducted, as the violence experienced by civilians since the foreign intervention has increased substantially.
The adjectives ‘critical’ and ‘realist’ are habitually presented, in the field of International Relations Theory, as antithetical. But might there have been a misunderstanding among critical theorists with regard to their definition of realism?
The ongoing people’s uprisings in the Arab countries against autocratic rulers have provided Iran with both challenges and opportunities in the Middle East and beyond. Will these momentous events enhance Iran’s foreign policy opportunities, or will they ultimately lead to further isolation and strategic loneliness for Iran?
Although all wars may represent a failure of diplomacy, war is often the last resort of diplomacy. This paradox results from two competing ideas of what the supreme objective of diplomacy should be: peace at any cost, or peace by any means. This is the paradox of Libya. The international military intervention resulted from a mixture of an arguably successful strategy of coercive diplomacy at the UN, and a failure of third-party mediations.
Russia has made a concerted attempt to become an ‘independent regional power’ since the demise of Yeltsin, with limited results in Eastern Europe, but with greater success in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia’s behaviour has been entirely predictable. Nonetheless, as China looks set to challenge Russian power in Central Asia in the future, Russia’s response remains unclear.
The relations within and between the British and Irish islands are now routinely described as never having been better; a description regarded as a cliché. A cliché? Good. It was not so long ago that such a belief would have been dismissed as an attempt at humour.
Within the antagonism between capitalist and communist ideas in the period of the cold war the Sino-US rapprochement appears as a very out of character phenomenon, culminating in the spectacular visit of president Richard Nixon in 1972, as the first president to enter Chinese Communist soil.
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