The development of international institutions is one of the most admirable efforts for the achievement of world peace that the world has ever seen. It possesses many of the qualities of the liberalist ideal, however, it has not fulfilled its aim to make the international community a more peaceful place.
Given how the Security Council has acted with regard to Libya via Resolution 1973, many have queried its failure to act in other situations, such as Bahrain, Yemen and Syria. The lethal responses by the governments of those countries to pro-democracy protests are appalling, but it cannot be said that the crisis in those States has reached the proportions of Libya. After all, humanitarian intervention is war.
Whilst Libya is no doubt important, it is but the tip of the iceberg. In the long run, timely and decisive action such as the international action in Libya will continue to be a recurrent but painful necessity. Yet, we will make most progress towards a world without mass atrocities by reducing the number of cases that become so acute and preventing crises from escalating to the point of imminent catastrophe.
Many international relations commentators are heralding the Western bombing of Libya as marking a return to the 1990s era of humanitarian intervention. The debate is largely over whether this return is to be welcomed or regretted. But a return of the moral or ethical understandings of the humanitarian interventionist 1990s is not a possibility.
The Libyan Crisis is in some respects a turning point in the ‘history’ of the responsibility to protect doctrine (RtoP). The case suggests that the international community is beginning to mobilize against rulers who conquer or purchase statehood to gain impunity.
Although all wars may represent a failure of diplomacy, war is often the last resort of diplomacy. This paradox results from two competing ideas of what the supreme objective of diplomacy should be: peace at any cost, or peace by any means. This is the paradox of Libya. The international military intervention resulted from a mixture of an arguably successful strategy of coercive diplomacy at the UN, and a failure of third-party mediations.
While the lessons of the Libyan crisis for international relations are many, the most important lesson is the need to change the way that humanitarian interventions are conducted, as the violence experienced by civilians since the foreign intervention has increased substantially.
The key element in shaping the Libyan intervention’s impact will be whether the operation can overcome the recurrent problems humanitarian interventions have been facing in the past two decades. The West’s reluctance toward renewed humanitarian interventions will only be revised if the operation attains its mission objective without becoming entangled in a protracted internal conflict.
Because of the deep mutual mistrust from both sides, especially the US concern over China’s military build-up, friction and cooperation will coexist in the development of the China-US naval relationship. Only when political mutual trust reaches a high level, can the military relationship stride forward beyond the stop and go cycle of the last 30 years.
Why does my heart sink when I hear the current UN-mandated action in Libya described as “humanitarian intervention”? After all, over the last 20 years the term has acquired currency — not only among Western politicians but also academics — as a description of coercive, usually military, intervention ostensibly for humanitarian purposes.
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